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Preface. 
The majority of commentators on the early writings of Marx agree that 
a theory of man can be found in these texts. 1 Moreover, there is general 
agreement that Marx' theory of man is developed through polemics with his 
philosophical predecessors, and is especially influenced by his encounters 
with Feuerbach and Hegel. 2 But beyond this point there seems to be slight 
agreement among the commentators. Since the notion of man in Marx' early 
texts is set forth in a polemical context, it is difficult to ascertain 
1 
2 
Cf. For example Adam Schaff, "Marxism and the Philosophy of Mari," 
in Socialist Humanism, edited by Erich Fromm (New York: Double-
day and Co., 1965), p. 142. Also Adam Schaff's Marxism and the 
Human Individual, translated by 0. Wojtasiewick, edited by 
Robert Cohen, (New York: McGraw Hill Inc., 1970), p. 9. 
Other concurring authors include Roger Garaudy, Karl Marx: The 
Evolution of his Thought, translated by Nan Apotheker, (New 
York: International Publishers Co. Inc., 1967), p. 53; Erich 
Fromm, Marx' Concept of Man (New York: Frederick Ungar Publish-
ing Co., 1961), p. v; Sartre, Search For a Method, translated by 
Hazel Barnes, (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), pp. xxxiv-xxxv; 
Shlomo Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 85; Nathan 
Rotenstreich, Basic Problems of Marx' Philosophy, (Indianapolis: 
The Bobbs-Merrill Co. Inc., 1965), p. 46; Pierre Bigo, Marxisme 
et Humanisme, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1954), 
pp. 137-141. 
The major dissenting opinion is offered by Louis Althousser, who 
in his Pour Marx argues that any hints of a notion of man in 
Marx' manuscripts represent a "Feuerbachian" phase of Marx' 
development, and are not genuinely "Mar;ician." Althousser's 
arguments will be considered in the second chapter of my thesis. 
Cf. especially Rotenstreich, Basic Problems of Marx' Philosophy, 
pp. 42-45, in which it is argued that Marx' concept of 'praxis,' 
the central concept in his theory of Man, is developed by Marx 
in the face of Hegel's notion of Spirit. 
i i 
r-··· 
i i i 
just what this notion is, and what its place is within the compass of 
Marx' thought. For the same reason, it is also difficult to determine 
precisely how Marx' theory of man is influenced by his predecessors, 
Feuerbach and Hegel. But it is important to determine clearly the rela-
tion of Marx to Feuerbach and Hegel. For Marx' notion of man is develope 
through his polemics with these of his predecessors. Consequently a clea 
understanding of the relation of Marx' thought to the thought of Feuerbac 
and Hegel is of critical significance in obtaining·a distinct understand-
ing of Marx' theory of man. 
In this thesis, I shall argue that the basic content of Marx' theory 
of man can be derived from a textual analysis of Marx' early manuscripts, 
particularly the "Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. 113 This theor 
functions for Marx as a criterion or norm, entitling him to comment on 
other topics, such as the nature of productive alienation, and the 
condition of the wage laborer. Further, I shall argue that the most 
fundamental concepts of Marx' 'normative' 4 theory of man have a close 
3 
Supporting references will also be made to selected of Marx' 
subsequent works; The German Ideology, The Poverty of Philosophy, Class 
Struggles in France, The Grundrisse of 1857-1858, The Contribution to a 
Critique of Political Economy, and Capital. These references will have a 
obvious bearing on the problem of continuity in Marx' writings. 
4 
In refering to Marx' theory of man as 'normative,' I intend a refer-
ence to the terms 'criterion' and 'norm' as used above. A normative 
theory which operates as a criterion for making judgments on topics not 
directly discussed within the ~ody of the theory itself. 
iv 
affinity with certain aspects of the thought of Hegel. I do not claim 
that Marx is "an Hegelian." Marx' studied Feuerbach seriously, and he is 
sharply critical of Hegel at many points. Nevertheless, I claim that it 
is on certain portions of Hegel's thought that Marx profoundly models his 
theory of man. 
A schema of my argument runs as follows: Chapter One develops the 
content of Marx' theory of man through an analysis of the relevant texts, 
principally though not exlusively the Manuscripts of 1844. 5 In this 
chapter I argue that the three basic categories present in Marx' theory 
of man are productive activity of praxis, 6 society, and consciousness. 
Praxis is first of all productive activity requiring as its object 
soemthing sensuous and external to the individual agent: nature. But the 
object of praxis is here understood as essentially a correlate of praxis. 
Nature is the field or milieu of praxis, and thus needs to be understood 
through its relation to praxis, rather than as a reality fully determined 
in itself. The result of praxis is 'objectification,' since the object 
produced by praxis bears the marks of that agency which produced it. 
'Objectification,' the embodiment of the details of praxis in an external 
5 
Cf. footnote three. 
6 
this term, for which productive activity or agency may be taken as 
synonyms, will, as I indicate in this preface, receive progressive 
definition through my first chapter. 
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product, is initially defined by Marx through a description of the 
relation of praxis to nature. But 'objectification' is also a concept 
which Marx frequently employs in further analyses of the structure of 
praxis itself. It figures prominently in his explanation of the effect 
of praxis on the experience of the agent, as one who is realized or 
actualized as a definite agent through his productive activity. Marx 
shows how the agent himself is embodied in the product he produces, and 
this is one of the two meanings of the concept of human 'self actualiza-
tion' in Marx' theory of man. 
The notion of objectification enables Marx to analyze praxis from the 
point of view of its product. But praxis in the texts of Marx is also 
analyzed from the point of view of the agent. Here the notion of "needs" 
comes into play. All praxis or productive activity is, Marx insists, 
rooted in needs; it is in virtue of his experiencing his own needs that 
the individual acts. Needs require agency for their satisfaction in that, 
as subjectively apprehended deficiencies or lacks within the individual, 
they require for their satisfaction the individual's active relating of 
himself to that which is other than and external to himself. And since 
the individual experiences definite needs, they are responsible for the 
definite forms of action the individual performs to obtain satisfaction. 
The human subject of praxis must be understood as the subject of two 
sorts of needs: 'subsistence needs' and 'human needs.' The former are 
those which arise directly from the physiological structure of the 
individual, and whose satisfaction is required for the organic 
maintainence of the individual, e.g. hunger. Such needs are common to 
vi 
all behaving organisms. Human needs arise from more complex interrela-
tions between agent and environment, and they are essentially character-
ized as developmental. Human needs develop from previous instances of 
praxis, and they in turn bring about new sorts of praxis, and thus new and 
more complex interrelations between individual and environment. And 
since the individual develops these needs through his own actions as a 
productive agent, he further 'actualizes' or realizes himself as an agent. 
Here the notion of 'self actualization' takes on an additional meaning. 
This expanded sense of 'self actualization' also allows Marx to 
characterize praxis as 'universal.' Human productive activity roots it-
self in needs which develop dialectically through praxis itself. Such~ 
activity then is not limited to those forms of behavior whose bases are 
needs arising from the physiological structure of the individual; 
distinctly human praxis is universal in scope. 
Marx, then, understands praxis in terms of its relation to its object 
through the concept of objectification, and through its relation to its 
subject, through his notion of needs. This analysis of praxis further 
allows Marx to hold that the human agent 'appropriates' nature in two 
senses. The human agent 'appropriates' nature in that he transforms it on 
the terms of his productive agency. The result of this agency is a pro-
duct suitable for the satisfaction of needs. But the praxis of the 
individual must also be described as occuring in society, in a context of 
social relations. And 'society' itself is a second category basic to 
Marx' theory of man. 
Marx holps that society must be understood as a series of social 
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relationships between subjects of praxis or productive agents, and 
explains that such relationships are possible through praxis itself. 
Praxis is objectified in its product. This means that the agent himself 
is externalized in the objective result of his activity, inasmuch as his 
activity is radically his own, rooted in his own needs. The product is 
appropriable by the agent for the satisfaction of his own needs. But 
since the result of praxis is an external product, it is appropriable 
also by other individuals, towards the satisfaction of their relevantly 
similar needs. In thus appropriating the results of productive agency, 
individuals relate themselves both to a product and to the producer him-
self, since the product here is a result of some feature of the indivi-
dual producer himself, viz., his own agency. Marx' point is that it is 
through my productive agency that I externalize myself, thus rendering 
relationships between myself and others, social relationships, possible. 
Consequently social relationships are most fundamentally relationships 
between productive agents. 
For Marx the relationship between praxis and society is more complex 
than this conclusion might seem to suggest. For just as society is to be 
understood in terms of praxis, actual praxis is in turn essentially 
conditioned for Marx by the social context in which it occurs. Praxis 
originates in needs and is directed at nature. But nature is here to be 
understood as the correlate of praxis, including social praxis. The 
"material" upon which praxis is excercised is nature as already deter-
mined by social production. And thus the possibilities which this 
"material" present to the individual productive agent are themselves 
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conditioned by his social milieu. Moreover, society for Marx is a system 
of productive relations. As a system society controls the definite 
productive options available to the individual. 
These two general descriptions of society show that for Marx praxis 
is in principle social. 'Society' is thus a category which plays an 
essential role in Marx' theory of man. All praxis results in the 
externalization of the individual, and thus renders him in principle 
accessable to social relations. And praxis, both in its definite options 
and "materials" depends upon the social context in which it occurs. The 
concepts of society and praxis are, then, to be understood in terms of 
each other. Just as praxis explains the possibility and the fundamental 
character of social relationships for Marx, so society explains the 
details of productive agency in their definite actuality. 
This view of society implies two further points of importance for 
Marx' "social" theory of man. One is the idea of 'totalization.' As a 
system of productive relations, society in principle offers us a pluralit) 
of options for productive activity. This makes it possible for the 
individual to act in diverse ways towards the satisfaction of diverse 
sorts of human needs. Thus the agent may achieve self actualization as 
an agent 'totally' rather than partially: society accounts for the real 
possibility of multi-directional rather than uni-directional or reified 
praxis, 
Second, society also accounts for the possibility of the agent's 
being determined as an 'object' as well as a 'subject.' The agent is 
determined as a 'subject' through his realization of himself as an agent 
ix 
in definite productive acts and through the development of new needs 
within his experience as a result of such acts. The agent is determined 
as an 'object' through his being the object of the productive activities 
of others. This is possible only in a context of social relations. The 
determination of the agent as an 'object' is essential in order that man 
as agent be considered 'natural' in Marx' sense of that term. 
Consciousness is the third broad category of Marx' theory of man. 
In his theory, consciousness is integrated with praxis and society. Marx 
first of all holds that consciousness as a feature of individual exper-
ience is a feature or moment of human praxis. Consciousness is 'produced' 
by praxis, inasmuch as consciousness is a relationship between the 
individual and his environment determined by the more fundamental rela-
tionship which the individual enjoys with his environment as an agent. 
But Marx also argues that consciousness is an essential feature of human 
praxis, in that only given this can the developmental character of human 
needs be explained. Further, consciousness as an indispensible feature 
of human praxis, albeit social praxis, must be distinguished from 
consciousness as ideology. It is the former treatment of consciousness 
which Marx' theory of man involves. 
In addition to developing praxis, society, and consciousness as the 
primative categories of his theory of man, Marx also holds in the 
Manuscripts and elsewhere that these categories are interrelated in a 
fashion such that praxis is the most fundamental of the three. Some 
reasons for this position are suggested throughout chapter one, and at 
the conclusion of this chapter I explicitly sketch an argument for this 
x 
claim. But the argument which Marx himself takes to justify this positioTI 
can, I feel, best be seen only through a consideration of Marx' relation 
to Hegel. Therefore I postpone this argument until the fourth chapter. 
A brief remark about my proceedure in chapter one may be made here. 
I take the positions and arguments outlined above to constitute the basic 
) 
structure of Marx' theory of man. I base my claim on a textual analysis 
of Marx' early writings. Whenever it is necessary to develop an argument 
that is implicit rather than explicit in Marx' texts, my test for the 
acceptability of such an argument is twofold. I offer no development of 
an implicit argument unless that argument is both consistent with 
positions held in Marx' theory of man other than the one which the 
argument supports, and consistent with other explicit arguments developed 
in Marx' theory and discoverable in the texts. And I cite no position in 
my exposition of Marx' theory of man that is merely implicit in Marx' 
texts. 
My second chapter attempts to confront the claim that Marx' theory of 
man is fundamentally identical with the humanism of Feuerbach. Louis 
Althousser has defended this claim. For Althousser, Marx' writings at 
least through 1844 are based on theories of man, .theories which through 
1843 depend on Kant and Fichte, and through 1844 on Feuerbach. The Paris 
Manuscripts most particularly repeat, Althousser claims, Feuerbach's the-
ory of man as a connnunal being, although Marx develops this theory through 
his own terminology, and uses it in his own evaluation of contemporary 
society. 
-
Beginning from 1845, Althousser claims, Marx' texts manifest a shift 
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towards those aims which are his mature goals, and this shift involves 
Marx' rejection of the theoretical validity of 'humanisms,' 'theories of 
man,' particularly that Feuerbachian humanism which had governed his 
intellectual minority. Marx came to hold that any theory of man must 
describe a transhistorical human nature, thus contradicting his thesis 
that man is the "ensemble" of his social relations, with society 
understood here as the subject of the historical process. And he held 
further that any theory of man is an ideology, a representation of the 
operative reality of, and particularly the class structure of, actual 
society. As such no theory of man may legitimately function in a theory 
of history, and of society as the subject of history. Marx' mature theor 
must be viewed as 'anti-humanistic.' 
My second chapter deals with the first feature of Althousser's claim 
concerning Marx' theory of man in the Manuscripts of 1844. This text 
lends some plausibility to Althousser's interpretation, for Marx praises 
Feuerbach therein for having achieved three corrections of Hegel, 
relevant to a theory of man. Feuerbach had corrected Hegel in showing 
that the individual must be described through the totality of his 
determinations, rather than simply through'those pertaining to him as a 
self conscious subject. He had defended this statement by refuting 
Hegel's employment of the dialectical method in relation to sense 
consciousness. And he had insisted that, of those determinations which 
must be located descriptively and argumentatively in a theory of human 
nature, one essential determination is the communal dimmension of 
individual experience. 
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I argue, however, that in spite of these points of agreement with 
Feuerpach, Marx' theory of man as it is presented in the Paris Manuscripts 
and elaborated in the "Theses on Feuerbach" and The German Ideology is 
critically opposed to Feuerbach Theory, on at least four counts. 
First, Marx rejects Feuerbach's doctrine of nature. For Feuerbach, 
nature presents itself in experience as immediate and wholly self 
contained, i.e. self determined. Nature is that which of itself contains 
its determinations within itself, and delivers these determinations to 
the subject. But for Marx this understanding of nature will not do, both 
because it renders nature as the correlate of productive activity 
theoretically inexplicable, and because it renders a genuine theoretical 
account of productive activity impossible. This criticism of Feuerbach's 
concept of nature, made explicit in the "Theses on Feuerbach," is based 
on those portions of the Paris Manuscripts in which Marx' theory of man 
is discoverable. 
Marx also criticizes Feuerbach's doctrine of consciousness, particu-
larly sense consciousness. For Feuerbach, the sensible object is again 
self contained in its determinations, and in relation to this object the 
sensory subject is fundamentally passive, although it is necessary that 
his sensations be 'refined' through imagination and thinking. This also, 
for Marx, will not do. In describing the sense object as internally 
determined and the sensory subject as passive, Feuerbach is unable to 
offer an account of this object as itself determined through praxis, 
or of consciousness itself as a feature of praxis. Marx insists upon 
these points in his theory of man. 
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Feuerbach's descriptions of the social. dimensions of individual 
experience, and of society itself, are also critically viewed by Marx. 
Feuerbach comprehends social relations on the model of interpersonal, 
"I-Thou" relationships, through which the finite individual achieves 
the satisfaction of his desire to realize within his ·m..m experience the 
infinite predicates of the human species: reason, will, love. But for 
Marx the comprehension of social relations and of society on this model is 
inadequate. This is because, first, this description forces Feuerbach to 
discuss needs too abstractly. Second, this model of society renders 
Feuerbach theoretically incapable of describing social relations as 
systems of relationships between productive agents. And finally, the 
logic of Feuerbach's comprehension of society forces that comprehension 
to be one of society as trans-historical, rather than of societ~ as a 
subject of the historical process. 
The above criticisms of Feuerbach are finally related to similar 
criticisms which Marx levels against Prudhon. Both Feuerbach and Prudhon, 
Marx claims, develop theories of human nature which are trans-historical 
in that they define human nature through certain attributes and needs 
occuring above and beyond the historical process. But to do this is to 
misconceive the nature and function of a valid theory of man. Such a 
theory is one which describes and accounts for those structural features 
of human nature which render possible the historical process itself, and 
human self actualization through history. Such a theory of man may be 
entitled trans-historical, but not in the sense in which that term would 
be attributed to the 'humanisms' of Feuerbach and Prudhon. 
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I develop these points concerning the relation of Marx' theory of man 
to Feuerbach through an analysis of the arguments discoverable in Marx' 
texts, I take my second chapter to refute Althousser's interpretation of 
that theory. Marx' theory of man must be linderstood not as a contentual 
repetition of Feuerbachian anthropology, but as developed in critical 
opposition to it. 
The third and fourth chapters are a continuation of the attempt to 
determine the relation of Marx' theory of man to the thinking of his 
predecessors, this time in relation to Hegel. 
Chapter three contains an analysis of those texts in which Hegel 
develops categories utilized in Marx' theory of man. In his Philosophy of 
Spirit Hegel argues that consciousness must be understood in relation to 
embodied consciousness, and thus shows that a work such as the 
Phenomenology of Spirit can present categories relevant to a theory of 
man. But the development of such categories themselves occurs in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit and the Philosophy of Right. I consider first 
selected texts from the Phenomenology. Hegel argues that, given the 
relationship between the self conscious subject and the object of his own 
experience, and the desire arising for the self conscious subject out of 
this relationship, the subject must realize himself as an agent. And he 
proceeds to develop a notion of agency through concepts which, although 
located in a different framework from Marx', are nevertheless identical 
to those employed by Marx to describe praxis. Agency, arising from desire 
is directed at the transformation of the subject's material environment. 
Such agency as "work" is objectified in the environment as its pt'aduct. 
xv 
This results both in the partial satisfaction of the agent's desire, and 
his necessary emergence within an intersubjective milieu. And the activ-
ity of the individual subject also effects that subject's 'self-actualiz-
ation.' 
Arguments in support of these claims are culled principally from 
Hegel's "Introduction" to the Phenomenology, and from the transitional 
text from "Consciousness" to "Self-Consciousness." Hegel develops these 
notions in a section of the Phenomenology entitled "Society as a Community 
of Animals," There Hegel argues that the individual subject can not be 
accounted for as an agent through the possession of an "original nature," 
the possession of fixed and intrinsically determined interests and needs. 
Agency itself is further described through the concepts of 'objectifica-
tion' and 'self actualization.' And Hegel argues that the individual who 
achieves self-actualization through his activity must be understood as a 
member of a society of agents. 
These themes are further developed and refined in the Philosophy of 
Right. In his analysis of will as embodied in property in the Philosophy 
of Right, Hegel argues that this external embodiment is necessary for the 
individual subject of will, and that the active appropriation of property 
brings this individual into necessary relations with others, social 
relations, however primitive. Further arguments in the Philosophy of 
Right show that, for Hegel, the individual subject of will must be 
comprehended both as an agent and as a social agent. The individual is 
an agent in virtue of privately experienced needs. His work effects both 
the satisfaction of and the multiplication of such needs. But the details 
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of his work are conditioned by the labor of his society. He is dependent 
for the satisfaction of his own needs on the work of others, and they 
upon his work. And the needs which he experiences as his own, and thus as 
his self, are socially derived. 
But Marx• anthropology is not simply inspired by Hegel. It includes 
a critical argument against Hegel's description of the individual as a 
self consciousness subject. For Marx, Hegel is, given his theory of the 
self conscious subject, unable to further describe the individual as an 
agent, with theoretical adequacy. But a theory of man which describes 
the human individual most fundamentally as an agent, is adequately able 
to further describe this individual as a self conscious subject. I 
exhibit this argument in my fourth chapter. It is crucial to Marx• 
theory of man in that, for Marx, it supports his position that praxis is 
the most fundamental category in that theory. 
Finally, in my fifth chapter, I show that Marx• theory of man plays 
a 11 normative11 role in his larger theoretical schema. It does this by 
providing Marx with principles whereby he can comprehend human history 
as the process of human 'self actualization,' and with norms with which 
he may evaluate given socio-historical phenomena. I treat the latter 
briefly in my fifth chapter, by indicating the relationships between 
Marx' theory of man and his analyses of social alienation, and of the 
condition of the wage laborer in capitalist society. 
--
Chapter One 
Marx' Theory of Man 
Adam Schaff, a major theoretician and proponent of Marxist humanism, 
has stated that, " ... the central problem of socialism - of~ socialism, 
and Marx' social ism in particular - is the problem of man, with its 
essential aspect of creating conditions for man's happiness and full 
1 
development." In fact, the theory of man is, for Schaff, of such 
importance that he is willing to assert that, 11 ... a philosophy of man was 
2 
the cradle of Marxism." In this chapter I shall examine the early 
writings of Marx, especially the "Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts of 
1844, 11 for the purpose of showing the theory of man which they contain. 
It should not be surprising that Marx' anthropology is principly 
found in a text whose subject matter he announces as "political economy,'' 
and in which themes such as, 
... the state, Jaw, morals, civil life, etc., are 
toutched upon only insofar as political economy 
itself, ex professo, deals with ·these subjects.3 
1 Adam Schaff, "Marxism and the Philosophy of Man," in Socialist 
Humanism, ed. Erich Fromm, (New York: Anchor, 1966), p. 141. 
2 Ibid., p. 142. Schaff's arguments in this essay are reminiscent of 
Lionel] Rubinoff, The Pornography of Power, (New York: Ballantine, 1969), 
pp. 15-90, in which any theory of society, Rubinoff argues, is founded 
upon a theory of man. 
3Karl Marx, "Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts (1844) ," in Writings 
2.f. the Young Marx 2!!. Philosophy and Society, ed. Loyd Easton and Kurt 
Guddat, (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1967), p. 284. Marx-Engels, 
Historisch-Kritische Gesamtausgabe, ed. D. Rjazanov and V. Adoratski, I 
(Moscow: The Marx-Engels Institute, 1927-1932), Abteilung 1, Band 3, p,333· 
(This edition of the works of Marx-Engels will be subsequently refered I 
to as~). 
-1-
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F as Pierre Bigot observes, "economics" does not mean to Marx what it or, 
does for many contemporary social scientists, namely, the attempt to study 
empirically and in a value free context the economic operations of 
4 
society. On the contrary, for the Marx of the Paris Manuscripts economici 
involves both a critique of capitalism and a critique of the devaluation 
of labor which capitalism essentially involves, especially insofar as this 
devaluation is a result of private property, the defining institution of 
capitalism. 5 But the critique Marx makes is grounded on a general theory 
4 
Cf. Pierre Bigot, Marxisme et Humanisme, (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1954), pp. 2-3. 
5 
Cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, pp. 288-289, 
287-288; MEGA, 1, 3, p. 82, p. 81. That this is a defining feature of 
Marx' understanding of political economy, is clear from the texts. He 
objects to any merely empirical or positivistic interpretation of politica: 
economy. "It acknowledges as a fact or event what it should deduce, 
namely, the necessary relation between two· things, for example, between 
division of labor and exchange. In such a manner theology explains the 
origin of evil by the fall of man. That is, it asserts as a fact in the 
form of history what it should explain." In particular, for Marx, econ(!)m-
ics as ordinarily understood accepts private property as a given, rather 
than attempting to explain private property as an historical economic 
occurence. "Political economy proceeds from the fact of private property. 
It does not seek to explain private property. It grasps the actual, 
material process of private property in abstract general formulae which 
it then takes as laws. It does not seek to comprehend these laws ••• " 
Political economy in the ordinary sense, then, is deficient for Marx to 
the extent that it analyzes private property as a datum, rather than 
attempting to comprehend it critically in its relations to other features 
of the economic system. Marx' version of private property will, he insists , 
undertake this critical comprehension. 
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of productive agency or praxis, a theory of reference to which statements 
regarding the devaluation of labor may be validated. 6 And the theory of 
praxis which grounds the critique of political economy in the Paris 
Manuscripts constitutes the heart of Marx' theory of man. 
To be sure, the theory of praxis which Marx holds cannot be adequatel) 
grasped apart from its relations to the concepts of society and conscious-
ness. In fact, reference to these concepts is necessary for a more 
complete theoretical description of praxis itself. Still, I want to claim 
that "society" and "consciousness" are concepts best defined in terms of 
their relation to praxis. I shall show how each of these concepts is 
present in the Paris Manuscripts, and how society and consciousness are 
related to praxis, according to Marx. 
6 
Cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 288, 
p. 291; MEGA, 1, 3, p. 82, p. 85. This requirement arises from Marx' sense 
of "political economy," and is central to the consideration of this 
chapter. Political economy involves a critique of capitalism. As such it 
involves an analysis of private property and a critique " ••• of value with 
the devaluation of man ••• " as resulting from capitalism. But in order to 
achieve this, political economy must also offer a theory of value, as 
~ell as a theory of labor, in general terms. The first is necessary 
because some notion of value is required to stand as a criterion, in order 
that the relation of value and product as it obtains in capitalism can be 
criticized. And again, some general theory of labor is required as a norm 
for the critique of labor and its devaluation within capitalism. Thus for 
"political economy" to do the task which Marx sets for it, both a concept 
of value and a general theory of labor are required. In the last analysis 
these requirements are met for Marx by the same theory. Value in an 
economic sense resides in the product. But the product for Marx is 
essentially only 11 ••• the resume of activity, of production." Therefore, 
the theory which explicitates the process of productive action at the 
same time provides the criterion in terms of which the value of the product 
in a capitalist setting can't be critically comprehended. 
......--
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Marx' Concept of Praxis 
.!: -
7 
Marx' first inroads towards a theory of praxis in the manuscripts arE 
made through a discussion of the relation of man as agent to nature, under 
the general heading of "objectification." The initial and most basic 
requirement for praxis to occur, Marx tells us, is the presence of an 
external, natural environment for the agent to act upon. "The worker can 
make nothing without nature, without the sensuous external world. It is 
the material wherein his labor realizes itself, wherein it is active, out 
of which and by means of which it produces. 118 Praxis, labor, requires an 
environment other than and external to the agent, upon which labor can be 
performed, and it requires an environment which is maleable, which can be 
shaped and transformed by labor. The ideas of externality and maleability 
provide a first meaning of nature in Marx' manuscripts. 9 And the point he 
wishes to make here is that, given nature as a sine qua non for praxis, 
man as agent is essentially related to that which is both external to him, 
. and is a context for his productive behavior. 
7 
A definition of 'praxis' appropriate to the texts of Marx can be 
given only after an analysis of the argtnnents in Marx concerning this con-
cept. As a general rule, 'praxis,' 'productive activity,' and frequently 
'labor' may be taken as synonyms. 
8 
Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," .. in Easton and Guddat, p. 290; MEGA, 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 84. 
9 
This meaning will be extended in Marx' discussion of nature as man's 
"i . norganic body." 
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Marx's emphasis at this point, however, involves more than the as-
sertion that man is related essentially to his external, natural environ-
ment. For, as Marx states repeatedly at this point in the manuscripts, 
the relation he is discussing is one of agency. It is man as a practical 
agent who for Marx requires a relation to that which is sensuous, external, 
and maleable. And therefore it is the nature of human agency in its es-
sential relation to nature which Marx needs to clarify at this stage of 
1 . 10 his ana ysis. 
Marx commences his analysis of praxis under the general heading of 
a theory of "objectification." To begin with objectification itself is 
discussed in terms of labor as externalization. The agent, Marx holds, 
" ••• appropriates the external world and sensuous nature through his la-
lbor.1111 Insofar as praxis occurs in a natural environment, then that en-
~ironment is in some sense taken in hand by the agent, constituted as 
lbeing in an essential relation to him, made into his own. The sense in 
which this occurs for Marx, however, is a very specific sense. Nature, 
lthe "external world;" of praxis, is appropriated through agency because 
the result of labor is a product, and the product itself is for Marx in 
"' lOThere is a problem here, as it seems that Marx is claiming not 
~imply that man entertains a relationship to mature through labor, but 
!that Man's most fundamental relation to nature is had through labor, praxis 
tather than, for instance, through perception, or through aesthetic or 
~onceptual consciousness. Consequently Marx needs to provide arguments 
~n support of this claim. But he can provide such arguments only after he 
has clarified the structure of praxis, and when some defendable meaning 
[or praxis has been established. 
11 Marx, Easton and Guddat, p. 291; MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 85. 
--6-
iessence, " ••• the resume of activity, of production."12 
The point which Marx wishes to mainta.in here is of basic importance 
to his general theory of praxis, and must be explicitated in some detail. 
If it is the case that by praxis man "appropriates" nature, and if this 
is the case because the product, the result of praxis, is a "resume" of 
the act of production, then what is the nature of this "resume," and how 
[does this lead to an "appropriation" of the natural world by labor? 
It is difficult to see from Marx' texts how he answers these 
questions. In part this dif~iculty stems from his ·convoluted use of 
~erms in the beginning portions of the manuscripts, and in p art it arises 
~rom the fact that Marx' discussion of praxis as appropriation in general 
~s done simultaneously with a discussion of alienated labor. However, 
~lose analysis ofa key paragraph can aid in clearing his terminology, 
and in showing the distinction between the two levels of discussion which 
~rx carries on around the concept of praxis. 
Towards the beginning of the section of the manuscripts entitled 
'Alienated Labor," Marx asserts that, under the system of production des-
cribed by ordinary political economy, labor becomes reified and devalued, 
ln that it is viewed as an item to be bought and sold, an inert item in 
the market place. "Labor not only produces commodities. It also pro-
duces itself and the worker as a commodity, and indeed in the same 
12Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 291; 
~EGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 85. 
-
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-proportion as it produces commodities in general. 1113 Then, he goes on 
to argue that, 
This fact simply indicates that the object which labor 
produces, its product, stands opposed to it as an alien 
thing, as a power independent of the producer. The 
product of labor is labor embodied and made objective in 
-7-
a thing. It is the objectification of labor. The 
realization of labor is its objectification. In the 
viewpoint of political economy the realization of labor 
appears as the diminution of the worker, the objectification 
as the loss of and subservience to the object, and the 
appror.riation as alienation [Entfremdung], as externalization 
[Enta<lsserung],14 
The problem of this text lies in the meaning of the terms "objecti-
fication" and "realization" as applied to labor, and the relation of these 
terms to "alien thing," "diminution," "alienation," and "externalization." 
It appears on the surf ace that the former two terms are equated by Marx 
with the latter, in a general critique of labor under capitalism. Put 
another way, it at first appears that Marx is doing no more in this 
13Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 289; 
MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, pp. 82-83. 
14Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 289; MEGA 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 83. "Dies Faktum druckt weiter nichts aus als: Der 
Gegenstant, den der Arbeit produziert, ihr Produkt, tritt ihr als ein 
fremdes Wesen, als ein van dem Produzenten unabhangage Macht gegenuber. 
Das Produkt der Arbeit ist die Arbeit, die soch in einem Gegenstant 
fixiert, sachlich gemacht hat, es ist die Vergegenstandlichung der 
Arbeit. Die Verwirklichung der Arbeit ist ihre Vergegenstandlichung. 
Diese Verwiklichung der Arbeit erscheint in dem national okonomischen 
Zustand als Entwirklichung des Arbeiters, die Vergegenstandlichung als 
Verlust und Knechtschaft des Gegenstandes, die Aneigung als Entfrerndung, 
als Entausserung." 
--8-
paragraph than offering the beginnings of_ his theory of alienated labor. 
He seems to say that, insofar as the product of labor is an "alien thing,' 
i.e., a "power independent of the producer" under capitalism, then labor 
is "made objective" in a product; thus labor's "realization" in the pro-
duct is at the same time "the diminution of the worker." There seems then 
to be one level of discussion involved in this paragraph, a critical dis-
cussion of labor under capitalism as "alienated," in which the terms noted 
above are roughly equivalent. 15 
But when one delves through the terminological confusions which 
plague this text, a second impression arises. This becomes apparent if 
one isolates the last two sentences of the above cited paragraph from the 
body of the text. Marx here first asserts that, "The realization of 
labor is its objectification. 1116 In this sentence Marx equates "objecti-
fication," not with alienation, but with that process through which labor 
15 
This impression is reinforced further in the texts, in Marx' 
employment of the terms 'object' and 'objectification.' For example, 
in''Manuscripts of 1844," Easton and Guddat, p. 289; MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, 
p. 83, Marx goes on to refer to the result of capitalist production as 
an " ••• alien object ••• " (fremden Gegenstant), and at p. 290; MEGA, 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 84, Marx shows two senses in which the worker, 
" ••• becomes a slave to his objects ••• " (wird der Arbeiter also ein Knecht 
seines Gegenstandes). These usages seem to point to a semantic equiva-
lence between 'object' and 'alienated object' even though, at this point 
in the Manuscripts, alienation has been defined only in its most general 
form as involving the product " ••• as a power independent of its pro-
ducer." 
16Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 289; 
~' Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 83 •• 
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in general "is realized," is made actual. He then goes on to describe the 
manner in which this process of labor's being made actual appears "In 
.. 11 the viewpoint of political economy •••• 
Now political economy, in its ordinary and deficient sense, begins 
for Marx by accepting the premises operative in existing relations of 
production: private ownership and the ensuing competition of commodities 
18 
in the marketplace. Only with this clearly in mind can we appreciate t e 
sense of Marx' next assertion. For he goes on to say that it is from the 
perspective of existing (capitalistic) relations of production, and from 
the viewpoint of the science which accepts these relations as its basic 
premises, that "this realization of labor," the process through which 
labor is made actual, "appears as the diminution of the worker, the ob-
1119 jectification as the loss of and subservience to the object.... In 
other words, Marx is here making critical comments concerning the eco-
nomic realities of capitalism, but in addition, he is at least laying 
down terms -- "objectification" and "realization" -- which he takes to 
17Ibid. 
18
cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 288; 
~' Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 81. 
19 Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 289; MEGA, 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 83. Note here too that inthis last phrase the notions 
of loss and subservience in relation to the object of labor are con-
trasted to, not equated with, 'objectification.' 
--10-
be applicable in a more general theory of praxis. 
This impress ion is reinforced if one ·reads a 1 ittle further on in 
the text. Continuing his comments on labor from the "viewpoint of 
political economy," Marx goes on to say that, 
So much does the realization of labor appear as diminution 
that the worker is diminished to the point of starvation. 
So much does objectification appear as loss of the object 
that the worker is robbed of the m~st essential objects 
not only of 1 ife but also of work. O 
Given what Marx has contended in the passage just examined, one can 
clearly see the distinction. here between the notion of labor "real ized11 
and "objectified," and the 11 diminution11 of labor as a result of its 
occuring in a context characterized by private property and competition. 
Marx, then, describes and analyzes praxis as involving an 11 appro-
priation" of nature on two levels: on a general level, under the heading 
of "objectification'' and on a more specific and critical level·, under 
the headings of "diminution" and ''al ienation. 11 This distinction must be 
justified by the texts if one wishes to argue, as t do, that Marx des-
cribes the relation between man and nature as "appropriation," i.e., as 
essentially a relationship of agency, and in turn describes the structure 
of this agency through the concept of "objectification." Only if Marx 1 
arguments concerning 11objectification11 are descriptive of praxis in 
general, can it be shown that they relate for him to an overall feature of 
the structure of agency. If his arguments concerning the concept of 
11objectification 11 related only to his descriptions of labor as alienated, 
20 Marx, "Manuscripts of t844, 11 in Easton and Guddat, p. 289; MEGA, 
Abt. 1 , Bd. 3, p. 83. 
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then these arguments could be with necessity applicable only to Marx' 
critique of capitalism, not to his comments on the nature of agency over-
all. But, as I have tried to show above, the texts do illustrate two 
levels of discourse in relation to the notion of praxis, and do point to a 
discussion of praxis in general as well as to a critique of labor as 
alienated. 
With this distinction seen, the question posed above can be reformu-
lated. What is the structure of praxis in general, such that praxis 
requires the p::iesence of an external natural context for its realization? 
Put otherwise, what for Marx is the meaning of "objectification" insofar 
as this concept describes praxis as an "appropriation" of nature? 
Lobkowicz offers an interesting analysis of "objectification" in a 
section of his Theory and Practice devoted to Marx, an analysis which, I 
believe, gets at the basic meaning of this concept. 
Marx describes the essence of labor as Vergegenst~ntlichung, 
objectification. Though he never explains what the ex-
pression "objectification" means, it is not overly difficult 
to state its basic connotations. "Objectification" first 
means externalization: man externalizes himself in labor in 
that he makes of his inner life a form of exterior objects. 
He confers his life on objects. However, this externali-
zation must not be taken to be a translation of pre-existing 
ideas into reality. Rather, the inner life conferred to outer 
objects must be viewed as a potentiality which becomes actual 
in and for man by becoming the form of a reality outside man. 
Accordingly, "objectification" also connotes self actualization: 
by externalizing his inner life through labor, man labors and 
creates, in short, brings out of himself his human potentialities 
schafft seine Gatterngskr~fte heraus.21 
21Nicholas Lobkowicz, Theory and Practice, (Notre Dame: University 
of Notre Dame Press, 1967), pp. 341-342. 
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Lobkowicz is correct in his indication that Marx' explicitation of the 
meanings of "objectification" is indirect. However, as he himself points 
out, these meanings are discoverable in the texts. First, objectifi-
cation entails the "externalization" of the activity of labor in the pro-
duct. The choice of terms here is unfortunate, for "externalization" 
(EntaUsserung) typically has the meaning of alienation for Marx. 22 But 
taken in a broader and non-technical fashion, the idea which Lobkowicz 
wishes to establish holds good, even if his terminology falters. Marx, 
as we mentioned above, hold that " ••• the product is only the resume of 
activity, of production. 1123 His point is that an object can be con-
sidered an object of labor only to the extent that it bears the stamp 
of activity having been performed upon it. Thus he would argue that, on 
the one hand, the act of labor requires an external object, because 
labor can only be conceived of as occurring if it is labor £!!. something 
other than and external to itself. On the other hand, the object of labor 
the product, is not unchanged through the process of production. Quite 
the reverse is the case. A thing is a product precisely because it has 
been changed, transformed, through some activity of labor being per-
formed upon it. And the details of the transformation which occurs in 
the product correspond to the details of the activity of labor performed 
upon it. When I am engaged in writing, my product is the written page. 
22rt is clear that in the text which Lobkowicz himself at this point 
refers to, that 'Entausserung~ is being used by Marx in this technical 
sense. 
23Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 291; MEGA, 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 85. 
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While I begin my activity with objects external to my self (e.g., paper 
and ink), the result of my activity is a product to the extent that it 
has been transformed through my labor, and transformed in a way that 
bears the stamp of the specific details of that labor (in this case, 
writing). It is in this sense that the product is for Marx a summary 
or "resume" of the activity of production. 
The conclusion towards which Marx' argument points is that because 
the product is a "resume" of productive activity, labor itself is, as 
Lobkowicz puts it, externalized in the product. The product of labor, 
while being a result of the activity performed upon it, nonetheless 
remains "external" to or other than that activity itself. Since this is 
the case, and since it is the case that the product perdures even after 
the process of labor has terminated (since, for example, the written 
page perdures as my product even after my activity of writing has 
terminated), then labor itself is rendered public and observable in the 
enduring product. This is so because the product is a thing trans-
formed according to the details of the activity of labor. Thus the 
activity of labor is rendered enduring and "external" to itself in 
the product. It is in this sense too that Marx speaks of the "reali-
zation of labor" as "objectification. 1124 In being rendered enduring 
and observable in the produce, labor is rendered actual in a way which 
transcends the transient character of the activity itself. 
This rendering public and external of praxis is one side of the 
24Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 289; MEGA , 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 85. 
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concept of objectification. Lobkowicz notes also a second side to this 
concept: " •• ·~objectification also connotes self actualization: by ex-
ternalizing his inner life through labor, man labors and creates, in 
short, brings out of himself his human potentialities, schafft seine 
Gattungskrafte heraus. 1125 This comment indicates that praxis as ob-
jectification" effects the agent himself as well as the natural object. 
Here objectification also entails a "realization," in the sense of 
"self-actualization." 
Marx gives what I take to be his clearest expression of this idea 
in his "Excerpt Notes of 1844," notes written in the spring and sunnner 
of that year, while undertaking the study of classical economic theories. 
In a section of those notes entitled "Free Human Production," Marx 
attempts to describe the structure of production in a non-alienated 
condition. The nature of non-alienated labor is such, he holds, that, 
In my production I would have objectified my individuality 
and its particularlity, and in the course of the activity 
I would have enjoyed an individual life; in viewing the 
object, I would have experienced the individual joy of 
knowing my personality as an objective, sensuously per-
ceptible, and indubitable power.26 
The nature of production, of praxis in general, is such that the agent 
as well as the product is in some sense "actualized" through the act of 
production. He is actualized, Marx tells us, at least in the sense that 
251obkowicz, Theory and Practice, p. 342. 
26Marx, "Excerpt-Notes of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 281; 
MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 546. 
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his activity is rendered overt and enduring in a product, and, because 
of~this, recognizible for him. 
Unfortunately, Marx does not supply an explicit argument in the 
texts to establish this assertion. As a result, it is not clear pre-
cisely what he means to claim. Nor are the commentators on Marx of great 
aid in supplying clarification of the notion of self actualization. 
Lobkowicz connnents that Marx makes this assertion, but provides no analy-
sis of its meaning. Both Schaff27 and Rotenstreich28 observe that self 
actualization is a feature of Marx' basic notion of praxis, but then 
move immediately to discussions of the relation of praxis and society. 
Thus, they also fail to provide clarification of the idea of self actu-
alization itself. 
· .. 
But it is possible to adduce an argument in support of the claim 
tpat objectification results in the self actualization of the agent, an 
argument, I think, which is both consistent with other statements which 
Marx makes about praxis, and which captures his mind on this point. 
In discussing the product as the objectified "resume" of the 
activity of production, Marx consistently relates the notions of "reali-
zation" or actualization, "objectification," and enduring recognizability. 
27Adam Schaff, Marxism and the Human Individual, trans. O. 
Wojasiewicz, ed. R. S. Cohen, (New York: McGraw Hill, 1970), p.70, 
28 Nathen Rotenstreich, Basic Problems of Marx~ Philosophy, 
(Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merril Co., 1965), p. 38. 
~·· 
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The act of labor is realized, made actual, in that it is embodied in a 
product which. captures and summarizes the details of the activity of 
which it, the product, is the result. And because the actualization 
of labor involves its being embodied in a product, i.e., an enduring 
object, then labor itself achieves an enduring recognizability in this 
29 
object. 
Now it can be argued, and I think consistently with Marx' texts 
at this point, that the identification of these notions holds for Marx' 
doctrine of the effect of labor on tjle agent, as well as for his doc-
trine of the effect of labor on the product. The key notions here are 
endurance and recognizability. First, since my labor· results in a 
product, it is embodied in an enduring object. At the same time my 
labor is myself, or an aspect of myself. But for some process to be 
e~bodied in an enduring object is for Marx, as we have just seen, the 
"actualization" of that process. Thus because my labor results in an 
enduring object, that aspect of myself which is my activity is "actua-
lized" in the product. Here, then, actualization means embodiment in 
an enduring object, and praxis, because it results in a product, implies 
29To return to the example used above, the result and realization 
of my activity of writing is the written page. Since the written page 
endures beyond the termination of my activity and at the same time is 
the'~esume'of of that activity, my labor becomes recognizable in its 
result. In this sense Marx has already identified the actualization or 
realization of labor, its "objectification" or embodiment in a product, 
with its being recognizable through the product. 
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the "self actualization" of the agent. 
Second, objectification entails self actualization by reason of 
the recognizability of labor in the .product. To say that the product is 
~ product means that I can recognize myself in the result of my ac-
tivity, that is, I can recognize that the labor which is summarized in 
the product is mine. And moreover,___! can recognize my activity in a 
different and fuller way when it is sununarized in a result than I can 
30 during the process of activity itself. My activity is a feature of 
myself. And thus in recognizing my activity in the product, I recognize 
a feature of myself as embodied in the product. I take this to be the 
import of Marx' statement that, " ••• in viewing the object I would have 
experienced the individual joy of knowing my personality as an objective, 
sensuously perceptible, and indubitable power. 31 
These arguments establish a twofold meaning for self actualization 
in this context: the embodiment of the agent's labor in a product, and 
the resulting ability of that agent to recognize his labor in the pro-
duct. The arguments are consistent, I believe, with Marx' use of the 
notions of "realization," "objectification," and "recognizability," 
and consistent also with the assertion concerning the "objectification" 
30To return to our paradigm case, as I examine the written page 
which is the product of my act of writing, I can recognize the details 
of my activity, evaluate its strength and weakness, and observe its 
structure, in a way fuller than that possible during the process of writ-
ing itself. 
31Marx, "Excerpt-Notes," in Easton and Guddat, p. 281; ~' 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 546. 
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of the individual through labor, which Marx makes in the "Excerpt-Notes." 
In the light of the idea of praxis as "objectification," the 
question of Marx' meaning of praxis as the "appropriation" of nature can 
now be answered. Labor or praxis requires the presence of an external, 
"natural" environment as a condition of its occurrence. But the basic 
feature of labor's relation to this natural context is appropriation, 
since the result of labor in nature is a product which is defined as an 
object modified according to the terms of the process of labor performed 
upon it. 32 Put briefly, labor transforms nature, and this transformation 
occurs on labor's own terms. The result of praxis is not nature un-
changed, but nature "appropriated," transformed through labor, and 
emergent as a result describable through those of its details which 
"realize" and embody the labor process. Thus of Marx, the basis of the 
relation of praxis to nature is "appropriation." 
Marx' development of the notion or praxis as the appropriation of 
nature leads him to a discussion of two further concepts, by means of 
which he tries to develop his theory of praxis and render it more concrete 
These are the concepts of "needs," and the idea of human praxis as "uni-
versa!." As with the notion of objectification, "needs" is taken by 
32It is interesting to note that the same relation of labor, 
product, and nature is noted by Marx in Capital, ed. Frederich Engels, 
~rans. s. Moore and E. Aveling, (New York: International Publishers, 
1967), Vol. 1, pp. 42-43, under the heading of the product in its 'use 
value.' See Marx-Engels, Werke, (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1961-1971), 
Vol. 23, p. 57. (This edition of the works of Marx-Engels will be sub-
sequently referred to as MEW.) 
[-dJ==========tt== 
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Marx to be a concept descriptive of both the agent as the source of 
praxis, and the product as its result. 
The idea of needs as a universal characteristic of praxis is used 
by Marx in the Paris Manuscripts to elucidate further his notion of the 
33. 
relationship between man and nature. He writes: 
Immediately, man is a natural being. As a I iving natural 
being he is, ~one aspect, endowed with the natural 
~acities and vital powers of an active natural being. 
These capacities exist in hiM as tendencies and capabilities, 
as drives. In another aspect as a natural, Jiving, sentient 
and objective being man is a suffering, cpnditioned, and 
limited creature 1.ike an animal or plant~ The objects of 
his drives , that is to say, exist outside him as independent, 
yet they are objects of his need, essential and indispensable 
to the exercise and confirmation of his essential capacities.34 
In this text Marx is making three claims concerning the relation 
of man and nature. Each of these claims is made in terms of the governing 
concept of "needs." The rel at ion of man to nature, forst of al I, is not 
simply an 11 abstract 11 or merely formal relation. In all individual cases, 
rather, this relation has a particular content, a particular series of de•~ 
cribable features. And this is the case because 11 needs 11 form the context 
in which particular relations between man and his natural environment 
occur. 'n particular cases man relates to nature because of certain needs 
for whose satisfaction a natural context is required:e.g., subsistence 
needs such as hunger, thirst, or the requireni~nt of shelter. He selects 
from his environment those items capable of satisfying these needs. And 
his relations to nature are founded in his relations to these items. 
33 Cf. a I so Ibid. 
34• II • f 844 d dd Marx, Manuscripts o 1 , 11 in Easton an Gu at, p. 325; MEGA, 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. t 60. 
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Thus, Marx argues, man's relations to nature are concrete and particular, 
and are such irt virtue of the needs which form the context of these re-
lations. 
Thus man relates concretely to nature in virtue of needs. But in 
addition the structure of this relation is such that, again, man's re-
lation is to something external to and in some sense independent of him. 
Man " ... is a suffering, conditioned, and limited creature like an animal 
or plant. The objects of his drives, that is to say exist outside him 
as independent. 1135 The externality of nature is emphasized by Marx, here 
in the sense that what man aims at in attempting to satisfy his needs is 
a natural, i.e., external item. It is in this sense that man is "a 
suffering, conditioned, and limited creature," and that nature is "inde-
pendent" of its relation to man. .The implied premise, as I takei.t, is 
that the satisfaction of all needs requires an aim and direction towards 
something external and independent. A need is precisely some lack whose 
satisfaction cannot be attained by the subject of the need's relation 
to himself, but whose satisfaction requires a relation to a real other, 
here nature for Marx. Thus needs indicate that man's relation to an 
external nature is notonly concrete, but also necessary. 
But third, man's necessary relation to nature in virtue of needs 
is not simply a relation to anindependent and external other. In the 
second part of the sentence cited above, Marx offers an additional comment 
35 
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on this relation. "The objects of his drives, that is to say, exist 
outside him as independent, yet they are objects of his need, essential 
and indispensable to the exercise of his essential capacities. 11 36 In 
other words, external natural items are not simply independent of man. 
They are also items in relation to man, objects for him. A thing in 
nature may subsist simply as that item in an independent state. But as 
an object of a need it is no longer simply independent. It stands in 
relation to the subject, as well as being independent of or external to 
that subject. Thus, in virtue of needs, nature is not simply "inde-
pendent," just as man is not simply "a suffering, conditioned, and 
limited creature ••• " Rather, nature is also an "object" for man, a 
setting of items which are in relation to man, just as man is also "en-
dowed with the natural capacities and vital powers of an active natural 
b~ ,,37 it::.1.ng. ·-
A sunnnary of this idea is offered by Henri Lefebvre, who sub-
stitutes the term "passion" for Marx' term "drive," as man's self 
direction towards external nature !~_response to his needs. 
Natural man as such is passive. Inasmuch as he feels this 
passivity, that is, the thrust of his desire together with 
the impotence of that desire, he becomes passionate. 
"Passion," says Marx, "is an essential force in the man 
tended towards his object." ••• And yet passion itself must 
only be the basis and starting point of power. Power no 
longer depends on the object, it dominates and contains 
36Ibid. 
37rbid. 
its object: the objectivity of nature is no longer 
anything more than its limit and its end.38 
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Up to this point, what Marx has claimed is that "needs" indicate 
the concrete and necessary qualities of the relationship of man and 
nature, as well as qualities of independence and dependence as aspects 
of that relation. Marx, however, does not stop here. The development 
of Marx' thought proceeds in two complementary directions: an explicit 
relating of the concept of needs to praxis, and a distinction between 
two sorts of needs. 
Lefebvre, in the citation above, suggests a conceptual relation 
between Marx' concept of needs an~ his general notion of praxis. In 
Lefebvre's formulation, that "passion" or drive which has its basis 
in need is converted into "power" in the agent who, through his agency, 
overcomes the pure externality of na~ure, relating natural items to 
himself as objects suitable for the satisfaction of his needs, 
"appropriating'' nature to his needs through praxis. Lefebvre' s point 
is that, just as needs govern the concrete relations between man and 
nature, again, "man" for Marx must here be taken to signify "man as 
agent." It is through agency or praxis that those concrete relations 
between man and nature are established whereby needs are satisfied. 
Thus needs must be understood in relation to praxis, for their location 
in Marx' thought to be more precisely determined. 
Marx' texts, themselves, suggest that Lefebvre's reading of the 
38 
Henri Lefebvre, Dialectical Materialism, trans. John Sturrock, 
(London: Johnathan Cape Ltd., 1968), p. 117. 
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of the relation of needs and praxis is accurate. As shown above, Marx 
refers to "vital powers" and "drives" as that through which man attains 
a relation to nature such that needs can be satisfied, and man himself 
is referred to in this context as "an active natural being." The 
satisfying of any need involves, as a minimum, man's directing himself 
towards some external natural item, his constituting of himself as in 
relation to this item, and his taking of this item for his use. This 
self-directing and taking involve agency or praxis. For Marx, then, 
"needs," are inexorably connected with praxis and conversely, all praxis, 
since this involves as its sine qua .!!2.!'!_ a relation of the agent to nature, 
is governed by needs. 
The concept which I take Marx to have in mind here, although he 
assumes it rather than stating it explicitly, is again the concept of 
objectification, Just as the product is a summary of the details of the 
process of its production, the object of need is a summary of need as 
resident in its subject, in the sense that the object possesses some 
qualities through which it can satisfy the subject's need. An object 
of need is as such "produced" by an agent, at least insofar as an agent 
directs himself to an object relevant to his need and takes it up for his 
own use. Needs are satisfied through praxis, and needs in turn govern 
the specific details of praxis in its relation to nature, and as a result, 
determine the qualities of the product, which "resume" the process 
through which the product was produced. 
The relation of needs to praxis is further developed by Marx 
........_ through a distinction between two sorts of needs. Up to this point the 
r 
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relation of needs to praxis has been limited to just one sort of needs, 
namely, needs directly defined in terms of natural necessities. A more 
complete analysis of therelation of needs to praxis requires that we 
take into account a second major class of needs, namely, developing 
needs. 
On the one hand, some needs arise simply from the structure of the 
organism which is their subject, and must be satisfied for the life pro-
-· 
cesses of the organism to be sustained. Hunger is an example of such a 
need which Marx uses in the Manuscripts. "Hunger is a natural need; it 
requires nature and an object outside itself to be satisfied and quieted. 
Hunger is the objective need of a body for an object existing outside 
itself, indispensable to its integration and the expression of its 
nature. 1139 Such a need has the basic characteristics of needs outlined 
above: an item external to, the subject of the need is required for its 
satisfaction; this item is constituted as an object in relation to the 
subject's need; the object is thus not simply external to and independent 
of the subject, for the object is an object answering to the subject's 
d i f h b . . bl f . h b. 40 nee nso ar as t e su Ject is an agent capa e o using t e o Ject. 
Further, this sort of need is characterized as one of organic sub-
sistence. Its satisfaction relates simply to the maintainence of 
39 Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, pp. 325-326; 
MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 161. 
40
cf. Ibid. 
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biological life processes. In a primitive sense, such need can be satis-
field simply. by "taking" for use relevant items from the natural environ-
ment. At another point in tle manuscripts, Marx identifies the processes 
whereby such needs are satisfied as, " ••• animal functions - eating, 
drinking, and procreating, 11 41 implying that he might entitle the needs 
towards which such functions are geared as "animal needs." Indeed he 
does assert several paragraphs later that, " ••• the animal produces only 
what is immediately necessary for itself or its young •••• The animal pro-
duces under the domination of inunediate physical need •••• 11 42 Note that 
"production" is the term used here, but that production geared towards 
the needs of biological subsistence is referred to by Marx as the pro-
duction of the "animal." To this-Marx contrasts man as agent, who, 
" ••• produces free of physical need, and only genuinely so in freedom 
from such need. 1143 A distinction is drawn then between two sorts of 
needs, those involved with anithose free of biological requirements for 
subsistence, and a corresponding distinction between two sorts of "pro-
duction," that of the "animal" and that of man, relative to these two 
41Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 292; MEGA, 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 86. 
42Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 294; MEGA, 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 88. 
43 
Ibid. 
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two classes of needs. 
Despite. the fact that Marx contrasts "animal" and human production, 
his chief interest in making this distinction is not to elucidate 
philosophical distinctions between human and animal life. Rather Marx 
uses these distinctions heuristically, as a device in terms of which to 
distinguish classes of needs, and to draw out the implicatons of this 
distinction for a developed doctrin~ of human praxis. To see the import 
of this distinction for Marx' doctrine of praxis, it will be helpful to 
introduce reference to another assertion Marx makes on this theme: 
The animal's product belongs immediately to its physical 
body while man is free when he confronts his product. The 
animal builds only according to the standard and need of 
the species to which it belongs while man knows how to 
produce according to the standard of any species and at 
all times knows how to apply an intrinsic standard to the 
object.44 
·-In this passage Marx brings out the point that in contrast to 
animal production, human praxis involves "universality. 1145 We need now 
to see how this distinctively human kind of productivity affects the 
meaning of human praxis. 
That needs govern the particular details of human praxis is a 
premise which Marx takes as already established. But in distinguishing 
4~arx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 295; MEGA, 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 88. 
45cf. for example, Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and 
Guddat, p. 294; MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 88. "Conscious life activity 
distinguishes man immediately from the life activity of the animal." 
r 
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needs geared towards and needs free from the requirements of organic 
subsistence: Marx suggests an argument to the effect that needs are 
not fixed for man, but are developed, and developed in terms of their 
dialectical relation to praxis itself. The basic proposition upon 
which Marx rests this argument is the assertion that human praxis involve 
more than simply the satisfaction of those needs under whose egis it 
initially occurs. This is one of the points to Marx' assertion that the 
"production" of the "animal," produces in a one sided way while man pro-
duces universally. 1146 The labor of the animal does accomplish no more 
than the satisfaction of those needs which immediately govern it: those 
of the subsistence of the individual organism and, in terms of pro-
creation, the survival of the species. It is a "one sided" labor in this 
sense. In human praxis, however, the result is more complex. 
To substantiate this claim Marx must of fer some further distinction 
between "human" praxis and simple (animal) behavior in nature. And such 
a distinction is offered by him in The German Ideology. There, Marx 
asserts that man "begins to distinguish himself from the animal the 
moment he begins to produce his means of subsistence, a step !equired 
by his physical organization. By producing food, man indirectly pro-
duces his material life itself. 11 47 The "labor" of the "animal" involves 
simply the taking up of items from the natural environment, or the 
47Karl Marx and Frederich Engels, The German Ideology, trans. 
R. Pascal, (New York: International Publishers, 1947), p. 7; MEGA, Abt. 
1, Bd. 3, p. 10. 
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utilization of aspects of lis own organism (e.g., sexual aspects). 
Human praxis however, Marx asserts, involves labor in a more accurate 
sense of the term: to wit, it involves production. It involves the 
active modification of aspects of the (at least) natural environment so 
that out of this praxis a new object arises, capable of satisfying a 
need. Primitive agriculture is an example of such production on the 
level of subsistence needs. And the meaning of this is that, through 
human production, nature is "transformed," with this term bearing the 
meaning given it above in the discussion of objectification. 
At this point, two features of the theory of objectification out-
lined above need to be recalled, and related to Marx' argument on the 
relation of human praxis and needs. For Marx, production as objectificati< 1 
involves the transformation of the context of labor, since the result is 
an object which (as product) "resumes" the activity of production; and 
it involves the actualization of the agent, since he is realized as one 
who has produced this product. The result of praxis is transformative 
both for the agent and the object. Through praxis, then, a more fully 
"developed" (or 'actualized") agent exists in the face of a more fully 
"developed" (or"realized") environment. 
Now given the relation of praxis and needs which Marx has already 
argued, it can be further claimed that the product, as "resume" of the 
productive activity, is one capable of satisfying that need which con-
ditioned the agency. The agent, then, is actualized as capable of 
achieving satisfaction from his product. But since the agent is both 
--
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capable of achieving satisfaction and confronts a newly modified environ-
ment in relation to which he has to some extent actualized himself in 
some respect, he is further capable of responding to his environment with 
new needs. As a paradigm case, let us say that I begin the study of a 
philosopher with a need, for instance the need to learn something about 
Hegel. I undertake this study, and its result may be an essay on some 
feature of Hegel's philosophical doctrine. Now on the one hand, this 
essay is my product, it "resumes" the activity of my study. As my pro-
duct, it constitutes an aspect of my environment which is new, and which 
is a modification of myenvironment as it previously occurred. And it 
satisfies a need of mine: through its production I have learned something 
of Hegel's philosophical doctrine. But further, it is now the case that, 
because both my environment and myself have been realized through this 
~iece of productive behaviqr, I am now capable of responding to that 
environment with new needs: e.g., the need to learn more about Hegel, or 
to study Hegel in relation to some other philosophers, Husserl or Kant. 
And the ground of the possibility of this new need for me is precisely 
that productive behavior whereby a prior need was satisfied. 
It is in a sense exhibited by this sort of example that Marx pic-
tures the relation between human praxis and needs. Because the result 
of praxis is both an actualized agent and a transformed environment, the 
agent is capable of developing new needs with which to relate to a 
~elevantly new environment. Thus it is the case both that human praxis 
~s conditioned by needs, and that new needs are the result of praxis, 
r . r 
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that new needs are elicited in man as agent through a dialectical rela-
tionship of needs and praxis. As Rotenstreich puts this conclusion, 
"Production has two main aspects: it creates both the wants and the means 
for the provision of goods. 1148 .. , 
Marx' discussion of praxis as "objectification," is then in his own 
eyes rotmded out only when the relation of praxis and needs is elucidated. 
The point of distinguishing needs botmd to and needs free from biologi-
cal subsistence requirements is to show that, in ~elation to praxis, 
human needs are not fixed in a specific pattern, but that they develop 
and become more complex. This is not to say that, in behaving so as to 
fulfill needs of the former sort, man behaves "inhumanly" for Marx. But 
it is to say that the restriction of human needs to a fixed pattern of 
biological necessity is for him "one-sided." "To be sure, eat~ng, 
drinking, and procreation are genuine human ftmctions. In abstraction, 
however, and separated from the remaining sphere of human activities 
and turned into final and sole ends, they are animal ftmctions. 1149 
This discussion of needs and praxis suggest two further points which 
move Marx closer to the interpretation of human praxis as an indication 
of man as a "species being" (Gattungswesen). These conclusions involve 
assertions concerning the "universality" of human praxis, and a further 
refinement of the notion of "self-actualization." 
In a text'cited above, Marx, in describing the "one-sided" 
48Rotenstreich, Basic Problems of Marx' Philosophy, pp. 34-35. 
49Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 292; MEGA 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 86. 
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production of the "animal" (i.e., production restricted to subsistence 
needs), and in contrasting this to human praxis, asserts that, "The 
animal builds only according to the standard and need of the species to 
which it belongs while man knows how to produce according to the standard 
f . ..so o any species •••• I have argued that, for Marx, "one-sided" labor 
denotes labor tied to needs of a fixed biological necessity, in dis-
tinction from human praxis, dialectically related to developed series of 
needs. But the text shows a further implication of this distinction. 
Insofar as animal "labor" in nature is bound by fixed needs, the 
details of its behavior are also fixed, as are the items in its environment 
to which its behavior will relate. Further, because such behavior does 
not;: "produce" its "means of subsistence, 1151 the natural environment is 
not, in Marx' sense of the term, "transfonned" by such behavior. Such be-
havior is limited and is not praxis in the true sense of the term. Ac-
cording to Marx, these limits are biological ones, those of the species: 
"The animal builds only according to the standard and need of the species 
to which it belongs •••• " 52 The environment in which the animal behaves 
50Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 295; MEGA, 
Abt. 1, Bd. , 3, p. 88. 
51Marx-Engels, The German Ideology, Pascal, p. 7; MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 
3, p. 10. 
52Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 295; MEGA, 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 88 
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For Marx, human praxis has another character. New need;develop dia-
lectically through praxis. And simultaneously through praxis the environ-
ment is transformed, and thus new possibilities are elicited from the 
environment. Marx' contention, then, is that man, in acting from an on-
going development of needs and towards a developing environment, is in 
principle capable of acting out praxis in the context of any environmental 
setting. Marx expresses this by asserting that man, '" ••• knows how to pro-
duce according to the standard of any species, and at all times knows how 
to produce according to the standard of the object. 1154 Since human praxis 
is not fixed by biological needs, and thus not fixed to a specifically 
structured natural environment, it is in principle possible for human 
55 production to occur within any context and to transform any context. 
53 
Cf. Peter Be~r and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of 
Realitv, (New York: Anchor Books, 1967), p. 47. My use of the term 
"species specific" is derived from the definition which Berger and Luck-
lmann give to that term. Species specific, " ••• refers to the biologically 
fixed character of their (animals) relation to the environment, even if 
geographical variation is introduced. In this sense, all non-human ani-
mals, as species and as individuals, live in closed worlds whose struc-
tures are pre-determined by the biological equipment of the several ani-
lm.al species." 
54Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 295; MEGA, 
IAbt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 88. 
55 
Cf. Berger and Luckmann, pp. 47-48. These authors express this 
idea through the statement that, " ••• man's relationship to his environment 
is characterized by world openness. Not only has man succeeded in estab-
lishing himself over the greater part of the earth's surface, his relation 
to the surrounding environment is everywhere very imperfectly structured 
by his own biological constitution ••• the human organism manifests an im-
mense plasticity in its response to the environmental forces at work on 
it." 
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Human praxis, then, is "universal," capable of "transforming" all 
portions of the natural environment rather than being "species specific." 
And this is the case for two reasons: because human praxis does tranform 
nature rather than leaving it as it is, thus eliciting from nature new 
possibilities for praxis; and because praxis enables man to actively 
relate to his environment through an on-going series of new needs. 
Allied to this is afurther comment which Marx makes about praxis 
as involving the "self-actualization" of the agent. Human praxis, he 
claims transforms theagent as well as the environment; through his pro-
56 ductive activity the human subject develops new and more complex needs. 
Now under the heading of "objectification," Marx argued that praxis result 
in the self actualization of the agent, that is, through praxis the agent 
is actualized as one who has performed a specific piece of productive 
behavior. But given his further discussion of needs, "self-actualization" 
now takes on a wider meaning. It is also the case that new needs are 
developed through agency, and that the means to satisfy these needs is 
also produced, through the (at least partial) transformation of a prior 
environment. If the reality of agency includes both needs, which ground 
the details of productive behavior, and an environment within which pro-
duction towards the satisfaction of such needs can effectively occur, 
then it can be said that the reality of agency itself, and thus of the 
56Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 294; MEGA, 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 88. 
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agent, is '1self-actualized " by praxis. 57 
In general, then, praxis for Marx actualizes the agent, or the agent 
achieves "self-actualization" through praxis. "Self-actualization" 
through praxis now means: a) that the agent is actualized as one who has 
performed a specific act of production; b) that the agent is actualized 
as the subject of new needs as a result of his prior act of production; 
) h 1 f h . f d . 58 h c t at, as a resu t o is act o pro uction, t e agent encounters a 
transformed environment in which his action can satisfy these new needs. 
Lefebvre summarizes these point in this way: 
By acting man modifies Nature, both around and within him. 
He creates his own nature by acting on Nature. He trans-
forms himself in nature and transforms Nature in himself. 
By shaping it to his own requirements he modifies himself 
in his own activity and creates fresh requirements for 
himself. He forms himself and grasps himself as a power 
by creating objects or "products." He progresses by 
resolving in action the problems posed by his own action.59 
57This point may be illustrated by returning to an example used 
above. My reality as an agent who (a) needs to learn more about Hegel, 
and (b) faces an environment in which effective study towards this re-
sult can occur, arises from a prior act from which both this need and this 
environment have been elicited. Thus a prior instance of praxis has "ac-
tualized" me as tlis potential agent, i.e., as one with definite needs, 
and an environment which can be acted upon to satisfy them, in this new 
situation. 
58Marx will further argue that praxis actualizes 'man' as such, rather 
than simply man as agent. But in order to bring out this point, we shall 
have first to consider Marx' arguments for the claim that praxis is basic 
to human reality. 
591efebvre, Dialectical Materialism, p. 118. 
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This discussion of needs in relation to praxis60 is crucial to 
Marx' theory of man. For one thing, he uses the discussion in his po-
lemic against the use of a concept of human nature in Prudhon's version 
· 0 f political economy. Marx~ account of the relation of needs to praxis 
would thus seem to be a critical factor in distinguishing an appropriate 
from an improper use of a theory of human nature. This is a point to 
which I shall return when I consider the function of a theory of man in 
Marx' thought. (See below, Chapter two, ~1?· 197ff .• ) 
A second reason for the critical importance of Marx' account of 
the relation of needs to praxis is that it is intimately involved in 
60cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 239; 
MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 87. The points of the above discussion, in-
volving the ideas that human praxis is "universal" rather than "species 
specific," and that praxis involves the "self-actualization" of the agent, 
is summed up by Marx through his referring to nature as man's "inorganic 
body." "The universality of man appears in practice in the universality 
which makes the whole of nature his inorganic body: 1) as a direct means 
to life; 2) as the matter, object, and instrument of his life activity." 
Body is that through which the individual has life, that which develops 
as individual life processes develop, and that through the development 
of which the individual himself is realized. Just so the relation of 
praxis and nature to the agent. Nature is the agent's " ••• inorganic 
body ••• insofar as it is not the human body." But it is that through 
which the agent lives, since agency or praxis, as seen above, requires na~; 
ture as a sine qua !lQ!!.• Again, nature, or the external, maleable context 
within which praxis occurs, develops or is transformed as a result of its 
being the scene of iraxis. And through this development, the agent him-
self experiences "self actualization," becomes the subject of new needs 
and a new environment within which they can be satisfied through pro-
ductive behavior. Thus, "Nature is the inorganic body of man •••• Man lives 
by nature. This means that nature is his body with which he must remain 
in perpetual process in order not to die." 
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his attempt to show that man is a "species being" (Gattungswesen). It 
is to this argument tlat I shall now turn. 
Marx' discussion of man as a "species being" occurs initially as a 
portion of his general discussion of alienation, in the section of the 
p aris manuscripts entitled "Alienated Labor." Here he lists man's 
alienation from his "species being" as a result of his being alienated 
from his product and from his activity of production, under the capita-
1 i f d . 61 list re at ons o pro uction. The meaning of "species being" at this 
stage of Marx' analysis seems to involve first a summary of those 
specifically human characteristics which he has already listed in his 
62 
general theory of praxis. The argument here is that, insofar as man is 
alienated from his product and his activity of production, he is alie-
nated from that which specifically characterizes him as man. In elabo-
rating this assertion, Marx both sunnnarizes his discussion of praxis up 
to this point, and points out those characteristics which specifically 
constitute man as man. 
Man is specifically characterized through his essential relation to 
nature, a relation 63 grounded in praxis. Furthermore, the structure of 
61cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 293; MEGA 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 86~ "We have now to derive a third aspect of alienated I 
labor from the two previous ones." 
62 . 
Cf. Gaston Fessard, "Is Marx' Thought Relevant to the Christian? 
A Catholic View," in Ma:rx and the Western World, ed. Lobkowicz (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967), pp. 344-345, footnote 18, 
for agreement with this anlaysis. 
6~rx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 293; MEGA, 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, -. 87. 
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this relation, or the structure of praxis as the ground of this relation 
is such that man is not a "species specific" organism, but rather "uni-
II i h' d • 64 versa! n is pro uction. Such production involves objectification 
as a basic characteristic, and the on-going development of needs 
through a dialectical relation of needs and praxis. 65 And finally, 
Marx takes the praxis which specifically characterizes man to involve 
66 
consciousness and freedom, topics I shall consider later in this 
67 
chapter. 
64cf. Ibid. 
65cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 295; 
MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 89. 
66
cf. Ibid. 
67cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 293; 
MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 87. There is in Marx' first statement of the 
doctrine of "Gattungswesen" a note not only a differentiation, but also 
of recognition by the agent of this differentiation. This is seen in 
Marx' assertion that, "Man is a species being (Gattungswesen) ••• in that 
as present and living species he considers himself to be a universal and 
consequently free being." The argument which Marx implies here seems to 
fall into two stages. First, that which fundamentally distinguishes the 
human agent from other sorts of organisms related to nature is that man's 
agency or praxis involves "universality." This in tum is accounted for 
through the notion of needs as developing dialectically in relation to 
praxis. Because praxis brings about the satisfaction of those needs 
which ground it, as well as the production of new needs which in turn can 
grotmd new forms of praxis, man is capable -Of utilizing all of his natu-
' ral environment, rather than simply a limited portion of that environment 
as the material of his labor. Thus he is distinct in not being "species 
specific." But further, this distinctness is not simply a fact of the 
structure of human praxis. It is also a fact which is recognized by the 
agent. The universality of human praxis does not simply occur as an ele-1 
ment of agency. It is experienced by the agent, in the sense that it is 
recognized by him, in that " ••• he considers himself to be a universal andl 
consequently free being." This recognition, Marx seems to assert, is an 
essential moment of the structure of human praxis itself. The distinct-
ness of human praxis does not consist in the fact that man's production 
is universal, and that he then recognizes this distinction. Rather, man 
-38-
But Marx does not here further elaborate these ways of charac-
terizing distinctively human praxis. Instead, he develops another rami-
f ication of the notion of the dialectic of needs as the f oWldation of his 
concept of "GattWlgswesen." In the process, he advances a thesis con-
cerning the essentially social character of praxis and of the agent. 
Here I shall follow Marx' lead, dealing first with his notion of the 
social character of agency, and then returning to the question of con-
sciousness. 
II. Marx' Concept of Society 
Marx' assertions concerning the social nature of human praxis are 
of comparable importance to his assertions concerning the relation of man 
to nature. He tells us that to speak of human existence in its true sense 
68 is to speak of social existence, . that the relation between man and 
nature is described abstractly to the extent that it is not recognized as 
. 69 
occurring in society; that, " ••• the essence of man ••• " is " ••• the en-
semble of social relationships. 1170 But while Marx seems to assign basic 
is specifically distinct in virtue of the Wliversality of his production, 
a feature of which is this recognition. Thus tied into the notion of spe-
cies being is a hint of a doctrine of consciousness for Marx, and of a 
doctrine of the relationship of consciousness to praxis. 
68 
Cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, pp. 304-
305; MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, pp. 114-
69cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of.1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 305; 
MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 115. 
70 
Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," in Easton and Guddat, p. 402; MEGA, 
Abt. 1, Bd. 5, p. 525. 
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importance to the social character of praxis in the Paris Manuscripts 
and other texts, the exact place of these assertions in Marx' overall 
argument is not immediately evident, a difficulty resulting partly from 
the polemical character of the texts themselves. 71 
Nor do the commentators on Marx greatly clarify this point. 
Lobkowicz traces the historical background of Marx' ideas on the soci-
ality of praxis through Strauss, Feuerbach, and Hess, but fails, I think, 
~o elucidate the structure of Marx' own arguments on the question. 72 
Adam Schaff does a slightly better job in emphasizing the importance of 
the concept of sociality:fbr Marx' understanding of praxis, but in doing 
this Schaff underplays the arguments whereby Marx elucidates this con-
cept. 73 Perhaps Calvez offers the best explanation of social alienation, 
but his account is somewhat unsatisfactory in that he fails to consider 
the positive arguments which Marx might utilize to found his discussion 
of alienation.74 Still, even an initial reading of Marx' texts and the 
commentaries makes clear two points: Marx wishes to relate his discussion 
71 The section of the Paris Manuscripts entitled "Private Property 
and Communism" contains some of Marx' baldest assertions concerning the 
social structure of human praxis. However, they are set in the context 
of Marx' polemics against forms of socialism which he takes to be de-
ficient. Because of this, the clarity of argument is often wanting. 
72 
Cf. Lobkowicz, Theory and Practice, pp. 389-392. 
73cf. Schaff, Marxism and the Human Individual, pp. 82-91. 
74cf. Calvez, La Pensee de Karl Marx (Paris: Editions de Seuil, 
1965), pp. 222-238. 
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of society to his discussion of nature, praxis, and human needs;75 
and he wishes to hold that his discussion of society is in some sense a 
completion of these other themes. 76 
Although Marx' polemical style tends to confuse the issue here, 
it still seems possible to isolate the basic contentions which Marx 
wishes to assert concerning the social character of human praxis, and 
the (at least implicit) arguments which he utilizes in support of these 
claims. I would hold that in the Paris Manuscripts and in later stages 
of Marx' writings, five basic propositions are asserted and argued con-
cerning the social character of praxis. First, Marx argues that society, 
or social relations between agents, is rendered possible through human 
praxis as thus far described. The details of this argument seem to rest 
on two ideas developed above: viz., that praxis transforms the environ~ 
ment so as to render it the context of new possibilities, and that the 
product of praxis involves the relation of agency and nature (the "ma-
terial" of agency) in such a fashion that the resulting product is the 
"externalization" of that agency which is its source. 
These ideas are clearly involved in Marx' account of objectification 
But the argument he uses to relate these concepts to the concept of society 
is implicit rather than explicit in the text. .It may be formulated as 
75 
Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 305; MEGA, 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 115. 
76 
Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 304; MEGA, 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 114. 
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follows. As shown above, acts of production and their resulting products 
do more than simply satisfy needs. They also give rise to new needs, and 
to environments which are capable of sustaining praxis towards the satis-
faction of these new needs. Now the result of praxis is a product, that 
the product is a modification, and this modification is a modification of 
an environment, (or''nature") i.e., of something other than and external 
to the agent. The product is always "external1177 to the agent in some 
relevant sense, and the product itself is the modification of the environ-
ment or nature. But as external, the product is also "objective" in the 
f b . bl. b bl . . 78 And b sense o eing pu ic, o serva e, open to inspection. ecause 
of its externality, it is possible that the product occuzsin relation not 
only to the producer, but also in relation to some other agent. This 
means that the product, in virtue of its externality to its producer, can 
79 be appropriated by some other agent, can acquire a "use value" for some 
other agent to whom it is present. Therefore the product as such intro-
duces a new possibility into the environment of an agent, viz •• the 
77cf. Supra, Marx' initial discussion of the relation of productive 
activity to 'nature.' 
781 take this to be a typical meaning of 'objective' in the texts of 
Marx. Marx takes the 'object' to be that which is both related as a pro-
duct to the productive agent, and at the same time that which is external 
to that agent and therefore public. 
79 This use of 'use value' is perfectly consistent with the first ex-
position given of that term by Marx in Capital, Moore and Aveling, vol. 1, 
P. 36; MEW, vol. 23, p. 50. There Marx tells us that, "The utility of a 
thing makes its use value. But this utility is not a thing of air. Being 
limited by the physical properties of a commodity, it has no existence apar 
~rom that commodity. A commodity such as iron, corn, a diamond, is there-
~ore, so far as it is a material thing, a use value, something useful. His 
Point here is that the product, as involving definite physical p~operties, 
r 
---
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possibility that the result of his agency may be taken up by someone other 
than himself. 
That the product introduces this new possibility into the environment 
of the agent is the first step of Marx' argument towards the conclusion 
that society is rendered possible by the character of the product of 
praxis. Marx' argument requires also a second step, This second step 
involves the reiteration of the concept of the product as "resume" of the 
activity of production. 
As seen above, an item is a product precisely because it is an item 
transformed through some process of agency. And because of this trans-
formation, the product itself contains the details of that activity of 
production of which it is the result, albeit that the finished product 
contains these details as other than and external to the process of pro-
duction. But, as seen above in the discussion of self-actualization more 
is involved here than simply the relation of production (or agency) and 
product. For the activity from which a product results is the activity 
of an agent, and therefore it is the agent's own activity, his own "self," 
that is objectively resumed in the completed product. As Marx puts it in 
the "Excerpt Notes" of 1844, "In my production I would have objectified 
my individuality in its particularity," 80 that is to say, the product 
which is the result of my agency objectifies the details of a process whicl 
is capable of being appropriated by persons other than its producer, to 
the extent that those properties may satisfy needs of these others as well 
as needs of the producer himself. Thus the product is a 'commodity' as 
an item susceptible to exchange. And it is clearly a general notion of ex 
change that Marx is working towards in this argument. 
Abt.8£~B~! 3~x~;rgE6~otes of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 2~1; MEGA, 
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is my own, and thus objectifies a feature of myself. 
This idea has significant implications for Marx' initial concept 
of the relation of praxis and society, when linked with the first step 
of his argument. The product introduces into the environment of its 
producer the possibility that his product may be taken up for use by 
someone other than himself. But the product does not stand, as a simple 
item does, in a neutral relation to its producer. Rather, and by defi-
nition, the product is the result of the producer's agency, and is thus 
the objectification of an aspect of his own self. And thus, when some-
one other than its producer takes up a product for his own needs, he also 
is taking up more than a simply neutral item. He is taking up an object 
in which a fundamental feature of its identity, the details of his agency, 
is "resumed." 
The implication of this statement is of key importance for Marx' 
argument, and it is the following. If the product of one agent is taken 
up for use by another, it must be the case that this product relates in 
its definite composition to some needs of this other, because for Marx all 
use is use towards the satisfaction of a need, in the broadest sense of 
this latter term. But then, on the one hand, the production of a product 
by one agent and its appropriation by another entails a similarity of 
needs shared between them, and on the other hand, the product itself in 
being produced and appropriated is the objectification of this similarity 
of needs. The similarity of needs, as Marx sees it, forms the context 
of the possibility of social inte~action between the two, and the form in 
' 
r 
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which this interaction occurs is agency, !espectively the production of 
and the appropriation of a product. Again as Marx states it in the 
"Excerpt Notes" of 1844, "In your satisfaction and your use of my product 
I would have had the direct and conscious satisfaction that my work 
satisfied a human need, that it objectified human nature, and that it 
created an object appropriate to the need of.another human being. 1181 
Thus, for Marx, social relations are to be initially and fundamen-
tally understood in terms of praxis, in that such relations are rendered 
possible by the character of the product of praxis. To appreciate the 
full force of this conclusion, however, we must see how Marx is led by 
it to the second of his propositions concerning the relation of praxis 
and society, to wit, that details of acts of praxis are conditioned by 
actual social relations. 
We face a difficulty in examining this second proposition similar to 
a difficulty noticed in connection with the first proposition on the 
relation of praxis and society. It is a contention which Marx seems to 
assert rather than to defend by argument. Marx states that, "society it-
lf d .,82 h i se pro uces man as man.... ·He asserts tat man as agent is n some 
sense "produced" by the social context in which he is situated, just as 
he asserts above that social contexts themselves find their f oundatton in 
I 
agency, in being rendered possible by agency. And in the famous sixth 
81Ibid. 
82 
Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Eastcm and Guddat, p. 305; ~' 
Abt. 1, Bd/ 3, p. 116. 
r 
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thesis on Feuerbach, Marx goes so far as to hold that, " ••• the essence 
of man is no abstraction inhering in each single individual. In actu-
ality it is the ensemble of social relationships. 1183 
To understand these statements of Marx, we must first recognize that 
he is here discussing again the social dimensions of praxis. The texts 
themselves are a clear indication of this. In the first text cited above, 
the full clause reads, "As society itself produces man as man, so it is 
produced by him. 1184 The reference of the second part of this statement 
is at least that assertion which has been argued above, viz., that the 
structure of praxis involves those conditions which render social re-
lations possible. Society "is produced" by man in being made possible 
through the structure of human agency itself. But if praxis is the sub-
ject matter of the second portion of this statement, it is reasonable 
to assume that it is the subject of the first portion also. Moreover, 
Marx typically refers to agency in stating that man is in some sense a 
"product of his social context.11 85 In these statements, Marx seems to 
be asserting then that it is man the agent that society "produces." 
8~rx, "Theses on Feuerbach," in Easton and Guddat, p. 402; MEGA, Abt 
1, Bd. 5, p. 535. 
8~arx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 305; MEGA, Abt.'. 
1, Bd. 3, p. 116. 
85For example, in a text immediately preceeding the one cited above, 
Marx asserts that, given the overcoming of private property, a society 
would occur in which man would affirmatively produce both himself and 
other men. He would do this, however, through his productive activity, 
and other men would be 'produced' by him through their activity of 
appropriating the object of his labor. Thus in asserting that society 
'produces' man Marx is stating that the details of praxis are conditioned 
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Or, he seems to assert that agency, praxis, is in some way "produced" by 
society. 
Marx makes these statements in the Manuscripts of 1844, in a section 
in which his prime purpose is the comparison of his. theory of socialism 
to other theories which he considers less radical and therefore less 
satisfactory than his own. Because this comparison is his first purpose, 
he does not spend his energy to provide a clear argument for the claim tha 
the details of productive activity are conditioned by actual social re-
lations. And of course the absence of argument makes it difficult to 
ascertain just what this assertion means. Moreover, the commentators are 
by no means in agreement on this point. Schaff, e.g., takes Marx' state-
ments to the effect that man is "produced" by society to mean that the 
individual's consciousness of himself is conditioned by the social matrix 
in which he is located. Society produces man by providing the context 
from which the individual's self-understanding is derived: 
••• if human attitudes, opinions, evaluations, etc., are a 
historical product of mutual interaction between base and 
superstructure ••• then the general psychological structure 
of men under given conditions depends on the patterns of 
social relations, particularly in the sphere of production. 
These relations are the bases of his consciousness -- they 
create it, although this creative process is an extremely 
complicated one. What philosophers call "human nature" or the 
"essence of man" is thus reduced to the status of a product --
or a function -- of social relations.86 
by the social setting in which praxis occurs. The 'man' that society 
'produces' is, for Marx, the agent. 
86 
Schaff, Marxism and the Human Individual, p. 65. 
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Marx does indeed wish to maintain something of this sort concerning 
the question of the relation of society and consciousness, although as we 
shall see his doctrine on this point is more complex than Schaff's state-
ments might imply. And it is doubtless true that this idea of the re-
lation of society and self understanding is something of what Marx means 
in asserting that "society produces man." He states in the German 
Ideolol!v, e.g., that "Consciousness is ••• from the very beginning a social 
product, and remains so as long as men exist at all. 11 87 But while this 
notion of the relation of consciousness to society is an aspect of Marx' 
assertion that "society produces man," I would argue that it is not the 
fundamental sense of this assertion, and that the other statements which 
~arx makes on the general question of the relation of society and con-
sciousness suggest that it has another meaning, and one that is logically 
!more basic. 
Society for Marx means a system or systems of production of useful 
items, in which (either cooperatively or competitively), persons interact 
through reciprocal appropriation of and exchange of social products. 
Marx himself argues, in the German Ideology, that the theory of 
production or praxis, he has stated, results in an understanding of society 
'The production of life," he asserts, "both of one's own in labor and of 
fresh life in procreation, now appears as a double relationship: on the one 
hand as a natural, on the other hand as a social relationshp."88 We have 
87Marx-Engels, The German Ideology, Pascal, p. 19; MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 5 
o. 20. 
88 
D, 19 . Marx-Engels, The German Ideology, Pascal, p. 18; MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 5 
--==#:::======================================================::::::========tt======= 
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seen both that production of any sort requires nature as a condition, 
and that praxis engenders the possibility of social relations. Marx, in 
this text goes on to develop from this a notion of society in the sense 
discussed above. 
By social we understand the cooperation of several 
individuals, no matter under what conditions; in what 
manner and to what end. It follows from this that a 
certain mode of production, or industrial stage is al-
ways combined with a certain mode of co-operation, or 
social stage, and that this mode of co-operation is 
itself a "productive force." Further, that the multi-
tude of productive forces accessible to men determines 
the nature of society, hence the "history of humanity" 
must always be studied and treated in relation to the 
history of industry and exchange.89 
Society for Marx, then, given its foundation in production, becomes for 
Marx a system or series of systems of interacting (i.e., cooperation as 
above) productive activities, geared towards "industry" (i.e., productive 
acts) and "exchange" (i.e., the reciprocal appropriation of the products 
of its members). 
It is this understanding of society which is the key premise for the 
argument I am advancing here, to wit, that just as society is engendered 
by praxis, it also specified and controls the sorts of acts of praxis that 
are available to its members. Marx, in the text cited above, explains 
that because society involves the interaction of agents in terms of pro-
duction and reciprocal appropriation (i.e., exchange), and because the 
repetition of such acts results in a certain stylization thereof, a "cer-
tain mode of cooperation" which Marx himself entitles the "social stage," 
r 
t 
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society itself becomes a "productive force," i.e., the systematization 
and organization of specific acts of production of various kinds occurr-
ing within it. Society facilitates, renders more efficient and more 
~ fruitful, these latter sorts of acts. 
But as the systematization of kinds of production occurring within 
it, society affects more than simply their efficiency and utility. 
Society also offers these kinds of production -- whatever they may be in 
a given social system -- as viable alternatives for its members in their 
own practical engagements. Or, society as that "force" which organizes 
and systematizes sorts of production occurring within it, at theSillle 
time renders these sorts of production and the relations occurring be-
tween them available to its members. But this means that society con-
ditions and to some extent determines the sorts of production or praxis 
------- occurring within it, just as society itself is engendered by praxis. 
...... 
And this means that the sorts of interactive relations occurring between 
persons in a given social system depends upon and are conditioned by the 
structure of the society itself as a "productive force," i.e., as the 
i i f f d i . i h. . 90 systemat zat on o sorts o pro uct on occurring w t in it. 
Thus conceived, the "structure of society" determines the sorts of 
90 
Cf. G. V. Plekhanov, Essays in the History of Materialism, trans. 
Ralph Fox (New York: Howard Fertig, 1967), pp. 214-215. As Plekhanov 
puts this point, " ••• the means of production just ·as inevitably deter-
mine the mutual relations of men in the process of production, as the 
armament of an army determines its whole organization, all the mutual re-
lations of the men of which it consists. But the mutual relations of 
men in the process of production in their turn determine the whole 
structure of society • 
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productive behavior available to its memb~rs. 91 For Marx, just as man 
as agent and society are mutually productive of each other, so society 
9lcf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 305, 306; 
MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 116, 117. See also, Marx, Pre-Capitalist Eco-
nomic Formations, trans, E. J. Hobsbwam (New York: International Pub-
lishers, 1965), pp. 80-81; Marx, Grundrisse der Kritik der Politischen 
Okonomie (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1953), p. 384. That this is what Marx 
intends to argue in asserting that, " •.• as society itself produces man 
as man, so it is produced by him," can be seen from further comments which 
Marx himself makes in the Paris Manuscripts and in the Grundrisse of 
1857-58. In the first of these texts, Marx notes that, "To be avoided 
above all is establishing 'society' once again as'an abstraction over 
against the individual. The indidivual is the social being. The ex-
pression of his life, even if it does not appear immediately in the form 
of a communal expression carried out together with others, is therefore 
an expression and assertion of social life." The point of this state-
ment is twofold, co-incident with the note from Plekhanov cited above, and 
the inference derived from it. First, society is not to be taken as an 
entity apart from its members. Rather, it is the system of productive 
activities and relations of these activities which its members enjoy. 
But second, society is the system of these activities and relations. As 
a system it offers them as viable alternatives to its members.· As a re-
sult the productive activity of an individual, even if seemingly private, 
is nonetheless " ••• an expression ••• and assertion of social life ••• " i.e., 
because it is an activity rendered available to the individual by the 
society within which he is located. 
This view of the relationship of individual praxis and society is 
reinforced in the section of the Grundrisse of 1857-58 entitled "Pre-
Capitalist Economic Formations." There, in describing the relation of 
the productive individual to society in primitive communal systems, he 
notes first that, in a stable social system, individual productive be-
havior effects a "reproduction" of those forms and relations of praxis 
offered as viable alternatives to the individual by society. In such 
societies, " ••• the economic object is the production of use values ••• ," 
and this behavior yields, " .•• the reproduction of the individual in certai 
definite relationships to his community, of which it (sic. the community) 
forms the basis ••• " The wording of this text is of major inportance. The 
production of items bearing "use values" involves an activity through 
which the agent acts out his role as a producer within the broader system 
of productive relations which is his society. This is the meaning of 
Marx' phrase, " ••• the reproduction of the individual in certain definite 
relationships to his community." But he goes on to say that the society 
itself, (i.e., the community)· is the ''basis" of the relationship which the 
individual has to it, the basis of his role within the larger productive 
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changes man (through the offering of new and broader productive options) 
as man changes society (through the development of new modes of pro-
duction which result necessarily in social change). With the caveat 
that the relation between man as agent and society is conceived of by 
Marx as dynamic as well as stable, 92 we may claim to have shown two pro-
positions of major importance in Marx' account of the relation of praxis 
system. And society here is such a basis because society, as the or-
ganization of productive acts occurring within it, provides this role 
as an option for the individual member. Thus again "society produces 
man as man," i.e., society provides options for productive behavior 
through which the individual may act out his role in the social system, 
just as society finds its source in the activity of production, i.e.·' 
just as "society is produced by man." 
92cf. Marx, Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations, Hobsbwam, pp. 92-93; 
Grundrisse, pp. 393-394. See also Marx' "Preface" to A Contribution to 
the Critique of Political Economy, in Karl Marx and Frederich Engels, I 
Selected Works in One Volume (New York: International Publishers, 1969) ,1
1
1
, 
pp. 182-183; MEW, vol. 13, p. 9. In order to avoid the impression that I 
Marx' understanding of society is static at this point, another idea \ 
from the same section of the Grundrisse cited above may be briefly noted,/ 
to wit, that as modes of production within a social system develop, thesej 1 
may lead to new productive forms, and new needs on the part of the pro- I 
ducer, thus outstripping those systematized relat:tons of production which I 
society as a "force" has constituted. And this development would in turn 
require a re-organization of society itself, as a result of which society'! 
would offer new and expanded options to its members. Marx in this sect::im 
of the Grundrisse uses the example of the growing complexity of agri- I 
cultural forms of production, enabling a community to produce new and I 
more varied forms of agricultural products without expanding its terri-
torial boundaries. Such advance in turn would lead to the re-formula-
tion of social relations of production, and thus to a society offering , 
its members more varied agricultural options. This example is consistentl
1 
with the general formulation of the process of social change which Marx h 
offers in his famous "Preface" to A Contribution to the Critique of Po- II 
litical Economy of 1859. He states that, "At a certain stage of their II 
development, the material productive forces of society come in conflict 'I 
with the existing relations of production, or - what is but a legal ex-
pression of the same thing - with property relations within which they 
have been at work hitherto. From forms of development of the productive 
forces these relations turn into fetters. Then begins an epoch of social 
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and society. First, society is rendered possible by the structure of 
human praxis. Second, society specifies the details of praxis, through 
controlling the productive options available to its members. 
A third principal assertion concerning the relation of society and 
praxis arises out ofthese two propositions. This is the claim that all 
praxis is in some sense social; in other words, that nothing occurs which 
might accurately be described as a purely private act. 
The young Marx gives at least two indication$ that this is a claim 
he wishes to make, one in the 1844 Manuscripts, and one in the sixth 
93 
thesis on Feuerbach. First, in the Manuscripts, Marx discusses an ex-
ample of the activity of scientific thinking. It may seem that as a 
scientist my speculative behavior is purely private, that I withdraw from 
my community to formulate hypotheses concerning the nature of my subject 
matter, and to work out criteria by which these hypotheses might be tested. 
But, "Not only is the material of my activity - such as the language in 
which the thinker is active - given to me as a social product, but my~ 
revolution. With change in the economic function, the entire immense 
superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed." 
93 
Cf. Marx, Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, ed. and trans. 
J. O'Malley (Cambridge: The University Press, 1970), p. 79; MEGA, Abt. 1, 
Bd. 1, Hb., p. 496. A third indication may be found in Marx' Critique of j 
Hegel's Philosophy of Right, in which Marx speaks of " ••• the commonwealth 
(das Gemeinwesen), the communal being (<las konnnunistische Wesen) within 
~hich the individual exists •••• " Avineri, The Social and Political Thought 
of Karl Marx, p. 35, interprets Marx' choice of terms here as an indi-
cation of his belief, " ••• that man and society should not be antagonisti-
cally conceived ••• ," or that the being of the individual is always social, 
a "kommunistische Wesen." If this is so, then it follows that all agency 
~s also social in some relevant sense, or that there is no such occurrence 
as a totally private act. 
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experience is socialactivity; what I make from myself I make for society, 
conscious of my nature as social. 1194 The implication Marx appears to 
draw from this example is that no act, however private and individual it 
may seem, occurs without the social context, and more strongly, that the 
social context is a necessary condition for the occurrence of even the 
most seemingly private act. 
Second, in the sixth thesis on Feuerbach, Marx states that Feuer-
bach's critique of religion errs in its tendence " ••• to abstract from the 
historical process and to establish religious feeling as something self 
contained, and to presuppose an abstract - isolated individua1. 1195 The 
clear implication of this statement is that one could only examine re-
ligion as a "self-contained" rather than an historically-socially con-
ditbned phenomenon, if one presupposed an asocial, "isolated individual" 
as the bearer of religious feelings and beliefs, and that this is an 
error because all individuality and agency somehow involve their occurring 
in the context of society. 
As I understand these texts and what they imply, Marx' intention 
here is to draw upon the arguments already seen on the relation of praxis 
and society to support this third proposition, as well as to show, by this 
proposition, that deep significance of the two claims we have already dis-
cussed. Note first that in his statement concerning the social character 
of scientific activity, Marx states that, " ••• what I make from myself, I 
94Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 306; MEGA, 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 116. 
95Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," in Easton and G.uddat, p. 402; MEGA, Abt. 
1, Bd. 5, p. 535. 
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make for society, conscious of my nature as social." Now excluding the 
question of consciousness here, Marx is in this statement clearly har-
kening back to the point that praxis is such that through its resulting 
product another might have access to the agent (producer), and the agent 
access to the other (appropriator). The point here is that for Marx, even 
the most seemingly private actions share in this structure. My seemingly 
private act of scientific investigation results, if brought to term, in a 
product, e.g., a written report of the process and conclusions of my re-
search, which is available for public inspection and appropriation. Thus 
even this seemingly private act is in principle social. 
Further, actions of this seemingly private variety draw upon the 
strucutre which society organizes as structures for productive acts oc-
curring within it, either through the utilization of materials which are 
socially provided, or through the adoption of procedures which are soci-
ally constituted, or both. As Marx notes, if I am engaged in scientific 
""esearch, the " ••• material of my activity ••• " is " ••• language ••• given to 
i 1 d ,.96 ne as a soc a pro uct.... That is to say, in performing this sort of 
speculative behavior, one of necessity utilizes a socially constructed 
material, and through his action participates in the society in which he 
[s located. 97 
96Marx insists on the social origin of language in several texts othe
1 than this cited from the 1844 Manuscripts. I consider this point further I 
in the section of this chapter devoted to a discussion of society, praxis, · 
and consciousness. 
97 
The person performing scientific activity utilizes paradigmatic 
models to guide the formation of his experiments, definite laboratorytech-
niques, instruments for measuring and recording the data of his 
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These examples provide Marx with illusfrations of the general point 
which I take him to be making, namely, that no action or instance of 9 is thoroughly "private" and that no individual acts in a thoroughly 
~ 98 
private fashion. 
-
experimentation, all of which are social ir. origin, at least in terms of 
the conununity of scientists of which he is a member. In other words, in 
his activity he adopts procedures and utilizes instruments which are 
socially derived. In this respect also his behavior is far from private; 
it shares in the structure of the society in which he is located. 
98 
Similar sorts of statements could be made concerning religious be-
havior as a so-called "private" form of action, as Marx indicates in the 
sixth thesis on Feuerbach. Religious action seems at first glance to in-
volve a private relation between the individual and some object which he 
considers divine and therefore worshipful. But upon examination one notes 
that this sort of action, if brought to term, does result in some kinds of 
products (e.g., rituals and rites) which render it accessible to obser-
vation and appropriation by others - in a word, social. Again, religious 
behavior participates in the society in which worshipers are located, 
through its belonging to those forms of action which the society in gen-
eral constitutes as appropriate for worship. Additionally, cf. Geo. 
Kline, "Hegel and the Marxist-Leninist Critique of Religion," in Darrel E. 
Christensen (ed.), Hegel and the Philosophy of Religion, The Wofford 
Symposium (Martinus Nijhoff: The Hague, 1970), p. 195. Professor Kline 
correctly notes that Marx' concept of religion involves an "Absterbens-
theorie," that, "In Marx, religion stirbt ab, dies out, or whithers away; 
it negates itself, although the 'self elimination of religion' may be in-
terpreted as 'elimination by the objective movement of history."' For 
Marx, religion is an " ••• historically transient phenomenon, inextricably 
bound up with the socio-economic system of capitalist (and pre-capitalist) 
exploitation, and doomed to 'whither away' with the approach of a non-
exploitative, classless economic system." But the point here is that 
through 'pre-historical' social development religion is for Marx pre-
cisely an, ·experience which is 'inextricably' related to the various social 
contexts in which it occurs. Thus for Marx religious behavior is in no 
meaningful sense of the term a private act of the individual. 
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is important to see the role which this assertion plays in 
Marx' general argument. As I read the texts, Marx is not attempting to 
construct some new argument through which he might deduce this assertion 
as a conclusion. Rather, he is utilizing the assertion that no act is 
thoroughly private, as implied by the examples of scientific and religious 
praxis, to indicate a further, and to him more profound, dimension of 
the claims previously discussed concerning the relation of society and 
praxis. This more profound dimension of Marx' arglllllents involves the 
notion that praxis and society are mutually implicative. No action is 
a private action because all praxis, given its structure and the nature 
of its resulting product, opens the way towards a relation between the 
agent and the other. All action opens the possibility for interaction. · 
Conversely, all praxis qccurs in specified and describably forms, and 
this specification is the result both of those needs which are the ground 
of praxis for the individual agent, and of the society in which the agent 
is located. Society organizes the sorts of praxis which occur within it, 
and thus constitutes certain forms of praxis as appropriate for the satis-
faction of certain needs. Or, the interactive context in which praxis 
occurs conditions the character of that instance of praxis. 
Society and praxis, then, are for Marx integral components of a 
single subject matter which Marx wishes to examine. He does not claim 
that praxis is the historical origin of society, which then goes on to 
determine the character of praxis. Rather, Marx would assert of the re-
lation of praxis and society the same statement which he makes concerning 
his analysis of the dialectical division of satisfaction of needs, 
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production of new needs, and the origin of the family in the German 
Ideology, to wit, that, "These .•• aspects of social activity are not of 
course to be taken as ••• different stages, but just, as I have said, as 
••• aspects or, to make it clear to the Germans ••• 'moments,' which have 
existed simultaneously since the dawn of history and the first men, and 
still assert themselves in history today. 1199 
Society and praxis mutually and necessarily compliment each other 
in Marx' analysis, and each in its turn accounts for certain properties 
as belonging to the other. Praxis accounts for the possibility of 
society, and for society as being fundamentally a system of productive 
relations among agents. Society accounts for the organization of praxis 
into definite and describably historical forms. Thus the agent is neces-
sarily a social agent, and praxis is necessarily conditioned by the 
social context in which it occurs. Once we see this, we can also see 
the full force of Marx" acsertion lhat_, "To be avoided above all is es-
cablishirig 'society' once again as an abstraction over against the indi-
vidual. The individual.is the 'social being •••• The expression of his life 
even if it does not appear innnediately in the form of a connnunal ex-
pression carried out together with others - is therefore an expression an 
assertion of social life."lOO 
99Marx-Engels, The German Ideology, Pascal, pp. 17-18; MEGA, Abt. 1, 
Bd. 5, pp. 18-19. 
lO~arx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 306; MEGA, 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 117. 
\ 
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As a post-script to this idea, one may also see that, for Marx, 
society provides the one and only environment in which certain· needs, 
which for him are crucial cases of human needs, can arise for the indi-
vidual. Among these crucial cases are the needs of the individual for 
love and friendship. Roger Garaudy is quite correct in noting that, 
given Marx' understanding of the broad social character of human re-
lations, neither notions of love or hostility can be used by Marx as 
concepts of the most fundamental sorts of relationships between persons, 
in terms of which other sorts of relations can be critically examined.IO! 
'~hese relations (i.e., love and hostility), are established between men 
102 by the nature which encompasses them and which is their common work." 
In other words, the structure of social agency itself provides norms 
whereby various sorts of human relations can be critically examined, and 
no specific relation can be used in itself as the conceptual foundation 
of such a norm. However, once this proviso is taken, Marx is willing to 
103 
point out, as Garaudy himself notes, that love, (and I think friend-
hi b . li . ) 104 f h 1 i h i . 11 s p y imp cation , are cases o uman re at ons t at are er tica y 
101 
Cf. Roger Garaudy, Perspectives de !'Homme (Paris: Presses 
Universitaire de France, 1969), p. 206. 
102 
Ibid. My translation. 
103 
Cf. Ibid., p. 265. 
104 
Cf. John Macmurray, The Self as Agent (London: Farber and Farber 
Ltd., 1953), p. 15. When Macl{lurray asserts in this volume that, "All 
meaningful knowledge is for the sake of action, and all meaningful action 
is for the sake of friendship," I take him to be making two assertions 
with both of which Marx would agree thoroughly. That Marx incl1nes 
\ 
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important. For example, Marx asserts of the relation of love between 
man and woman that, "From this relationship one can thus judge the en-
tire level of man's development •••• It ••• indicates the extent to which 
man's natural behavior has become human or the extent to which his human 
existence has become a natural essence for him, the extent to which his 
h b ,,105 human nature as ecome nature for him. 
Now the factor to be noted here is that, for Marx, the development 
of a need beyond that of biological subsistence requires for Marx, among 
other conditions, the presence of some relevant characteristic in the 
environment that may elicit that need as a need for the agent. This has 
already been noted above, in showing that, for Marx, initial modifications 
of an environment provide the environment with those features which 
give rise to new needs in the agent. An environment then which would 
give rise to the needs for love and friendship must be one which involves 
relevant features of interpersonality, i.e., one in which some real inter-
action between personal agents occurs. .Such an environment is, by 
towards the second, which is our question for the moment, can be seen in 
a text already cited from the "Excerpt-Notes of 1844," in which Marx dis-
cusses the ideal of the relationship between the agent as producer and 
the personal other as appropriator of the product. There Marx states that 
my basic satisfaction in the other's appropriation of my product is my 
knowledge that I have "created an object appropriate to the need of 
another hilman being." (Easton and Guddat, p. 281, MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, 
P• 546). The point here is that Marx describes as~ideal a relation in 
which my satisfaction is derived from the need of the other in virtue of 
an object which I have produced relevant to that need. And the notion of 
friendship as a fundamental and critical human relationship seems deriv-
able from this idea of Marx. 
105 
Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 303; MEGA, 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 133. This passage, widely used as an indication of 
Marx' "humanism" indicates at least that for Marx the love relationship is 
-- one of crucial importance. 
r 
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definition, society. Thus society is the necessary for the emergence of 
106 
such crucial cases of human needs as friendship and love. . 
Up to this point, then, we have considered three propositions of 
central importance to Marx' view of the relation of society and praxis: 
a) that society is rendered possible in virtue of the structure of praxis; 
b) that society in turn organizes the sorts of praxis occurring within it, 
and thus conditions the sorts of praxis available to its members; and c) 
that no act, or instance or praxis, is in a litera+ sense of the term a 
"private" act; or that all praxis. is in some sense social. I take these 
three propositions, and the arguments supporting them, to be the kernel of 
his doctrine concerning the relation of praxis and society. In addition 
to these, however, two other propositions concerning the relation of 
society and the agent need to be taken into account. I want now to con-
sider them. 
The first of these propositions concerns Marx' concept of "totali-
~ation," and may be stated as follows: in society there is a "division of 
106 
Marx argues against Prudhon that all human needs are social, and 
thus historically variable. His point is that since all human needs are 
pistorically variable, then no such need can be posited as historically or 
~ulturally universal. But it seems that Marx contradicts himself here on 
~wo grounds. First, in discussing friendship and love as crucial human 
Peeds, he seems to posit these needs as universally present to human agency 
~Otherwise, why would the alienation of man from other men which Marx dis- I 
usses in the 1844 Manuscripts be a case of alienation at all?) Second, 
n positing society as the necessary environment for the eliciting of these 
leeds Marx seems to further posit the need for society as an historically 
Jniversal need of the agent. Is this not a contradiction of Marx' con-
ention that all human needs are historically variable? 
i 
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labor," an extension of the varieties of praxis, opening the possibility 
h li . 107 f h for t e tota zation o t e agent. 
One of Marx' more notorious statements concerning "totalization" 
occurs in the German Ideology, in a discussion on the effects of "division 
of labor," in the pejorative sense of that term. There Marx tells us that 
klivision of labor effects a social condition in which, "man's O';m deed be-
comes an alien power opposed to him, which enslaves him instead of being coa-
trolled by him. For as soon as labor is distributed each man has a par-
ticular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon him and from 
which he cannot escape. He is a hunter, a fisherman, a shepherd, or a 
critical critic, and must remain so if he does not want to lose the means 
f h . li l"h d 11108 o is ve 1 oo •••• Division of labor here denotes a social con-
~ition in which forms of labor are "distributed" variously among members 
of the social system, and a condition in which each of these members is 
~arced, for reasons of subsistence, to perform his own form of labor to 
~he exclusion of all other forms. Marx contrasts this state of affairs 
~ith that of communist society: 
••• while in communist society, where nobody has one 
· exclusive sphere of activity but each can become accom-
phished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the 
general production and thus makes it possible for me to 
107 
Of course, for this proposition to be fully intelligible, 
'totalization" must be defined, a definition of this term will be worked I 
~ut through an examination of the argument which Marx uses to support this 
llssertion. It will be seen that the term "division of labor" can be used iIJ 
wo senses for Marx. 
108 Marx-Engels, The German Ideology, Pascal, p. 22; MEGA, Abt. 1, 
Bd. 5, p. 22. 
do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in 
the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the 
evening, criticize after dinner, just as I have a mind, 
without159er becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd, or critic. . 
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It is in this highly utopian statement that Marx sets forth 
totalization as an ideal goal for man in communist society. However, the 
utopian elements of Marx' assertion can be taken as metaphorical in the 
110 
context of the argument of the German Ideology. The true sense of 
this statement can be seen in Marx' contrast of the condition of the 
agent in a society pejoratively characterized by division of labor, and 
that of the agent in "communist society~" And that contrast involves at 
least this: that the agent as member of a society characterized by "di-
vision of labot" is limited in terms of the forms of productive activity 
available to him, and thus limited in the sorts of needs which he may 
satisfy through his action; while the agent as member of a social system 
in which labor is not so "distributed" is free to undertake a variety of 
forms of productive actions towards the satisfaction of a variety of 
disparate needs. Productive activites in this context may assume direc-
tion toward disparate ends such as organic subsistence (agriculture and 
109 
Ibid. 
110 
Cf. Marx-Engels, The German Ideology, Pascal, p. 26; MEGA, Abt. 1 
Bd. 3, p. 25, Marx himself would certainly wish that the "utopian' ele- 1 
ments of this statement be interpreted metaphorically. In a later passag11 
of The German Ideology, in which Marx is attempting to establish com- I 
munism as a science, he states that, "Communism is not for us a stable 
state which is to be established, an ideal to which reality will ha. ve to I 
adjust itself. We call communism the real movement which abolishes the 
present state of things. The conditions for this movement result from 
the premisses now in existence." 
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husbandry), recreation, and philosophical criticism. Totalization for 
Marx, then, involves the ability of the agent to act fruitfully in a 
variety of fashions towards the satisfaction of disparate needs. 
This understanding of totalization in Marx is reiterated by Marek 
Fritzhand, "What did Marx intend when he proclaimed the ideal of a 'total' 
man?" Fritzhand asks. "First, he meant the overcoming of the 'fractional 
zation,' 'fragmentation,' and 'functionalization' of modern man caused by 
111 
the institution of private property and the social division of labor." 
And Fritzhand goes on from this to state something of what he takes to be 
the positive content of Marx' concept of totalization. 
The "total" man is a complete man, whose self realization 
knows no bounds. He is a human individual not separated 
by private property from the world of culture and civili-
zation. The totality of that human being consists in his 
"possession" of that total world-possession understood here 
as the fullest possible share in the creation and enjoyment 
of the goods of civilization and culture.112 
This interpretation is consistent with the understanding of totalization 
offered above. Totalization as a possibility for the agent is contrasted 
here to-the condition of the agent in a society in which labor is "dis-
tributed" or "divided." Further, totalization is noted as a feature of 
"self-realization" or self actualization, i.e., the satisfaction of needs 
through agency and the production of new needs. And in speaking of a 
"self realization" which "knows no bounds," and individual enjoying 
"possession of that total world," Fritzhand indicates the capacity of the 
111 
Marek Fritzhand, "Marx' Ideal of Man," in Socialist Humanism, ed. 
Erich Fromm, p. 174. 
112 
Ibid. 
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agent to perform varieties of forms of praxis towards the satisfaction 
of disparate needs. 
One difficulty with these statements, however, has to do with their 
consistency with Marx' refusal to postulate utopian ideals for communist 
society, or for the condition of the individual within such society. 
Fritzhand refers to Marx' concept of "totalization" in the above text as 
an "ideal," and indeed Marx' own rhetoric in the text from the German 
Ideology seems to indicate that he is positing an ideal of utopian 
character. But in the German Ideology itself Marx argues that, "Com-
munism is not for us a stable state which is to be established, an ideal 
to which reality will have to adjust itself. We call communism the real 
movement which abolishes the present state of things. The conditions of 
.. 
. . .. 113 h this movement result from premises now in existence. In ot er words, 
the concept of totalization, as a postulate describing the condition of 
the individual in communist society, must have its foundation in those 
premises which describe society in general, and the relation of individual 
praxis and society. In other words, the concept of totalization must be 
in some sense derivable from these assertions concerning the relation of 
society and praxis which have already been seen. 
The concept of totalization can be derived from Marx' analysis of 
the fundamental relation of praxis and society in two ways. The first of 
these takes its source from the premise that society organizes the forms 
of praxis occurring within it; the second from the premise that praxis 
113 
Marx-Engels, op. cit., loc. cit. 
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itself implies the possibility of social relations. 
Marx' first argument justifying the concept of totalization be-
gins with the premise that, as a system of organization of praxis, 
society necessarily organizes and involves a plurality of diverse sorts 
of activities, and of diverse sorts of subjectively located needs cor-
responding to these activities. Initially praxis aims at the satis-
faction of those needs relating to biological subsistence, " ••• before 
everything else eating and drinking, a habitation, clothing, and many 
other things. The first historical act is thus the production of the 
means to satisfy these needs, the production of material life itself.~14 
Even at this level of praxis, a limited range of diverse actions and 
needs occur as can be seen by Marx' enumeration of the several items 
requisite for the sustinence of the human organism. And thus the 
society which organizes praxis even on a primitive level organizes a 
limited plurality of disparate activities. 
But a more crucial recognition of the idea that society organizes 
praxis in terms of disparate forms of action is had when one remembers 
that, for Marx, a result of the satisfaction of biological or "first 
level" needs is that "new needs are made."115 The agent and the en-
vironment are, in virtue of that action which satisfies subsistence 
needs, modified (or in Marx' terminology "actualized) such that the 
114 
Marx-Engels, The German Idelogy, Pascal, P• 16; MEGA, Abt. 
Bd. 5, p. 17. 
115 
Marx-Engels, The German Ideology, Pascal, p. 17; MEGA. Abt. 
Bd. 5, p. 18. 
1, 
1, 
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agent is now capable of being the subject of needs of a more complex 
sophisticated variety, and the environment is capable of sustaining 
action towards the satisfaction of these new needs. Such new needs and 
forms of action may include the production of tools and techniques which 
render more efficient existing means for the satisfaction of subsistence 
needs, the development of new means towards the satisfaction of sub-
sistence need,116 the formation of rites and rituals occurring in re-
lation to the productive activities of a society, lending these activ-
ities and aesthetic (and religious) significance,117 and the formation 
of creative means for the utilization and enjoyment of leisure time. 
Now the development of new needs and forms of action such as these 
does not obliterate those needs and actions which relate to subsistence 
within a society. On the contrary, needs relating to and actions aimed 
at subsistence of necessity remain a part of the productive composition 
of the social system, only now they are integrated with new needs and 
forms of action of a more complex and sophisticated variety. According 
to Marx, as a system of organization of praxis, society for Marx organize 
and integrates both those forms of action which relate to subsistence, 
and those which relate to more developed and sophisticated needs produced 
116 
For example, the development of an agricultural mode of pro-
duction out of a society previously geared to hunting and gathering. A-
nother example of this point is the historical development of land dis-
tribution and utilization within agricultural societies, which Marx point 
out in the section of the Grundrisse entitled "Pre-capitalist-Economic 
Formations," Hobsbwam, pp. 68-80; Grundrisse, pp. 375-384. 
117 
Fritzhand, op. cit., loc. cit., p. 174. points out that for 
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as a result of the satisfaction of subsistence needs. And thus the forms 
of action which the social system organizes can be seen to be a plur-
ality of activities of a more widely disparate character. 
The idea of society as necessarily relating and integrating a 
plurality of disparate forms of action can also be justified by Marx in 
terms of his assertion that, along with the development of more complex 
forms of action within the social system, there occurs the development 
of specific forms of social relatbns between persons. These developing 
relations facilitate the performance of productive activity, and must in 
turn be systematized by the society as a whole. The first and foremost 
example of such relations is the family. 
The third circumstance which, from the very first, enters 
into historical development, is the men, who daily remake 
their own life, begin to make other men to propagate their 
kind: the relation between man and wife, parents and chil-
dren: the Family. The family which to begin with is the 
only social relationship, becomes later, when increased 
needs create new social relationships and the increased 
population new needs, a subordinate one ••• and then must be 
treated and analyzed according to the existing empirical 
data.118 
The point which Marx wishes to make here is that the development of 
new needs and forms of action resulting from the satisfaction of the 
requirements of subsistence involves more than simply the appearance of 
Marx the 'total man' is one who " ••• does not distinguish between work and 
enjoyment." One interesting way of understanding this is to see that I 
work can be ritualized in a fashion so as to attain aesthetic signifi- I 
cance. This notion, which might be involved in an attempt to do history I 
from a Marxian perspective, is verifiable at least with regard to primi-
tive and feudal societies. 
118 
Bd. 5 
Marx-Engels, The German Ideology, Pascal, p. 17; MEGA, Abt. 2, 
--, 
• 18. 
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·new sorts of activities which might ordinarily, and for Marx much too 
narrowly, be entitled "productive forms of action." In addition to the 
growing complexity of needs and actions there also emerges definite forms 
of social relations within which production occurs. These forms of 
social relations are, for Marx, products, in that they are the results 
of agency, albeit that agency here takes the form of interaction with 
other agents. Such relations provide contexts for unique forms of ac-
tion$, and for the satisfaction of definite needs. And again, such re-
lations, while they seem to be synonymous with society itself -- i.e., 
a system of interactive relations within which productive agency is or-
ganized -- are also factors which are developed and systematized by the 
119 larger society within which they occur. 
Through this analysis Marx establishes that society is necessarily 
a context in which a plurality of disparate forms of action are available 
to its members. These forms of action, or praxis, include activities 
aimed at the satisfaction of subsistence requirements, aesthetic, recre-
ational, or indeed intellectual forms of action rooted in needs which 
developed as the results of the satisfaction of subsistence needs, and 
activities appropriate to characteristically interpersonal settings, such 
as the family. 
119 
Cf. Ibid. Marx clearly points this out with regard to the 
family, in stating that, "The family which to begin with is the only 
social relationship, becomes later, when increased needs create new 
social relationships, a subordinate one ••• and then must be treated and 
analyzed according to the existing empirical data •••• " That is to say, 
given the historical development of societies, the family can only ac-
curately be understood through an examination of its relations. to other 
r 
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Given this analysis, Marx can justify the idea of "totalization" 
as follows. Since society organizes praxis in this fashion, it offers 
to its members as individual agents the possibility of engaging a 
variety of activities, towards the satisfaction of distinct needs of 
which the agent is subject. Further more, since society is the necessary 
environment within which the agent exists, and since society is a con-
text within which disparate forms of action are possible, society con-
stitutes the agent as subject of various and distinct needs, correlative 
to the distinct sorts of ac.tivities which it renders available to the 
agent. The premise to be kept in mind here is that needs arise for an 
agent from two sources: from the individual's own action, and satis-
faction of prior needs; and from the environment within which action 
occurs. It is the environment as source of needs that is at issue here. 
As composed of a variety of available forms of action, society renders 
the agent the subject of a variety of needs which the various forms of 
action possible in his social milieu are capable of satisfying. Thus 
the individual agent, as member of society, is in principle capable of 
engaging in various sorts of activities, towards the satisfaction of dis-
parate needs which are his own. 
Thus the possibility of totalization as defined above is, for 
Marx founded in the general structure of society, and the relation of 
society and praxis. "Total man" is not an ideal postulate descriptive 
of the condition of the individual in a utopian conununist society, but 
a state of affairs which society renders in principle possible for its 
features of the social system, because it is from these relations that th 
famil derives its ch9_r · 
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members, albeit that some "pre-historical" societies simultaneously offer 
this possibility to their members and deny it to them through an enforced 
"division of labor." Interestingly enough in this connection, Fritzhand 
notes that Marx objects to only one sense of division of labor, that 
sense in which forms of labor are severally distributed to persons in an 
enforced fashion, such that persons are capable of significantly engaging 
in one form of action, exclusive of others. 
Marx was aware of the need for a division of labor and of 
it significance for the development of mankind. He was not 
against a voluntary division of labor which would do justice 
to the desires, inclinations, talents, and individuality of 'I 
htunan beings. He disapproved only of a compulsory division I 
of labor which condemns people to work in the same treadmill, 'I 
doing the same things and performing the same functions all 
their lives. This division of labor has "assumed a life of 
its own." It has alienated itself from human beings, con-
strained their powers, limited their lives and their possi-
bilities of choice.120 
Marx, then, approves of a social division of labor in which the agent acts 
in keeping with volition, and in terms of which he is capable of per-
forming various compatible sorts of activities towards the satisfaction 
of the several distinct needs which he possesses. He approves of a con-
dition whose possibility is founded in the general structure of society 
itself, in which the individual, as Marx metaphorically puts it, "Hunt in 
the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize 
ft di 11121 a er nner •••• 
120 
Fritzhand, op. cit., loc. cit., p. 174. 
121 
Marx-Engels, The German Ideology, Pascal, p. 22; MEGA, Abt. 1, 
Bd. 5, p. 22. 
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This interpretation of "total man" is one generally held by the 
commentators on Marx' texts. And it is undoubtedly the major significanc 
which Marx attaches to the concept. I would claim, however, that a 
second aspect of the concept of totalization is suggested by Marx in his 
discussion of division of labor. In a text already cited, Marx states 
that one result of a "division of labor" pejoratively taken is that, 
"man's own deed becomes an alien power opposed to him, which enslaves 
him instead of being control~ed by him. 11122 Marx's idea here is that, 
as a member of a society in which forms of labor are distributed in a 
compulsory and exclusive fashion, the agent is unable to recognize his 
action as the result of his own choice. He recognizes his action as 
imposed upon him, and thus as a phenomenon opposed to him rather than 
being of his own authorship. And Fritzhand echoes this idea when he 
comments: "This division of labor has 'assumed a life of its own.' It 
has alienated itself from human beings, constrained their powers, limited 
their lives and their possibilities of choice. 11123 If the agent's own 
activity is recognized by him as imposed rather than as embodying his 
own volition, if they seem opposed to him rather than being of his own 
authorship, then such activity has, from the point of view of the agent, 
"assumed a life of its own." And one result of this is that society, 
which is indeed made possible by praxis and is itself the product of 
interactions among agents, comes to be recognized as a reality apart 
122 
Ibid. 
123 
Fritzhand, op. cit., loc. cit., p. 174. 
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from and opposed to the agent as individual, both because it is here 
a product of activities which already seem opposed to him, and because 
it is that force which "distributes" forms of action according to a 
124 
formula of the "division of labor." 
One may infer that for Marx the concept of totalization includes 
the agent's capacity to recognize his own activity and his society as 
124 
Cf. Berger and Luck.mann, op. cit., p. 89. The topic under dis-
cussion here is well sunnnarized by Berger and Luckmann under the heading 
"reification." "Reification is the apprehension of human phenomena as if j 
they were things, that is, in non-human or possibly supra-human terms. I 
Another way of saying this is that reification is the apprehension of the i'.I 
products of human activity as if they were something else than human pro-
ducts - such as facts of nature: cosmic laws, or manifestations of divine I 
will. Reification implies further that man is capable of forgetting his 
1
[ 
own authorship of the human world, and further, that the dialectic be-
tween ~an the producer, and his products, is lost to consciousness. The 
reified world is, by definition, a dehumanized world. It is experienced 
by man as a strange facticity, an opus alienum over which he has no con-
trol.i rather than as the opus proprium of his own activity." For 
r~asons given above, Marx would hold that one result of the division of 
labor, i.e., the social condition which inhibits the realization of "total! 
man" in practice, is reification as described by Berger. This reification· 
extends to two fronts: one apprehends both his own activity and the 
society in which he is located as, in Berger's terminology, "opera aliena, 
rather than as being of his own authorship, as "opera propria" of his own 
action. But on the other hand, and appearances to the contrary, one's 
own actions as well as the society in which he is located are respec-
tively of his own authorship and product of his interactions. The over-
coming of division of labor as that condition which inhibits the actua-
lization of "total man," would also mean the overcoming of the agent's 
apparent and reified apprehension of his own activities and of his social 
world. 
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of his own authorship, in virtue of the overcoming of that division of 
labor which renders this recognition impossible. The concept of totali-
zation, then, includes both the capacity to act in a variety of signifi-
cant fashions towards the satisfaction of disparate needs, and the cap a-
city to recognize his own actions and his social world as being of his 
authorship. 125 Both these aspects of totalization are founded in own 
the general explanation of the relation of society and praxis Marx pro-
vides, and both are actualized through the .. overcoming of "division of la-
bor" in its pejorative sense. The latter is expressed by Marx in his 
dictum that, "The individual and generic life of man are not dis.tinct, 
however much -- and necessarily so ~ the mode of existence of individual 
life is either a more particular or more general mode of generic life, or 
generic life a more particular or universal mode of individual life. 11126 
125 
Cf. Gajo Petrovic, "Marx' Theory of Alienation," Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, 1962-63, 23 (2), p. 421. Also cf. Petrovic, j 
Marx in the Mid-Twentieth Century (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1967), I 
pp. 144-145. In these essays, Petrovic argues that the crucial forms of ! 
alienation for the Marx of the 1844 Manuscripts are the alienation of the I 
self from its own actions, and the alienation of the self from society. 
Both of these forms of alienation, I would argue, are forms which Marx 
discusses as arising from 'division of labor' and both are overcome in 
the actualization of the 'total man.' 
126 
Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844, " in Easton and Guddat, p. 306; MEGA, 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 117. Cf. Lefebvre, Dialectical Materialism, p. 148, 
p. 150, pp. 161-162. It is interesting to note the Henri Lefebvre treat- I! 
ment of totalization in Dialectical Materialism dicusses the concept ex- ! 
elusively in terms of the relation of man to nature. He correctly notes 1 
that for Marx, man, i.e., the human agent, exists in a necessary relation j 
to the non-human other, nature, as the context of his activity. (p. 148) II 
Through this relation, man, "produces himself through his activity ••• " 1 
(p. 148) and produces as the result of his activity on nature, " ••• a 
world, an organized experience •• .'' (p. 150) an environment which is 
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My consideration of totalization has been an examination of one 
of two propositions through which Marx explicates the relation of the 
organized through the labor of the agent and satisfies his needs. Now 
for Lefebvre, to produce a "world" in this sense is to overcome the other-
ness and externali ty of nature, to "humanize nature," (p. 150) , to 
realize nature as a source of human self-satisfaction. And, Lefebvre 
argues, it is man as so realizing nature whom Marx entitles "total man."" 
The total man is both the subject and object of the Becoming. He is the 
living subject who is opposed to the object and who surmounts this op-
position. He is the subject who is broken up into partial activities 
and scattered determinations and who surmounts this dispersion. He is the 
subject of action, as well as its final object, its product even if it 
does seem to produce external products." (pp. 161-162) I would suggest 
that, while Lefebvre's comments are accurate with regard to Marx' con-
cepts of praxis and self actualization, they are inaccurate because they 
are too broad in scope to his concept of totalization. Lefebvre offers 
a passing nod to "total man" as an agent capable of engaging in a variety 
of activites towards the satisfaction of disparate needs, but he does not 
seem to see this as essential meaning to totalization, which, I suggest, 
Marx clearly does. Further, Lefebvre does not include in the concept 
of totalization the agent's apprehension of his own actions and of his 
social world as being of his own authorship, a significance which the 
concept does have for Marx. Finally, Lefebvre argues that the condition 
of totalization is rooted in the relationship of the agent to nature. 
But the sense of Marx' statements on the question seem clearly to indi-
cate that this condition is founded rather in the relation of the agent 
to society, and that it is the general structure of society which renders 
totalization a state of affairs which is in principle possible. For 
Marx, I think, to assert that totalization is rooted in the relation of 
the agent to nature would be too abstract an assertion, for it is only 
the structure of society, and the mediation of the agent's relation to 
nature by society, which renders totalization possible. And it is only 
an explanation of totalization in terms of a description of social 
structures which can show the former to be more than a mere utopian 
ideal, and thus a concept inadmissable within the framework of communism 
as a "science." 
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agent to society, beyond the three propositions which I take to form the 
kernel of his doctrine of the relation of society and praxis. A second 
important implication of this basic theory suggested in the 1844 
Manuscripts is that society provides a structure in which the agent is 
an object as well as a subject, thus further determining the content of 
his subjectivity. 
I take this claim to explain the sense of Marx' assertion in the 
1844 Manuscripts that, "A being which is not itself an object for a third 
being has no being for its object, that is, is not related objectively, 
its being is not objective, 1112 7 a thought which Marx completes by re-
128 
marking that, "An unobjective being is a nonentity." 
This assertion of Marx occurs in the section of the 1844 Manuscripts 
entitled "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy in General," in 
a passage offering extended critical analysis of Hegel's doctrine of 
consciousness, self-consciousness, objectivity, and the relation of con-
sciousness to its object. A thorough exposition of Marx' arguments in 
this passage will be offered in my fourth chapter, in which I will suggest 
that it is in terms of these arguments against Hegel that Marx explains 
and defends his concept of the fundamentality of praxis. For the moment, 
this passage needs to be examined only to the extent that it reveals an 
argument in support of the claim that society provides a structure in 
which the agent is an object as well as a subject. 
127 
Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 326; MEGA, 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 161. 
128 
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In order to clearly analyze this argument, brief comment must be 
made as to the meanings which Marx assigns to the terms "subject" and 
129 
"object." First, it is worth recalling that for Marx a requirement 
for the occurrence of all agency is a real relation between the agent and 
some external, maleable environment, "Nature," in Marx' sense of the term. 
Marx expresses this idea a few lines above the text in the Manuscripts 
now under study by stating that, "A being which does not have its nature 
outside itself is not a natural one and has no part in the system of 
nature. 11130 His meaning here, regarding the agent, is that the structure 
of praxis necessarily relates the agent to something outside himself, 
something in w)iich his labor is "externalized," and in which the details 
of his action are "resumed," i.e., the product. It is thus that the 
agent has a part in 'the system of nature." 
Correspondingly, nature too has its being "outside of itself": it 
129 
Cf. Marx, Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, ed. O'Malley, 
pp. 23-24; MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 1, Hb. 1, p. 426. That the meanings of 
"subject" and "object" are derived meanings is clear from this and other 
texts. In the passage referred to here, Marx asserts, in the contexts of 
an argument against Hegel, that "Subjectivity is characteristic of sub-
jects, and personality a characteristic of person. Instead of considering 
them to be predicates of their subjects, Hegel makes the predicates inde-
pendent and then lets them be subsequently and mysteriously converted into 
subjects." Now the import of this passage is that, if subjectivity is a 
'characteristic' of something else, then its meaning can only be deter-
mined through an examination of its real relation to that of which it is 
a determination. And mutatis mudandis, Marx would argue similarly concern 
ing the concept of the object. We shall see that, for Marx, both subjec-
tivity and objectivity are differentiations occurring within and deter-
minations of agency, and that they can only be understood accurately if 
they are examined as such determinations. 
130 
Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 326; MEGA, 
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is essentially related to the agent as that material upon which.he can 
exercise praxis, transforming items into products capable of satisfying 
needs which are his own. Marx adds that, "A being which has no object 
outside itself is not objective. 11131 
Now initially to speak of an "object" in this context is to speak 
of some item in nature which is external to the agent. But since the 
theme of this discussion is agency, praxis, the object may be defined as 
that in nature which, though external to the agent, is capable of being 
the material of his labor, of being transformed through his action, and 
thus coming into an essential relation to him. To be an object, then, 
is to be an item capable of being determined through the action of 
another, and thereby of coming into a relation with that other. The term 
"objective" in the above sentence is used in a sense already seen as 
characteristic of Marx, to indicate the "public" features of the object. 
An item is objective in that it is "external" with regard to the agent: 
an item which is available for observation, inspection, and in principle 
appropriation by someone other than the agent who has "transformed" it 
through his praxis. The product for Marx is by definition "objective" in 
this sense. 
With this seen, the meaning of "subjective" for Marx can also be 
determined. The subject is intitially one who has an "object outside 
itself," is essentially related to something other than itself. But again 
this relation is one of agency. Just as the object is that which is 
131 
Ibid. 
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capable of being transformed and determined through agency, so the sub-
ject is one capable of effecting that transformation and determination. 
Since all agency is rooted in needs and exercised towards the satis-
faction of needs, the subject is further the possessor of needs in which 
the responsibility for specific forms of agency is founded. The subject, 
then, is one who is a possessor of needs which he is capable of satis-
fying through action, thus being essentially related to nature as his 
"other." The specific "nature" of the subject is determined by the de-
tails of those needs which he possesses, and the forms of action through 
which he effects their satisfaction. 132 As an agent, he is a being which 
again has, "its nature outside itself," is a "part of the system of 
nature. 11133 
The 1.lllderstanding of the meanings of "subject" and "object" in 
Marx allow the analysis of his argument concerning a further·relation of 
society and the agent to proceed. The subject or agent forms a real 
part of the "system of nature," in that he is really and essentially re-
lated to items in nature, "objects." But this implies, first, that as a 
part of nature the subject is "obejctive": his actions as well as the re-
sults of his actions are in principle public and observable. It also im-
plies that, as an "objective" feature of the natural world, the subject 
himself is capable of receiving a further determination in that he is 
132 
This latter is essentially the case in that it is through actio 
that the agent achieves 'self actualization.' 
133 
Ibid. 
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capable of being the "object" of the activity of another. In other words 
the structure of the agent qua "objective" is determinable both as "sub-
ject," as one possessing needs and able to effect their satisfaction 
through action, and as "object," i.e., as an item upon which another agen 
,. 
can act towards the satisfaction of his own needs. 
This, as I see it, is the meaning of Marx' statement in this 
context that, "A being which is not itself an object for a third being 
has no being for its object, that is, is not related objectively, its 
being is not objective." 134 A necessary feature of the "objectivity" 
of the agent is its ability to be determined both as subject and as ob-
ject, its ability both to satisfy need through action, and to be that 
upon which another acts towards the satisfaction of his needs. Lefebvre 
sums up the idea in discussing this feature of the agent. "Since he has 
other beings for his object, this man is an object for other beings. He 
is at once a subject and an object which are opposed and yet inseparable: 
a material subject, objectively given in his organism and elementary 
biological consciousness, and thus containing a relation with other being 
who are, for him, the objects of his desire, but, in themselves, subjects 
a material object for these other beings. The fact that he is thus an 
object exposes natural man to the desires and aggressions of other living 
beings. 11135 
134 
Marx, op. cit., loc. cit. 
135 
Lefebvre, Dialectical Materialism, p. 116. 
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Consequently, for Marx, a structural feature of agency that the 
agent be determinable both as subject and object in the above described 
senses of these terms, and it is only in virtue of the latter determi-
nation that the "objectivity" of the agent can be located in some inter-
active and productive milieu with other agents, and allows him to attain 
real relations with them. Society is by definition such a milieu, and 
the agent is necessarily socially located. As necessarily located in an 
interactive context composed of other agents, the subject finds himself 
in an environment in which he may be determined as an object, acted upon 
towards the satisfaction of the needs of others. This can occur in eithez 
of two fashions. It may be seen that the result of the agent's praxis, hi~ 
product, is appropriated for use by another. In this case, the praxis 
of the agent and its result are treated by others as objects upon which 
to exercise their action. Here the producer may anticipate appropriation 
of his product by others and this anticipation may in part determine the 
details of his agency. And he may, in Marx' language, experience sat is-
faction in his work, in that it has "satisfied a human need, that it ob-
jectified human nature, that it created an object appropriate to the need 
of another human b i 11136 e ng. On the other hand, the agent may be the ob-
ject of actions rooted in needs of a more properly personal sort, such as 
136 
Marx, "Excerpt-Notes of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 281, 
~' Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 546. 
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137 friendship or love. Such relations may obtain between two or several 
agents, in situations of interaction in which the two or several agents 
are mutually the subjects of their own actions and the objects of the 
actions of others. In either case, it is necessary that the agent be 
located in an interactive milieu, and this condition is fulfilled by the 
agent's being socially located. Thus society renders the agent capable 
of being determined as object as well as subject. 
A remark must be added here with regard to Marx' statement that, 
"An unobjective being is a nonentity. 11138 This statement immediately 
follows Marx' assertion that a being which has an object must also be 
itself also "an object for a third being ••• ," and immediately preceeds 
his claim that an item which is not an object would occur in a state of 
non-relation, privacy, solitude. 139 To the extent that Marx' statement 
here is an explicitation of the structure of the agent in relation to 
society, I take it to be simply a further elucidation of his comments and 
arguments relative to the agent's public or "objective" character. The 
agent is in principle "objective" as a part of the "system of nature." 
But in order that this objectivity be realized in practice as well as in 
principle, the agent must be located in a context in which he and his pro-
ducts can be inspected and appropriated by others, or, in a context in 
137 
As noted above, p. 58, these sorts of needs are crucial cases 
of human needs, for Marx. It is most appropriate, then, that he explain 
how the agent is capable of being the object as well as the subject of 
actions rooted in needs of this variety. 
138 Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 326; MEGA, 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 161. 
139Ibid. 
-82-
which he may be determined as object as well as subject. In other words, 
objectivity can only actually occur for the agent if he is socially lo-
cated, or that it is only in terms of the concept of society that ob-
jectivity as a characteristic of the agent makes sense. Marx sums 
this up in the manuscripts by stating that,"To be objective, natural, 
sentient, and at the same time to have an object, nature, and sense out-
side oneself or to be oneself object, nature, and sense for a third per-
. d h h" ,,140 son is one an t e same t ing. 
This concludes my analysis of Marx' views of the relation of soc:iety 
and praxis. To resume, I have analyzed five assertions, three of which 
describe significant effects which Marx conceives society as having on 
the agent. These propositions are: a) that society is rendered possible 
in virtue of the structure of praxis; b) that society in turn organizes 
the sorts of praxis occurring within it, and thus conditions the sorts 
of praxis available to its members; c) that no act, or instance of praxis 
is in a literal sense of the term a thoroughly "private" act; d) that 
society yields a "division of labor," an extension of the possibilities 
of praxis, opening the possibility for the totalization of the agent; 
and e) that society provides a structure in which the agent is determined 
as an object as well as a subject. I claimed at the beginning of this 
chapter that the concepts of praxis, society, and consciousness are the 
key concepts in terms of which Marx constructs a theory of man. I turn 
next to a consideration of Marx' concept of consciousness. 
140 
Ibid. 
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III. Marx' Concept of Consciousness 
Marx' writing on the critical question of human consciousness in 
the 1844 Manuscripts and other texts suffers from being more of ten po-
lemical than argunentative. He seems to be as much interested in de-
fending his position against such opponents as Hegel, 141 Feuerbach, 142 
143 
and Stimer, as he is in justifying his own position. Nevertheless, 
a close reading of the texts shows that a doctrine of consciousness is 
of crucial importance to Marx' thought. At one point in the 1844 Manu-
scripts, he asserts that, " ••• free conscious activity is the species 
144 
characteristic of man." A little later he states that, "Conscious 
life activity distinguishes man immediately from the life activity of the 
animal. Only thereby is he a species being. Or rather, he is only a 
conscious being - that is, his own life is an object for him - since he 
145 
is a species being." 
Statements such as these show unquestionably that Marx' theory 
of man involves a significant doctrine of consciousness. Other texts mak 
141 
Cf. for example, that section of the Paris Manuscripts devote 
to Marx' critique of Hegel. 
142 Cf. for example, the first of the "Theses on Feuerbach," in 
Easton and Guddat, p. 400-401; MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 5, p. 534. 
143 
Cf. for example, Marx-Engels, The German Ideology, Pascal, 
p. 29; MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 5, p. 28. 
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Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 294; 
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it equally plain that Marx wishes to integrate his doctrine of conscious-
ness with the doctrines of praxis and society. In the succeeding pages, 
I shall maintain that, analogous to his theory of society, Marx' doctrine 
of consciousness can be expressed in three propositions, which together 
with their supporting arguments offer an overall schema of this doctrine. 
These propositions are: a) that consciousness is an aspect or moment of 
human praxis; b) that consciousness is an essential moment thereof; c) 
that as praxis is conditioned by society, so consciousness is conditioned 
by society. 
To best understand the first of these proposidom we would do 
well to recall Marx' general doctrine of praxis as outlined above, and 
to riote again that, for Marx, it is through praxis that man attains his 
fundamental relation with his environment, and that it is in virtue of 
praxis that human self-actualization occurs. Men, "begin to distinguish 
themselves from animals ••• ," i.e., they begin to occur as men in the true 
sense of the term, "as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsis·-.!.1 
tence, a step which is conditioned by their physical organization. By 
producing their physical subsistence, men are indirectly producing their 
•f .. 146 h actual matieral 11 e. And he goes on to assert t at since praxis is 
the condition of theoccurrence of human experience, the identity of the 
individual is his actions. "As individuals express their life, so they 
.. 14 7 d f i are. In turn, while praxis requires nature as a con ition o ts 
146 
Marx-Engels, The German Ideology, Pascal, p. 7; ~' Abt. 1, 
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occurrence, nature itself is to be understood as that environment which 
is capable of being transformed through human agency, as that material 
out of which products can be produced. Nature is man's "inorganic body; 
1) as a direct means of life, and 2)as the matter, object, and instru-
ment of his life activity. 11148 Because praxis is the fundamental category 
in terms of which man, his relation to his environment, and that environ-
ment itself are to be understood, Livergood is correct in commenting 
that, "Reality, for Marx must be viewed as the redirective activity of 
human beings in relation to 'the changing conditions in external reality. 
Both the object and the subject are continually active; human history may 
be seen as the process in which the changes in material reality create 
new needs which in turn bring about human transformations of material 
reality. 11149 
If both the reality of the external environment and man himself 
are to be understood in terms of praxis, it would seem to follow that 
consciousness, as a feature of man, or as a feature of the occurrence of 
human experience, must in a Marxian framework be understood in terms of 
praxis. Now in its primary sense consciousness for Marx means the aware-
f 1 b . 150 ness o an externa o Ject. But, as Livergood points out, to speak of 
148 
Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 293; 
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N.D. Livergood, Activity in Marx' Philosophy (The Hague: Mar-
tinus Nijhoff, 1967), p. 20 
150 
This is clear from', among other things, Marx' criticisms of 
Hegel's doctrine of consciousness and its implications for a philosophical 
understanding of the object of consciousness, in the 1844 Manus~ripts. Cf. 
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the "real object" is to speak of that which is external to man and to 
which he is essentially related as an agent. It is to speak of that 
"nature" out of which man produces a world. Thus to say that consciousnes~ 
is of an "object" in this sense of the term, is to say that, what in vir-
tue of consciousness man is aware of and related to, is that which he is 
already related to as agent. 
Further, the "object" or "world" of which man is conscious, re-
ceives its fundamental determinations through praxis. Nature does not 
i d . 1 . h . 151 occur mme iate y in uman experience. Rather, Nature or the external 
environment occurs as mediated by praxis, as that environment which man 
for example Easton and Guddat, p. 320; MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, pp. 155-156, I 
Marx writes that "The human quality of nature, of nature produced through ,
1
, 
history and of man's products appears in their being products of abstract 
spirit and hence phases of mind, thought entities, The Phenomenology is II 
thus concealed and mystifying criticism •••• " Marx' point here is that, 
~iven Hegel's refusal to re~ognize consciousness as a feature of praxis, 
be is unable to describe the object of consciousness as anything more than I 
~n intelligible content, a concept, rather than a 'real' (read sensuous) 
, K>bject. But even in this context Marx implicitly admits that Hegel does 
~ecognize that it is necessary and fundamental to consciousness that it 
be awareness of an object. Indeed Marx' criticism of Hegel here, which 
will be analyzed in more detail in the fourth chapter, is that Hegel does 
recognize this, but is unable to offer an adequate philosophical account 
IOf it. 
151 
Cf. the first of Marx' "Theses on Feuerbach," in Easton and 
Guddat, p. 400; MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 5, p. 533. "The chief defect of all 
previous materialism (including Feuerbach's) is that the object, actu-
ality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object of per-
~eption (Anschauung), not as sensuous human activity, Practice (Praxis), 
not subjectively." This question epitomizes from the point of view of 
the question of perceptual consciousness Marx' doctrine of the relation-
ship between the agent and his environment, object, or "Nature." The 
object is, for Marx, always given to man as the object of praxis, as that 
~hich receives its fundamental determinations in virtue of praxis. Thus 
the object does not occur in human experience immediately, but rather 
occurs as mediated through agency, 
I 
I 
II 
,, 
,I 
I' 
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152 
"humanizes.'' The environment occurs always as a correlate of the 
agent, and moreover of the socially located agent. Society both con-
ditions and enhances the quality of his agency. 153 Thus that which con-
sciousness is conscious of is more primitively mediated by and determined 
by agency. This is to repeat the claim that the object of consciousness 
is more fundamentally the object of an agent. 
From this it is a short step to the proposition that consciousness 
is a moment or aspect of human praxis. Marx' position here is that to 
speak of consciousness is to speak of the subject's awareness of an object. 
But both the subject and object :are in a more fundamental sense constitute< 
and determined by -- Marx would say "produced" by -- praxis. Therefore 
consciousness is related to praxis in such a fashion that praxis holds 
primacy over consciousness in the relation between subject (agent) and 
object. The argument may be developed through the introduction of two 
headings under which Marx discusses consciousness as a moment or aspect 
of praxis. 
First, Marx asserts in a passage discussingthe result of praxis as 
"the objectification of his (man's) species life," that man "produces him-
self not only intellectually, as in consciousness, but also actively in a 
real sense and sees himself in a world he made. 11154 This assertion 
152 
Cf. Lefebvre, Dialectical Materialism, p. 150. 
153 
This of course inplies a relation between society and conscious-
ness; a relation I will examine in the discussion which follows. 
154 
Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 295; 
!MEGA, Abtl. 1, Bd. 3, p. 89. 
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involves a double edged intent. On the one hand, Marx is reiterating the 
familiar theme of objectification, that praxis results in an objective 
product which resumes the details of the agency of which it is the re-
sult, and that man thus actualizes himself as well as the "world." But 
on the other hand, a crucial feature of the idea of "self-actualization" 
is noted here. For in this text Marx is asserting that, while the 
production of consciousness is not the only feature of self actualization, 
and not even the most basic feature thereof, it is. nonetheless a feature 
thereof. In other words, Marx here asserts that consciousness is related 
to praxis in that consciousness is actualized or "produced" through praxis 
and that praxis is responsible for the self actualization of the indivi-
dual in general. 
An argument supporting this assertion may be formulated in the 
following manner. Self actualization may be understood as the actualiza-
tion of the agent's ability to enjoy productive and complex relations with 
his environment above and beyond those relations which fulfill subsistence 
155 
needs. Actions geared towards the fulfillment of subsistence require-
ments are indeed "human" forms of praxis, but are so when and only when 
they are integrated with actions, which are rooted in needs of a more 
complex variety, needs which develop as a result of prior satisfactions 
of the former sorts of requirements. 
Such actions certainly involve at least the production of "means 
155 
Cf. for example, Marx, "Manuscripts of i'844," in Easton and 
Guddat, p. 292; MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 86. 
,.156 
of subsistence. 
-89-
Even at the most primitive level they are geared 
towards the production of an environment, rather than the simple taking 
of what is offered in Nature. Indeed, a mere taking does not for Marx 
constitute an occurrence of human experience. The constitution of human 
experience requires the occurrence of relations to an environment more co 
plex than those barely required to maintain the organism. The crucial 
point to be noted here is that through such relations to the environment, 
new needs are "produced" or actualized through the satisfaction of sub-
sistence requirements. 157 
Now consciousness is a relation between subject and environment 
more complex than that required to maintain the bare subsistence of the 
organism, more complex than is required for the mere taking of sustaining 
items from nature. This is the case even for the limited awareness re-
quired to relate items in nature in terms of use, that required for the 
production of instruments or tools. Even this limited form of conscious-
ness involves a more than instinctual awareness of the qualities which 
given items possess,and the ability to relate them each to the other. 
156 
Marx-Engels, The German Ideology, Pascal, p. 7; MEGA, Abt. 1, 
Bd. 5, p. 10. 
157 
Cf. Marx-Engels, The German Ideology, Pascal, p. 16; MEGA, Abt. 
1, Bd. 5, p. 18. In an assertion previously noted, Marx states that with I 
regard to the satisfaction of subsistence needs, " ••• as soon as a need is I 
satisfied (which implies the action of satisfying and the acquisition of I 
an instrument), nevneeds are made, and this production of new needs is th~ 
first historical act." The import of this assertion is that it is only ! 
in virtue of the satisfaction of subsistence needs that more complex needs' 
are had by the agent, and thus that more complex relations of praxis be-
come possible between agent and environment. 
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But if so, and if relations between agent and environment more complex 
than those required for bare subsistence are "produced" as a result of 
forms of behavior which satisfy subsistence needs, then it follows that 
consciousness as a relation between agent and environment is a relation 
"produced" as a result of such forms of behavior. And if it is such forms 
of behavior or praxis which account for all senses of self actualization i 
the agent, then it is the case that consciousness is actualized or "pro-
duced" through that factor which is responsible for self-actualization in 
general, and that consciousness is related to praxis in virtue of the 
former's being made possible by the latter. 
A dual caveat must be issued here with regard to the notion of the 
"production" of consciousness resulting from the satisfaction of sub-
sistence needs. Marx does not, and can not, mean that consciousness is 
"produced" in the same way that an objective product is produced. I do 
not "make" consciousness in the same way that I'fnake" a house, by trans-
forming the qualities and relations of externally given items so that 
they fulfill a need of mine. Rather, Marx is speaking of the "production" 
of consciousness in the same way in which he speaks of the production of 
158 
new needs as qualities subjectively possessed by the agent. 
To speak of the production of a need for Marx is to speak of the 
developed ability of an agent to relate to his environment in a fashion 
IDlOre complex and sophisticated than was previously possible, as well as the 
tendency on the part of the agent to achieve this relation: needs are 
158 
Cf.~· 
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"natural capacities and vital powers of an active natural being. 11159 
Analogously, to speak of the "production" of consciousness is to speak 
of achieved ability of the agent, given certain inherent psychological 
. i 160 1 1 capacit es, to re ate to the environment in a fashion more comp ex 
than that required for the simple taking of items from nature. Marx 
is not speaking naively of the "production" of consciousness as one would 
in ordinary language speak of the "production" of an object. Rather, 
he means to indicate the developed ability of the subject to relate in 
a certain fashion to his environment, resultant upon definite forms of 
action. 
One must, I think, avoid reading the idea of a temporal sequence 
into Marx' discussion of the relation of consciousness and praxis at this 
point in his exposition. Marx is not asserting that an organism takes 
sustaining items from nature and then begins to produce the means of its 
own subsistence and then acquires new needs through which new and more 
complex relations of agency with its environment are subjectively founded, 
and then, realize a relationship of consciousness with its environment. 
In spite of the language of priority and posteriority employed above, 
159 
Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 325; 
MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 160. 
160 
Marx would no doubt assent to the idea that the ability to ac-
hieve conscious relations with the environment would in part depend on 
the organism's possession of a certain inherent and complex physiological 
structure. But given that, he would still insist that the achievement 
of the capacity, here consciousness, made possible by that structure must 
occur in terms of active or behavioral relations between agent and en-
vironment. 
---
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this is not at all Marx' meaning. 
He is rather attempting to understand the occurrence of human ex-
perience as a complex phenomenon in which a variety of factors must be 
distinguished, related to each other, and explained. Among these are 
praxis, which must be described in both its individual and social di-
mensions, the environment or nature, needs which subjectively ground 
actions, developed and more complicated needs resultant upon successful 
instances of agency, and consciousness as a relation between subject and 
environment. Now within this schema of categories praxis is the most 
theoretically basic to Marx, both because it provides for accurate des-
cription of the others, and because it provides the foundation for an 
account of the others. But this implies no notion of temporal sequence. 
It implies instead that the occurrence of human experience can only be 
properly understood through an accurate understanding of the dialectical 
interrelationships of these categories as they there appear. Indeed 
praxis itself in a Marxian scheme can only be understood through an 
analysis of how it involves and is dialectically interrelated with nature, 
needs, society, and consciousness. 
Given these two qualifications, then, one can state that for Marx, 
consciousness is actualized or "produced" through praxis. But Marx' 
discussion of the relation of consciousness and praxis may be further 
~xpanded under a second heading. This heading involves the thesis that 
consciousness is itself a form of action, and one intrinsically related 
to all other forms of agency which can be validly entitled instances of 
human praxis. This thesis can also be formulated as follows: that 
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consciousness is not a feature alien to the occurrence of human praxis, 
but a feature thereof implied by the structure of praxis as Marx describes 
it. To speak of praxis is among other things to speak of a process 
of agency whereby modifications are introduced into an environment. 
This is the case even at the most rudimentary level of production, that 
. 161 
relating to the production of "means of subsistence." Now even this 
162 
rudimentary sort of production is sufficiently complex to be iden-
tified as human praxis and distinguished from animal behavior. But some 
conditions are required in order for this basic transformation of the 
environment to occur. For one thing the agent must entertain some con-
scious awareness of the qualities possessed by items discovered in the 
environment, as well as the purpose he wishes to achieve through pro-
duction, and the way in which discovered items may be related to each 
other, and transformed in order to achieve that purpose. Otherwise all 
successful actions upon the environment would represent merely a hap-
hazard series of chance instances, and there would be nothing to dis-
tinguish productive agency from a simple "taking" of items. Furthermore, 
in order that such productive agency be a sustained rather than a chance 
series of intermittent events, the agent must possess consciousness of 
his actions and their results as well as of his purpose. He must be ca-
pable of learning which forms of action on the environment are successful 
161 
Marx-Engels, The German Ideology, Pascal, p. 7; MEGA, Abt. 1, 
Bd. 3, p. 10. 
162 
Ibid. 
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given certain ends in view, and which fonns do not succeed. 
This implies that consciousness for Marx is itself a kind of 
activity, a relation between subject and environment in virtue of 
which the subject deals with the environment. Basic conscious events 
occur at rudimentary levels of praxis; such events are acts of a sub-
ject whereby he relates to his environment and such relations of 
consciousness between subject and environment are part of the total 
process which Marx entitles praxis. "Knowledge, for Marx, is that 
activity of man whereby he comes into interaction with the world and 
understands it so as to transform it •••• Knowledge is an active process 
of apprehension which is necessarily linked to transformation of re-
ality •••• Knowledge (for Marx) is not material transformation of realityt 
Knowledge, however, is necessarily related to such transformation. 11163 
On the other hand, the structure of praxis itself implies the occurt-
ence of consciousness as an essential feature. In order that the pro-
cess which Marx entitles praxis be thoroughly described, or that the 
possibility of praxis be accounted for, consciousness must be located 
as an intrinsic feature of this process. But this is simply to say 
that upon thorough analysis the structure of praxis as Marx initially 
describes it reveals that consciousness to be indispensable as aspect 
of this process. And finally, Marx' description of consciousness in 
relation to praxis shows that, for him and at this stage of his analysis 
163 
Livergood, Op. cit., p. 22. 
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consciousness does not occur as a process whose goal is contained within 
itself. "There is no complete cognition which is knowledge for know-
164 
ledge's sake." Rather, an occurrence of cognition or consciousness is 
completed or brought to term through the completion of the instance of 
praxis of which it is a feature. This is the case because consciousness 
is both a definite sort of relation, one of awareness, between subject 
and environment and an aspect of a more basic relation between the sub-
ject and his environment, the process of agency. Because of the latter, 
the relation between subject and environment which is constituted through 
consciousness is only completed when that instance of agency of which it 
is a feature is also brought to term. 
That consciousness is a feature of agency implied by the struc-
ture of human praxis itself can, then, be seen from Marx' description 
of praxis on even its most rudimentary level. This idea is expanded by 
Marx in his discussions of more sophisticated forms of praxis. In the 
1844 Manuscripts, Marx holds that, 
The animal produces under the domination of immediate 
physical need while man produces free of physical need 
and only genuinely so in freedom from such need. The 
animal only produces itself while man reproduces the 
whole of nature ••• the animal builds only according to 
the standard and need of the species to which it be-
longs, while man knows how to produce according to the 
standard of any species and at all times knows how to 
apply an intrinsic standard to the object.165 
164 
Ibid. 
165 
Marx, "Manuscript·s of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, pp. 294-
295; MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 88. 
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Marx' argument here begins with the often repeated premise that 
the satisfaction of subsistence needs results in the production of new 
needs, which ground the individual's ability to engage in new and more 
complex forms of agency. This of course means that the individual as 
agent' is now capable of relating to his environment in a broader fashion 
than before, and that the transformations which he is capable of intro-
ducing into the environment are of a wider range and scope. But again, 
for this sort of agency to occur, certain conditions must be present as 
features of the structure of agency itself. First, the agent must be 
aware of the nature of his newly developed need. Otherwise his actions 
towards the satisfaction of this need would be merely random, and would 
not represent agency in a true sense of the term. He must know what the 
details of his need are, in order to know how to act for its satisfaction. 
Second, the agent must be aware of the nature of his more modified en-
vironment, in order to be able to introduce further transformations in 
it. Marx is arguing here that the taking of sustaining items from the 
envir~nment requires nothing more than an iIIllllediate biological inter-
action between organism and environment indicating the suitability of the 
item. But in order to transform the environment, the agent must know 
how to engage in this transformation. That is to say, the agent must be 
aware of the characteristics of objects which he encounters, as well as 
the potentialities of objects, in virtue of their characteristics, for spe 
cific sorts of transformation. To satisfy a need of a more complex variet' 
the agent must know what that need is, and he must know the details of his 
environment, in order to know how that environment or objects c6ntained 
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therein may be manipulated and transformed towards the satisfaction of his 
need. 
Marx expresses this in the above text through the statement that, 
" ••• man knows how to produce according to the standard of any species and 
166 
at all times knows how to apply an intrinsic standard to the object." 
To say that man is able to act "according to the standard of any species" 
is to say that man's needs, the subject's grounds of all action, are not 
limited to those resident in his specific organic structure as require-
ments for the maintenance of that structure. To say that human action 
implies knowing "at all, times how to apply an intrinsic standard to the 
object" is to say that action above and beyond that rooted in sustenance 
needs requires that the agent be aware of the nature of the object is to 
say ~hat the agent be aware of the nature of the object upon which he is 
acting, and in virtue of this awareness be able to apply to that object a 
!cognitive "standard" appropriate to the characteristics of the object, 
~nabling him to form that object into a new product capable of satisfying 
the need which is the subjective ground of his agency. 
Given the above, it is clear that, for Marx, the very structure of 
~uman praxis implies the presence of consciousness as a factor occurring 
~ithin that process, as well as implying that consciousness is not some-
167 ~hing which comes about independent of agency. And this concludes Marx' 
166 
Ibid. 
167 
Cf. Macmurray, The Self as Agent, pp. 54-55. Here and elsewhere 
n this work Macmurray offers an argument that Marx would wholeheartedly 
!ccept, to the effect that any philosophical theory which posits ,the 
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arguments towards the proposition that consciousness is an aspect or 
moment of human praxis. Consciousness as awareness of the object has 
been shown to be dependent upon that more fundamental determination that 
the object receives through agency. And consciousness has been shown to 
be, in a certain sense of the term, a "product" of praxis, as well as an 
occurrence implied by the vert structure of praxis itself. An accurate 
.L 
relationship between consciousness and its object as a relationship com-
plete in itself and self contained, is then unable to make sense of the 
phenomenon of h uman agency·, i.e. , is unable, to show that agency is nece 
sarily related to the occurrence of consciousness. On the other hand, a J 
philosophical theory which posits agency as the fundamental relationship 
between self and environment can make sense of the occurrence of consciou • 
ness. In the text referred to here, Macmurray argues that, "Knowledge is I 
the determination of an object, but that determination is theoretical. 
If the object can be determined by thought, by a judgment which may be 
true or false, then it must already be determinate. If it were not de-
terminate, then no judgment of ours could be either true or false. Ac-
tion, however, is the determination of something not in theory, but in 
actual fact. To act is to make something other than it would have been 
had we not determined it." Now if the relation between consciousness and 
its object were the primary relation between subject and environment, the 
the object would be perforce understood as fully determinate in itself, 
requiring only to be comphrehended through thought, to be determined 
through a concept adequate to the object itself. In this schema, no 
agency is required to explain the occurrence of consciousness, or to 
augment or further determine the object. Therefore no necessary relation 
can be shown between consciousness and agency, and thus no adequate sense 
can be made of agency from the perspective of this sort of theory. How-
ever, to describe action as the more basic relation between subject and 
enviornment allows one to describe the object as indeterminate, or as 
partially determinate. One may then argue, as Marx does, that some 
occurrence of consciousness is necessary as a feature of that agency which 
further determines the object. Thus from this theoretical perspective, 
the occurrence of consciousness and the theory itself then seems prefer- · 
able as more inclusive, Marx himself argues in this fashion, but the de-
tails of his argument are developed only in his consideration of Hegel's 
doctrine of the relationship of the object to consciousness and to action 
respectively. Our reflections on this argument must be postponed to the 
fourth chapter in which the broader nature of Marx' arguments against 
Hegel will be treated. 
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swnmary is offered by Rotenstreich of the relation between praxis, re-
ality (or "existence" in his terminology), and consciousness: 
Existence is the product of the process that man has made, 
This existence is reality not strange to man, and not even 
strange to consciousness. Consciousness is part of the 
practice that creates it. Existence, the product of prac-
tice, determines consciousness; this means that consciousness 
is not cut off from existence and is not bound to an inde-
pendent realm. Consciousness is only a part of existence, 
determined by its totality. The relationship between con-
sciousness and existence is similar to the relationship be-
tween the part and the whole. But since consciousness is a 
part of existence and from its nature an element alien to 
it and since the whole determines its part, consciousness 
combined in the whole determines the consciousness that is 
a part of the whole.168 
To be avoided in this discussion is the view that while consciousness is 
an aspect of praxis, it is an aspect which occurs only at the initiation 
of an instance of praxis, the idea that agency involves a conceptual 
terminus a quo which then is translated into real production resulting in 
the product, an actual terminus ad quern, if production be successful, 
corresponds to the conceptual initiation of the process. Marx' under-
standing is rather that of a constant interrelationship between conscious-
ness and production in all stages of the process of praxis. Since any 
engagement in production requires some awareness of how this is to be 
done, such awareness must be present throughout the several moments of 
that process through which a product is realized. And correspondingly, 
insofar as a process of production can itself be an "object" for con-
sciousness, then consciousness itself progressively acquires a more pre-
cise and detailed awareness of its object as this object is"realized"; 
168 
Rotensteich, Basic Problems of Marx' Philosophy, p. 50 •. Cf. also 
Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx, p. 71. 
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169 this is one way in which consciousness is "produced" by praxis. 
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The above analyses may seem to argue for the second as well as the 
first of the propositions listed above as outlining Marx' theory of con-
sciousness; they seem to show that consciousness is both an aspect or 
moment of human praxis, and an essential moment thereof. For if con-
sciousness is implied by the very structure of Marx' description of 
praxis, then to say that praxis can occur in a non-conscious fashion 
would be a~contraditction. In that case by definition consciousness would 
be an essential condition or factor which must be present if praxis is to 
occur. But the import of the above analyses is to show that, while there 
is an intrinsic relation between consciousness and praxis, praxis holds 
primacy in that relationship. Consciousness is dependent upon praxis 
for the object of which it is aware. Consciousness is "produced" by 
praxis, in that it involves a relation between subject and environment 
which is brought about and developed through the more ftmdamental factor 
of agency. And to assert that consciousness is an aspect or feature of 
human praxis is to assert precisely that consciousness is a feature of 
something else, rather than a relation of subject and object which is in-
dependent and complete in itself. In considering the second proposition 
listed above, I would like to consider one argument·. which I take to be 
implicit in the text of the 1844 manuscripts and crucial in demonstrating 
the essential relationship of consciousness to praxis: an argument· which 
shows that only if consciousness is considered as essential to praxis 
169 
Cf. Macmurray, The Self as ~ent, p. 82, Marx would agree with 
Macmurray's statement that,'lt'Acting' and 'thinking' then are, irr abstract 
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can an account be given of the developmental character of human needs. 
It is axiomatic for Marx that human praxis involves the develop-
mental character of needs, that praxis is the sort of agency in which, 
h ' f f d 11 11170 upon t e satis action o certain nee s, new needs are made ••• 
To consider this then in relation to the question of consciousness, I 
wish to retulllto a text of the 1844 manuscripts already seen, in which 
Marx asserts that, 
The animal produces under the domination of immediate 
physical need, while man produces free of physical need 
and only genuinely so in freedom from such need. The 
animal only produces itself while man reproduces the whole 
of nature •••• The animal builds only according to the stan-
dard and need of the species to which it belongs while man 
knows how to produce according to the standard of any species 
and at all times knows how to apply an intrinsic standard to 
the object.171 
Marx is here asserting that man is not "species specific" in re-
lation as agent to his environment. And he is asserting this idea in t 
terms of his understanding of the nature of human needs. But what is the 
condition under which a need can develop and what is the condition under 
which a developed need can be a ground for action? First, a need can 
conception, exclusive contraries. In actuality they are the ideal limits 
of personal experience; and 'acting' is the positive, while 'thinking' j 
is the negative limit." And he would go on to add that, in Macmurray's I 
terminology, this positive limit itself implies the occurrence of its 
negative, and that the latter is produced and developed by the former. 
170 . 
Marx-Engels, The German Ideology, Pascal, p. 17; MEGA; Abt. 1, 
Bd. 5, p. 18 •. 
171 
Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 295; MEGA, 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 88. 
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only develop as a result of some previous modification of an environment. 
Only under this condition, a) is a prior need satisfied, and b) does the 
agent stand in relation to a new environment which can elicit a new need 
in him. But to speak of medication of an existing environment is for 
!Marx to speak of production, and this in turn is to speak of a form of 
agency which includes consciousness. For in order to transform an en-
~ironment, one must know how to bring about that rransformation. Thus 
to speak of a developed need at all is to speak of a need developing out 
bf a form of agency which includes consciousness. But further, something 
must be said of the conditions under which a developed need can be a 
ground for action. For one thing, the agent must stand in some relation 
~o the modified environment such thatthis environment can be the source 
pf a new need. Further, the agent must stand in some relation to this new 
~eed itself as it is subjectively located, i.e., he must stand in some 
elation to this new need as a need of his own. Finally, the agent must 
btand again in some relation to his environment such that through his ac-
ion the new need can, all other conditions being equal, be satisfied. 
Now I would suggest that each of these conditions can be met only if 
he agent has consciousness. If, for example, the environment is to be 
onsidered as that which stimulates behavior relative to a subsistence need 
then it need only present to an organism some item which will trigger a 
biological, "species specific" response. And in this case the relation 
of organism to environment need only be "species specific," need only in-
Volve an instinctual behavioral response to the presence of some sus-
taining item. But in order to present a stimulus relative to a developed 
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need, the environment must present not a given item but a possibility, 
i.e., it must present itself as a context in which some fruitful mani-
pulation and production can be undertaken. In turn, the subject must 
be capable of relating to its environment so as to envision possibili-
ties in it, i.e., must be able to relate to the environment not as it 
is simply given, but as it potentially could be. To be able to relate 
to an environment in this fashion, it is necessary that the agent be 
able to relate objects to each other in an ideal fashion. And this 
ability is by definition a (function) of consciousness, i.e., a (functionr 
of a subject insofar as he is aware of his environment. Thus in order 
to elicit some developed need in a subject, the environment must be re-
lated to a subject which is a conscious subject. Only such a subject is 
capable of responding to possibilities as well as givens in an environ-
ment.172 
Further, the relation of the subject to the developed need as a 
need of its own must be considered. Here again the relation differs 
from that of the simple organic subject to its own subsistence needs. In 
the latter case, because the need is only a subsistence need, its sub-
ject need only be an organism, a unified structure capable of biological 
responses. A subsistence need is by definition built into the specific 
172 . 
Cf.Marcuse, Reason and Revolutions (Boston: Beacon, 1960), p.vi • 
In his preface to the work, "A Note on Dialectic," Marcuse notes that the! 
concept of dialectical consciousness in general involves an understanding! 
of consciousness in general as involving, " ••• the power of negative I 
thinking," the power of overcoming the facticity of an environment in I 
terms of possibility of value. Marx would agree with this understanding 
of consciousnes, and add a) that such consciousness is necessarily the 
consciousness of an agent, and b) that only in virtue of consciousness 
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structure of an organism. Thus the organism as such can relate to such 
a need in a simple instinctual fashion. It can simply behave as it will 
behave, given its own biological nature. But a developed need is by 
definition not built into the specific structure of an organism. It is 
a need in virtue of which the subject acts not only in such a fashion as 
to produce "what is immediately necessary for itself and its young," but 
a need in virtue of which, "man produces universally. 11173 But insofar 
as a need is something developed, it cannot be a need to which its sub-
ject relates as a simple organism; it cannot relate to such a need in-
stinctually as a specific feature of its biological makeup. If so, then 
something other than instinctual relation between a developed need and 
the subject in which it is located is required. But this can only be a 
relation in which the subject realizes or is aware of a developed need 
as a need of its own. If a subject is to relate to a need which is not 
organically determined, then it must do so in terms of some feature 
through which it can transcend its own species structure. Only conscious-
ness can account for such a transcendence. Only consciousness can ac-
count for the relation of a subject to its own developed, non species 
specific needs. 
Finally and briefly, in order to stand 1n some relation to an en-
vironment in terms of which he may fruitfully act towards the satisfaction 
can such a relationship of negativity between subject and environment be 
explained. 
173 
Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 294; MEGAj 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 88. 
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of a developed need, a subject must be able to act productively in that 
environiuent. A developed need, as above and beyond subsistence needs, 
cannot be satisfied merely by taking items from an environment, but only 
by production. But productive activity involves the presence of a sub-
ject for whom consciousness occurs, an agent capable of praxis in Marx' 
full sense of that term. Thus the subject must stand in a conscious 
relation to his environment, in order to act towards the satisfaction of 
a developed need. 
This import of these arguments is that consciousness is crucial to 
Marx' idea of developed needs. Only if the subject of such needs is a 
conscious subject can we explain those relations between subject and en-
vironment and subject and self which must be explained if sense is to be 
made out of the notion of developed needs. But the idea of developed 
needs is itself crucial to Marx' description of human praxis. It is only 
in virtue of the idea of developed needs that Marx is able to explain how 
human agency, as opposed to animal behavior, "produces universally, 11174 
how it "reproduces the whole of nature. 11175 So if the idea of developed 
needs is necessary to explain human praxis, and if the occurrence of con-
sciousness is necessary in order to account for developed needs, then the 
occurrence of consciousness is a necessary and essential feature of human 
praxis, and a complete description and explanation of human praxis must 
include consciousness as an indispensable feature. 
The assumptions underlying Marx' doctrine of consciousness can be 
174 
Ibid. 
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fully understood only when seen in this light. Consciousness is related 
to praxis both in terms of dependence and of essentiality. Consciousness 
is dependent upon praxis for the fundamental determinations of the ob-
jects of which it is aware and for its own "production." The conscious 
subject is always an agent. But at the same time consciousness is an 
essential feature of praxis, a feature which must occur if praxis is to 
\ 
occur, a necessary feature of the agent as agent, and of any adequate 
description of human agency. And, I would submit, only an account of 
consciousness which insists upon both these points is faithful to the 
texts of Marx. 
Some further discussion, however, is necessary to provide an 
account which Marx would feel is both theoretically adequate and suf-
ficiently concrete. Connection must be drawn between society and the 
occurrence of consciousness in human experience. I have claimed that 
Marx' general description of praxis is only explicitated in adequate 
theoretical detail through arguments which illustrate the relation of 
praxis and society. Analogously, a discussion of consciousness which 
brings out the relation of consciousness and praxis without any signi-
ficant reference to society would be in Marx' eyes an abstract, one-
sided account. The very sense and meaning of what I have claimed con-
cerning the relation of consciousness and praxis invites some discussion 
of the relation of consciousness and society. 
To bring out the connection between consciousness and society, let 
us recall some of the principle contentions already defended concerning 
-
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the relation between society and praxis. These function in the main as 
the premises for Marx' further arguments on the relation of society 
and consciousness. We have already shown that society functions to 
organize and condition the details of praxis, the concerted actions of 
its members, and that all praxis is in some sense social. From these 
premises, Marx can construct an argument for the additional claim that 
consciousness, as well as praxis, is in the concrete structured and 
conditioned by society. 
As already seen, Marx' assertion that, " ••• as society itself 
produces~ as~' so it is produced by him, 11176 indicates a relation-
ship of reciprocity between praxis and society. Man "produces" society, 
that is to say, social relations are rendered possible through the 
structure of praxis, and "society" itself is understood by Marx, in its 
most basic sense as a system of productive rel~tions between agents. 
Correspondingly, " ••• society itself produces man as man •••• " that is, 
precisley as a system of relations, society regulates and conditbns the 
forms of praxis that are available to its members; it determines the 
character of the various productive roles available to its members. Ar-
guments for these assertions have been seen. And their import for Marx' 
doctrine of consciousness can be seen through the formulation of a fur-
ther argument. 
The relation between consciousness and praxis is such that conscious 
ness must be understood as a necessary ingredient of praxis, or, that the 
176 
Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 305; MEGA, 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 116. 
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subject of praxis must be understood as a conscious subject. In order 
that behavior be productive action, praxis as opposed to "animal" be-
havior, and in order that needs be developed within the individual agent 
rather than organically static, praxis must be understood as including 
consciousness as a moment of itself. But, praxis or productive action 
for Marx is not isolated action, not that of the isolated individual. 
Rather, praxis is organized and systematized by the very social relations 
which it engenders. But then consciousness, as a feature or "moment" 
of those social relations, must likewise be organized and structured by 
society. 
Marx expresses this idea under three headings, senation, language, 
and theoretical thinking,thereby lending concreteness to his claim. 
Sense consciousness, first, is understood to be immediate awareness of 
some datum in the external environment, some item of nature. But an 
item of nature for Marx is not to be understood simply. Rather, natural 
objects occur in human experience. As objects of praxis, and as deter-
mined by praxis. And he understands consciousness to be instrumental 
in relation to praxis. Thus, the object is, in the words of the first 
thesis on Feuerbach, to be considered both "in the form of object or 
perception (Anschauug) ••• ," and as object of "sensuous hmnan activity, 
177 
practice (Praxis) ••• ," and the former is for Marx derived from the 
latter. 11178 And . i h b i d i i moreover, praxis s, as as een seen, organ ze n ts 
177 
Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," in Easton and Guddat, p. 400; MEGA, 
Abt. 1, Bd •. 5, p. 533. 
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actual occurrence by society. But if sensory consciousness is dependent 
for its object upon praxis, and if the possibilities of praxis are 
organized and defined by society, then the object of sensory conscious-
ness, and thus sensory consciousness itself, is conditioned by society. 
The data available to sense consciousness are socially conditioned. 
As Marx states in the German Ideology, the "sensuous world ••• " available 
to the individual is 'hot a thing given direct from all eternity, ever 
. 179 
the same, but the product of industry and of the state of society ••• " 
Just as Marx argues that consciousness in its most rudimentary form, 
sensation, is socially conditioned, so he argues that it is similarly 
conditioned in its more developed forms. The arguments offered here 
center first around the nature of language. In the German Ideology, 
Marx first asserts that thought is a phenomenon inconceivable apart from 
language. "From the start the 'spirit' is afflicted with the curse of 
being ~burdened' with matter, which here makes its .. ,appearance in the 
180 form of agitated layers of air, sounds, in short of language." Marx 
J. H. Nicholas , . .'Jr., ed., Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 
1969), p. 48. In a footnote to a discussion of the Master-Slave dialect~ 
in the Phenomeno1y of Spirit, Kojeve notes that, "According to Hegel, · 
Concept (Begreff) and Understanding (Verstand) are born of the slave's 
work, whereas sensual Knowledge (sinnlich Gewissheit) is an irreducible 
given. But one could try to deduce all human understanding from work." 
Marx in the first of his "Theses on Feuerbach" is clearly attempting to 
argue along the lines indicated by Kojeve here. 
179 Marx-Engels, The German Ideologi, Pascal, p. 35; MEGA, Abt. 1, B 
5, p. 32. 
180 
Marx-Engels, The German Ideology, Pascal; p. 19; MEGA, Abt. 1, 
Bd. 5, pp. 19-20. 
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offers no explicit justification of this statement, but an implicit 
justification seems to reside in a following statement, in which Jan-
guage is described as"~ .. practical consciousness, as it exists for 
other men, and for that reason is really beginning to exist for me 
181 
personally as well II 
His reasoning seems to be as follows. That of which a subject is 
aware must enjoy some measure of external ity from him in order to 
possess that definite embodiment which an object of awareness must have. 
And of course, one's owh thought, to be such, must be something of which 
one is aware, must "exist personally for me. 11 Now language is in prin-
ciple external to the conscious subject, at least in that it may be 
produced by him for pub I ic inspection. But then language also lends 
thought that concrete embodiment through which it may be cognitively 
182 
ap·) rehended. 
Thus thought is conceivable, Marx asserts, only with its I inguistic 
embodiment. But language, as the necessary condition of the 
occurrence of rational consciousness, is, Marx goes on to argue, 
at once a human action and a human product. Both as act and product it 
is only conceivable as rooted in a need: 11 ••• language, like 
181 Marx-Engels, The German Ideology, Pascal, p. 19; MEGA, Abt. 1, 
Bd.5, p. 20. 11 ... die Sprache ist das praktische, auch fur andere 
Menchen existerende, also auch fur mich selbst erst existierende 
wirkl iche Bewusstsein ... 11 
182 Language should be taken here in its broadest sense, to mean 
any concrete symbolization of cognitive content, including for example 
mathematical symbolization. 
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consciousness, only arises ·from the need, the necessity, of intercourse 
with other men. 11183 It is out of the necessity of sharing at least basic 
f . h . di . 184 h l' . i b h . in ormation as to t e imrne ate environment t at inguist c e avior 
originates. Thus.language necessarily originates in a social setting. 
And further, language is ·conditioned in the details of its origin and em-
ployment by the concrete demands and exigencies of the social setting 
within which linguistic behavior occurs. But this means that language 
itself, and rational consciousness whose occurrence is made possible 
by and is simultaneous with language, is conditioned by the social con-
text within which the conscious individual is present as a language 
185 bearer. 
Finally, Marx, argues that theoretical scientific activity is 
socially conditioned, and this argument is exhibited in a text already 
cited in the 1844 Manuscripts. He states that, "My general consciousness 
is only the theoretical form of that whose living form is the real com-
munity, the social essence •••• " Scientific thinking, for example, is to a 1 
appearances private. But first, it is a form of activity undertaken 
through the use of socially provided materials. Language is one of its 
183 
Marx-Engels, The German Ideology, Pascal, p. 19; ~, Abt. 1, 
Bd. 5, p. 20. 
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Ibid. 
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Cf. also that section of Marx' Grundrisse, translated by 
Hobsbwarn as Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations, p. 88; Grundrisse, p. 390 .. 
"Language as the product of an individual is an absurdity •.• Language is jut 
as much itself the product of a comrnunity, as in another respect it is 
the existence of the community: it is, as it were, the communal being 
s eakin f " 
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instruments: " ••• the material of my activity -- such as the language 
- . ~86 
in which the thinker is active -- given to me as a social product ••• 
In that theoretical, scientific thinking occurs through the utilization 
of socially determined materials, it is in its details a socially con-
ditioned activity. Moreover, for Marx theoretical thinking involves 
a response to the demands of the social milieu, and thus is conditioned 
by the claracter of those demands. This seems to be the import of his 
remark that, insofar as theoretical thinking involves a kind of pro-
duction.,, " •• ~what I make from myself I make for society, conscious of my 
nature as social," and that, "Consequently the activity of my general 
consciousness is thus, as activity, my theoretical existence as a social 
187 
being. No~explicit argument is offered by Marx to support these 
assertions. He might appeal to the notion that all activity results from 
a need, that the need for theoretical thinking is rooted in social exi-
gencies requiring theory in order that they be handled, and that the de-
tails of theoretical behavior are thus conditioned by the concrete 
character of the social need eliciting such behavior. This would be at _ 
least be consistent with his frequent condemnations of pure theory, e.g., 
188 
metaphysics, as ideology. 
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Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 306; MEGA 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 119. 
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Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 306; MEGA, 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 117. 
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Cf. for example, Marx-Engels, The German Ideology, Pascal, pp.4-
5, MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 5, pp. 8-9. This notion will also appear-in Marx' 
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In addition to these assertions con~erning the nature of conscious-
ness, and the arguments offered for them, it is well known that Marx 
frequently advances .two additional.claims concerning the relationship 
of consciousness and society: that consciousness occurs at large in 
society in the form of two theories expressing a rationale for social 
institutions, and that such rationales may become ideologies when 
189 functioning in society to legitimize class domination. That these 
propositions play key roles in certain of Marx' c~itical arguments, par-
ticularly those concerning capitalist society, there is no doubt. But 
I would argue, their relevance is to the sociological premises implicit 
criticisms of a theory of human nature of the type advanced by Prudhon. 
Also cf. Callewaert, "Les manuscripts economico-philosophique de Karl 
Marx," Revue Philosophique de Louvain, 1951, 49 (3), p. 390. 
189 
Cf. O'Neill, "Alienation, Class Struggle, and Marxian Anti-
Politics," The Review of Metaphysics, 1963-64, 17 (67), p. 468, where it 
is argued that these propositions are separate for Marx. "It is clear 
that the externalization of human behavior into ideologies, social 
instuments, material products, is a necessary condition of the phenomenon 
of e~rangement, i.e., men treated, say, as means, rather than the end 
of such cultural products. It is not necessary that the phenomenon of 
externalization be accompanied by estrangement." Textual evidence for 
this is found, among other places, in Marx' Critique of Hegel's Philoso-
phy of Right, ed., and trans. O'Malley, p. 10 and p. 26; MEGA, Abt., 1, 
Bd. 1, Hb. 1, p. 409 and p. 430. See also Dupre, The Philosophical Foun-
dations of Marxism (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, Inc., 1966), 
p. 157, for an exposition of the latter proposition in the context of 
commenatary on The German IdeologY-· 
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in Marx' work, rather than directly to the theory of human nature. These 
statements describe the ways in which societies explain and legitimize 
existing institutional structure9, and thus indicate Marx' conception of 
the role of theory as operative in society at large. They are thus dis-
tinct from porpositions descriptive of and arguments concerning conscious-
ness as a feature of human nature properly taken, and the necessary role 
and function of consciousness in the experience of the individual. That 
the text of Marx reveal propositions and arguments concerning this latter 
theme, I take the above expositions to have shown. Arid it shows as 
well, I hope, that Marx argues that consciousness is a necessary feature 
of human nature. Albeit that consciousness is derived from praxis, it 
must, Marx holds, be understood as a feature thereof if praxis is to 
be distinguishable from mere random behavior, in Marx' terminology, from 
"animal" behavior. In making this claim Marx at least moves beyond a 
sociological critique of consciousness which focuses exclusively on the 
operational role of concepts within society at large. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * 
The propositions which Marx asserts and argues for around the 
topics of praxis, society, and consciousness are, in my understanding, 
the basis of Marx' theory of human nature. These propositions may now 
be summarized. 
1) Concerning praxis: 
a) Praxis requires external nature for its occurrence. 
b) Praxis, human productive activity, yields a transformation 
r 
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of the natural environment upon which it is exercised. 
c) The result of praxis resumes or objectifies the details 
of that activity of which it is the product. 
d) Praxis is universally rooted in subjectively apprehended 
needs. 
e) The satisfaction of needs through praxis yields the 
production of new needs. 
f) The human agent is thus "self-actualizing." 
2) Concerning praxis and society: 
a) Society, or social relations between agents, is rendered 
possible through the structure of praxis. 
b) Society, in turn, conditions the details of actual praxis. 
c) Agency as praxis is only possible within a social context. 
d) Social relations provide for the diversification of possi-
bilities for praxis through "division of labor." 
e) Social relations enable the individual to be determined 
as an object as well as a subject. 
3) Concerning consciousness: 
a) Consciousness is a feature or moment of human praxis. 
b) Consciousness is an essential feature of the structure of 
h\Ullan praxis. 
c) As praxis is conditioned by society, so consciousness is 
conditioned by society. 
The above exposition shows, I hope, that these propositions are consisten 
with each other, that the arguments offered are also so consistent, and 
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that the procedure of those arguments and their interrelations cause 
the propositions to relate to each other in the form of a consistent 
unity of doctrine. 
But from this analysis a number of crucial questions arise. 
First, how does the theory of man fare in the face of Marx' specific 
attacks on the notion of a theory of human nature, especially those 
attacks which he directs against Prudhon? And allied to this is a 
second question: What of those scholars, most particularly Althousser, 
who argue that any theory of human nature discoverable in Marx' early 
texts belongs to a "Feuerbachian'phase of Marx' development, a phase 
which was later rejected by Marx the scientific communist, and therefore 
is not a genuinely "Marxian" theory? I shall discuss these questions 
in the next chapter. In that chapter I will take up the question as to 
whether and how far the theory of man which I have attributed to the 
early Marx is "Feuerbachian" and also discuss the critical role of this 
theory in Marx' attacks on Prudhon. 
Thirdly, and most crucially, what is the relation of the above 
outlined theory of Marx' to Hegel? Marx' texts suggest that this 
relation is a strong one, but its details are far from immediately clear. 
I shall deal with this question in the third and fourth chapters of this 
text, arguing: a) that given the content of his theory of human nature, 
Marx must be understood as rejecting Feuerbach and returning to Hegel to 
derive the key categories of his analysis; and b) that Marx at the same 
time, within the context of his theory, provides a critique of the Hege-
lian doctrine of the relation of consciousness and action that is crit:ica.l 
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to Marx' theory of human nature, but that this critique can only in the 
most attenuated sense be talen as a "Feuerbachian" criticism of Hegel. 
And, I will hold that only when these points are developed can a proper 
understanding of Marx' theory of human nature be distinctly grasped. 
Finally, some remark should be made here concerning the role of 
praxis as a category in Marx' theory of man. At this point, such a re-
mark must be provisional. For it is only in the context of his criti-
cism of Hegel on the question of the relation of action and conscious-
ness, that Marx develops an argument in support of the fundamental 
categorial role of praxis that he might consider decisive. Still, I can 
give a tentative sketch of this argument. 
Praxis, society, and consciousness are the three basic categories 
contained in Marx' theory of man, and the latter two are to be under-
stood in terms of the former. It is in virtue of praxis that social 
relations are understood as possible for Marx. Analogously, it is 
through praxis that consciousness is "produced;" in the sense in which 
that term is used in the relevant sections above. 
To hold with Marx that praxis is a more fundamental category than 
society and consciousness, is to hold that these latter can only be 
accurately comprehended if they are comprehended on their relation to 
praxis. If 'x' is necessarily understood through 'y', than 'y' cna be 
said to be more fundamental than 'x.' If consciousness and society are 
understood through praxis, then it can be argued that praxis may be taken 
as the fundamental category through which a description of the structures 
of human experience is to be developed, and through which a theory of 
r 
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human nature is to be elucidated. 
But the above argument is at best provisional, and is unsatisfactory 
as it stands, particularly with respect to the~question of the relation 
of consciousness to praxis. We have seen Marx' attempt to argue that 
praxis "produces" consciousnes, that the occurrence of consciousness 
arises from praxis, that concrete praxis determines the details of the 
actual occurrence of consciousness. And we have also observed that, for 
Marx, consciousness is an essential moment or fea~ure of the occurrence 
of praxis, that praxis can only be praxis if it includes consciousness 
as a feature of itself. Now if the occurrence of 'x' is necessary in 
order that 'y' be 'y,' then might not one argue that 'x' is categorially 
more fundamental than 'y'? 
In the light of this sort of objection, my sketch of an a~gument 
in support of the claim that praxis is the fundamental category of 
Marx' theory of human nature can only be considered a preliminary sketch. 
It does indicate the line of argument which Marx will use in dealing with 
this question. But Marx offers his basic argument in support of the 
claim that praxis is the fundamental category of an adequate theory of 
human nature, an argument he thinks is decisive, only in his explicit 
critique of Hegel in the Manuscripts of 1844. 
-Chapter Two 
Ma.rx 1 Critigue of Feuerbach 
A critical problem in determining the content of Marx• theory of man 
is that of the relation of Marx to Feuerbach. And the problem is twofold. 
First, the texts in which Marx• theory of human nature is developed, 
principally the Paris Manuscripts, were written during a period in which 
Marx• thinking was significantly influenced by his reading of Feuerbach. 
It would seem, then, that knowledge of the details of that influence 
might be essential to an accurate awareness of the theory of man discover-
able in those texts. But second, some commentators have held that these 
very texts should be discounted as representing truly 11marxian11 arguments 1 
because of their 11 Feuerbachian11 leanings. Louis Althusser has defended 
this position particularly regarding the question of Marx'anthropology. 
l· Althusser•s Interpretation of Marx 1 Theory of Man 
In his Pour Marx, Althusser classifies the texts of Marx, including 
those edited and published by Engels, under four headings: 
1) 1840-1844 Youthful Works 
2) 1845 Transitional Works (de la coupure) 
1
cf. for example D. C. Hodges, "The Young Marx, a Re-appraisal, 11 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1966-67 27 (2), p. 216. The 
Paris, Manuscripts are here refered to as 11 ••• materials from Marx• own 
wastebasket, 11 a consignment which Hodges feels ought to be permanent. 
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3) 
4) 
1845-1857 Maturational works 
2 1857-1883 Mature works 
-1.20-
And of the first period, important for us because of the Paris manuscripts 
Althusser further comments that, "The period of Marx' youthful works 
(k840-1845), that is to say, of his ideological works, may itself be 
subdivided in two periods: a) the rationalist-liberal period of the 
articles of the Reinische Zeibung (up to 1842), b) the communal-rationalis 
period of the years 1842 to 1845. As I briefly point out in my essay on 
'Marxism and Humanism', the works of the first period are based on a 
Kantian-Fichtean problematic the writings of the second period are based, 
3 on the other hand, on the anthropoligcal problematic of Feuerbach." 
Althusser goes on in the essay referred to above to amplify this 
commentary on the writings of the young Marx. 
The first stage is dominated by a rationalist-liberal 
humanism, resembling more Kant and Fichte than Hegel. 
As Marx combatted censorship, feudal Rhenish laws, and 
Prussian despotism, he founded his political combat 
theorietically, and based the theory of history which 
underlay this combat on a philosophy of man. History 
is only intelligible in virtue of the essence of man 
' which is freedom and reason. Freedom: this is the 
essence of man as weight is the essence of body. Man 
is given over to freedom, his very being ••• Reason: 
man is only free as rational. Human freedom is neither 
caprice, nor the determinism of interest but, as 
2
Louis Althusser, Pour Marx, (Paris: Francois Maspero, 1969) 2 Thi d b ' p. 7. s an su sequent translations from Althusser's text are my own. 
3Ibid. 
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Kant and Fichte would have it, autonomy, obedience to 
the interior law of reason.4 
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Marx' political articles for the Rheinische Zeitung, then are 
exercises in "cTiticisni" as Bauer and other of the young Hegelians 
understood that term: an exercise "which measures individual existence 
against essence, particular actuality against the Idea. 115 And for the Man 
of this period, that critical norm against which existing social realities 
are measured is a theory of the "essence" of man in which freedom and 
reason are the key concepts. From these concepts, the Marx of the 
Rheinische Zeitung was able to "deduce" his criticisms of existing social 
and political structures, as well as of contradictory theoretical positions 
of Prussian censorship, or of the legal theories of Hugo and Savigny. 6 
But through such criticism Marx came to understand the very existence 
4 
Ibid., p. 230. 
5 
Marx, "Notes to the Doctoral Dissertation," in Easton and Guddat, 
~ritings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society, (New York: Doubleday 
~nchor, 1967), pp. 61-62. 
6 
Cf. Marx' articles, "Comments on the Latest Prussian Censorship 
Instruction," and "The Philosophical Manifesto of the Historical School of 
Law," in Easton and Guddat, pp. 67-92, pp. 96-105; MEGA, 1, 1, 1, pp. 153-
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of the state as the alienation of man's communal being, 7 and this under-
standing was based for him on a humanism, a theory of human nature, which 
I was now not derived from Kant or Fichte, but was that of Feuerbach. 
The second stage (42-45) is dominated by a new form of 
humanism, the "communal" humanism of Feuerbach. The 
rational state has remained deaf to reason: the Prussian 
state has not reformed .•• the abuses of the state are 
no longer conceived as aberations of the state in 
relation to its essence, but a real contradiction 
between its essence (reason) and its existence 
(irrationality). Feuerbachian humanism allows one to 
think precisely this contradiction, by shpwing in 
irrationality the alienation of reason, and in this 
alienation the history of man, that is, his realization. 8 
Marx is able to perform a radical critique of the state, then, because he 
is able to conceive the state as the alienation of man's nature, in 
Feuerbachian terms. He, for example, critically describes the state in hii 
article "On the Jewish Question," through the statement that, "Where the 
political state has achieved its full development, man leads a double life 
I. a heavenly and an earthly life, not only in thought or consciousness, but 
in actuality. In the political community he regards himself as a communal 
7Althusser might have cited here, in support of his position, a text 
from Marx' essay "On the Jewish Question." Cf. Easton and Guddat, p. 255; I 
MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 1, Hb. 1, p. 584. "By its nature the perfected politica~ 
state is man's species life in opposition to his material life ••• Where thej 
political state has achieved its full development, man leads a double life~ 
a heavenly and an earthly life, not only in thought or consciousness but I 
in actuality. In the political community he regards himself as a communal_ 
being; but in civil society he acts as a private individual, treats other 
men as means, and becomes the plaything of alien powers." 
8A1thusser, Pour Marx, p. 231. 
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being; but in civil society he acts as a private individual, treats other 
men as means, and becomes the plaything of alien powers. 119 And he is 
able to make this critical assertion precisely because of his option for 
the Feuerbachian theory of the essence of man as communal, the attitude 
that, "The single man for himself possesses the essence of man neither in 
himself as a moral being nor in himself as a thinking being. The essence 
of man is contained only in the conuntmity and unity of man with man. 1110 
It is in virtue of the state's being the imaginary rather than the actual 
embodiment of man's communal being that his existence as a "citizen" is 
an alienated existence, and that his existence in civil society is such 
11 
that he "becomes the plaything of alien powers." 
This dependence on Feuerbach for his basic problematic and for the 
concepts through which that problematic is elucidated is, Althusser 
further insists, clearly present in the Marx of the 1844 manuscripts. 
Indeed in this text Marx was beginning to deal broadly with issues that 
are recognizably those of political economy. 12 But first, Marx is not 
occupied in this text with political economy as such, and is not 
performing the critique of political economy that characterized his 
maturity. Rather, he is in the Paris manuscripts occupied with a 
9 Marx, "On the Jewish Question," Easton and Guddat, p. 225; MEGA, Abt. 
1, Bd. 1, Hb. 1, p. 584. 
10 Feuerbach, Principles of the Philosophy of the Future, trans. Vogel, 
(Indianapolis: The Library of Liberal Arts, 1966), p. 71; Feuerbach, 
Sammtliche Werke, ed. W. Bolin and F. Jodl, (Stuttgart: Fr. Frommanns 
Verlag, 1903-1911), vol. 2, p. 318. 
llcf. Althusser, op. cit., p. 67. 
12cf. Ibid., p. 157. 
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discussion. of certain political economic ramifications, "in certain 
effects of a political economy, or certain economic conditions of social 
. 1113 
conflicts. 
Second, that concept which is at the foundation of the argument of 
the manuscripts, the concept of alienated labor, is ultimately rooted in 
a Feuerbachian humanism, for certain conditions of labor may yield 
"alienated labor" precisely because they alienate man from his essence, 
14 
conceived in Feuerbachian terms. The Marx of the manuscripts had 
passed beyond Feuerbach's terminology, and had moved beyond Feuerbach in 
a critical application of his anthropology to questions other than 
religious. But this central concern remained Feuerbach's anthropology 
nonetheless. As Althusser puts it, " ••• Feuerbach's anthropology could 
become the problematic not only of religion (The Essence of Christianity), 
but also of politics ("The Jewish Question," the Manuscripts of 1843), 
even of history and of economy (the Manuscripts of 1844), without ceasing, 
in all essentials, to remain an anthropoligical problematic, even though 
Feuerbach's language had itself been abandoned and overcome. 1115 
It is in 1845 that Althusser locates Marx' break with his 
Feuerbachian sources, and his initial development of a doctrine of society 
!::hat is "Marxian" in the mature and genuine sense of the term. This 
ijevelopment has for Althusser three characteristics. The first involves 
13Ibid. 
14
cf. ~., p. 158. 
15
Ibid., p. 65. 
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f h . 1 . li 16 Marx' development of the basic conepts o istorica materia sm. But 
it is the latter two that are of importance here. They are: the "Radical 
critique of the theoretical pretensions of all philosophical.humanism" 
and the "Definition of all humanism as ideology. 1117 These two development:, 
as described by Althusser, may be reported on briefly. 
Involved first in Marx' critique of philosophical humanism, his 
critique of any attempt at a theory of human nature, is his realization 
that any such attempt demands the assertion of two propositions: 
" ••• first that there ixists a universal essence of man; second, that this 
essence is the attribute of 'individuals taken as isolated' who are its 
real subjects. 1118 Regarding the first of these propositions, Althusser 
further comments that, "For the essence of man to be a universal 
attribute, it is necessary that, in effect, its concrete subjects exist 
as absolute givens ••• 1119 If there be an essence or nature of man, then 
any individual man must be a priori determined by that essence, in spite 
of any relationships or conditions which might otherwise empirically 
condition his experience. And this leads to the second of the two 
statements asserted above, which Althusser comments on by stating that, 
"For these empirical individuals to be men, it is necessary that they 
individually bear with themselves the totality of the essence of man ••• "20 
16
cf. Ibid., p. 233. 
17Ibid. 
18Ibid., p. 234. 
19Ibid. 
20ibid. 
, r 
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This position would allow one to assert that an individual is 
essentially determined as a man in a condition of isolation. It would 
thus allow for two fallacies against which the mature Marx constantly 
inveighs. First, it allows for the assumption that the capacities and 
needs of the individual may be deduced from his "essence," the latter 
being determinable in an a priori fashio, for, " ••• the myth of the 
economic man, that is the individual having defined faculties and defined 
d 1121 nee s ••• In the arguments of the Poverty of Philosophy which Marx 
levels against Prudhon, he makes it quite clear that this is a position 
which he opposes. 
Second, this position allows for the notion that man can be 
adequately understood as an isolated individual. But that this is 
~onsidered by Marx falacious can be clearly seen in Marx' assertion, in 
~he Sixth Thesis on Feuerbach, that " ••• the essence of man is no 
~bstraction inhering in each single individual. In its actuality it is 
,..he ensemble of social relationships."22 This is an assertion which Marx 
~eld throughout his maturity, and represents his decisive break with any 
~ttempt to do a theory of human nature, in the sense in which that term 
~ust be understood. 
Coupled with this recognition of the necessary fallacies in any 
ttempt to deprive a theory of human nature was, Althusser further insists, 
arx' identification of any humanism as ideology. Ideology is described 
21Ibid. 
-
22 
Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," in Easton and Guddat, p. 402; ~' ht 1 Bn c; " r:;1c; 
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by Althusser as "a system (possessing its proper logic and rigor) of 
representations (in various cases images, myths, ideas or concepts) 
endowed with an existence and an historical role at the heart of a 
given society. 1123 Ideology is a necessary feature of any society; its 
appearance may be expected within the context of any social system, 24 
class or classless. In terms of its function, Althusser discusses 
ideology as the overall expression of socially necessary learning: 
" ••• ideology (as a system of common representations) is indispensible to 
all society for educating men, for transforming them and for putting 
them in the condition to respond to the exigencies of their existential 
situation. 1125 But more important is Althusser's discussion of the 
location of ideology as such within society. 
As a system of common representations, ideology expresses the lived 
relations of persons to their social context, as those lived relations 
are had in imagination, or, as those relations are lived imaginatively. 
"In ideology, men express, in effect, not their relations to the condition: 
of their existence, but the appearance (facon) in terms of which they live 
their relation to the conditions of their existence: that which at one 
and the same time supposes real relation and 'lived,' 'imagined' 
relation. 1126 In other words, ideology expresses the relation of persons 
23 Althusser, OE· cit., p. 238. 
24Cf. Ibid., pp. 238-239. 
25 242. ~., p. 
26Ibid., p. 240. 
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to the details of their social setting, as that relation is apprehended 
imaginatively, as, for example, the bourgeoisie of capitalist society 
apprehend their relation to the details of society to be such as to 
maximize individual freedom and opportunity. Of itself, ideology is 
neither necessarily accurate nor inaccurate presentation of reality, 
precisely because it is an image (or better, a system of images or 
representations) through which reality is apprehended and acted upon, 
through which, as Althusser puts it, relations to the details of actual 
social situations are "lived." 
But that ideology can, and indeed for Marx has been up to his time 
an illusory representation of reality, is apparent. This has been 
possible precisely because ideology has not been recognized for what 
it is; a system of imagined representations of lived reality, rather tha 
the truth thereof. And it is here, Althusser reports, that Marx' attack 
on hmnanism is to be found. 
Within the history of class societies, various systematized 
representations of the nature of man (i.e., ideologies) have arisen. Sue 
representations, when arising from the dominant class in society, have 
led to the exploitation of other classes. But because of the nature of 
ideology itself, and because of its being taken for truth, such 
27 ideologies, as long as the societies remained stable, legitimized 
the behavior of the dominant class, and rendered the situation of 
exploited classes tolerable, even necessary or fruitful, in their own 
27That is to say, in Marx' language, as long as the relations of 
production remained congruent with the forces of production. 
r 
~ 
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vision thereof. Althusser comments on this phenomenon in terms of the 
humanisitc ideology of the bourgeoisie. "When the 'rising class,' 
the bourgeoisie, developed through the course of the 18th century a 
humanist ideology of equality, freedom, and reason, it gave to this claim 
of its own the form of universality, as if through this it wished to 
enroll in its ranks, by st.aping them towards this end, the very men 
whom it liberated only to exploit. 1128 
The point which Althusser wishes to make in this discussion is that, 
for Marx, humanism has historically functioned as ideology, and ideology 
has been simply the imaginatively developed self understanding of a 
society or portion of society, reflecting the economic details of the 
given social system from which it develops, but taken as truth rather 
than as reflection. Precisely because ideology is a reflection of given 
societies, it cannot validly function as a theory which will undertake a 
critical examination of the nature and development of social history. 
Nor can any theory of human nature function as such a theory. For 
as a theory of the "essence" of man, it must take human reality and the 
details of human experience to be simply given rather than historically 
developed. Now Marx' mature aim was the construction of a theory which 
would expose the structures of historical development, based on the idea 
29 that the subjects of such development are given societies. Such a 
theory would enable him to critically examine capitalist society, as well 
28A1thusser, op. cit., p. 241. 
29 Cf. Ibid., p. 238. 
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as point out proper directions for the practical, active overcoming of 
this social system. Clearly because of the above, a humanism will not 
do as such a theory; Marx' discovery of this inadequacy was indeed the 
beginning of his formulation of his mature goal. And thus Marx' mature 
d • b 1 • 1 11 d II h • 1 • h • II 30 octr1ne may e egit1mate y ca e a t eoret1ca anti- uman1sm, 
one which replaces prior modes of theorizing with, "an historical-
dialectical materialism, that is to say with a theory of the different 
specific levels of human action (economic action, political action, 
ideological action, scientific action) in their own articulations, based 
on the specific articulations of the unity of human society. 1131 
Humanism, then, and attempts at theories of human nature are theoretical 
attempts whose value is denied by the mature Marx. 
The interpretation of Marx offered by Althusser raises two questions 
one of which is especially critical for my argument. First, there is 
the question of the continuity of the texts of the "young" and the 
"mature" Marx. On Althusser's terms, Marx' later texts represent a 
crucial shift from the ideas embodied in those written through 1844. 32 
Second, the question of the content of those earlier texts must itself 
be raised. And, again on Althusser's terms, their content must be viewed 
as a humanism whose most significant expression is through and through 
JOibid., p. 236. 
31Ibid., pp. 235-236. 
32r shall not take up the question of continuity directly in this 
thesis. However, the arguments of this and the following chapters will, 
I think, have significant bearing on that question. 
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Feuerbachian. One concludes then that the content of the theory of 
human nature which Marx expresses in the Paris Manuscripts is for all 
intents and purposes identical to Feuerbach's theory of man, that the 
former can be understood most fruitfully in terms of the latter, and 
that Marx' act of elucidating a theory of man in the Manuscripts of 
1844 essentially involved an act of borrowing and assimilating into his 
own terminology a theory of Feuerbach's. 
I shall devote the body of this chapter to arguing that this is not 
the case. Textual analysis of certain works which Althusser classifies 
as "youthful" works of Marx, particularly the Paris Manuscripts, reveals 
a theory of man definitely continuous with that implied in certain texts 
which Althusser would classify as "transitional," e.g., the Theses of 
Feuerbach. This is to deny, first, that the later Marx represents a 
definite break with the earlier around the question of theory of man. 
And it is secondly to argue that, even in the Manuscripts of 1844, Marx 
defined his theory of man most significantly in terms of opposition to 
rather than agreement with Feuerbach. Thus Marx' divergence from 
Feuerbach must be understood if the content of his theory of man is to 
be properly elucidated. Additionally, Marx attacks Feuerbach, in a 
manner similar to his confrontation with Prudhon, on the question of 
the theoretical function of a theory of human nature. His arguments 
on this theme will also be briefly sketched in this chapter. 
II Marx and Feuerbach's Critique of Hegel 
It must first be noted that Marx' attitude towards Feuerbach as 
expressed in the Paris Manuscripts is far from unequivocal. Indeed, he 
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introduces the Manuscript entitled "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic and 
Philosophy in General," by pointing out those Feuerbachian criticisms 
of Hegel which he takes to be both accurate and significant. Feuerbach, 
for Marx, "is the only one who has a serious and critical relation to 
Hegel; a dialectic, who has made genuine discoveries in this field, 
and who above all is the true conqueror of the old philosophy. 1133 And 
Marx goes on to list those Feuerbachian criticisms of Hegel which he 
takes to be crucial under three headings. 
Feuerbach's great achievement is: (1) proof that philosophy 
is nothing more than religion brought to and developed in 
reflection, and thus is equally to be condemned as another 
form and mode of the alienation of man's nature; 
(2) the establishment of true materialism and real science 
by making the social relationship of "man to man" the 
ft.m.damental principle of his theory; 
(3) opposing to the negation of the negation, which claims 
to be the absolute positive, the self-subsistent 
positive positively grounded on itself.34 
As Marx t.m.derstands this statement, the "great achievement" of Feuerbach 
here is a direct overcoming of Hegel. And that overcoming involves 
essentially a change in attitude as to the nature of philosophy itself, 
particularly in relation to its subject matter. 
33Marx, "Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts (1844)," in Easton and 
Guddat, p. 316; MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 151. Marx is here opposing 
Feuerbach's noti-;;n-Qf and analysis of Hegel's dialectical method to thos 
analyses offered by others of the Young Hegelians, e.g., Bauer, for whom 
dialectical negation is equivalent to 'criticism' as the motive force 
of the development of self consciousness. On this point cf. McLellan, 
The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx, (New York: Praeger, 1969), pp. 59-63. 
34Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, pp. 316-317; 
~' Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 152. 
,. 
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For Feuerbach, religion concretely involves the details of human 
self-understanding, but with those details imaginatively projected and 
so understood as belonging to a being other than (or alien from) man, 
rather than man himself: 35 " ••• religion is man's earliest and also 
indirect form of self-knowledge. 1136 But speculative philosophy, i.e., 
Hegelian philosophy, has retained something of this "religious" form 
of human self-understanding. For just as religion involves man's 
alienating through imaginative projection the predicates of his own 
nature from himself, speculative, Hegelian philosophy projects those 
predicates descriptive of the concrete individual into one single feature 
of the human individual, self-consciousness, and then treats that feature 
as an absolute. 
Marx might, at this point in the Manuscripts, have referred to a 
text in Feuerbach's Principles of the Philosophy of the Future37 in 
which the latter explicitly attacks Hegel in the terms to which Marx 
35cf. Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, trans. Geo. Eliot 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1957), p. 12; Feuerbach, Sllinmtliche Werke, 
vol. 6, p. 15. " ••• the object of any subject is nothing else than the 
subject's own nature taken objectively. Such as are men's thoughts and 
dispositions, such is his God; so much worth as a man has, so much and 
no more is his God. Consciousness of God is self consciousness; 
knowledge of God is self Knowledge." 
36Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, Eliot, p. 13; Sarnmtliche 
Werke, vol. 6, p. 15. 
37cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," Easton and Guddat, pp. 315-316; 
MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 151. It is clear, one may note in passing, that 
the Principles of the Philosophy of the Future is a dominant text which 
Marx has in mind in commenting on Feuerbach, in the Paris Manuscripts. 
In those Manuscripts Marx, in discussing the superiority of Feuerbach 
over other young Hegelian cr{tics of Hegel, principally Bruno Bauer, 
writes: "But now that Feuerbach in his "Theses" appearing in the 
Anekdota and more fully in his (Principles of the) Philosophy pf the 
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refers. In number 23 of that work, Feuerbach writes that, "Hegelian 
philosophy is reversed idealism; it is theological idealism ••• It placed 
the essence of the ego apart from the ego, separated from the ego, and 
objectified as substance, as God. But, by doing that, it expressed 
again indirectly and reversely the divinity of the I. .. 1138 Hegel 
"divinizes" the "I", or, self consciousness through examining self-
consciousness as if there were contained therein all determinations 
which might properly be taken as "human." And Feuerbach's correction 
of this lies in his realization that the hwnan individual must be 
examined through the totality of his determinations, rather than those 
d i . f lf . 1 . 1 39 er ving rom se consciousness exc usive y. In Feuerbach's words, 
"Man distinguishes himself from the animals not only by thinking. His 
40 
whole being, rather, constitutes his distinction from the animals." 
This realization of Feuerbach's, that human nature must be 
examined in its concrete totality rather than simply through a 
description of self consciousness, is both itself a correction of Hegel 
Future has destroyed the inner principle of the old dialectic and 
philosophy, the school of criticism which was unable to do this in 
itself but has seen it done has proclaimed itself pure, decisive, 
absolute, and entirely clear within itself." 
38Feuerbach, Principles of the Philosophy of the Future, Vogel, p. 
36; Sammtliche Werke, vol. 2, p. 279. 
39we shall see in chapter four, however, that Marx' ultimate rational 
for accepting this criticism is not a "Feuerbachian' one, but one that 
is rooted in his own confrontation with the Hegelian doctrine of 
self-consciousness. 
40Feuerbach, Principles, Vogel p. 69; S!immtliche Werke, vol. 2, p. 
315. 
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and leads to a second such correction, " ••• the establishment of true 
materialism and real science by making the social relationship of 'man 
to man, the fundamental principle of the theory ••• 1141 
In that Feuerbach had realized the necessity of a concrete 
description of human nature, he opened the way for an examination of one 
such determination that is both concrete and flllldamental: man's 
determination as social. And moreover, Feuerbach had insisted on the 
essential character of this determination of human nature, even in the 
first pages of The Essence of Christianity. There, he begins a 
description of the nature of human consciousness by asserting that, 
"Consciousness in the strictest sense is present only in a being to whom 
his species, his essential nature, is an object of thought. 1142 Human 
consciousness is such that the individual is aware of himself both as a 
discrete individual, and as an individual embodiment of human nature. 
And Feuerbach goes on immediately to assert that, in virtue of this 
characteristic of human consciousness, "Man is himself at once I and 
thou; he can put himself in the place of another, for this reason, that 
to him his species, his essential nature, and not merely his 
individuality, is an object of thought. 1143 In that human consciousness 
entails "species consciousness," the individual is capable of 
apprehending the experience of another self as well as that of his own 
4~rx, "Manuscripts of 1844," Easton and Guddat, p. 316; MEGA, Abt. 
1, Bd. 3, p. 152. 
42 Feuerbach, Essence of Christianity, Eliot, p. l; SMnnntliche Werke,p. 1 
43Feuerbach, Essence of Christianity, Eliot, p. 3; Sammtliche Werke, 
2. 
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self, of putting "himself in the place of another," of experiencing 
intersubjectivity. And in that "species consciousness" is essential to 
the human individual, intersubjectivity is also essential. As McLellan 
comments: 
The fundamental unity of mankind that the idea of a species 
presupposes arises from the fact that men are not self-
suff icient creatures; they have very different qualities, so 
it is only together that they can form the "perfect" man. For 
Feuerbach all knowledge comes to man as a member of the human 
species and when man acts as a member of the human species his 
action is qualitatively different. His fellow human beings 
make him conscious of himself as a man, they form his con-
sciousness, and even the criterion of truth. 11 44 
Marx would agree with McLellan's gloss of Feuerbach's notion of man as 
essentially intersubjective or social, and consider this point a lasting 
contribution of Feuerbach's to the concrete analysis of human nature. 
Finally, and as a consequence of the above, Feuerbach offers for 
Marx a third and necessary corrective to Hegel, and now a methodological 
corrective, that of "opposing to the negation of the negation, which 
claims to be the absolute positive, the self-subsistent positive 
positively grounded on itself. 1145 
Marx offers a clue to this initially complex statement by stating 
immediately after it in the text that it indicates the manner in which 
44Mc~ellan, The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx, p. 92, McLellan's last 
comment is a gloss on article 58 of the Principles of the Philosophy of 
the Future, Vogel, p. 71; Sammtliche Werke, vol. 2, p. 318. "Truth 
is only the totality of human life and of the human essence." 
4~arx, "Manuscripts of 1844," Easton and Guddat, p. 317; MEGA, 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 152. 
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Feuerbach "justifies starting out from the positive, from sense 
certainty ••• 1146 And his point seems to involve Feuerbach's specific 
critique of Hegel's application of the dialectical method to the question 
of "sense certainty." As Feuerbach reads Hegel, the question of the 
first chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit is that of an initial 
conception of the relationship between thought and being. Consciousness, 
at the most primitive level at which it can be analyzed, takes as its 
object simply, "the immediate ••• what is, 1147 that which is given as an 
innnediate sense datum to consciousness. And moreover, consciousness 
takes this immediate object to offer "the richest kind of knowledge ••• 1148 
But the structure of its own experience leads consciousness to recognize 
that, on the one hand, this attitude implies a radical distinction 
between itself and its object, between thought and being, and that on the 
other hand this notion of a radical distinction between thought and being 
will not do because, on its terms, the object can be apprehended simply 
as immediate, whereas the object itself is apprehended by consciousness 
in a richer and more manifold condition, as is show by its, the objects' 
being named. In virtue of the objects being named, being described 
through language, its content must be apprehended as including 
universality as well as particular immediacy. "It is as a universal, 
46Ibid. 
47G.W.F. Hegei, The Phenomenology of Mind, trans. Baillie, (London: 
Allen and Unwin, 1931), p. 149. G.W.F. Hegel, PhYnomenologie des 
Geistes, ed. Hoffmeister, (Ha~burg: Felix Meiner, 1952), p. 79. 
48Ibid. 
r 
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49 too, that we give utterance to sensuous fact." But then the object 
of consciousness, being, must be understood as not simply distinct 
from consciousness and as such being necessarily mediated thereby. 
But it is here that Feuerbach offers his objection to Hegel. And 
that objection yields the realization that Hegel's dialectical examinatio 
of sense certainty involves his "reformulating the differences between 
thought and being as a difference between knowing and the known ••• 1150 
For Feuerbach, to speak of the object as fundamentally mediated by 
knowing consciousness is to describe the object of conscious knowing, but 
not the object of sensation. It is rather to abstract from the latter. 
For on its own terms, sense consciousness does recognize the distinction 
of its object from itself, and its own necessary dependence on its 
object. "Were Hegel really to enter the experience of sensuous 
consciousness and to shift the emphasis of the Ph~nomenologie away from 
the logic of the phenomena, he would have to acknowledge that sense 
certainty in no way refutes itself by virtue of being thought and 
d 1151 expresse ••• Rather, thought and language are expressions of the 
richness of the content delivered in sensation. 
This is not to assert that raw sensation delivers of itself the 
total richness of content accessable to the subject. Feuerbach is aware 
49 II • Ibid., p. 152; Phanomenolog1e, p. 82. 
SOLowith, "Mediation and Immediacy in Marx, Hegel, and Feuerbach," in 
Steinkraus (ed.) New Studies in Hegel's Philosophy, (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart, and Winston, 1971), p. 132. 
51 Ibid., p. 134. 
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that, "Immediate sensuous intuition is, on the contrary, subordinated to 
imagination and representation," that, "The true sensuous intuition first 
makes visible what is invisible to the uneducated eye. 1152 Imagination 
and the response of feeling53 unveil the richness of the content 
delivered in sense intuition for Feuerbach, but precisely because of this 
they are themselves culminating features of the experience of sense 
consciousness. And this is to maintain the position of the fundamental 
nature of sense consciousness for the individual subject, as well as the 
distinction between thought and being which can be recognized as integral 
to the experience of sense consciousness, if the latter is examined on 
its own terms. Thus sensation, and its integral features, are for 
Feuerbach necessary and basic to the experience of the subject, and not 
to be understood as overcome through a dialectical "negation of the 
negation." 
Marx takes this criticism of Hegel to be a crucial one because it 
corrects the latter precisely at that point which limited him to finding 
"only the abstract, logical, speculative expression of the movement of 
history, not the actual history of man as a given subject. •• 1154 Because 
52 Ibid., p. 136. 
53
cf. Feuerbach, Principles, Vogel, p. 52; stfuuntliche Werke, vol. 2, 
p. 297. "The new philosophy regards and considers being as it is for us, 
not only as thinking but also as existing being; thus it regards being 
as an object of being, as an object of itself. Being as an object of 
being - and only this being is being and deserves the name of being -
is the being of the senses, perception; feeling, and love. Being is 
thus a secret of perception, feeling, and love." 
5~arx, "Manuscripts of 1844," Easton and Guddat, p. 317; MEGA, Abt. 1, 
Bd. 3, pp. 152-153. 
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Hegel, in virtue of his speculative employment of the dialectical method, 
was unable to consider on their own terms the sensuous relations of the 
individual to his environment, both natural, and social, he was unable to 
offer a total and accurate description of the nature of individual 
experience, but rather only one of the experiences of the self-conscious 
individual. Feuerbach, in overcoming Hegel's dialectical description of 
sense experience by insisting that the latter be examined on its own 
terms, points the way to a more adequate and more total description of 
those determinations which constitute the nature of the individual as 
such. 
To this point, it has been seen that Marx in the Paris Manuscripts 
affirms three Feuerbachian crticisms of Hegel, directly relating to the 
formulation of a theory of human nature. Feuerbach had corrected Hegel 
in showing that the individual must be described through the totality of 
his determinations, rather than simply those which pertain to him as a 
self-conscious subject. He had defended this statement by refuting 
Hegel's employment of the dialectical method in relation to sense 
consciousness, "sense certainty." And he had insisted that, of those 
concrete determinations which must be located descriptively and 
argumentatively in a theory of human nature, one such determination, and 
an essential one, is the communality or sociality of the individual. 
Given simply these statements, one might readtly suspect that Althusser's 
reading of the Manuscripts of 1844 is correct, that Marx develops therein 
a "humanism" that is in its cpntents essentially Feuerbachian. 
But it is at this point that I would suggest that such a reading 
r 
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of the Manuscripts of itself will not do, and will not do because its 
very partiality renders it inadequate. Certainly on the above points Mar 
considers Feuerbach's correctives on Hegel to be crucial in defining and 
formulating his own theory of human nature. Their implications will be 
further developed when a consideration of Marx' own criticisms of Hegel's 
doctrine of self consciousness, in relation to the question of agency, is 
offered in a later chapter. However, the question now at hand is, what 
is the relation of Marx' fuller theory of human nature to his understand-
ing of Feuerbach, given his acceptance of the above positions? I shall 
argue that Marx supposes his own theory to be, in certain crucial and 
fundamental features, opposed to Feuerbach, that he is correct in this 
supposition, and that he formulates his theory of man overtly within the 
context of this opposition. This can be seen by showing that certain 
criticisms of Feuerbach offered in the "Theses on Feuerbach" are 
thoroughly consistent with the content of the theory of man which 
underlies the Manuscripts of 1844. It will thus be shown by implication 
that Althusser'is incorrect in reading these texts as representative of 
distinct periods of Marx' development. Marx' criticisms of Feuerbach 
relevant to this discussion revolve around the themes of the relationship 
between praxis and nature, between nature and consciousaess of the social 
character of the individual (man as a communal being), and of the 
function and possibilities of a theory of human nature. 
III Marx' Critique of Feuerbach's Notion of Nature 
The theme of the relation between praxis and nature is the first of 
the above noted topics which Marx himself treats, and he does this in the 
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first of his often cited "Theses of Feuerbach." There, Marx notes that, 
"The chief defect of all previous materiaiism (including Feuerbach' s) is 
that the object, actuality, sensuousness is conceived only in the form of 
the object or perception (Anschaung), but not as sensuous human activity, 
t . (P . ) b. . l 11 54a prac ice raxis , not su Jective y. And he follows up this asser-
tion with the further statement that, "Feuerbach wants sensuous objects 
actually different from thought objects," but he does not comprehend 
human activity itself as objective. 1155 Certain implications of these 
statements concerning Marx'. attitude on the relation of nature and 
consciousness will be later seen, but now, what points concerning the 
relation of nature, "the object," is Marx implying here, and why do these 
points lead him to a posture on Feuerbach which is critical? Particular! 
what does Marx mean by asserting that "the object" or nature has a 
"subjective" side, and that human praxis has an "objective" side? 
Responses to these questions may be offered by comparing Marx' 
acceptance of Feuerbach's criticisms of Hegel with Marx' own elucidation 
of the concept of nature in the Manuscripts of 1844. In the content of 
the first, as has been seen, Marx views Feuerbach as correct in 
distinguishing the question of the relation of thought and being from tha 
of the relation of knowledge and its object, 56 and in recovering through 
this distinction an understanding of nature, and by implication of the 
54aMarx, "Theses on Feuerbach," Easton and Guddat, p. 400; ~, 
Abt. 1, Bd. 5, p. 533. 
55Ibid. 
56cf. texts previously cited from L~with's article, in which this 
distinction made by Feuerbach is described. 
---
-143-
relation of the human individual to nature, that is more adequate than 
that available to Hegel. But at the same time, Feuerbach's own 
understanding of nature must for Marx be subjected to critical analysis 
and correction. Because as Marx reads Feuerbach, and I suggest that 
this is a correct reading, nature in its originary occurrence for the 
sensory subject is experienced in an immediate condition, as that which 
of itself exists, contains its determinations within itself, and delivers 
these determinations to the sensuous subject. 
Feuerbach's statement that "The real in its reality or taken as real 
57 is the real as an object of the senses; it is the sensuous," needs to 
be taken in two senses. First, it means that the subject's primary 
access to reality is had through sensation, with the essential proviso 
noted above that the data of reality be revealed and made visible by 
imagination and feeling as themselves aspects of sense experience. The 
second, this statement also means that the object of sensation is "the 
real," is that which can most accurately and originally be entitled 
"being." "The real" then is for Feuerbach that self contained immediate 
datum which is the object of sensation, 58 or nature as, "in the sum of 
57Feuerbach, Principles, Vogel, p. 51; Sammtliche Werke, vol. 2, p. 
296. 
58
cf. J. E. Barnhart, "Anthropological Nature in Feuerbach and Marx," 
Philosophy Today, 1967 (11) 414, p. 268, for an opposing interpretation 
of the question of nature as the object of sensation in Feuerbach. 
Barnhart argues that as object of sensation, nature is 'mediated' by 
the snesory subject. "Sensuousness or matter serves as the basis of 
man's consciousness of 'personality'. But man is more than 'personality' 
and as a part of man matter has no reality apart from the human species. 
In perceiving his material base, man is simply knowing himself." 
r 
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all the sensuous forces, things, and beings which man distinguishes from 
himself as other than human. 1159 
Nature is in this sense for Feuerbach, that which man, "experiences 
directly and sensuously as the ground and substance of his life, 1160 and 
it is capable of functioning as and of being experienced as such a ground 
precisely in virtue of its being fundamentally real in itself and as such 
distinct from the human subject. Feuerbach might argue that it is only 
in virtue of nature's being self contained in its determinations distinct 
from the human subject, primarily real in itself, that it is capable of 
being that to which the human subject relates sensuously, that from which 
he is capable of drawing ever enriched data through the multi-faceted 
act of sensation. 
But it is here that Marx levels an initial critical comment on 
Barnhart supports this interpretation by citing Feuerbach's statement in 
The Essence of Christianity, Eliot, p. 12; (SHmmtliche Werke, vol. 6, p. 
15), that, " ••• the object of any subject is nothing else that the 
subject's own nature taken objectively," Barnhart is of course correct 
in holding that for Feuerbach 'matter' or 'nature' is " ••• the basis of 
man's consciousness .•• " but he errs in holding that Feuerbach moves from 
this to the conclusion that nature is therefore mediated by human 
(sensory) consciousness. For Feuerbach, as seen above in the text, this 
would be to translate the distinction of thought and being into the 
distinction of knower and known. Rather, for Feuerbach, nature is man's 
own nature 'taken objectively' in the sense that human nature requires 
that the individual subject be related to aa object that is distinct from 
itself, and that contains its determinations within itself. 
59Feuerbach, Lectures on the Essence of Religion, trans. Ralph Manheim 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1967), p. 90; Sammtliche Werke, vol. 8, 
p. 113. 
60rbid. 
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Feuerbach. The latter insists on describing nature as self contained 
reality. And this description, is taken to be one that is in principle 
complete. As complete, however, this description leaves no room for a 
theoretical consideration of nature as the material base of human praxis. 
Stated more formally, if nature is self-contained reality, then there is 
no need to hold that nature is also that which stands in relation to the 
human subject as agent, or as that which relates itself to the agent as 
capable of receiving determinations through and as the result of human 
productive activity. And Marx' assertion here is that nature must be so 
described if the phenomenon of productive activity is itself to be given 
h . 1 61 a t eoretica account. 
The terminology of the first thesis of Feuerbach expresses this idea 
through asserting that nature must be conceived "subjectively. 11 62 That is 
to say, nature must be conceived of as that which as such receives 
determinations from the agent subject to which it stands in relation. And 
the prior chapter has shown that Marx also insists on such an understand-
ing of nature in the Manuscripts of 1844. There Marx asserts that nature 
is man's "inorganic body: (1) as a direct means to life, and (2) as the 
61
rt will subsequently be argued that a concept of nature including 
the idea that nature is as such determined by human agency is 
necessary in Marx' eyes in order that a theory of man be functionally 
valid. This will be seen in the context of a consideration of Marx' 
remarks on Prudhon. 
62Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," Easton and Guddat, p. 400; ~' Abt. 1 
Bd. 5, p. 533. 
r 
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matter, object, and instrument of his life activity. 1163 The point there, 
too, is that, in order to make sense out of the phenomenon of agency, 
some theoretical description must be given of nature as that within 
which actual agency, actual human praxis, is undertaken. But this means 
that a concept of nature must include the idea that nature is as such 
fundamentally maleable, that which, in virtue of its own character, 
presents itself as something capable of receiving determinations 
resultant upon productive activity, and therefore that which is not of 
itself self-contained, in the way Feuerbach would have it. Because of 
this, as shown above, the two concepts which most accurately describe 
nature for Marx are externality and maleability. This description, 
however, is one which Marx recognizes as distinct from Feuerbach's in 
the "Theses," and which is included in the 1844 Manuscripts. On at least 
this point, then, Althusser's statement that the Marx of 1844 is an out 
and out Feuerbachian will not do. 
The above, however, treats a comparison of Marx and Feuerbach on the 
theme of the relation of nature and action only by a description of the 
first of these terms. Marx implies in the First Thesis on Feuerbach that 
critical comparison might be made on the second term as well. He 
initiates such a comparison through stating that Feuerbach "does not 
h d h i • • lf b • • • II 64 compre en uman act vity itse as o Jective. 
63Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844, 11 Easton and Guddat, p. 293; ~A, Abt. 
1, Bd. 3, p. 87. 
64Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," Easton and Guddat, p. 400; MEGA, Abt. 
1, Bd. 5, p. 534. 
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Given Feuerbach's doctrine of nature, what sort of action would be 
possible within the natural environment? At best, Marx might reply, the 
action of taking given items from the environmental setting. To be sure, 
this is not to imply precisely the same sort of "taking" which Marx 
notes as the proper characteristic of "animal" behavior in the Paris 
Manuscripts, but the analogy is a strong one. Feuerbach insists in a 
fashion similar to Marx that, "Man is ••• a universal being ••• wherever a 
sense is elevated above the limits of particularity and its bondage to 
needs, it is elevated to an independent and theoretical significance and 
d . i . 1 i d d . . 1 . . d " 65 1gn ty; universa sense s un erstan 1ng; universa sensation, min • 
Because sensation is for man integrated with consciousness, 66 albeit 
that sensation is basic to any form of consciousness, then sensuous 
awareness, and possible actions consequent upon sense awareness, are for 
man not limited to those founded upon organically inbuilt instincts. Man 
is capable of acting to use his invironment for purposes developed 
through imagination and theoretical thinking. But given Feuerbach's 
description of nature, can action for him mean more than use? Marx seems 
to think not, and here again critically differentiates himself from 
Feuerpach. Rotenstreich comments intelligently on this point: 
65Feuerbach, Principles, Vogel, p. 69; S~mmtliche Werke, vol. 2, pp. 
315-316. 
66cf. Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, Eliot, pp. 1-2; 
Sammtliche Werke, vol. 6, pp.· 1-2. One must remember here that, for 
Feuerbach, human consciousness is 'species consciousness,' and that in 
virtue of this scientific knowledge is possible for man. 
r 
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Action, according to Feuerbach, is connected with the 
acquisition of pleasure, or with utility; it is egoistic-
utilitarian action. A somewhat pointed question arises: 
Is such acquisition an action at all? Marx apparently 
thought that it was not an action, that it did not create 
objects; it derived pleasure from given objects insofar 
as it derived benefit from them. The action that Marx set 
foremost in his theory was not an action of use and ex-
ploitation of goods or objects of the surrounding world; 
it was rather a creative action, a spontaneous actioni 
even though it was limited to the area of the senses. 0 7 
The key feature of Rotenstreich's comment here seems to me to be his 
highlighting of Marx' equation of action and creativity. It has been 
shown above that the Marx of the Paris Manuscripts insists on describing 
human activity as human productive activity, as praxis, and that for him 
a key feature of praxis is objectification, activity resulting in a 
product which, "is only the resume of activity, of production. 1168 The 
product of human activity on its side "resumes" or contains within 
itself and manifests the details of that activity of which it is the 
result. And it is its being related to such a product that, in part, 
defines human activity itself. But then human activity is for Marx 
productive or creative. It is responsible for the determinations of 
its result. 
This equation of human activity with productivity and creativity is 
the meaning of Marx' assertion that human action must be understood 
"objectively," and it defines his criticism of Feuerbach on this point. 
Activity must be seen as "in the material wherein his labor realizes 
67Nathan Rotenstreich, Basic Problems of Marx' Philosophy, (Indianapo-
lis: Bobbs Merrill, 1965), p. 36. 
6~arx, "Manuscripts of 1844," Easton and Guddat, p. 291; ~' Abt. 
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itself, wherein it is active, out of which and by means of which it 
d 1169 pro uces. Thus activity must be understood as essentially related 
to its object in the sense that the object involved the determinations 
which it possesses as a result of the activity from which it results, 
that activity is embodied in its produced object, or that activity is 
"objective." For the same reason, nature is "subjective," is in its 
concrete details determined by the agent, the subject of action, and 
embodies certain details of that subject, to wit his action itself. Just 
as in politics, so in the theory of agency and of human nature, what Marx 
desires is a theory that is "radical," that is to say one which will 
70 
"grasp things by the root." And in terms of a theory of praxis or 
agency, this means a theory which will describe and account for the 
productive creativity which Marx takes to be at the basis of the structurE 
of praxis. 
It can be seen then that, in the "Theses on Feuerbach," Marx levels 
critical comments on Feuerbach's understanding of the relation of action 
and nature, and on his understanding of each of the terms in that relatior 
as well as that the foundation for this critical comment is discoverable 
in the 1844 Manuscripts. One may legitimately infer, then, that those 
aspects of Marx' theory of man in the Paris Manuscripts which involve 
discussion of the relation of agency and nature, and the meaning of those 
69Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," Easton and Guddat, p. 290; MEGA, 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 84. 
70 Marx, "Toward the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law: Introductic ~," 
Easton and Guddat, p. 257; MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 1, Hb. 1, p. 614. 
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terms within that relationship, are not, contrary to Althusser's claim, 
aspects of Marx' theory of man which may be validly entitled Feuerbachian. 
In addition to this, one may argue that Marx also levels criticism in 
the theses against Feuerbach's doctrine of the relation of nature and 
consciousness, particularly sense consciousness, and that the foundation 
of this criticism is also contained in the Paris Manuscripts. 
IV Marx' Critique of Feuerbach's Doctrine of Sense Consciousness 
The briefest statement of Marx' criticism of Feuerbach on this 
theme is the fifth of the "Theses on Feuerbach": "Feuerbach, not 
satisfied with abstract thinking, wants perception; but he does not 
comprehend sensuousness as practical, human sensuous activity. 1171 This 
statement seems susceptible to two interpretations. One, indicated by 
Rotenstreich, reads this statement as a methodological criticism of 
Feuerbach. Feuerbach attempts but does not reach a consideration of that 
which is actually and materially real, human praxis as mediated by 
society. Thus for example, Feuerbach analyzes religion as "Religious 
self-alienation, the duplication of the world into a religious world 
and secular world, 1172 but does not go on to analyze the details of the 
secular base, of soceity, which induce the phenomenon of religious 
consciousness. Marx himself does go on to do such analysis, and thus 
achieves a more radical critique of such phenomena as religion than that 
71Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," Easton and Guddat, p. 401; MEGA, 
Abt. 1, Bd. 5, p. 534. 
72Ibid. 
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of which Feuerbach is capable. 73 
One may read the Fifth Thesis in this fashion, but it seems that for 
Marx to assert this implies another assertion concerning the nature of 
perception as well: that Feuerbach fails to grasp "Human sensuous 
activity" because he fails to comprehend "perception" itself in an 
adequate fashion. Implications of this were seen already in the first 
thesis. Now Marx explicates these around the questions of sensation and 
consciousness. 
Feuerbach's discussions of the nature and role of sense perception 
occur in two contexts, that of the function of sense perception itself as 
the basis of individually realized knowledge, as well as within a 
discussion of perception as affected by community. The latter context 
will be illustrated below, in an exposition of Marx' attitudes towards 
Feuerbach's notion of community in general. The texts seem to indicate 
that it is only within a discussion of comm-nity that the nature of 
perception can be completely described for Feuerbach. But he nonetheless 
does make a number of assertions about perception itself, abstracting 
from the broader context, which are germane to the present analysis. 
First, and indeed implied by the above exposition of the meaning of 
"nature" for Feuerbach, he insists that the basis of all knowledge is 
awareness of the content of real, separate, and given objects delivered 
in sensation. "The determinations that afford real knowledge are always 
only those that determine the object by the object itself, namely, by 
73cf. Rotenstreich, Op. cit., p. 68-69. 
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its own individual determinations ••• 1174 Feuerbach insists that it is in 
awareness of concrete determinations of given objects that all valid 
knowledge is based, and he contrasts this basis to the general 
determinations of objects offered by metaphysics, which cannot function 
as the basis of knowledge in that they "determine no object because they 
extend to all objects without distinction. 1175 Thus he indicates that he 
is, as Marx comments, "not satisfied with abstract thinking~6 but insists 
~ on recovering a notion of the source of knowledge in the concrete 
determinations of the immediate given. 
Feuerbach proceeds from this point to make several assertions 
concerning sense perception itself, and the perceiving subject. In that 
the awareness of concrete given data constitutes the foundation of knowl-
edge, and in that this awareness is had through sensation, then sensation 
is in principle, 77 the clearest form of knowledge available to the 
knowing subject: " ••• only the sensuous is as clear as daylight; all 
doubt and dispute cease only where sensation begins. The secret of 
innnediate knowledge is sensation."78 
74Feuerbach, Principles, Vogel, p. 66; sHmmtliche Werke, vol. 2, p. 312 
75rbid. 
7~arx, "Theses on Feuerbach," in Easton and Guddat, p. 401; MEGA 
Abt. 1, Bd. 5, p. 534. 
77Feuerbach will qualify this assertion by going on to describe two 
sorts of imagination, primative and refined. 
78Feuerbach, Principles, Vogel, p. 55; sMmmtliche Werke, vol. 2, p. 301 
Here again Feuerbach opposes the clarity which he takes to be in principle 
available to sense knowledge,·to the supposed clarity of the intuition 
of ideas, e.g., Cartesian intuition, indicating the accuracy of Marx' 
comment. 
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And reflection on the experience of sense perception yields statements 
describing further the semsory subject himself. That which is realized 
by the subject in sense awareness is data in the literal sense of that 
term: something given. Therefore the sense subject realizes himself in 
the experience of sensation as not a pure subject; i.e., not exclusively 
active, 79 but as passive as well, as one who receives the given through 
sensation. Feuerbach expresses this through stating that "In the 
activity of the senses ••• ! let the object be what I myself am--a real and 
self actualizing being. Only sense and perception give me something as 
subject. 118° For a thing to be a subject in this context is for it to be 
in some sense active. And in the experience of sensation, the object 
realized is related to the sense subject in something of an active 
fashion: it delivers the data realized by the sense subject, is the 
source of that data which the individual subject receives. 
Sensation involves an experience in which the subject is "given" 
something, and in whic~ he is to that extent passive. The concrete 
details of the experience of the sense subject reveal this to him, and 
reveals as well the separateness of object from subject in sensation. 
For example, "Pain is a loud protest against the identification of the 
79cf. Feuerbach, Principles, Vogel, p. 40; Sanmltliche Werke, vol. 2, 
p. 284. "In thought, I am an absolute subject, I accept everything 
only as my object or predicate, that is, as object or predicate of a 
thinking self; I am intollerant." 
80Ibid. 
r 
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subjective with the objective, 1181 an experience revealing the distinct-
ness of the source of pain from the subject tmdergoing it. And indeed 
the very experience of concrete objects itself is, when accurately 
described, a demonstration of this separateness of the object from the 
sense subject: "only where I am transformed from an 'I' into a 'thou' 
where I am passive, does the conception of an activity existing apart 
from me, that is, objectivity, arise. But only through the senses is 
82 
an 'I' a 'non-I."' The term "thou" here is used to indicate something 
acted upon. And the point is that .the very experience of perceptual 
objects necessitates the conclusion that the subject is and must take 
himself to be a "thou" in this sense, something acted upon, and, by 
implication for Feuerbach, something acted upon by an item really 
separate fromhimself. Indeed it is only given this that an accurate 
notion of the subject's consciousness of himself as an individual can be 
hand. For, "Man is given to himself only through the senses, he is an 
object of himself only as an object of the senses. 1183 The individual, to 
accurately and concretely comprehend himself, must comprehend that he is 
receptive to data delivered from distinct sources, and that his basic 
tmderstandings of his own reality are likewise delivered via sensation. 
Finally, it must be noted that Feuerbach is not asserting a theory 
81Feuerbach, PrinciEles, Vogel, P• 53; Sammtliche Werke, vol. 2, p. 28 • 
82Feuerbach, PrinciEles, Vogel, p. 51; Sannntliche Werke, vol. 2,p. 296 
83Feuerbach, PrinciEles, Vogel, p. 58; SHmmtliche Werke, vol. 2, p. 30 • 
- i 
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of sensation that is either crude or narrow. For first, as already seen, 
fcuerbach's uotion of sensation is a broad rather than a narrow one, 
including i11msinative and affective aspects as well as "perceptual" 
f catures in the strict sense of that term. "Certain and innnediately 
assured is only that which is an object of the senses, perception, and 
feeling."84 And second, he does not hold that sensation in an unrefined 
sense yields innnediate and clear knowledge. Feuerbach distinguishes 
"crude senses" from "refined senses. 1185 The former receives that data 
which is immediately and apparently given. It may be encumbered by the 
association of data with spontaneously constructed and fantastic images. 8 
Refined sensation is that which attains accurate awareness of the data of 
sensation through analyzing it critically through responding to it 
imaginatively and emotively, as well as intellectually. 87 The point is 
that refined sensation is attained by the individual who utilizes the 
several critical devices available to him, emotive, imaginative, and 
intellectual, to interpret and thus attain awareness of the real content 
of the data of sensation itself. In this sense, the perceiving individua 
is active, that is he acts on his sensations of the object, though not on 
the object itself. In this context the role even of philosophy is 
84 ., Feu~rbach, PrinciEles, Vogel, p. 55; Sannntliche Werke, vol. 2, p.300 
85 
s•tliche Feu4'.!rbach, Princi12les, Vogel, p. 58; Werke, vol. 2, p.304 
86 Fe1u.trb11ch, Princi12les, Vogel, p. 60; Sannntliche Werke, vol. 2, P· 30 
87 Sannntliche f(!1u.rh11ch, Principles, Vogel, P· 58-60; Werke, vol. 2, pp. 30 3~ 'j(I(). 
- ,·---'I"'""···· 
. 
-156-
defined for Feuerbach. "The task of philosophy and of science in general 
consists, therefore, not in leading away from sensuous, that is, real, 
objects, but rather in leading toward them, not in transforming objects 
into ideas and conceptions, but rather in making visible, that is, in 
objectifying, objects that are invisible to ordinary eyes. 1188 
Feuerbach's doctrine of sense perception itself, then, includes 
the following ideas. Sense perception yields the most basic form of 
awareness available to the conscious subject. The experience of sense 
perception reveals that the subject stands in a passive and receptive 
relation to real and separate objects which deliver the data of sensation, 
and experiences his own self awareness through the medium of sensation, 
i.e., experiences himself as an object as well as a subject, a "thou" as 
well as an "I." But sensation must be taken to include imaginative and 
emotional as well as strictly perceptual features through which the 
individual acts on his sensations of the object. And these former two 
features, along with intellectual behavior, function to refine sense 
awareness and to enable the subject to attain an enriched and accurate 
consciousness of its delivered content. Upon which of these statements 
might the author of the "Paris Manuscripts" and the "Theses of Feuerbach" 
desire to comment critically? 
From remarks made earlier in this chapter, one must infer that Marx 
!would not quarrel with Feuerbach's general effort to recover through 
theoretical means an awareness of the basic character of the sensuous. 
88Feuerbach, Principles, Vogel, p. 60; Sammtliche Werke, vol.2, pp. 305-
,~nf. -
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Marx, like Feuerbach is "not satisfied with abstract thinking1189 i.e., 
not satisfied with describing the individual simply as a self-conscious 
subject, but requires a description of the totality of the determination 
of the individual. We have seen Marx praise Feuerbach on this very 
point, as offering a materialism which indicates the manner in which "the 
actual history of man as a given subject1190 may be theoretically 
comprehended and described in terms of the actual relation of the 
individual to his concrete environment. But Feuerbach goes on to describe 
the basis of those actual relations as sense perception. It is this 
thesis that Marx attacks, and he attacks it by criticizing Feuerbach's 
understanding of the perceptual object itself. 
For Feuerbach the object of perception occurs as separate from the 
perceiving subject, contains within itself its own determinations, and 
offers itself to the perceiving subject as receptive. This implies that 
Feuerbach can only make sense of the notion of the subject if the 
subject is taken to be an object as well, an individual that is both activ 
and receptive, an "I" and a "thou". In this sense it can be said that 
the subject requires or needs the object in order to be a subject, to be 
what it is. And it is the nature of the perceptual object itself which 
' defines the content of the need which the subject has for it. The object 
is self existent and in terms of its determinations self contained; the 
89Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," Easton and Guddat, p. 401; MEGA, 
Abt. 1, Bd. 5, p. 534. 
9~arx, "Manuscripts of 1844," Easton and Guddat, p. 317; MEGA 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 152. 
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perceiving subject requires this object, one which is thus self existent 
and self contained, in order to be a perceiving subject. But can 
Feuerbach expand the notion of need beyond this? Marx seems to realize 
that he cannot. In attempting to describe the individual subject as a 
"sensuous" subject, Feuerbach describes him as a perceiving subject. And 
the object which such a subject requires or needs is then precisely that 
which Feuerbach describes. But the description of this object is such 
that it does not allow him to define the notion of need itself in an 
adequate fashion. 
For an accurate description of the individual in his relations to 
his environment, Marx argues in the Manuscripts of 1844, the notion of 
need must be defined in a sense at once more general and more concrete 
than that available to Feuerbach, as some felt lack or deficiency within 
the individual, capable of being satisfied through the individual's 
relating himself to something other than and external to himself. To 
understand the individual concretely, Marx asserts in the Manuscripts, 
is, "as seen above, to understand him, as a natural, living, sentient, 
and objective being," as "a suffering, conditioned, and limited creature 
like an animal or plant. The objects of his drives, that is to say, 
exist outside him as indpendent, yet they are objects of his need, 
essential and indispensable to the exercise and confirmation of his 
essential capacities. 1191 "Need" must initially be understood as 
describing that manifold of felt requirements which demand that the 
91Marx, "Manuscripts of 1.844," Easton and Guddai:, p. 325; ~' 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 160. 
r 
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individual relate himself to his environment. And Feuerbach's narrower 
und-rstanding of need as the need of the perceiving subject for the 
perceptual object will not do simply because it seriously limits the 
sense of the term to the extent that it cannot describe the totality of 
its actual manifestations. The serious difficulty with this limitation 
is that, by holding that the individual requires the object as a percep-
tual object, Feuerbach implies for Marx that the individual subject must 
be described as a perceiving subject. But this is a retreat into 
II b h" k" n 92 11 • d h d i h' h a stract tin 1ng... equa y as 1na equate as tat octr new 1c 
would describe the individual simply as a self-conscious subject. 
Feuerbach does not want to hold to this exclusive and limited description, 
he asserts that, "Indeed, even the stomach of man, which we view so 
contemptuously, is not animal but human because it is a universal 
being ••• 11 93 that the individual is constituted by the totality of his 
relations to his environment. But Marx' implication seems to be that 
Feuerbach wants to but cannot hold this, given his description of the 
nature of the perceptual object in relation to the perceiving subject. 
This notion of need which Marx considers at once broader and more 
concretely accurate than that available to Feuerbach leads Marx to 
further statements concerning the nature of the relation of individual 
to the external environment and the nature of the external environment 
itself 'in that relation. 
92Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," Easton and Guddat, p. 401; MEGA, 
·Abt. 1, Bd. 5, p. 534. 
93Feuerbach, Principles, Vogel, p. 69; Sannntliche Werke, vol. 2, p. 31 • 
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Need, as Marx takes the term, governs the manner in which the indiv-
idual relates to his environment. But this manner must be one through 
which the individual is capable both of relating his need to the 
environment itself, and of satisfying that need. For Marx, this is to 
assert that it is some manner in which the individual "appropriates the 
94 
external world and sensuous nature through his labor ••• " or some 
manner in which the individual relates to his environment as an agent, 
through praxis. In that the individual relates his needs to the 
environment through practical agency, those needs are at once specified 
(e.g., hunger as a need is specifically transformed into the need for 
this or that food item available through action on the environment; the 
need for friendship is transformed into the need for interaction with 
this or that person) and the conditions for the possibility of their 
satisfaction are constituted through the contents of the environment 
being brought into relation to those needs. 95 But this is to reassert 
the familiar theme that the external environment or nature is to be 
understood as the material for and the context of agency. 
Further, it has been shown that human productive agency or praxis is 
94Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," Easton, p. 290; MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, 
p. 84. 
95cf. Karl Marx, The Grundrisse, trans. and ed. David McLellan, (New 
York: HarpeE and Row, 1971), p. 26. Marx, Grundrisse der Kritik der I 
Politischen Okonornie, (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1953), p. 14, in which text 
Marx expresses the same idea in the economic language of production and 
consumption. "Production creates the material as well as the external 
object of consumption, consumption creates the want as the immediate 
object, the purpose of production." 
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in part defined for Marx through being governed by needs developed 
96 beyond those subsistence needs. But as Marx argues in the German 
Ideology, such developed needs arise from the satisfaction of priorly 
97 
experienced needs, and that prior satisfaction entails some activity 
having been performed within the environment, and this in at least 
minimal modification of the environment. Indeed as also seen above, 
it is the environment as modified through action which forms the objective 
source which elicits the development of concrete and new needs in the 
subject. This however yields a second familiar assertion: that the 
actual and external environment to which man relates, nature in Marx' 
sense of the term, is not self contained in its determinations, but 
receives determinations as a result of human productive activity; or, 
that nature as related to by man98 is produced by him. Translated into 
Feuerbachian language, this statement would read that the object to which 
the subject relates is actually external to him but not simply self-
contained in terms of its contents; rather it is an object or feature 
of nature in virtue of its bring determined by the productive activity 
of the subject. 
As it stands, this may seem simply another argument in support of 
Marx' criticism of Feuerbach's doctrine of nature itself in relation to 
action. But its implications for an understanding of the perceived object 
96cf. for example Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," Easton and Guddat, pp. 
292-293; MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, pp. 86-87. 
97Marx, Engels, The German Ideology, Pascal, pp. 16-17; MEGA, Abt. 1, 
Bd. 3, p. 18. 
98rhat Marx will ultimately accept no other sense of 'nature' is shown 
by texts already cited from the Paris Manuscripts and the German Ideology. 
--
-
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perception itself, and consciousness more generally taken, are both 
immedi-te and crucial. Perception is the most rudimentary and basic 
manner in which the individual is aware of his environment. It is 
tautologous, given this, to state that perception is perception of an 
object. But the object perceived is a portion of the natural environment 
to which the individual relates, and that natural environment is as such 
determined through its being the object of productive activity. Thus the 
object of perception itself, as a portion of the environment, is so 
determined. Put differently, the experience of the perceiving subject is 
determined by the object of perception, but that object itself is not 
simply given in its content, but more fundamentally determined in its 
content by the subject as an agent. 99 However Feuerbach incorrectly 
asserts the contrary of this: that the expereince of the perceiving 
subject is, in its content, determined by the content of the perceived 
object taken in isolation, that is, as unaffected by the subject himself. 
That "refined" sensation which makes " ••• visible objects which are 
invisible to ordinary eyes ••• , 11160 is an activity of the perceiving 
99.Marx would of course immediately insist here that the productive 
activity determining the character of the natural environment, and thus 
of the perceived object, must be understood as the productive activity 
not simply of the agent taken in isolation, .but of the social whole 
within which the individual is located. 
100. • Feuerbach, Principles, Vogel, pp. 58 and 60; Sammtliche Werke, 
vol. 2, pp. 304 and 306. 
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subject, but an activity of that subject on his sensations, which in 
turn ultimately depend for their content on the self contained object 
of perception, in Feuerbach's understanding of perceptual experience. 
This then is Marx' criticism of Feuerbach's doctrine of the 
perceptual object and of perception itself: that the latter"· .. does not 
comprehend sensuousness ... ," that is, does not comprehend the perceptual 
101 
object, " ... as practical, human sensuous activity •.. ," as in its own 
reality not self contained, but as fundamentally determined by human 
productive activity. In view of his correction of Feuerbach here, Marx 
asserts not that the perceiving subject stands in a relation of 
receptivity to his object, but that he stands in a more basic and active 
relation to that object, as a practical agent. And if one were to argue 
in a Marxian context the Feuerbachian premisse that all forms of 
consciousness derive from and relate back to sense consciousness, then 
one would have to argue with Marx the further assertion that all other 
forms of consciousness are themselves had by a subject who relates to 
that of which he is aware fundamentally as an agent. Marx would of 
course insist here that the productive activity determining the character 
of the natural environment, and thus of the perceived object, must be 
understood as the productive activity not simply of the individual taken 
in isolation, but of the social whole within which the individual is 
situated. Praxis, as seen in the first chapter, is and for Marx must be 
101 Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," Easton and Guddat, p. 401; MEGA, 
Abt.1, Bd.8, p. 534. 
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understood as a social rather than an exclusively individual phenomenon. 
But given this qualification, one may still assert that for Marx and 
contrary to Feuerbach, the perceived object is still not itself essential! 
given, but is, in a relevant sense of the term, 11 produced. 11 
It appears then that on the theme of consciousness and its object, 
significantly perceptual consciousness in relation to its object, as well 
as on that of the significance of nature in relation to action, Marx 
stands in a posture of opposition to rather than of agreement with 
Feuerbach. This opposition is both noted in the "Theses on Feuerbach11 and 
based on arguments imp! icit in the Manuscripts of 1844. And the arguments 
for both of these points of oppositton appear significantly in the theory 
of human nature offered in those manuscripts. Just as Marx argues 
concerning the relation of praxis and nature in that theory of man, he 
argues also therein concerning the relation of praxis, consciousness 
Including sense consciousness, and nature, Thus it seems that on both of 
these themes Althusser's claim that the "humanism" of Marx' Manuscripts 
is in its inspiration as well as its content 11 Feuerbachian11 will not hold 
Y...:... The ~estion of Community and Society. 
A third area of Althusser's claim however remains to be treated, 
involving the que~tion of the unity or disparity of Marx and Feuerbach 
on the assertion of the communal or social nature of man. And on this 
point it at least initially seems that Althusser's interpretation of 
Marx' theory of man in the Manuscripts might be given some creedence. 
A1thusser asserts that in the period (1842-45) within which the 
Manuscripts were written, Marx envisioned a theoretical humanism in which 
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man was understood as " ..• primarily a 1 Gemeinwesen, 1 a 'communal being,' 
a being who only actualizes himself theoretically {science) and 
practically (politics) in his universal human relations, relations with 
other men rather than with object {external nature 'humanized' through 
102 Jabor). 11 And he further states that this "communal" theory of human 
nature is identical with 11 ••• the 'communal 1 humanism of Feuerbach."l03 
Now there are certain textusl features of the Manuscripts of 1844 which 
apparently lend weight to this interpretation. 
It has alread~ been shown that Marx in the Manuscripts places great 
emphasis on the social nature of the individual as agent, and of man as 
such. The 11 ••• expression .•. 11 of the 4 individual 's I ife, Marx states in 
104 
the Manuscripts, is 11 ••• an expression and assertion of social I ife. 11 
And indeed packed with Feuerbachian overtones is Marx' statement that, 
" ... though man is therefore a particular individual - and precisely his 
particularity makes him an individual, an actual individual communal bein 
he is equal to the totality, the ideal totality, the subjective existence 
. 105 
of society explicitly thought and experienced." Moreover, as has also 
been seen, Marx in the Manuscripts lauds Feuerbach for the formulation of 
102 Althusser, "t 232 £P..:.. .£.!.......:..., p. . 
103 Ibid. 
104 Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844, 11 Easton and Guddat, p. 306; MEGA, Abt.1, 
Bd. 3, p. 116. 
l o5 Ibid. , p. 307; p. 1t7. 
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a materialism adequate to the description of the individual as actually 
and fundamentally social. 106 Texts such as these have led Mclellan to 
comment, concerning the influence of Feuerbach's doctrine of man as 
communal in the Principles of the Philosophy of the Future in relation to 
Marx' Manuscripts that, "It is ... in the Paris Manuscripts that Feuerbach 
is supreme and his all pervasive influence cannot escape anyone who 
107 
carefully compares the respective texts," However, differing 
interpretations are possible and have been offered. lobkowicz, for example, 
who states generally concerning Feuerbach's influence on Marx that, 
108 
11 
••• this influence would seem far Jess than is generally bel ieved, 11 
insists that this comment is specifi-cally accurate concerning the theories 
109 
of man as communal and social as offered by the two. 
An accurate determination of this question can only be the result of 
some attempt to analyze Feuerbach's theory of the commune! nature of man 
itself. The texts of Feuerbach, both the Essence of Christianity and the 
Principles of the Philosophy of the Future readily allow this analysis, 
and it is one that can be initially related to previous statements made 
about Feuerbach's doctrine of sensation. For in the Principles of the 
Philosophy of the Future, Feuerbach explicitly relates his statement that 
sensation yields certainty, to the notion of man as communal. "The 
l 06 I b id. , p. 3 16; p. 15 2. 
107 Mclellan, The Young Hegel ians and Karl Marx, p. 106. 
108 lobkowicz, Theory and Practice, p. 251. 
109 ~ 
Cf. Lobkowicz, p. 360.' 
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certainty of the existence of other things apart from me,"he tells us, 
"is mediated for me through the certainty of the existence of another 
human being apart from me. That which I perceive alone I doubt; only that 
110 
which the other also perceives is certain." Feuerbach's point here see 
to be that first, as noted above, i~ is sensation which delivers the most 
basic and recognizable form of certitude, in virtue of the sensation's 
itself being that which is capable of being apprehended immediately. But 
second, as has also been seen, the data of sensation is, for Feuerbach, 
not biven to the sense subject in a merely immediate fashion. Although th 
object of sensation is for him finally a self contained and therefore 
non-mediated object, it is nonetheless one whose content must be made 
"visible" because it is "invisible to ordinary eyes. 11111 That is, it must 
be rendered discernable through relevant affective and imaginative, as 
112 
well as intellectual, acts. The occurence of affective and 
imaginative responses relevant to specific sorts of sense data is 
requisite in order that the sense data itself yield certitude to the 
subject. But the import of Feuerbach's texts cited above is in this also 
that the individual's ability to develop the affective and imaginative 
capacities necessary to reveal the truth of sense data is not possible 
apart from his membership in community. Feuerbach supports this assertion 
by no argument at this stage of his analysis. But the assertion itself 
110 • 
• •Feuerbach, Principles, Vogel, p. 59; Sammtl iche Werke, vol.2, p.304. 
111 Ibid., p. 60; p. 306. 
112 
Cf. Ibid. 
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seems to be this. Sense data is capable of delivering true 
.-
certitude, but only when interpreted affectively and emotionally. But 
sense data can also only deliver recognized certitude to the individual 
in community, not to the individual as isolated. Therefore, the 
development of those affective and imaginative capacities necessary for 
recognizable certitude ~s possible only for the individual taken as 
113 
communal. 
The general point of these statements is that, for Feuerbach, the 
individual is not self contained, is not capable of developing those 
capacities which as a human individual he needs to develop, in a conditio 
of isolation. As noted above, the individual subject "needs" the 
perceptual object in order to be a subject, in Feuerbach's sense of the 
latter term. But now he is further asserting that community is necessary 
i~ order that the subject adequately attain the object. Thus he is 
asserting that community is necessary in order that the subject attain 
that which he requires or "needs" to be a subject at a I 1, and to 
be adequately able to "perceive" his experience. 
Feuerbach's proceedure in developing these assertions involves his 
departing from a discussion of the perceptual object, and a move towards 
' 
113 As noted, Feuerbach offers no argument in the Principles of the 
Philosophy of the Future to support his assertions regarding 'sense 
certitude' and community. Therefore, it is very difficult to ascertain 
the content of those assertions. I shall argue that other and explicitly 
defended positions of Feuerbach.exhibit consistency with the claim for 
the content of the assertion which I have made. 
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discussing the nature of individual personal subjectivity in a more 
general sense. But within this move he retains an intention of supporting 
the assertion that the individuaJ·subject requires community to be an 
individual subject at all. 
An initial indication that this assertion might be justifiable is 
given by Feuerbach in the first pages of the Essence of Christianity. 
There, as seen ablve, Feuerbach argues that man's "species consciousness" 
necessarily implies that man as an individual, " •.• is himself at once I 
and Thou; he can put himself in place of another, ·for this reason, that 
his species, his essential nature, and not merely his individuality, is 
114 
an object of thought." In virtue of his "species consciousness," in 
other wirds, the individual is capable of interpersonal or communal 
relations. This at least Feuerbach wishes to assert in this text. But he 
seems to wish to assert more than this as well. 
To be an individual, "species consciousness" must be realized, or 
some sense actually apprehended by the subject. But it is not only the 
case that the individual is constituted through "species consciousness." 
For, as noted above, all knowledge must in some way be derived from 
sense experience. Now "species consciousness" involves the individual's 
realization that "human nature" is a reality beyond that of the 
114 Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, Eliot, p. 2; S~mmtl iche 
Werke, vol.6, p:-2°. 
--
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singular discrete reality of the individual. 11 5 But given Feuerbach's 
doctrine of the relation of all knowledge to sense experience, then the 
individual is only capable of realizing "species consciousness" if he is 
able to view the content of such consciousness, "human nature, 11 as actuall 
transcending his own discrete individuality, in its exhibition in sense 
experience. 
This necessarily involves the individual's experiencing himself 
as in relation to the concrete personal other. For it is the concrete 
personal other who exhibits to the individual the phenomenon of "human 
nature" transcending his, the individual's own, discrete singularity. 
As seen above, "species consciousness" on the one hand renders the 
experience of interpersonal ity or community possible for Feuerbach. 116 
But on the other hand, it is the experience of interpersonality or 
community which provides the individual with the concrete exhibition or 
sensuous ground in virtue of which he can realize "species consciousness." 
Thereofre, it is the experience of community which constitutes the 
individual as a human individual. o/ more simply, for Feuerbach the 
human individual must be, and must be understood as, communal. 
115 Cf. Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, El lot, p.2; Sammtl iche 
Werke, vol.6, pp. 1-2. That Feuerbach intends this is clearly seen by 
his identification of species consciousness as the necessary condition 
for scientific knowledge, i.e., knowledge of classes rather than 
knowledge of discrete singular items. 
l16 Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, El lot, p. 2; S~mmtliche 
Werke, vol.6, p~, 
-171-
Feuerbach develops this assertion of the necessary communality of 
the individual through a number of texts in the Essence of Christianity 
and the Principles of the Philosophy of the Future. He begins by 
reasserting the necessity of species consciousness, or 11 humanity11 as an 
idea, being founded on concrete communal experience by comparing the felt 
effect of idea and concrete experience: " .•. the idea of humanity has 
little power over the feelings, because humanity is only an abstraction; 
and the reality which presents itself to us in distinction from 
. b . . h 1 • d f l 0 • d . d" 0 d 1 11117 this a stract1on 1s t emu t1tu e o separate, 1m1te 1n 1v1 ua s. 
The experience of concrete personal others is the individual's experience 
of 11 humanity, 11 of human nature as transcending the 1 imits of his 
singularity, and of its being embodied and realized in others as well as 
himself. It is this experience of sensuous concreteness, Feuerbach 
argues, which basically affects or has "power over the feelings" of the 
individual, and the "idea of humanity," species consciousness, is itself 
118 
the accurate comprehension of community in its sensuous concreteness . 
...... 
Sensuous communal experience is had in an immediate way by the individual 
t in direct interpersonal experience, in what Feuerbach calls the direct 
~· 
!. experience of the /l-thou. 11 
r 
! 
, 
-
ll7 Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, .Eliot, p. 153; Sammtl iche 
Werke, vol. 6, P:-185. 
118 
Cf. Ibid.; Sammtliche Werke, vol. 6, p. 184. One may note here that, 
dispite the above statements, it is not Feuerbach's intention to wholly 
collapse the identity of the individual into that of the community. 
Feuerbach states that the ancients sacrificed the individual to the 
species, and that Christians sacrificed the species to the individual. 
His language suggests his opposition to both 'sacrifices'. 
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Feuerbach amplifies this assertion by further stating that it is 
only within the direct experience of communal interpersonality that the 
individual distinguishes and differentiates himself as an individual. One 
of his most overt statements of this idea involves a statement of the 
relation of personality and sexuality. The individual must experience 
himself sensuously, and thus must experience himself as a body. 119 And 
l b d . f . l l "f" . 120 persona em o 1ment o course 1nvo ves sexua spec1 1cat1on. 
From this point Feuerbach goes on to make three statements. First, 
sexuality is not simply one property possessed by the individual among 
others and indifferent to those others, but is a pervasive feature of 
the reality of the personal individual. "The distinction of sex is not 
superficial, or limited to certain parts of the body; it is an essential 
121 
one; it penetrates bone and marrow." Second, it is within situations 
of direct intimacy, such as sexual intimacy, that the individual's most 
~ 
basic and concrete experiences of interpersonal ity or community are 
had. 11The thou between men and women has quite another sound than the 
122 
monotonous thou between friends." One might generalize slightly 
from this statement to say that, for Feuerbach, those experiences of 
11 9 Ibid., p. 91; S~mmtl iche Werke, vol 6, p. 109. 
120 Ibid., pp. 91-92; S~mmtl iche Werke, vol. 6, pp. 110-111. 
121 Ibid., p. 92; Sammtl iche Werke, vol. 6, p. 111. 
122 
r 
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community necessary for the individual's realization of himself are as 
such necessarily and most concretely had through experiences of direct 
intimacy. But thirdly, Feuerbach goes on to assert that it is precisely 
within such situations of direct intimacy, refering again to sexual 
intimacy, that the individual differentiates himself from the other and 
realizes himself as this individual, as unique. "There is no thou, 
there is no _L; but the distinction between land thou, the fundamental 
condition of all personality, of all consciousness, is only real, Jiving, 
123 
ardent, when felt as the distinction between man and woman. 11 
Some concrete and immediate experience of interpersonality is 
necessary for the individual in order that a sensuous ground for species 
consciousness be had. But such experience is also required in order that 
the individual be able to distinguish himself from others and realize his 
P.ersonal uniqueness. The realization of such uniqueness involves one's 
differentiating the characteristics and traits of his own personal self 
from those of other selves. But this can only occur if other selves are 
given within the experience of the individual. And for such experience to 
be effectively significant for the individual, it must occur in the 
contest of a relation which, in Feuerbach's words, is 11 ••• real, living, 
ardent ... 11 such as, for example, the sexual relationship. It is in the 
context of such a relationship that the individual most concretely 
relates himself to and differentiates himself from the other, and 
123 Ibid. 
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realizes himself as unique. Thus in this sense too community and 
significant interpersonality comprise necessary experience for the 
individual. 
Developing this point, Feuerbach goes on to note that, in the act of 
differentiating himself from the other, one feature which the individual 
realizes concerning himself is his own limitation and imperfection. 
Noting this involves Feuerbach's unifying certain comments made early in 
the Essence of Christianity concerning human species consciousness with 
other comments noted above concerning individual self-differentiation and 
the synthesis of these comments in the statement that it is through 
concrete community that the individual overcomes those limitations which 
he notes as necessary features of himself. 
Interpersonal experiences within which individual self-differentiati 
occurs involve the individual's noting distinctions between himself and 
others, and among other things distinctions of capacities and developed 
abilities. Friendship is an example ~f this. "Friendship can only exist 
between the virtuous, as the ancients said. But it cannot be based on 
perfect similarity; on the contrary, it requires diversity, for 
friendship rests on a desire for self-completion. One friend obtains 
through the other what he himself does not possess. The virtues of the 
one atone for the failings of the other ••• If I cannot be myself perfect, 
I yet at least love virtue, perfection, in others."124 A concrete 
124. u • Ibid., pp. 156-57; Sammtliche Werke, vol. 6, p. 189. 
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feature of individual self differentiation within interpersonal relations 
like friendship, is the individual's noting his own limitations and 
imperfections vis a vis the other. This recognition provides a motive fo 
such relations, a 11 ••• desire for self-completion." But Feuerbach seems 
additionally to assert that this motive is a consistently operative 
desire. 
Feuerbach's rationale for this seemingly involves an appeal 
to initial statements concerning human consciousness as adequately 
present '' ... only in a being to whom hJs species, his essential nature, 
125 is an object of thought." For Feuerbach, man's consciousness of his 
"essential nature" has a content, namely reason, will and tove. 
"Reason, love, force of will, are perfections - the perfections of the 
126 
human being, nay, more, they are the absolute perfections of being. 11 
These predicates must be taken as absolute or infinite perfections, in 
that they must be taken as ends in themselves: "···it is impossible to 
love, will, or think, without perceiving these activities to be 
perfections - impossible to feel that one is a loving, willing, thinking 
being without experiencing infinite joy therein .•. It is therefore 
impossible to be conscious of a perfection as an 'imperfection,' 
127 
impossible to feel feeling 1 imited, to think thought l imited. 11 
125 Ibid., p. 1, S~mmtliche Werke, vol. 6, p. 1, 
126 Ibid., p. 3, Sammtliche Werke, vol. 6, p. 3. Cf. Ibid., pp. 3-12, 
S~mmtTTChe Werke, vol 6, pp. 3-13, in which Feuerbach expands in detail 
on these ideas. 
127 Ibid., p. 6; Sammtl iche Werke, vol. 6, p. 7. 
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Feuerbach's last statement here is the critical one for our purposes. 
In themselves, and as ends in themselves, reason, will, and love are taken 
by the individual to be infinite perfections, and thus capable of 
infinite expression. They are also taken by him to be perfections of 
human nature, and thus of himself as an individual embodiment of human 
nature. But at the same time the individual is not fully identical with 
human nature or with his species, is not the full embodiment of those 
perfections which are nonetheless his own. If the individual errs, as 
Feuerbach insists he does, in making 11 ••• his own I imitations the 
limitations of the species, 11 this is an error which arises from, 11 th~ 
mistake that he identifies himself immediately with the species, a 
mistake which is intimately connected with the individual's Jove of ease, 
128 
sloth, vanity, and egoism. 11 Given, then, an accurate perception of 
hi~self, the individual must comprehend himself as characterized by 
reason, will, and Jove, infinite perfections of the species whose reality 
he individualizes, and at the same time as incapable within his own 
individuality of realizing the infinity of these perfections. 
In this comprehension is rooted the desire noted above. The 
individual desires to realize infinite reason, will, and love, because 
these are infinite perfections of his own nature. But he is unable to 
achieve such realization on bis own terms, because as distinct from the 
species, the individual is 1 imited and is thus unable to fully embody 
128 ~ .• p. 6; Sammtl iche Werke, vol. 6, p. 7. 
---
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the species• perfections. The desire·noted above must then be a 
129 
structural and consistently operative desire for the individual. 
But it is further one which can be related to by community as an 
essential element of the experience ef the individual. Community yields 
the concrete experience of the individual 1 s participation in the species. 
And concrete communal interaction involves interaction with others who in 
terms of their own developed abilities compensate for the deficiendies of 
the individual, and he for theirs. Communal interaction and experience 
then involves his experiencing a situation in which the perfections of 
human oature are developed beyond his own limited development of them. 
And thus actual community relates to and compensates the individual's 
desire for a perfection that transcends his own 1 imitations. 
Mclellan summs up this idea in the comment that, for Feuerbach, 
11 T~e fundamental unity of mankind that the idea of a species presupposes 
arises from the fact that men are not self-sufficient creatures; they have 
very different qualities, so it is only together that they can form the 
130 
'perfect' man. 11 Feuerbach himself states the idea in numerous ways, 
beginning with the general statement that, 11 Hence intercourse 
129 
Cf. Ibid., p. 153; Sammtl iche Werke, vol. 6, p. t84. Feuerbach 
argues that the consistency of the individual's desire to realize the 
perfection of the species is the basis of the religious illusion. 11 Thus 
the species is unlimited; the individual alone is 1 imited. But the sense 
of I imitation is painful, and hence the individual sets himself free from 
it by the contemplation of perfect Being; in this contemplation he 
possesses what is otherwise wanting to him. 11 
130 Mclellan, The Young Hegel ians ~Karl Marx, p. 92. 
r . 
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ameliorates and elevates; involuntarily and without disguise, man is 
different in intercourse from what he is when alone. 11131 Feuerbach's 
comment on friendship as such an 'elevation' has been seen. He discusses' -
sexual love in these terms, as that context in which the individual, 
" ••• postulates the existence of another as a need of the heart, he 
reckons another as part of his own being; he declares the life which he 
has through love to be the truly human life, corresponding to the idea of 
132 
man, i. e., of the species." Feuerbach even relates the idea of 
connnunity as compensating the individual for his own felt sense of self 
f limitation to the community as historical. History offers limitless 
possibilities for the overcoming of imperfections. And the individual, as 
I 
participating in historical connnunity, can envision these possibilities, 
albeit vicariously. "My life is bound to a limited time, not so the life 
of humanity; the history of mankind consists of nothing else than a 
continuous and progressive conquest of limits ••• the future always unveils 
the fact that the alleged limits of the species were only limits of 
individuals. 11133 Thus i.n various ways community and interpersonality 
relate to the individual's desire to realize the perfections of the 
species, which are in themselves infinite. 
The idea that reason. love, and will are perfections proper to the human 
species, and as such infinite perfections, allows Feuerbach to ennunciate 
131. 
Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, Eliot, p. 156; Sammtliche 
Werke, vol. 6, p. 188. 
132. 
Ibid. 
133 
• Ibid. ,pp. 152-153; Sfunmtliche Werke, vol. 6, p. 184. 
.! 
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that, "Homo homini Deus est - This is the great practical principle; 
this is the axis on which revolves the his·tory of the world. 11134 And in 
that connnunity is that through which these perfections are realized 
concretely as ends in themselves for the individual, then connnunity is 
both essential to the individual, and is for him, in the only sense of th 
word which Feuerbach will accept, "sacred." Feuerbach's model for 
understanding community is and must be for him direct or interpersonal 
"I-Thou" relations, because it is in such relations that the individual 
experiences both interaction and self-diffe~entiation in their fullest 
sensuous innnediacy. But given that, he can confidently assert in 
concluding the Essence of Christianity that, " ••• true social relations 
136 
are sacred~ such." And in concluding the Principles of the 
Philosophy of the Future he is capable of applying the above ideas to the 
topic of "thought," asserting that the individual's realization of 
reason, as of any other hyman perfectionis possible only through 
communal participation. "The true dialectic is not a monologue of a 
solitary thinker himself; it is a dialogue between I and thou. 11137 
From the above, then one can recognoze Feuerbach's emphasis on the 
. connnunal nature of man, the individual as essentially communal or social. 
Social relations are necessary for the individual to be an individual; 
134. Ibid., p. 271; Sannntliche Werke, vol. 6, p. 326. 
135. Cf. Ibid. This idea is illustrated by Feuerbach in his statement 
immediately following the text cited above. " The relations of child and 
parent, of husband and wife, of brother and friend - in general of man to 
man - in short all the moral relationships are per ~ religious. Life as 
a whole is, -in its essential; substantial relations, throughout of 
a divine nature. 
136. Ibid., p. 273; 
137. Feuerbach 
vol. 6, p. 329. 
72· Sammtliche Werke vol.2 
r 
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they provide the context in which his imaginative and affective capacities 
can be concretely developed; they constitute him as a human individual, 
and enable him to achieve individual self awareness through actual self 
differentiation; they relate to a desire which is structurally invovled i 
the human individual as such. In language perilously close to that of at 
least the young Marx, and thus in seeming substantiation of Althusser's 
claim, Feuerbach asserts that, "The essence of man is contained only in 
11138 
the community and unity of man with man... But at the same time one 
might read the statement of Marx in the "Theses," that, "Feuerbach 
resolves the religious essence into the human essence. But the essence of 
man is no abstraction inhering in each single individual. In its actualit 
139 it is the ensemble of social relationships." And the implication of th" 
statement is that, for Marx, Feuerbach does not comprehend these social 
relationships adequately. 
One aspect of the above criticism involved Marx's attitude towards 
Feuerbach's conception of the function of a theory of human nature. This 
criticism will be considered subsequently in this chapter, along with P 
analogous statements made by Marx agains~ Prudhon. But this implication 
of the abvve statement from Marx' Theses" depends on a prior criticism 
of Feuerbach's doctrine of the nature of social relations. And it is a 
-· 
criticism which, I shall argue, is both is both founded upon argumentativ 
138. ~., p. 71; Sainmtliche Werke, vol.2, p. 319. 
139. II II Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, Easton and Guddat, p. 402; MEGA, 
Abt. i. Bd. 5, p. 535 
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details present in the Paris Manuscripts, and is tied to another 
statement made by Marx in the sixth Thesis, that Feuerbach is " ••• com-
pelled 1) to abstract from the historical process and to establish 
religious feeling as something self contained, and to presuppose an 
abstract - isolated - human individua1. 11140 
A hint as to why these cemments concerning social relationships and 
history are linked together by Marx in the Sixth Thesis is offered by 
Rotenstreich, in his commentary on that thesis. "The view that regards 
society as a natural reality implies that it is a given reality; and if 
society is viewed as an historical reality, the implication is that it is 
141 
capable of changing itself." For history to occur, it is necessary that 
142 
the historical subject, society, be capable of process and change. But 
l 40. Ibid. 
141. Rotenstreich, £E..• cit., p. 73. 
142. 1 There can be no doubt that, for Marx, society is the historical 
subject, the subject of the historical process. Althusser, ££.• cit., 
p. 328, notes that, for the mature Marx, "The subjects of history are 
given human societies." But the foundations of this statement are clearly 
present in the Paris Manuscripts as well. For example, Marx there 
frequently refers to 'communism' as the goal of history (cf. Easton and 
Guddat, p. 314; MEGA Abt.l, Bd.3, p. 125), but the term 'communism' in 
the Manuscripts refers to a system of social relations. Also, Marx assert 
in the Paris Manuscripts (cf. Easton and Guddat, p. 314; MEGA, Abt.l, 
Bd.3, p. 125), that, " ••• for socialist man, however, the ;ntire so called 
world history is only the creation of man through human labor ane:r--the 
development of nature for man ••• " As already seen, Marx also argues in 
the Manuscripts that both the motive forces of man's self actualization 
and his relations to nature involve praxis as conditioned in its actual I 
details by society. Thus on these terms too, Marx must see society as thei 
subject of the historical process, now identified with the p~ocess of 
human self actualization. 
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then a theoretical account of society, or of social relations, must be 
one which includes a description of society as capable of undergoing 
change, such that it can be the subject of the historical process.Otherwis• 
the possibility of history itself is left unaccounted for. And 
Rotenstreich states, Marx understands Feuerbach's doctrine of social 
relationsas not yielding such a description in that the latter understands 
society " ••• as a natural reality ••• " 
To see Marx' criticism of Feuerbach here, two statements made above 
about the latter's doctrine of society and community may be recalled. For 
Feuerbach social relations provude those and only those experiences 
through which the individual can be an individual, as the bases both of 
the realization of "species consciousness" and of individual 
discrimination. And for Feuerbach, social relations provide those 
experiences through which the felt limitations of the individual can, in 
one way, be overcome. This is for him to say at least that the individual 
is necessarily social. But more, these characteristics for Feuerbach are 
defining characteristics of society or community itself. Society for 
Feuerbach is given in direct, experienced interpersonal or "I-Thou" 
relations. The description of these relations and of their effects on 
individual participants, is a description for him of the nature of society 
itself, and its effects on its individual members. This description 
involves the ideas: a) that social relations occur directly within and at 
the basis of human experience; b) that such relations provide the basis 
for the individual's realizati·on of the nature of his species; c) that 
such relations provide the basis for personal individual differentiation; 
-t83-
and d) that such relations relate to the individual's desire to overcome 
imperfections which as an individual he necessarily possesses. But these 
are descriptive statements about the nature of society which are in 
principle ahistorical. They describe, in a Feuerbachian context, simply 
features of direct interpersonal relations waich are indifferent to 
history. But they are also descriptions of the essential nature of society 
for Feuerbach. And if so, then society is described by him as essentially 
ahistorical. 
The point here is not that Feuerbach does not want to describe 
society in relation to history. Indeed a text cited above indicates his 
desire to do this. But Marx' question is, can Feuerbach succeed in this? 
And his negative answer is based on the idea that Feuerbach describes the 
essential features of social relationships through a series of statements 
whose contents must be taken as unchanging contents. The direct innnediacy 
of social or interpersonal relations, the function of such relations as 
bases for species realization and individual self-differentiation, and 
the role of such relationsas enabling the individual to overcome those 
imperfections which he feels resident in himself as a mere individual, 
are characteristics and functions which social relations can in principle 
have or exercise in any historical context. But then to as·sert that 
these are the essential characteristics and functions of social 
relations is to assert that society is in its essential reality " ••• a 
i . ..143 g ven reality ••• , or, essentially ahistorical. This forces 
143. Rotenstreich, .££.· cit., p. 73. 
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Feuerbach both to " ••• abstract from the historical process ••• , 11144 to 
leave history unaccounted for, and also to describe society inadequately, 
in not describing it such that it can be viewed as the subject of history. 
Marx indicates the correction he takes to overcome the difficulty of 
Feuerbach's in the Eights Thesis, in asserting that, "All social life is 
145 
essentially practical." To understand society as essentially founded 
vpon "practical," i.e. active, relations, or productive relations, is to 
describe society in such a way as to render it comprehensible as the 
historical subject. 146 The details of practical or productive activity 
can vary within societies. If social reality is comprehended as essential 
involving such relations, then it is comprehended as that which can be 
the subject of histor~cal change. The elucidationof such a doctrine of 
society would then provide both an explanation of the possibility of 
history, and a more adequate account of the nature of society itself. 
144. II 11 Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, Easton and Guddat, p. 402; MEGA Abt.1, 
Bd. 5, p. 535. 
145. 
Ibid.Cf. Rotenstreich, £E.• cit., p. 80. Rotenstreich comments that 
this statement epitomizes Marx' other assertions on practical, pooductive 
activity in Theses One to Three, and Five. 
146
• It is also, and this Marx takes to be cricial in this thesis, to 
understand society as that which engenders ideological consciousness. 
This Marx asserts in the remainder of the Eighth Thesis. Cf. Easton and 
Guddat, p. 402; MEGA, Abt,l, Bd.5, p. 535. Marx states that, "All the 
human mysteries which lead theory to mysticism find their rational 
solutinns in human practice and in the comprehensinn of this 
practice." Thus the understanding of society which Marx offers here 
enables him, for example, to perform a critique of religion in a way 
unavailable to Feuerbach, because it provides him with a theoretical 
model which pointsto an examination of the 'practical' social basis of 
religiqn. 
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Marx' classic statement of social productive activity as the basis 
of history and his description of the historical process itself, is found 
in the "Preface" to his 1859 Critique of Political Economy. There he 
speaks of "social production," distinguishes "forces of production" and 
"relations of production, 11147 and describes the historical process as 
148 
governed by the former outstripping the latter. But we have seen that 
as early as 1845, Marx indicates in the "Theses on Feuerbach" at least the 
desire to account for history be describing society as essentially 
constituted by practical productive activity. And it can be shown that at 
least this idea is resident in the Manuscripts of 1844 as well, and resides 
hhere as a feature of Marx' theory of human nature. 
Proof of this statement can be seen through reference back to my 
first chapter, where I argue that, for the Marx of the Manuscripts, human 
praxis engenders, and is the condition of the possibility of, social 
~elations. Especially important for this idea are the texts whe~e Marx 
~sserts that man "produces" society, and that, for the individual, " ••• the 
~bject, the immediate activity of his own individuality, is at the same 
time his existence for other men, their existence for him. 11149 Beneath 
147. 
Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, trans. 
S. Ryazanskaya, ed. M. Dobb, (New York: International Publishers, 1970), 
pp. 20-21; MEW, vol. 13, pp. 8-9. 
148
• Cf. Marx, Political Economy, ed. Dobb. pp. 20-21; MEW, vol 13, pp. 8-S 
149. 
Marx,"Manuscripts t>f 1844," Easton and Guddat, p. 305; MEGA, Abt.!. 
Bd. 3, p. 115. The second of these statements is in context asserted by 
Marx as a description of social relations within a context characterized 
by the 9vercoming of provate property. That it is a description of social 
relations in general can be seen by comparing it to Marx' analysis of the 
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these texts lie two assertions germane to the present topic. 
One is the by now familiar assertion as to objectification as a 
characteristic of praxis or productive activity. The product of activity 
150 is, as we have seen Marx state, the "resume" of productive activity, 
the embodiment of the details of that activity of which it is a product 
or result. As such, and given the assertion of the necessary relation 
between activity and nature already laid down by Marx, 151 the product, as 
both the result of the individual's activity and external to the 
individual himself, 152 renders public the details of the individual's 
agency, and renders the details of that activity as embodied in the 
result available for inspection by and appropriation by others. In 
addition, Marx also implies here that this objectifying or publicizing 
of the individual through the result of this activity is necessary in 
order that social relations occur at all. In order that one individual 
interact with another, something about the former must be public (rather 
alienation of man from his fellow man (cf. Easton and Guddat, p. 295; 
MEGA, Abt.l, Bd. 3, p. 89. There, Marx argues that it is precisely 
becuase the individual is alienated from his product and thereby from 
himself, that he is alienated from his fellow man as well. And thus in 
an alienated as well as a non-alienated social condition, it is the 
product, or as Marx puts it here the "object" that mediates the 
individual's existence with and his relations to others. 
150
• Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," Easton and Guddat, p. 291; ~, 
Abt.l, Bd.3, p. 85. 
l5l. Ibid., p. 290: MEGA, Abt.l; Bd. 3, P• 84. 
152
• Ibid., p. 291, MEGA, Abt.l, Bd.3, P• 85. 
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than purely private to him) so as to be accessable to the latter. Without 
this condition's being met, social relations or interaction would be 
impossible. And it is precisely the product of activity, as the 
objectification of activity itself, which renders some feature of him, his 
action itself, public in such a way as to make him a possible member of a 
social relation. Moreover, it is also through the product of his activity 
that the individual brings others into social relations with himself, 
again by publicizing something of himself to wtiich they can relate. It is 
because of this that Marx asserts that the individual's product of 
activity t or 110bjeCt11 aS the term iS nOW USed t iS II•• .his existence for 
. 11153 h f other men ••• and their existence for him... The point is tat, or 
Marx here social relations must be understood as relations based on 
productive activity. And this idea is emphasized by Marx in the "Excerpt 
Notes of 1844" as well. 154 
No claim is made here that the above coDDD.ents represnet Marx' full 
doctrine of society and of the necessary relation of the individual and 
society as that doctrine is exhibited in the 1844 Manuscripts, or that 
the 1844 Manuscripts themselves exhibit Marx' full doctrine of society as 
a system of productive activities, forces, and relations, or that the 
Manuscripts contain Marx' developed notion of the relation between 
society so understood and history. The first would require an exposition 
153. Ibid., p. 305; MEGA, Abt.i, Bd.3, p. 115. 
154. Marx, "Excerpt Notes of 1844," Easton and Guddat, p. 281; MEGA, 
Abt;l, Bd.3, p. 546=547. 
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of Marx' dictum that, " ••• society itself produces man as man ••• 11155 that 
social relations systematize, govern, and condition specific productive 
activities undertaken within them, through the offering of an argument 
similar to that developed in chapter one towards this conclusion. 156 
Regarding the second, as early as the German Ideology, Marx offers some 
fleshing out of the notion of society as a system of productive inter-
. . 157. 
relations. And in the German Ideology, too, Marx develops his 
doctrine of the relation between social. productive activity and history, 151 
a doctrine whose mature and .developed explicitation is to be found in 
texts such as the 1857-58 Grundrisse, 159 and most concisely in the 
"Preface" to the Critique of Political Economy of 1859. 
I wish to argue the much narrower thesis that Marx' criticism of 
Feuerbach's doctrine of society as inadequate to an explanation of 
history in that it does not compTehend society "practically," as founded 
on practical productive relations, is, insofar as that criticism is 
offered in the "Theses on Feuerbach," prefigured in the MaJ}uscripts of 
1844. that Marx offers a rationale in support of that criticism in those 
155• Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," Easton and Guddat, p. 305; MEGA, Abt.!, 
Bd.3, p. 116. 
156. Ibid., pp. 305-307; MEGA, Abt.1, Bd.3, pp. 115-118. 
157
• Marx-Engels, The German Ideology, Pascal, p. 18; MEGA, Abt.!, Bdl.5, 
P• 19. 
158
• Cf. Ibid., pp. 16-19; MEGA, Abt.!. Bd.5, PP• 17-19. 
159. Cf. Marx,"Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations, ed. and trans. E.J. 
Hobsbwam, (New York: International Publishers, 1965), a translation of 
a text from the Grundrisse der Kritik der Politischen Okonomie, (Berlin: 
Dietz Verlag, 1953), pp. 375-413, in which these ideas are developed. 
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Manuscripts, and that the rationale he there offers is explicitly 
related to his theory of human nature. 
In the portion of the Manuscripts refered to here, Marx explicitly 
objects to the Feuerbachian attitude which conceives social relations to 
be given directly in the experience of the individual, in the form of 
immediately had "I-thou" relations."Social activity and satisfaction by 
no means exist merely in the form of immediate communal activity and 
• . . 11160 I immeidate communal satisfaction. And Marx objection to Feuerbach her 
is specifically that he does not comprehend social relations as made 
possible by, and one might also say as "mediated" by, productive activity. 
Marx in the Manuscripts even hints at the idea of society as an historica 
subject, at least through his references to communist society as the goal 
of history.161 On these terms, then, it seems invalid to argue that the 
Marx of such texts as the "Theses on Feuerbach" and the German Ideology 
differs fundamentally from the doctrine of the Paris Manuscripts, and 
that the "communal humanism" of those Manuscripts is merely borrowed 
from Feuerbach. 
In addition to the above, two further aspects of Marx' critisism of 
Feuerbach's doctrine of social relations should be noted. These are, 
first, that Marx understands Feuerbach as unable to describe the social 
individual adequately as an agent, and second, that Feuerbach's concept 
of the social individual as desiring to overcome his felt limitations 
160. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," Easton and Guddat, p. 306; MEGA, Abt.l, 
Bd.3, P• 116. 
161. 
Cf. Ibid. 
r 
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through association with others is an inadequate description of the 
phenomenon of needs. 
The first of these points may initially seem to be merely a 
repetition of the above. But the above argument represented a Marxian 
critique of Feuerbach's doctrine of social relations as such. This point 
rather reflects a Marxian critique of Feuerbach's attitude towards the 
status of the individual as a member of social relations. And it begins 
from the text of Marx cited above, stating that, "Social activity and 
satisfaction by no means merely exist in the form of an immediatecommunal 
• d d 1 f 11162 • F F b h h activity an imme iate communa satis action. or euer ac , t e 
experience of community or of social relations is had by the individual 
in its most concrete and essential features in diredt interpersonal 
relations, in relations of the "I" to the "thou" in Feuerbach's language. 
6f such relations, Feuerbach asserts that they directly and immediately 
occur, that they are necessary for the individual for reasons cited above, 
and that they satisfy. And these assertions are taken by him to describe 
such relations essentially. 
But given this, what can be said of the individual whose experience 
occurs essentially within the context of such relations? Simply that he 
so occurs, that he must so occur in order to realize himself as a human 
individual, and that he derives necessary satisfation from his direct 
occurence within-the interpersonal milieu. This, however, is to omit any 
discussion of the individual as a real agent, and it is precisely this 
162
• Ibid. 
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omission which Marx seems to find objectionable. 
This objection is not one primarily directed at the internal 
consistency of Feuerbach's position. It is one directed rather at the 
adequacy of his position, its ability to include and account for data 
which need to be included and accounted for. The individual's occurence 
as an agent in society, rather than simply his occurence itself in social 
relations, is one datum which, Marx holds, needs to be described and 
explained by any adequate theory of social relations. This means that a 
theory of social relations must at least offer some reason to describe 
163 
the individual as an agent in society. And Feuerbach's theory of 
social relations does not offer this. Feuerbach perhaps could assert the 
statements noted above as describing the individual in community, and also 
assert that this individual is the subject of actual productive activity. 
But this is simply to add concepts together or to lay them side by side, 
rather than to theoretically unify them through argument. Because of the 
statements he does make concerning the nature of immediate community, 
and because he holds that these statements describe social relations 
generally in their essential features, Feuerbach is unable to describe 
the individual productive agent in society with sufficient theoretical 
force. And thus he is even more unable to theoretically comprehend the 
statement made by Marx in the Paris Manuscripts, clearly descriptive of 
the individual as a productive agent, that, "The expression of his 
163 Ibid. 
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life - even if it does not appear immediately in the form of a communal 
expression carried out together with others - is therefore an expression 
164. 
and assertion of social life." 
Finally, a contrast must be made between Marx' notion of "needsn in 
relation to the social individual, and Feuerbach's notion of the "desire" 
which the individual feels in relation to community. And it will be 
seen that on this point, too, Marx levels criticism against Feuerbach's 
doctrine of social relations. 
For Feuerbach, as noted above, community relates to the desire which 
the individual entertains in relation to his own felt limitations. That 
desire must be examined in more detail here. We have seen Feuerbach argue 
that it is through concrete communal experiences that the individual both 
achieves "species consciousness" and discriminates himself as an 
individual distinct from others. But this is also to say that through 
concrete communal experiences the individual achieves realization of the 
perfections of human nature, which are the contents of "species 
consciousness," as infinite or absolute, as well as of himself as 
individually actualizing those perfections in only a limited fashion. 
Dlis latter awareness is had both through the individual's noting in 
others the actualization of some human perfections to a greater degree 
163 
than within himself, and through his experiencing interpersonal 
164
• Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," Easton and Guddat, p. 306; MEGA, 
Abt.I, Bd.3, p. 117. 
165 
• Cf. Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, Eliot, p. 156; 
Sammtliche Werke, vol. 6, p. 189. 
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contexts in which certain human perfections are experienced as ends in 
166 
themselves e.g. love in the context of the sexual relationship. These 
statements point out that, as Feuerbach understands it, communal experine 
does not simply relate to that desire which the individual experiences 
to overcome his necessary limitations; communal experience is also the 
source of that desire. It is in virtue of his being located communally, 
then, that the individual experiences that desire which in turn governs 
his actions towards the realization and enrichment of interpersonal 
relations, and thus, toward·s the satisfaction of the desire itself. 
But one can immediately see that, for Marx, this discussion is 
inadequate because too abstract. And it is overly abstract both as a 
discussion of desire or need itself, and as one of the relation between 
desire or need and communal or social relations. 
As seen in the first chapter Marx does insist on describing the 
individual as subject of desires or needs. On the one hand, some discuss! 
of needs is necessary in order to make sense of the phenomenon of 
167 
activity: activities are undertaken towards the satisfaction of needs. 
On the other hand, Marx seems also to hold that heeds themselves can 
only be adequately comprehended in relation to the notinn of activity: 
a need is itself some felt lack or deficiency which the individual 
experiences about himself, and whose resolution or overcoming involves 
166. Cf. Ibid., p. 156; Sammtliche Werke, vol.6, p. 188. 
i67. 
Cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," Easton and Guddat, pp. 325-326; 
~' Abt.I, Bd.3, pp. 160-161. 
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168 
his undertaking some relevant activity. Further, we have seen that for 
Marx there is also a necessary relation between the occurence of needs 
and social relationships. One of Marx' ways of defining human productive 
activity or praxis involves his holding that such activity is based on 
and governed by needs of two sorts: "subsistence needs" rooted in the 
physiological structure of the organism, and "human needs," which are 
developed beyond those involving simply physiological requirements and 
responses, and which are the source of activity which can be more 
169 
accurately entitled productive, d 1 
. 170 
an Marx wou d insist creative. 
Marx further insists in this context that human needs are developmental, 
and that a need which develops in the experience of the individual agent 
develops from activity undertaken for the satisfaction of other needs. 171 
Here the relation between the occurence of needs and society or 
social relations can be seen. In that newly developed needs arise from 
instances of productive activity, the details of these new needs are the 
168. Cf. Ibid., P• 326; MEGA, Abt.l, Bd.3, p. 161. 
169. Cf. Ibi1d., 292 and 294; MEGA, Abt.l, Bd.3, 86 and 88. PP• PP• 
170. Cf. Ibid., P• 294; MEGA, Abt.l, Bd.3, P• 88. 
l71. f d 7 C • Marx-Engels, The German I eology, Pascal, pp. 16-1 ; MEGA, 
Abt.l, Bd, 5, p. 18. Marx' most explicit early statement of his idea 
in found in this text already cited from The German Ideology. But, as 
is argued in my first chapter, all the concepts which Marx takes to be 
nedessary for the substantiation of this statement are operative in 
those portions of the Paris Manuscripts in which Marx' early theory 
of ~an is developed. 
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result of those instances of productive activity from which they 
develop. 172 • But in turn the details of that productive activity 
available to the individual agent is initially determined by the content 
of the social relations in which he is located, in that social relations 
constitute a milieu which systematizes the activity of production occuring 
173 
within it. The social implication of this is that the content of newly 
developed needs is the result of the features of the social contextin 
which the practical agent, as subject of those needs, is situated. 
These statements form the basis for a Marxian critique of Feuerbach 
on the point noted above. Feuerbach is able to describe desire as a 
feature of the experience of the individual which arises out of his 
actual communal relations. And he is further able to offer something of a 
desctiption of that desire: it is a desire of the individual to overcome 
his necessary limited possession of the perfections of his own nature. 
But given the limitations of his own analysis, Feuerbach is unable to 
go beyond these statements, His analysis is unable to point out any 
feature of the experience of community other than that communal 
experience itself involves the direct experience of interpersonal 
relations, And likew~se, he is unable to point out any feature of 
172
• Cf. Henri Lefebvre, Dialectical Materialism, trans. J. Sturrock, 
(London: Johnathan Cape Ltd., 1968) p. 118, for an argument which 
supports this statement. 
173. 
Cf. Marx-Engels, The Berman Ideology, Pascal. p. 18; MEGA, Abt.l. 
Bd.5, p. 19. Marx,"Manuscripts of 1844," Easton and Guddat, p. 306; 
~, Abtl, Bd.3, p. ii6. It is in The German Ideology that Marx 
specifically defines society in this fashion. But the definition is 
clearly prefigured in the section of the Paris Manuscripts ref ered to 
here. 
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this desire of the individual itself, other than that it is the desire 
of the individual to fully possess the perfections of his own nature, 
reason, love, and will. But this is, on the one hand, to discuss desire 
or need abstractly, because even the desire to exercise reason, love, or 
will can take on a multiplicity of forms, depending upon the actual 
174 
social environment within which one is situated. 
It is, secondly, to omit a discussion of and an account of a vast 
range of needs other than this desire itself of which the individual is 
capable of being, and indeed must be, the subject. For one thing, it 
omits a discussion of subsistence needs. Feuerbach seems to wish to 
discuss something of this sort; he does assert that, "Indeed, even the 
stomach of man ••• is not animal but human ••• 11175 But his analysis of the 
desire of the individual to overcome his limited possession of the 
perfections of his nature ultimately collapses all other needs into 
simply this desire. Marx, on the other hand, certainly wishes to assert 
that subsistence and human needs occur concurrently and are integrated 
ith . i h . 176 b t h 1 . h t . t i w in genu ne uman praxis, u e a so wis es o main a n a 
distinction between"these two sorts of needs,177 and to develop a theory 
114• Cf. Marx, ''Manuscripts of 1844," Easton and Guddat, p. 306; MEGA, 
Abt.l. Bd.3, p. 116. This is clearly implied in Marx' description---or-
scientific theoretical behavior. 
175. • Feuerbach, Principles, Vogel, p. 69; Scimmtliche Werke, vol.2, p. 31 
176. Cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," Easton and Guddat, p. 292; MEGA 
Abt.l, Bd.3, P• 86. 
177 ~· Cf. Ibid., pp. 325-326; MEGA, Abt.l, Bd.3, PP• 160-161. 
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of needs which will account for both. 
Finally, Feuerbach is unable on Marx' terms to point out those 
specific features bf social relations which result in the development of 
needs for the individual. He is simply able to hold that communal 
experience is directly had, and that it is the source of desire. But in 
that he is unable to point out that about the individual which is the 
source of his developing new needs. namely, productive activity, he is 
unable also to point out that about society which concretely influences 
the development of those needs: society as the systematization of the 
productive options available to the individual. 
In short, Marx views Feuerbach as unable to accurately describe and 
account for the essentially social character of needs, and of the 
individual himself, to assert accurately that man is " ••• the ensemble of 
social relationships. 11178 Feuerbach is only able to describe the 
individual as the subject of desire in general, to wit the general 
desire to fully exercise rationality, affection, and volition, and is onl 
able to attain an abstract description of community as the source of this 
desire, community as the experience of interpersonaiity immediately had. 
He is unable to point out the specific features of the social context 
which elicit the development of needs within the individual, or the 
concrete character and range of the needs operative within the individual 
himself. 
178
• Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," Easton and Guddat, p. 402; MEGA, 
Abt.l, Bd.5, p. 535. 
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At this point one might pause to note that, given the above, it 
appears that the interpretation of Marx' theory of man offered by 
Althusser is untenable. Althusser comments that the theory of man offered 
by Marx is identical in all but terminology with the doctrine of human 
nature developed by Feuerbach, and specifically with Feuerbach's 
understanding of man as essentially communal or social. But we have seen 
three critical themes, those of the relation of nature and action, 
nature and consciousness, and the social dimension of the individual 
itself, on which Marx markedly differs from and stands in opposition to 
Feuerbach's philosophical doctrine. That opposition is discoverable not 
only in certain texts of 1845, such as the "Theses on Feuerbach" and the 
German Ideology, as Althusser himself will admit, but also in the 
Manuscripts of 1844. Althusser's interpretation then will not hold. One 
must rather hold that in the Paris Manuscripts Marx develops a theory of 
man that is uniquely his own rather than borrowed from Feuerbach, and 
that this theory manifests a continuity with Marx' 1845 texts. 179 
VI. Humanism and Ideology. 
A final point in Althusser's critique of the 'humanism' of the 
Paris Manuscripts must however be dealt with. This is Althusser's 
comment as to Marx' own criticism of the viability of a theory of 
human nature, as expressed in such texts as the "Theses on Feuerbach," 
179. Cf. Louis Dupre, The Philosophical Foundations o!_ Marxism, (New York. 
Harcourt, Brace, and World Inc., 1966), P· 121. By the time Marx penned I 
the Paris Manuscripts, he had discovered that Feuerbach's " ••• man of fles · 
and blood was no less abstract than Hegel's Idea." 
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the German. Ideology, and the Poverty of Philosophy.As Althusser reads the 
texts, Marx in 1845 came to grips with the question of the possibility of 
a theory of human nature and rejected this possibility because, "It 
implied, as he confronted it, two complimentary postulates defined by 
him in the sixth thesis on Feuerbach: 1) that there exists a universal 
essence of man; 2) that this essence is the attribute of 'isolated 
individuals' who are irs real subjects. 11180 
Marx certainly wishes to deny these postulates in the Sixth Thesis. 
He asserts there that, " ••• the essence of man is no abstraction inhering 
in each single individual. In its actuality it is the ensemble of social 
1 . h. 11181 Ad h . f h' i .fi re ations ips. n e rein orces t is assert on as a speci c 
criticism of Feuerbach in the Eighth Thesis, in stating that, 
" ••• perceptual materialism," i.e. Feuerbach's doctrine, is one "that does 
not comprehend sensuousness as practical activity, is the view of 
111s2. separate individuals in civil society. The questions which pose 
themselves here are, what are the details of this criticism offered by 
Marx of Feuerbach; is this an implicit criticism by Marx of his own 
theory in the Paris Manuscripts; and is there any role for a theory of 
man which, given these statements, Marx might understand as valid? 
Regarding the first question, Marx' criticism of Feyerbach here may 
180. Althusser, .££.· cit., p. 234. 
181. Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," Easton and Guddat, p. 402; MEGA, Abt.l, 
Bd.5, p. 535. 
182
• Ibid. 
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be fruitfully seen in relation to certain of his criticisms of Prudhon 
offered in the Poverty of Philosophy. 183 In asserting that Feuerbach's 
doctrine is " ••• the view of separate individuals in civil society ••• " 
Marx is pointing out that for Feuerbach, the individual is himself and 
on his own terms the embodiment of human nature, as possessor of the 
perfections of the species, although his experience is also given as 
directly interpersonal. And this implies that the desires or 'needs' of 
the individual can be accurately deduced from a correct theory of human 
nature. But Marx wishes to argue, as pointed out previously, that to 
describe the individual concretely as the subject of needs involves the 
description of those needs themselves as developing dialectically from 
undertaken instances of praxis, and in the face of a social milieu which 
systematizes and thus determihes the options for productive activity 
available to the individual agent, as well as providing the " ••• material 
f i . 11184 b h ' d h b 1 o ••• act vity... availa le for t e agents use, an t e possi i ities 
of the imaginative development of new forms of praxis. It is from this 
basis that consciousness, as a mode of effectively dealing with the 
environemnt, arises as a capacity for the individual. And it is from 
this basis alsp that affection and volition arise as available ways of 
relating to personal others within the social environment, but not the 
183
• Cf. Shlomo Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Unimsity Press, 1969), p. 71, where it is 
suggested that the criticisms of Feuerbach and Prudhon implied here are 
identical. 
184
• Cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," Easton alid Guddat, p. 306, MEGA, 
Abt.!, Bd.3, p. 116, for this usage.'-
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most basic ways of so relating, in that, for Marx, all instances of 
interpersonal interaction are founded upon and made possible by that 
objectification which results from productive activity itself. 185 
It is the context of these notions that Marx wishes to assert against 
Feuerbach in the Sixth Thesis that, " ••• the essence of man ••• is the 
ensemble of social relationships." It is the specific detail of the socia 
environment which governs those f Drms of praxis available to the 
individual as options, which forms the contextual basis from which he 
may develop new modes of productive activity through creative 
imagination. Social relations are thus the necessary context conditioning 
the individual's possession of needs, his d.evelopment of new needs, and 
his exercise of consciousness, affection, and volition as manners of 
relating to and dealing with his natural-social environment. This is to 
say that, for Marx, an~ attempt to eluaidate a theory of man which would 
postulate specific predicates such as rationality, affection, and 
volition as the perfections of or fundamental needs resident in human 
nature, in abstraction from a discussion of these as developing in their 
actual and varied manifestations from real productive activity, and 
productive activity in turn as conditioned and constituted by exhisting 
historical society, is to Marx objectionable. And this is precisely the 
objection which he levels against Feuerbach in the Sixth and Eighth 
Theses. 
185
• Cf. Ibid., p. 305; MEGA, Abt.!, Bd.3, p. llS. Also see Marx, 
"Excerpt-Notes of 1844," Easton and Guddat, p. 281; MEGA, Abt.!. Bd.3, 
pp. 546-547. --
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As noted above, these criticisms of Feuerbach~ are developed by Marx 
in criticisms of Prudhon offered in the Poverty of Philosophy. Their 
content may be developed, therefore, by a brief examination of selected 
ideas from that work. 
Avineri sums up well Marx' criticism of Prudhon, and the unity of 
this with his attack on Feuerbach. "Classical materialism ••• reduced human 
activity to abstract postulates like 'the essence of man,' making a 
discussion of history as man's sekf development impossible on its own 
premises. According to Marx·, Prudhon faced the same dilemma when he 
started, under the influence of classical political economy, to discuss 
human nature per ~, overlooking the fact that human nature itself is the 
ever-changing product of human activity, ie. of history. 11186 That this 
comment accurately reflects Marx' criticism of Prodhon can be seen from 
an exanination of the text. 
Marx first accuses Prudhon of a dual error with regard to his 
comprehension of needs as the source of individual productive activity, 
and of society as the context in which productive activities and 
relations of production occur and are developed. According to Marx, 
Prudhon erroneously holds first that productive activity is initiated 
in virtue of the individual's sensing certain inate needs which cannot be 
. fi d b If ' d . 11187 d h i f i satis e y nature s spontaneous pro uctiou, an w ose sat s act on 
186
• Avineri,_2E_. cit., p. 71. 
187
• Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy,(New York: r:nternationalPublishers, 
1963), p. 31; Misere de la Philosophie, (Paris: Editions Sociales, 
1946), p. 31. 
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requires some practical initiative of the individual. To render his 
productive activities more efficient, the individual agrees to cooperate 
productively woth others in society who are able to carry out different 
d i d . i f . 188 an var ous pro uctive-econom c unctions. 
But to propose these theses is to err on two counts. It is, first, 
to fail to offer an explanation of the development of those needs which 
yield the initiation of productive or "economic" activity. Marx' 
implication here is that, because Prudhon is unable to offer such an 
explanation, his only way of accounting for the occurence of needs is the 
positing of a human essence, in the sense of an essence of the homo 
economicus, from which such need- are directly derived. This involves an 
error of which, as Althusser notes, Feuerbach is in Marx' eyes equally 
guilty, that of supposing, " ••• l) that there exists a universal essence 
of man; 2) that this essence is the attribute of 'isolated individuals' 
who are its real subjects. 11189 Second, Prudhon is unable to offer an 
account of the genesis of social relationships. He simply hypostacizes 
society as an existing entity, which as existing can then be the scene 
of productive relations towards the enhanced satisfaction of inately 
possessed needs. He is unable to account for the genesis of society as 
made possible by praxis, or to describe accurately the nature of society 
' 
188
• Cf. Poverty, pp. 32 and 33; Mis~re, pp. 32 and 33,to note that, as 
Marx reads Prudhon, the latter errs on the question of the origin of 
exchange value. "'A man' sets out to 'propose' to other men, his 
collaborators in various functions, that they establikh exchange, and 
make a distinction between ordinary value and exchange value." 
189
• Althusser, .£1?.· cit., P• 234. 
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~s fundamentally the systematization of pro?uctive activities. As Marx 
puts it," ... M. Prudhon personifies society; he turns it into a 
190 person," considers it as a person and an entity, rather than as a 
system of relations. 
Becuase of this dual error, Prudhon, as Marx reads him, falls prey 
to further erroneous ideas concerning both man and society. Concerning 
society, Prudhon is first unable, I ike Feuerbach, to accurately describe 
it as the subject of history. If society is the scene of productive 
activities and relations, and if productive activities are undertaken 
because of needs which arise out of a universal essence of man, then 
neither will these activities, nor society as the scene thereof, undergoe 
historical change. 191 Prudhon is unable to describe society as the subject 
of history, and thus is further unable to account for historical change, 
h h f h. d . I I . I 192 to note t at, "T e movement o 1 story pro uces soc 1 a re at 1 ons •1 
More germane to our theme, for Marx, Prudhon errs further in 
describing man, specifically in his description of human productive 
activity and human needs. Because he fails to accurately note the 
relation of needs to praxis, he is unable to define human needs as 
essentially developmental, or to see the relation between developed needs 
and the social milieu of the individual; unable to hold, in short, that, 
190 Poverty, p. 91; Misere, pp. 73-74. 
191 . Cf. Poverty, p. 122; Mis~re, pp. 97-98, for Marx' exp I icit reply 
to Prudhon on this point. 
192 
Poverty, p. 106; Mis~re, ~- 86. 
r 
r 
-205-
''Most needs arise directly from production, or from a state of affairs 
based on production. 11193 Because he invalidly posits an essence of the 
homo economicus, that is, Prudhon is unable to recognize that the needs 
which give rise to praxis, the details of productive activity itself, and 
the social relationships occuring between productive agents, change 
through history. Again, as Marx puts this in the Povert_y_ of Philosophy, 
"¥. Prudhon does not know that all history is nothing but a continuous 
transformation of human nature. 11194 
From this, one may see that Marx levels certain conunon objections 
against both Feuerbach and Prudhon, concerning the possibility of a 
theory of human nature. He objects to a theory of human nature which 
would posit given needs, be they "humanistic" or economic," as resident 
in the individual simply because of his possession of "human nature;" or, 
to any theory of human nature from which given and specific needs amy be 
deduced as necessarily occuring for the (ahistorical) individual. He 
objects to any theory of human nature which is unable to account for the 
development of new needs out of instances of praxis. And he objects to 
any theory of human nature which is unable to comprehend the individual 
as a productive agent, as one whose experience, in terms of his very 
productive activity itself, is concretely governed and conditioned by 
his social relationships; and theory of man unable to comprehend that 
193. p 42 M' ' 49 overty, p. ; isere, p. • 
194
• Poverty, p.147, see also pp. 166-161; Mis~re, p. 115, see also 
p. 80. 
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" ••• the essence of man is ••• the ensemble of social relationships. 11195 
Given these objections, however, one can see upon comparison that 
Marx is not objecting, as Althusser claims he is, to his own theory of 
man as developed in the Paris Manuscripts and elsewhere. And in the 
Manuscripts themselves, Marx provides at least the conceptual bases for 
the overxoming of these objections. 
First, as seen in chapter one, Marx undertakes his description of 
the relation of praxis and needs in the Paris Manuscripts, and links 
this to his discussion of action and nature already noted in this chapter 
For the individual agent, "The objects of his drives ••• exist outside 
him as independent, yet they are objects of his need, essential and 
indispensable to the exercise and confirmation of his essential capa-
cities. 11196 The distinction between subsistence needs and human needs 
is also drawn in the Manuscripts.197 And most essentially, those con-
cepts which in a Marxian context explain how it is possible that activity 
towards the satisfaction of needs may result both in that satisfaction 
and in the development of new needs are also laid down therein, as 
I show in chapter one, under the headings of transformation, object-
ification, and self actualization. In that praxis results in a product 
l95Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," Easton and Guddat, p. 402; MEGA, Abt. 1, 
Bd. 3, p. 535. 
196Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," Eastlon and Guddat, p. 325; MEGA, Abt. 1, 
Bd. 3, P• 116. 
197cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," Easton and Guddat, p. 292; MEGA, 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 86. 
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which in its "objective" reality embodys the details of that activity of ·· 
which it is the result, then human praxis is such as to render the nat-
ural context in which it necessarily occurs transformed, precisely 
because that content now includes some item that is the product not of 
nature taken simply, but of the activity of the agent on nature.198 
This however is to say that the environment is transformed and thus 
is one which offers new possibilities to the subject of praxis. Further, 
in acting towards the satisfaction of a need, the subject of pxaxis 
transforms not only his natural environment but also himself: " ••• object 
ification also connotes self actualization: by externalizing his inner 
life through labor, man labors and creates, in short, brings out of 
himself his human potentialities ••• 1119 9 In developing his own capacitie 
through praxis, the productive individual develops himself as one capabl 
of responding to new possibilities which his transformed environment, 
elicits, as one capable of developing and of being the subject of new 
needs, and of relating to these needs throush more complex forms of 
productivity. It is in the German Ideology that Marx asserts that 
" ••• as soon as a need is satisfied ••• new needs are made; and this 
production of new needs is the first historical act. 11 200 But the 
concepts which make this statement possible are found in texts as early 
198cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," Easton and Guddat, pp. 290-291; 
MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 84. 
199Lobkowicz, Theory and Practice. p. 342. 
200&rx-Engels, The German Ideology, Pascal, pp. 16-17; MEGA, Abt. 1, 
Abd. 5, p. 18. 
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as the Manuscripts of 1844. 
Further, in those Manuscripts Marx develops the concepts which enable 
him to hold that praxis, and the productive individual, are essentially 
social phenomena. He indicates therein that it is the productive 
activity of the individual which makes social relations possible for him, 
as well as which determines the specific features of those social rela-
tions " ••• the immediate activity of his individuality, is at the same 
time his own existence for other men, their existence, and,their exist-
ence for him. 11201 He asserts that productive activity, given that its 
result is an object in some sense external to its producer and thus 
public, is activity which is in principle accessible to others and 
therefore social: " ••• what I make from myself, I make for society, 
conscious.of my nature as social. 11 202 And he provides in the Manuscripts 
conceptual direction towards the specific assertion, made in the German 
ideology, that society, as the systematization of the productive activ-
ities occuring in it, controls the options for productive activity 
available for its members, as well as the foundation upon which new 
options might be imaginatively developed: " ••• society itself ••• produces 
man as man. 11 203 This willl allow him, also to assert that it is con-
201Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," Easton and Guddat, p. 305; MEGA, Abt. 1, 
Bd. 3, P• 115. 
202Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," Easton and Guddat, p. 306, MEGA, Abt. 1, 
Bd. 3, p. 116. 
203Marx, "Manuscrfpts of 1844," Easton and Guddat, p. 305; MEGA, Abt. 1, 
Bd. 3~ P• 116. 
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cretely wothin the context of social relations that new needs are devel-
oped, and that social relations themselves condition the development 
of those new needs. Finally, in virtue of the above, Marx is also 
able in the Manuscripts even to initially comprehend society as the sub~ 
ject of history, and thus human self-actualization as historical: 
" ••• only naturalism is able to comprehend the act of world history ••• 
History is the true natural history of Mankind. 11204 
One would not wish to, from the above, argue that there is a simple 
identity between the Manuscripts of 1844 and succeeding texts such as 
the German Ideology or the Poverty of Philosophy, on the theme of the 
question of the viability of a theory of human nature, or even on the 
complete exposition of the details of that theory. Certainly these 
succeeding texts develop, enrich, and offer new insights into the con-
cepts offered in the Manuscripts themselves. I wish to argue a narrower 
thesis. Althusser: claims that Marx' criticisms of Feuerbach's theory 
of human nature, 'both stated and implied, in the "Theses" on Feuerbach, 
represent a break with the theory of man which Marx had appropriated 
from Feuerbach and himself outlined in the Paris Manuscripts. It has 
been shown that Althusser' s ... interpretation of the Manuscripts as merely 
appropriating Feuerbach'sr doctrine of human nature will not do. The 
theory contained therein is, in crucial features, distinct from Feuer-
bach's doctrine. Now, the details againsg Prudhon in the Poverty of 
204Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," Easton and Guddat, p. 305,.al!_d p. 327. 
MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 160 and p. 162. 
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Philosophy as to the possibility of a theory of human nature have also 
been elucidated, and it has further been shown, I would hold, that these 
criticisms are not implicit criticisms of Marx' own 1844 position. 
The final question which arises from the above analysis is, given 
his objections to Feuerbach and Prudhon, what might Marx take a viable 
theory of man to be? Clearly it cannot be a description of the content 
of a "universal human nature: from which one may deduce those needs 
and the details of those experiences which will occur for the individual. 
This is clear from the above objections. But to say this is not to yet 
deny the possibility of a theory which describes the structural features 
of formal features in terms of which human historical experience is had, 
and in terms of which it is to be comprehended. And it is precisely 
this role which a theory of man plays for Marx. 
Avineri connnents significantly on this idea in his description 
~ 
of Marx' theory of human nature. 
Marx' view of history as shaping man who simultaneously 
impresses himself on the· world makes it quite impossible to 
ascribe to man any ~ priori essence. On the other hand, 
man's world shaping function itself becomes the empirical 
content of human existence. This process makes man into man, 
differentiates him from animals and lies at the bottom of his 
ability to create and change the conditions of his life. The 
contents of this continual creation, dynamic and changing, 
furnish the contents of the historical process. What is not 
changing and not modified is historical creation as constant 
anthropogenesis, deriving from ~ian's ability to create objects 
in which he realizes his subjectivity.205 
The point to Avineri's comment is this. Marx wholly rejects any theory 
of human nature which would, for example, allow one to deduce specific 
205Avineri, op. cit., p. 85. 
r 
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needs as ones which necessa~ily occur for the individual, because such 
a theory would in principle allow one to deduce in general the details 
of human experience itself. This would be to deny both human self-
actualization, and the historical character of that process, two phen-
omena of which Marx will not permit the denial. But Marx will permit, 
and indeed does develop and presume in the Paris Manuscripts and else-
where, is a theory of those structural features of human nature which 
specify man in terms of rendering historical self actualization, or as 
Avineri puts it "anthropogenesis," possible. For which for Marx, man's 
nature "can be conceived only as his historically. created human pos-
sibility. 11206 at the same time some theory of the structural features of 
human nature is necessary·in orfer·to show how, for man, historical 
self actualization is possible, Such a theory enables one to, first, 
comprehend the relation between various aspects of the specific charac-
ter of and the self actualization of the individual, the relations 
between productive activity, needs, natural environment, consciousness, 
and society. It provides criteria whereby the possibilities for 
productive activity and for experi~nce available to the individual 
historically and socially located~ aan be comprehended as such. 
Avineri, who in his commentary on Marx is fond of citing the 
Grundrisse of 1857-58, might concerning this idea have cited a text 
from the "General Introduction" to that work, in which Marx asserts 
that, " ••• all stages of production have certain landmarks in common, 
206Petrovic, "Marx; Concept of Alienation," Philosophy and Phenomeno-
logical Research, 1962-63, p. 422. 
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common purposes. PDoduction in general is an abstraction, but it is a 
rational abstraction, insofar as it singles out and fixes the common 
207 features, thereby saving us repetition." The elucidation of the 
common and structural features of social production enable one to com-
prehend and relate to one another accurately the concrete 
details of historical productive societies. Even so, the elucidation 
of the common and structural details of human nature enable one to 
comprehend and to relate to one another accurately the concrete details 
of the experience and active self actualization of the historical 
individual. It allows one to comprehend the very possibility of the 
historical self-actualizing individual itself. Such a theory enables 
oaa, .. second, to critically evaluate'" certain social conditions as ones 
which violate the structural features of human productivity, ones which 
for example render the agent unable to appropriate the object of his 
activity for the satisfaction of a directly experienced need,208 or 
which relegate the producer to action towards the satisfaction of sub-
sistence needs alone, 209 and which thus yield a condition of "alienation" 
in terms of productive activity. 210 
207Marx, The Grundrisse, trans. McLellan, p. 18; Grundrisse, p. 7. 
208cf. Marx, "Manuscripts'of 1844," Easton and Guddat, p. 289; MEGA, 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. SJ. 
209cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," Easton and Guddat, p. 292; MEGA, 
Abt. 1, Bel. 3, pp. 85-86. 
210cf. Avineri, op. cit., pp. 85-86. 
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In these two senses, Marx' theory of human nature is a normative 
theory that is to say, it is one which, in describing the structural 
features of human nature, without attempting to provide a descriptive 
account of the details of the actual experience of the historical in-
dividual, provides criteria or norms which enable one to comprehend 
a) the possibility of self-actualizing historical human individuality 
itself; b) the correct manner in which the details of the actual exper-
ience of the individual, including the concrete occurence for him of 
praxis, needs, consciousness, and society, ought to be related to one 
another for an accurate comprehension of that experience; and c) the 
terms on which given social conditions can violate the structure of 
human praxJ.s, yielding "alienation'.'.:. This sort of normative theory of 
human nature is clearly distinct in Marx' own eyes from the theories 
of Feuerbach and Prudhon, and is one which he is able to maintain in 
the face of his objections to these latter authors. 
The purpose of this chapter has been to attain a clearer understand-
ing of Marx' theory of human nature, through evaluating Althusser's. 
claim that this theory is, insofar as it is exhibited in the Manuscripts 
of 1844, one which Marx appropriates from Feuerbach, and one which he 
moves to reject as early as 1845. I take the analysis done in this 
chapter, if successful, to have shown that this interpretat.ion is 
erroneous. On three critical themes, those of the notions of nature 
in relation to action, consciousness, and human social relations, Marx 
in the theses diverges significantly from Feuerbach, and this divergence 
is made possible by concepts enunciated by Marx in the Paris Manuscripts 
-- themselves as well as in other texts. On the themes of the possibility 
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and role of a theory of man, Marx' criticisms of Feuerbach, and allied 
criticisms of Prudhon, in no way vitiate his 1844 position. Thus it 
cannot be held that the content of Marx' theory of human nature is 
borrowed from, and can be understood by comparison to, Feuerbach's 
doctr~ne. If one is to look for the historical inspiration of Marx' 
theory of man, it must be elsewhere~than the texts of the Essence of 
Christianity and the Principles of the Philosophy of the Future. 
Two pressing questions stand out, however, at the conclusion of 
this analysis. First, the theory of man which Marx can adopt, and which 
accounts for man's historical self-actualization, depends on a pro-
position noted frequently in chapter one as one to which Marx ascribes: 
that within the structure of human nature, praxis is the fundamental 
feature of that structure. But still, no definitive argument, as no 
argument which Marx himself might view as definitive, has been exposed. 
~ 
Is there such an argument in the texts, and if so what might it be? 
Second, if the content of Marx' theory of man cannot be fruitfully 
understood in terms of a positive comparison of it to Feuerbach, what 
of Marx' relation to Hegel? Can it be held that in Hegel are discover-
able those concepts which bear a possible relation to Marx' theory? 
I shall argue, in the subsequent two chapters that the response to both 
these questions is affirmative, and further that the relation between 
Marx and Hegel is critical for two reasons. First, because those con-
cepts which form the content of Marx' theory of human nature find their 
historical and textual sources in Hegel. And second, because Marx 
offers that argument for the fundamentality of human praxis which he 
-himself considers to be definitive in a direct confrontation with 
Hegel himself. 
·-
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-Chapter Three 
Marx• Hegelian Sources 
Readers of the texts of Marx are familiar with his encomium on Hegel 
in the Manuscripts of 1844: 
The great thing in Hegel's Phenomenology and its final 
result - the dialectic of negativity as the moving and 
productive principle - is simply that Hegel grasps the 
, self-development of man as a process, objectification 
as Joss of the object, as alienation and transcendence 
of this alienation; thus he grasps the nature of work 
and comprehends objective man, authentic because actual, 
as the result of his own work. 1 
This statement not only contains warm praise of Hegel, but singles out 
several features of Hegel's thought which Marx adopts in his own theory of 
man. It seems then that Marx here is giving Hegel credit for comprehending 
and developing several concepts which Marx himself further elucidates and 
develops in that theory. 
But this statement, taken by itself, by no means states the whole 
truth concerning the relation between Hegelian and Marxian theories of 
man. For in the third of the Paris Manuscripts Marx is also severely 
critical of Hegel, and the force of these criticisms is apparently that 
Hegel misunderstood and did not properly develop those concepts which, for 
Marx, must be operative and properly interrelated within a theory of 
human nature. For instance, Marx criticizes Hegel's view of subjectivity. 
"Man is assumed as equivalent to self. But self is only man conceived 
1Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844, 11 in Easton and Guddat, p. 321; MEGA, 
Abt.1, Bd.3, p. 156. 
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2 
abstractly, derived through abstraction." Marx also asserts that Hegel if 
unable to understand correctly the nature of needs as they function for 
man, 3 is unable to grasp properly man's relation to nature, 4 or the 
character and role of consciousness in human experience. 5 And finally, in 
virtue of these inadequacies, Marx accuses Hegel of being unable to compre· 
bend human productive activity or praxis itself. "The rich, living, 
sensuous, concrete activity of self objectification therefore becomes its 
mere abstraction, absolute negativity, an abstract~on fixed as such and 
regarded as independent activity, as activity itself. 116 
On first reading, then, the texts reveal that Marx' own attitude 
towards his relation to Hegel with regard to his theory of man is far from 
unequivocal. Marx seems to both affirm and deny Hegel's adequate 
understanding of the key concepts utilized in that theory. Here again the 
commentaries on Marx fail to answer satisfactorily the problem of the 
relation of Marx' thought to that of Hegel. Althusser insists that 
2 
MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 158, Easton and Guddat, op. cit., p. 322. 
3 
Cf. MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 160, Easton and Guddat, op. cit., p. 325 
4 
Cf. Ibid. 
5 
MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 163, Easton and Guddat, op. cit., p. 328. 
6 
~'Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 168, Easton and Guddat, op. cit., p. 333. 
-218-
" ••• the young Marx was never an Hegelian ••• 117 But Lefebvre holds that the 
basic theory of the Paris Manuscripts, " ••• is still closer to Hegelian 
rationalism than to Feuerbachian naturalism. 118 Hyppolite states that the 
development of Marx' theory involves his " ••• making novel use of the 
9 !Hegelian dialectic," which remained essential to Marx' theorizing despite 
the modifications he makes in his appropriation of it. Rotenstreich holds 
that " ••• Marx' concept of practice is parallel to Hegel's concept of 
Spirit, and was developed to replace it; that the relationship between 
practice and theory according to Marx is parallel to the relationship 
10 between spirit and reason according to Hegel." And Lobkowicz, going 
further, asserts that, " ••• almost everything which Marx says about labor 
11 
can be traced back to Hegel." 
It seems, then, that significant difficulties face the attempt to 
determine the relationship between those concepts developed and utilized b) 
7 
Louis Alt~usser, Pour Marx, (Paris: Francois Maspero, 1969), p. 27. 
8 
Henri Lefebvre, Dialectical Materialism, trans. John Sturrock, 
(London: Jonathan Cape Ltd., 1968), p. 101. Lefebvre refers here overtly 
to Marx' theory of alienation, but he has also the general theory of praxii 
in mind. 
9 
Jean Hyppolite, Studies on Marx and Hegel~ tran. O'Neill, (New York: 
Basic Books, 1969), p. 95. 
10 
Nathan Rotenstreich, Basic Problems of Marx' Philosophy, 
(Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1965), p. 41. 
11 
' Nicholas Lobkowicz, Theory and Practice, (Notre Dame: The University 
"""- of Notre Dame Press, 1967), · ~· 321. 
. I\ 
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~arx in his theory of human nature, and the philosophy of Hegel. Be this 
as it may, it is nonetheless the case that such an attempt must be made, 
for its resolution is critical to a proper understanding of Marx' theory of 
man itself. Iring Fetscher has noted that " ••• the history of the 
differing interpretations of the relationship between Marx and Hegel 
12 
reflects the history of the development of Marxism itself." Analogously, 
the interpretations of various commentaries on the content of Marx' theory 
of human nature varied according to their interpreta~ions of Marx in rela-
tion to his predecessors, especially Feuerbach and Hegel. We have already 
seen how this happens in the case of Althusser. Althusser interprets the 
'humanistic' Marx of the 1844 Manuscripts to be simply Feuerbachian, and 
this effects his understanding of Marx' early 'humanism'. It leads 
Althusser to an interpretation of Marx' theory of man which is, ~n my 
judgment, erroneous. But Althusser's case is instructive. From it we 
can recognize the importance of an accurate understanding of Marx! 
relations to his predecessors. For, comprehending these relations 
accurately will enable us to comprehend more precisely Marx' theory itself. 
In this and the following Chapter I shall argue that the basic 
operative concepts of Marx' theory of man as analyzed in Chapter One, were 
appropriated from.Hegel, though Marx differs from Hegel with respect to thi 
precise relationship of consciousness to human praxis. This implies, 
contrary to Althusser, that the young Marx was very much 'an Hegelian,' 
12 
Iring Fetscher, Marx and Marxism, trans. John Hargreaves, (New 
York: Herder and Herder, 1971), p. 40. 
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that Marx was at the same time a disciple and a radical revisionist of 
and that we must understand in detail how Marx 
plays both these roles if we are to grasp the distinctive 
of Marx' theory of man. I shall also argue in chapter four that 
argument against Hegel's view of the relationship of consciousness 
raxis is the same argument which, he would think, justifies his claim tha 
of praxis is the most fundamental concept of an adequate theo 
In this chapter, I shall limit my discussion to an analysis of those 
oncepts discoverable in Hegel which can be seen as one appropriated by 
man. First, I shall exhibit a "pre-phenomenological" 
a description of the individual in Hegel. This is 
it justifies discovering in Hegel concepts relating to a 
Then I shall discuss the notions of experience, agency, an 
in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Finally, I shall discuss 
of the essential social dimension of experience, as he 
develops that notion in the Philosophy of Right. 
Consciousness and the Embodied Individual 
It is doubtless the case that ;he Philosophy of Right and the 
13 
up to 1844. Marx' famous Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of 
completed in 1843,13 and Marx used the analyses of that wor 
, Cf. Karl Marx, Criti ue of Heel's Philoso h 
Malley, (Cambridge: The University Press, , e itor s 
· ix - xiv for a discussion of Narx' ur oses in writin 
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~s the basis of the development of some crucial ideas in his article, 
~'Toward the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law: Introduction. 1114 And, 
~n the Paris Manuscripts, Marx makes explicit reference to the 
Phenomenolo~v of Spirit. One important feature of these remarks of Marx is 
bis recognition that the Phenomenology contains concepts relevant to a 
theory of human nature. But if this is so then an innnediate difficulty 
~resents itself: Is this a valid recognition, or is Marx' 'recognition' a 
distortion of what the Phenomenology contains? It is well known that Hegel 
announced as his task in the phenomenology, " ••• the exposition of knowledge 
as a phenomenon. 1115 How can such an exposition result in concepts proper 
to a theory of human nature? Or more precisely, how is it the case that a 
science of knowledge, phenomenally taken, or of the experience of 
consciousness, can be at the same time a science descriptive of the 
individual? 
Errol Harris correctly points out that a response to this question may 
be most readily had through an examination of selected arguments from the 
~hilosophy of Mind, 16 the third volume of Hegel's Encyclopedia of the 
14 
Cf. MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 1, pp. 607-621; Easton and Guddat, op. cit., 
pp. 249-264. 
15 
Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, .trans. Baillie, (London: George 
Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1931), p. 135; Hegel, Phanomenologie des Geistes, ed. 
Johannes Hoffmeister, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1952), p. 66. 
16 
Errol E. Harris, "Hegel's Theory of Feeling," in New Studies in 
~egel's Philosophy, ed. Steinkraus, (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 
1971), pp. 71-91. 
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For in the first ~ection of that work Hegel 
ttempts the transition from philosophy of nature to philosophy of mind 
hrough arguing concerning the relationship of mind and individual 
I refer to these arguments as Hegel's 'pre-phenomenological' 
ustification of a science of the experience of consciousness, in that the 
how the location of consciousness as individual experience, and thus 
ustify a recognizable sense of the term phenomenon or experience of 
consciousness. 
Hegel introduces his analyses in the third volume of the Encyclopedia 
'th a statement of the general character of the relation of mind to natur 
as he conceives that relationship. "From our point of view mind has for 
its presupposition Nature, of which it is the truth, and for that reason 
its absolute prius. In this its truth Nature is vanished (ist di~ Natur 
erschwunden) and mind has resulted as the 'Idea' entered on possession of 
itself."18 The term 'truth' here is used in typical Hegelian fashion, to 
indicate, as Soll points out, the 'truth' of a thing as " ••• its objective 
"19 or goal... And Hegel goes on in an addendum to this article of the 
how he takes mind to be the 'truth' of nature, 
17 
Cf. Hegel, The Philosophy of Mind, trans. W. Wallace with the 
Boumann Zusatze trans. by A.V. Miller, (Oxford: The University Press, 
1971). 
18 
Hegel, The Philosophy of Mind, trans. Wallace and Miller, p. 8; 
G.W.F. Hegel, Enzyklopadie der Philosophischen Wissenschaften, ed. Nocolin 
and Poggeler, (Hamburg: Felix Me.iner Verlag, 1969), p. 313. 
19 
Ivan Soll, An Introduction to Metaphysics, (Chicago: The 
--223-
through stating that, " ••• in Nature, the Ide~ appears in the element of 
asunderness, is external not only to mind but also to itself, precisely 
because it is external to that actual, self-existent inwardness which 
. 20 
constitutes the essential nature of ,.nund." 
We are here reminded by Hegel first of that tlllderstanding of nature 
which marks the beginning of the second volume of the Encyclopedia, that, 
" ••• externality constitutes the specific character in which Nature, as 
i 1121 Nature, ex sts. Nature is i~ediately characteri~ed by Hegel as 
involving externality, parts outside of parts. But further, nature is 
comprehended as a system, that is, that whose externality involves within 
itself a tlllity. This is seen by theoretical physics, which attempts to 
comprehend the system and unity of nature in terms of intrinsic laws. 
" ••• it is directed to a knowledge of the tllliversal aspect of natu~e, a 
~iversal which is also determined within itself - directed to a knowledge 
of forces, laws, and genera, whose content must not be a simple aggregate, 
22 but arranged in orders and classes, must present itself as an organism." 
~ut for this comprehension to occur, nature must exhibit itself as 
involving such a unity, or as a process within which such a unity develops 
out of natural externality, which process will be most fundamentally 
( 
20 
Hegel, The Philosophy of Mind, (Wallace, Miller), p. 9. 
21 
Hegel, Philosophy of Nature, trans. A.V. Miller, (Oxford: The 
~larendon Press, 1970), p. 14; Hegel, Enzyklopadie. p. 200. 
22 
Cf. Ibid.; Enzyklop~die, pp. 199-200. 
23 
~omprehended by philosophy of nature. 
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As Harris comments, for Hegel, "The entire natural process is one in 
~hich the self-externality of the spatio temporal world is progressively 
pvercome, as each successive grade of natural being reflects more 
~dequately the entire ~ystem. 1124 Nature must be conceived of for Hegel as 
~ process of internally determined development through which its character 
pf parts outside of parts is progressively both canceled and preserved, one 
through which its externality is maintained while at the same time its 
~ntrinsic unity is exhibited. It is this which renders a scientific, and 
~ltimately a philosophical comprehension of nature possible. 
With this in mind, let us see how for Hegel mind is the 'truth' of 
nature. The 'truth' or goal of nature is the exhibition of its own 
intrinsic unity. And this unity is finally and explicitly exhibited in 
that individual organism which is capable of primative mental events 
whereby it is aware of, or Hegel would say senses or feels, 25 and which 
unifies its own experience; it is an individual capable of those primative 
llllental events to which Hegel in the Encyclopedia refers under the heading 
Pf 'sou1 1 • 26 Such awareness involves both a unification of experience, anc 
23 
Cf. Ibid.; Enzyklopadie, pp. 199-200. 
24 
Harris, op. cit., loc. cit., p. 77. 
25 
Cf. Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, (Wallace, Miller), p. 34; 
Enzyklopadie, p. 320. 
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an initial emergence from nature of subjectiyity. 
Harris cogently summarizes the point which Hegel wishes to make in 
this portion of the Encyclopedia: 
The entire natural process is one in which the self-
externality of the spatio temporal world is progress-
ively overcome, as each successive grade of natural 
being reflects more adequately the entire system ••• 
finally, in sentience, the whole of this natural 
interconnectedness focused in the animal organism is 
'inwardized' in subjectivity. 
Mind thus comes( to be both as a product of.nature 
and as its sublimation in feeling and awareness; 
it is the form in which nature becomes aware of 
itself, in a natural organism.27 
The natural, sentient organism is capable of awareness, albeit primative 
awareness, of its own experience. At the same time, this organism is a 
feature of nature itself, and is thus the realization within nature itself 
of nature's 'truth'. 
Hegel, as noted above, offers 'soul' as a term descriptive of the 
capacity for primative mental events marking the emergence of 'mind' in 
nature. And his abiding conce.rn throughout the first section of the 
Philosoohy of Mind remains the description of 'soul' as an actual feature 
of the experience of the individual organism. "The universal soul must not 
~e fixed on as World Soul, as so to speak a subject, for it is only the 
individual substance, which has its actual truth only as individual 
27 
Harris, op. cit., loc. cit. 
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subjectivity. 1128 Soul's emergence is the implicit goal or 'truth' of the 
process of nature, but that goal is realized only through the actual 
emergence of individual, natural organisms capable of primative forms of 
awareness of experience. For Hegel to describe conscious events as so 
~mergent from nature is to describe such events as properties of the 
!individual. 29 
This emphasis is further drawn out by Hegel in the Encyclopedia, as he 
~escribes the capacities of awareness of 'soul' under three headings: 
sentience, feeling, and habit. 30 By sentience or sensation, 
'Empfindung•, 31 Hegel means to indicate the barest form of organic aware-
28 
Hegel, Enzyklopadie, p. 320, my translation. Cf. Hegel, Philosophy 
of Mind, (Wallace, Miller), pp. 35-36, for a translation which is, in my 
opinion, deceptive. Cf. also Harris, op. cit., p. 80, for commentary on 
the idea offered by Hegel here. 
29 
Cf. Hegel, Enzykolpadie, pp. 325-326; Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, 
(Wallace, Miller), p. 73, for confirmation that Hegel retains this argument 
for consciousness as a property of the individual in the context of a 
~iscussion of more developed forms of consciousness as well. 
30 
The former translation of 'Empfindung' is selected by Harris, the 
flatter by Wallace. Harris' translation has the advantage of distinguishing 
~n translation 'Empfindung' from 'Sinnlicheit', a distinction which Hegel 
obviously draws. 
31 
Cf. Hegel, EnzyklopMdie, p. 325. 
--
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ness to stimuli, 32 so primative that the distinction between the object 
and the organism as subject is not drawn therein. 33 This most primative 
form of awareness, however, itself forms the basis of its subject's 
noticing itself as a subject, in the sense of feeling itself to be the 
center of those instances of sentient apprehension which are its own. 
~egel entitles soul as capable of this level of awareness "feeling soul" 
(fuhlende Seele). 34 He states with regard to "feeling soul" that, " ••• thie 
self centered being is not merely a formal factor of sensation (ein 
formelles Moment des Empfindenes): the soul· is virtually a reflected 
totality of sensation - it feels in itself the total substantiality which 
it virtually is - it is a soul which feels. 1135 The "soul which feels," 
the individual capable of distinguishing itself as a subject at least 
32 
Cf. Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, (Wallace, Miller), p. 33; 
~nzyklopadie, p. 325. 
33 
Cf. Ibid.; Harris, op. cit., p. 86. 
34 
Hegel, Enzyklopadie., p. 328. 
35 
Hegel (Wallace, Miller), p. 88; Enzyklop~die., p. 328. 
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insofar as it is able to feel itself as the ~enter of sentient events, is 
through this ability capable of realizing itself as subject in a fuller 
sense, as distinct from its sensations themselves. This Hegel refers to 
in the Encyclopedia in noting soul's ability of " ••• making itself an 
abstract universal being and reducing the particulars of feelings (and of 
) f f b 11 36 consciousness to a mere eature o its eing ••• 
But the condition of the subject as soul being able to realize itself 
in this fashion, i.e. as a conscious subject, involv~s its having recog-
nized its sensations as falling into categories or classes. This felt 
categorization of sensations through their repetition enables the subject 
to at once recognize typical features of its experience, and also to view 
them as features of its experience, rather than simply as its self. It is 
this felt categorization which Hegel entitles "Habit" (Gewohnheit). 37 The 
development of Habit has two effects for that subject of the awareness 
which Hegel names soul. It enables the subject to cease preoccupation witl 
its own internal sentient experience. 38 And it enables that subject to 
attend to other and external features of its experience: " ••• it is at the 
same time open to be otherwise occupied and engaged -- say, the feeling 
36 
Hegel (Wallace, Miller), p. 140; Enzyklop~die., p. 339. 
37 
Cf. Ibid. 
38 
Cf. Ibid. 
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39 
and mental consciousness in general." And this is in turn the ground of 
the ability of the subject to differentiate itself from such features of 
~ts experience, to realize itself consciously as a subject. 
Two points need to be noted here. First, that Hegel does argue in 
~he Encyclopedia that conscious experience and the subject of conscious 
experience, arise from "soul" as characterized by sentience, feeling, and 
~abit. Hegel notes that "The actual soul with its sensations and its 
toncrete self-feeling turned into habit, has implicitly realized the 
'ideality' of its qualities ••• In this way it gains the position of thinker 
and subject--specially a subject of the judgment in which the ego excludes 
from itself the sum total of its merely natural features as an object, a 
~orld external to it--but with such respect to that object that in it it is 
immediately reflected into itself. Thus soul rises to become conscious-
40 
ness." Sentience, feeling, and habit, mark and describe the development 
of the conscious subject as the "truth" of nature. And second, insofar as 
for Hegel the conscious subject emerges in this fashion from "soul," and 
insofar as the subject of "soul" is necessarily the embodied subject, 
~he individual, then one can confidently state that for Hegel the conscious 
~ubject is the embodied individual, that conscious experience, the subject 
Jllatter of phenomenology, is the experience of the indiyidual. Hegel 
bdicates this in stating that, "The soul, when its corporeity has been 
39 
Ibid. 
40 
Hegel (Wallace, Miller), p. ·1s1; Enzyklop~die, pp. 343-344. 
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and made thoroughly its own, finds itself there a single subject; 
corporeity is an externality which stands as a predicate, in being 
to which, it is related to itself. ,Al The conscious subject, the 
of whose possibility is "soul" itself, is then also to be 
42 by Hegel as the embodied individual. And Harris, in commentin 
emergence of consciousness as the "truth" of nature, confirms the 
that consciousness must be here taken to mean for Hegel the exper-
ence of the conscious subject as individual. "For Hegel, then, nature is 
process of becoming through which mind is realized ••• In this 
true, wide segments of nature are subjectivized, but not in som 
ervasive soul-substance for which no evidence is forthcoming, but in the 
• felt-experience of actual individuals, for it is as actual individual mind 
that the universal idea exists. 1143 
The point to these connnents is that Hegel, in discussing the emergenc 
consciousness from nature as nature's "truth", insists in the 
be understood as the experience of cons-
cious subjects, embodied individuals. Because of this, a science of the 
structures of the experience, phenomenology as Hegel understands that term 
41 
Hegel (Wallace, Miller), p. 147; Enzyklop~die, p. 342. 
42 
Cf. Harris, op. cit., p. 90. 
43 
Ibid., pp. 77, 81. 
....... 
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bOth in the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Encyclopedia itself , 44 is at 
~ne and the same time a science of the structures of the experience of the 
~ndividual. Thus it is valid to hold, as Marx in at least one text seems 
to have held, that we can discover in Hegel's Phenomenology concepts 
suitable for a theory of man. So if subsequent analysis should discover 
~hat certain features of Marx' theory of man seem to have been appropriated 
oy him from Hegel, we will have no general reason to suppose that such 
~ppropriation distorts the meaning these concepts have for Hegel. 
I now turn to the texts of the Phenomenology of Spirit and the 
Philosoohv of Right themselves. First, consideration should be given to 
~he doctrine of agency elucidated in the Phenomenology of Spirit. It is 
just for the development of a doctrine of agency that Marx pays tribute to 
aegel, as the text cited in the opening of this chapter shows. It seems 
appropriate, therefore, to first of all direct attention towards that 
doctrine. 
II. Agencv. Selfactualization. and Intersubiectivitv in the Phenomenologv 
of Spirit 
The first discussion of agency in the Phenomenology which seems 
~elevant to a discussion of the relation of Hegel to Marx appears in the 
44 
Cf. J.N. Findlay, Hegel: a re-examination, (New York: Collier Books, 
[962), pp~ 301, 302 • 
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transition passage from consciousness to self consciousness. 45 However, 
preparations for the argument of that passage are made in the 
"Introduction" to the Phenomenology of Spirit. There Hegel makes certain 
comments made concerning the relation of consciousness in general to its 
object. 
Hegel begins this analysis by asserting that consciousness, within its 
bwn experience, may recognize its object as something which is both 
distinct from itself and related to itself. "Consciousness, we find, 
distinguishes from itself something which it at the same time relates to 
itself; or, to use the current expression, there is something for 
consciousness ••• ,i46 For an item to be an object is for it to stand in some 
~elation to a subject, to occur within the experience of consciousness. 
This, Hegel notes, is at once an "abstract1147 and an accurate gen~ral 
statement descriptive of the nature of the object as such. It is not a 
statement which militates against the integrity of the object as such. 
Rather, it describes Hegel's insistence that for an item to be an object is 
for it to be a datum, and thus something which maintains its autonomy, and 
at the same time to occur essentially, as an object, within the experience 
of consciousness. In Hegelian terminology, this is to say that for an 
ff.; 
45 
Cf. Hegel, The Ph~nomenology of Mind, trans. Baillie, p. 218 and 
Hegel, Phanomenologie des Geistes, pp. 133 and ff. 
46 
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 139; Phanomenologie, p. 70. 
47 
Cf. Ibid. 
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tem to be an object is for it to occur both "in itself," and "for 
nother," for consciousness. 48 
Hegel develops and attempts to justify this understanding of 
consciousness in relation to its object in the "Introduction" to the 
of its object. Knowledge is initially to be understood as the awarene 
consciousness of that specific manner in which the object occurs 
its experience: " ••• the determinate form of this process of relatin 
49 
r of there being something for a consciousness, is knowledge." That 
owledge which consciousness immediately has of its object is its aware-
ess of the details of that relation which the object has to consciousness 
in its experience, the perspective, as it were, that the object offers to 
consciousness. 50 And within this knowledge itself, consciousness 
distinguishes from the object as a content of its own awareness, the objec 
"in itself," as occuring autonomously and as offering content to awareness. 
48 
Cf. Hegel, (Baillie), pp. 139 and 142; Phanomenologie, pp. 70 and 7 
49 
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 139; Phanomenologie, p. 70. 
50 
Cf. Martin Heidegger, Hegel's Concept of Experience, with a section 
from Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit translated by K.R. Dove, (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1970), pp. 57-58, and p. 89, for astute comment on this 
understanding of the object as it is had in the immediate knowledge of 
consciousness. 
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'But from this being for another we distinguish51 being in itself or per 
is related to knowledge is likewise distinguished from it, and 
as also existing outside this relation; one aspect of being per s 
r in itself is called truth. 1152 The object as occurring "per se" or 
tself" is taken by consciousness to occur within its experience, but 
ame time is "called truth," is taken to be that which provides content to 
onsciousness, rather than simply as being that content. 
As Hegel goes on to note, this understanding had by consciousness of 
relation to its object, and of the nature of the immediate knowledge of 
object, allows consciousness to construct from within its own 
) 
erience criteria whereby the adequacy of its knowledge may be evaluated. 
'In consciousness there is one element for another, or, in general, 
oI).sciousness implicates the specific character of the moment of knowledge 
es habt uberhaupt die Bestinnnheit des Moments des Wissen an ihm). At the 
'other' is not simply.!.£!. it, but also outside this relation 
t has a being in itself, i.e. there is a moment of truth. Thus in what 
onsciousness declares inside itself to be the essence of truth we have the 
tandard which itself sets up, and by which we are to measure its know-
51 
Cf. Hegel, Phanomenologie des Geistes, p. 70. Hegel's text here 
es clear that the distinction cited is one made within the experience of 
onsciousness itself in its immediate knowledge of the object, rather than 
ne drawn by the phenomenological observer: " ••• das auf das Wissen Bezogene 
ird ebenso von ihm unterschieden und gesetzt als seiend auch ausser dieser 
ziehung ••• " 
52 
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 139; Phanomenologie, p. 70. Cf. also Heidegger 
• cit., pp. 88-89. 
r 
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,.53 b f I ledge. The o ject occurs for consciousness in terms o consciousness 
awareness thereof. But the content of this awareness is derived from the 
~bject as existing within the experience of consciousness and simultaneous-
lly occuring "in itself". And it is the object in this sense against which 
~he adequacyrof knowledge must be measured. 54 Since, however, the object 
~s "in itself" occurs within the experience of consciousness, consciousness 
~rom within its own experience has to construct standards for the evaluatic i 
55 ~f its own knowledge. 
This account of the relation of consciousness and its object, however, 
~aises the question of how consciousness revises its knowledge of its 
pbject. In handling this question Hegel offers a further critical 
~escription of the relation qf consciousness to its object, and of the 
nature of the experience of consciousness itself. According to the 
~escription of consciousness' immediate attitude towards its object just 
given, it appears to consciousness that its knowledge is knowledge of the 
Object as it stands in relation to consciousness (fur ein anderes), 56 while 
at the same time the content of this knowledge is offered by the object as 
53 
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 140; Phanomenologie, p. 71. 
54 
Cf. J. Loewenberg, Hegel's Phenomenology, (La Salle: The Open Court 
bublishing Co., 1965), p. 14. 
55 
Cf. Ibid. 
56 
Cf. Hegel, PhMnomenologie, p. 71 
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it occurs independently. Suppose a comparison of the two be made, such 
that consciousness discovers that some modification in its knowledge is 
necessary. That is, suppose consciousness compares its "knowledge" of the 
object to the latter as it is "in itself" and discovers that its knowledge 
is not adequate to the reality of the object, and thus discovers that its 
~owledge must be in some fashion modified or developed. 
Should this occur, two results ensue. First, the awareness of the 
object which consciousness entertains is appropriately modified. "Should 
both, when thus compared, not correspond, consciousness seems bound to 
alter its knowledge, in order to make it fit the object. 1157 But second, 
the object itself is now viewed differently by consciousness. Previously, 
consciousness made the distinction of the object as for another (for 
consciousness) and as in itself, but understood the object as in itself 
to be the source of its own knowledge of the content of the object, i.e., 
the object as for consciousness. Thus, while consciousness distinguished 
the object as for another and in itself, its concept of the content of 
the object belied this distinction, simply because one concept, rather thar 
two, was involved. Consciousness may through some experience of the object 
be moved to modify its concept of that object, but this will be a modifica-
tion of the concept and experience of the object both as it is in relation 
to consciousness and as it is in itself, because the latter is understood 
!Precisely as the source of the former. As Hegel puts it, " ••• in the 
57 
Cf. Hegel, (Baillie), p. 142; Phanomenologie, p. 72. 
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alteration of knowledge, the object also, in.point of fact, is altered; 
for the knowledge which existed was essentially a knowledge of the object; 
~ith change in this knowledge, the object also becomes different, since 
58 it belonged essentially to this knowledge." 
These statements form for Hegel an explicitation of the statement that 
the distinction of the object as in itself and for consciousness is one 
~hich falls within the experience of consciousness itself, and from this 
~xplicitation implications may be drawn concerning tpe general nature of 
the experience of consciousness, and concerning the role of consciousness 
in its own experience. If Hegel's analysis is correct, then the descrip-
tion of the object offered through the already noted distinction is 
subsumed under a new category, and the object is now understood as being it 
itself for consciousness: " ••• consciousness comes now to find th~t what 
formerly to it was the essence is not what is per ~' or what was per ~ 
was only per se for consciousness (ft.fr es an sich), 1159 since consciousness, 
upon finding it necessary to modify its knowledge of its object, finds that 
" ••• the object likewise fails to hold out ••• 1160 Hegel insists that to 
~escribe the object as that.which is for consciousness is not to deny the 
integrity of the object. What is denied, rather is that the object is to 
58 
Ibid. 
59 
Ibid. 
60 
~-
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e simply as a reality in itself, and the negation involved in Hegel's 
61 
xpressing a developed concept of the object is a determinate negation 
h i k • 1 62 II h h • 1 i f rather tan negat on ta en s1mp y: ••• watt is rea per~ s or 
consciousness is truth: which, however, means that this is the essential 
bj h . h i h 1163 reality, or the o ect w 1c consc ousness as. 
This new description of the object of consciousness in turn leads to 
. 64 
a description of "experience," which is inherently dialectical, and 
hich understands consciousness as acting towards th~ constitution of its 
bject within its experience. 65 "This dialectic process which conscious-
ess executes on itself--on its knowledge as well as on its object--in the 
ense that out of it the new and true object arises, is precisely what is 
termed Experience. 1166 
61 
Cf. Hegel, (Baillie), p. 137; Phanomenologie, p. 69. 
62 
Cf. Hyppolite, Genese et Structure de la Phenomenologie de L'Esprit 
e He el, (Paris: Aubier Montaigne, 1946), p. 20. "Negativity is not then 
force which opposes itself to all content, it is imminent in content and 
llows its necessary development to be comprehended." 
63 
Cf. Hegel, (Baillie), p. 143; Phanomenologie, p. 73. 
64 
Cf. A. Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, ed. A. Bloom, 
trans •. J.H. Nichols, (New York: Basic Books, 1969), p. 215. Kojeve 
"nsists here that, for Hegel, experience is fundamentally dialectical, and 
that phenomenology adopts dialecti~ only out of the necessity of offering 
description of the structure of experience. 
65 
Cf. Dove, "Hegel's Phenomenological Method," in New Studies in 
A?c~..._.;:;__.;;..;~;.;..;;;....;;..i;;_h...._, ed. Steinkraus, (New York: Bolt, Rinehart, and Winston 
Baill" 
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Two features of this description of experience are notable. First, 
Hegel here asserts that the dialectical process, the initial positing of ar 
attitude towards the object, the determinate negation of that attitude, anc 
the subsuming of that negation under a new apprehension of the object, is 
a feature of the experience of consciousness itself. In fact the realiza-
tion of the necessary connection between the several dialectical phases of 
its own experience is not available to naive consciousness; it is only 
. 67 
available to the philosophical observer, " ••• to us, who watch the process 
••• so to say, behind its back. 1168 But nonetheless, the dialectical process 
itself is immanent to the experience of consciousness. Second, and in 
terms of the above, within its experience consciousness plays an active 
role in the production of the determinate character of its object. The 
object, that which is "in itself for consciousness," is in its appearance 
the result of consciousness's own activity, i.e. its act of revising its 
attitude towards its object, such that out of this revision " ••• the new 
69 
and true object arises ••• " Hegel's description of the nature of the 
experience of consciousness leads him to suggest that within its experiencE 
consciousness plays an active role in the production of the definite 
67 
Cf. Loewenberg, op. cit., p. 15, where, in virtue of the above 
comments, Hegel's method is characterized as " ••• experimental. •• " as 
" G d k . II ••• e an enexperimente ••• 
68 
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 144; Phanomenologie, p. 74. 
69 
Ibid. 
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character of its object, or as K.R. Dove suggests in the "constitution" of 
b . 70 . 1 b . i f . bj i its o Ject precise y ecause conscious exper ence o its o ect s 
determined by that activity whereby consciousness alligns its knowledge of 
the object with the object "in itself". 
From the above analysis, Hegel derives two further conclusions 
relevant to our purposes, in the "Introduction" to the Phenomenology of 
St>irit. First, he asserts that, from the description of "experience" he 
has offered, consciousness can be understood as actively constituting not 
only the determinate character of its object, but also its self: " ••• since 
what at first appeared as object is reduced (herabsinkst), when it passes 
into consciousness, to what knowledge takes it to be, and the implicit 
nature, the real object, becomes what this entity per ~ is for conscious-
ness; this latter is the new object, whereupon there appears also a new 
~de or embodiment of consciousness, of which the essence is something 
71 
other than that of the preceeding mode." Hegel's point here seems based 
on the basic statement that consciousness is primarily awareness of 
content, and its implication, that the details of its content are identicaJ 
~th the details of specific occurences of consciousness itself. Now that 
content of which consciousness in its experience is aware is its object. 
But the definite character which the object assumes in its experience is 
the result of consciousness' own activity on the object. Thus the specific 
70 
Cf. Dove, op. cit., loc. cit. 
71 
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 144; Phanomenologie, p. 74. 
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details of consciousness' own experience, or of its self, are the result of 
. i 72 ~ts own activ ty. 
Second, Hegel is already able even in the "Introduction" to the 
rhenomenology, to point out that given this description of consciousness, 
consciousness must in general be taken as self consciousness. Conscious-
ness within its experience is aware of content, i.e. of its object. But 
conversely, that content of which consciousness is aware is its own 
experience. If the object as for consciousness is an essential moment of 
its own experience, and if consequently its knowledge of its object is 
knowledge of its own experience, the consciousness, in knowing its 
experience, knows itself as well. As Hegel puts it, consciousness' 
experience of its object is at once "the experience which consciousness haf 
• • t lf II 73 concerning 1 se • Consciousness, in relating to its object at once 
relates to itself, i.e. to its own experience, and thus must in principle 
be described as self _consciousness. 
It is the discussion of self consciousness which Hegel takes as at 
least an initial goal towards which the description of the nature of the 
object in the "Introduction" to the Phenomenology tends. For it is self 
consciousness which in its own experience apprehends in an initial fashion 
I. 
72 
Cf. Hegel's Science of Logic, trans. A.V. Miller, (London: Allen anc 
Unwin, 1969), p. 60; G.W.F. Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik, ed. Georg 
Lasson, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1967), pp. 42-43, wherein Hegel 
analogously suggests that the concrete character of consciousness is the 
result of its own activity on its object. 
73 
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 144, Phanomenologie, p. 73. 
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the "truth" of consciousness in the "natural attitude," and particularly 
the truth of the implications of its own experience of the object. This 
~s particularly the case regarding Hegel's analysis of consciousness as 
~xercising an active role in relation to its object as well as itself. 
!Consciousness in the "natural attitude1174 takes its object to be an item 
simply occuring, essentially independent of any relationship with consciouE 
ness itself. 75 Self consciousness, however, recognizes that its object is 
an essential feature of its own experience, and that a thing's being a 
feature of its own experience is essential to its being an object " ••• that 
76 being 'in itself' and being 'for another' are the same." It is in terms 
~f his discussion of self consciousness as initially the realization of 
consciousness' relation to the object itself, that Hegel develops his 
notion of agency, in the transition from consciousness to self conscious-
ness of the Phenomenology. 
The movement from the "Introduction" to the Phenomenology to that 
section of the text describing the transition from consciousness to self 
consciousness omits, of course,ra discussion of those phases of Hegel's 
~hilosophical analysis which explicitly treat consciousness itself: the 
dialectics of sense certainty, perception, and understanding. But this 
74 
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 135, Phanomenologie, p. 74. 
75 
Cf. for example Hegel's beginning of the dialectic of sense certain· 
ty in Hegel, (Baillie), p. 149, Phi:inomenologie,, p. 79. 
76 
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 218, Phanomenologie, p. 133. 
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mission is, Lwould argue, valid for the purposes of my analysis. The 
bases of Hegel's dialectic of consciousness here noted represent his 
nitial attempts at a full philosophical justification of the doctrine of 
onsciousness' relation to its object already laid down in the 
'Introduction." But the basis of his justification of that doctrine is 
iscoverable in the "Introduction" itself, and the transition from 
onsciousness to self consciousness in the Phenomenology is, as already 
oted, Hegel's attempt at elucidating the "truth" of.consciousness itself. 
Hegel initiates his dialectical examination of "self consciousness1177 
reflecting back on the discussion of consciousness in relation to its 
bject laid down in the "Introduction." He begins by reasserting the 
ecessity of maintaining some distinction between consciousness and its 
To collapse the distinction of self consciousness and i~s object 
to render unintelligible the notion of self consciousness itself. 
Self consciousness minimally but essentially involves consciousness' 
experience of a relation to itself. This can only occur if consciousness 
is able both to be aware of itseLf, and to distinguish itself from that 
ich it is not. Without the former, of course, the very concept of self 
consciousness would be impossible. But without the latter, and experience 
77 
Cf. Hegel, (Baillie), p. 218 and ff.; Hegel, Phanomenologie, pp. 13 
and ff. 
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consciousness would likewise be impossible. 78 For consciousness 
can only experience itself if it also experiences its other, distinguishes 
tself therefrom, and apprehends through this distinction its own 
iqueness. In Hegel's language, when self consciousness 11 ••• distinguishe 
nly its self as such from itself, distinction is straightway taken to be 
superceeded, in the sense of involving otherness. The distinction is not, 
d self consciousness is only motionless tautology, Ego is Ego, I am I. 
en for self consciousness the distinction does not also have the shape 
b . . . lf . 1179 eing, it is not se consciousness. Any concept of self conscious-
ess, as well as any philosophical analysis of the experience of self 
onsciousness, must in some way maintain the distinction between 
consciousness and its object as other. 
Showing the manner in which this distinction is to be maintained 
ccupies Hegel in beginning the dialectic of self consciousness. He 
ummarizes his point in the following statement: "For self consciousness, 
hen, otherness is a fact, it does exist as a distinct moment (das 
' 
derssein als ein Sein oder als untershciedenes Moment): but the unity of 
78 
F.G. Weiss, Hegel's Critique of Aristotle's Philosophy of Mind, 
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), pp. 16 and 44, in which it is remarke 
n the language of 'nature' and 'mind', that Hegel's note on of 'actuality' 
lthough ultimately one which involves the dialectical unification of 
hese two concepts, at the same time maintains a distinction between them. 
79 
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 219, Phanomenologie, p. 134. 
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itself with this difference is also a fact for self consciousness, and a 
second distinct moment. 1180 Self consciousness apprehends its object as 
that which is other than itself. At the same time, self consciousness 
recognizes "the unity of itself with this difference" and two ideas follow 
from the description of this phase of the experience of self consciousness. 
Because consciousness recognizes some relation of itself to its 
object, it is capable of being self consciousness. But further, at this 
stage of his analysis Hegel implies that the "unity" between consciousness 
and its object here is a unity such that the object is consciousness' 
experience. The object of self consciousness is distinct from self 
consciousness itself, but it is also that which compromises the experience 
thereof. As such it is essentially related to self consciousness. Because 
the object is distinct, it can provide content for experience. But if 
/ 
self consciousness realizes its relation to itself through its other, then 
this other is essentially its own, a feature of its experience, its self. 
Because self ~onsciousness relates to itself in virtue of relating to its 
other, we may not comprehend the terms of this relation as simply occuring 
separately. H~gel expresses this by describing the experience of self 
consciousness as involving two aspects or moments. "With that first 
1n0ment, self consciousness occupies the position of consciousness, and the 
whole expanse of the sensible world is conserved as its object, but at the 
same time only as related to the second moment, the unity of self 
80 
Hegel, (Baillie), pp. 219-220, Phanomenologie, p. 134. 
. . 
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. 'th 't lf 1181 consciousness wi i se • And this means that the object is here both 
distinct from self consciousness, and is its experience, its own. 
For Hegel to describe the location of the object in the experience of 
self consciousness in this fashion is, as he explicitly states, to assert 
that the object is now to be regarded as the "life" of self consciousness, 
and is so regarded by the latter itself. In its initial statement, this 
/ 
concept of life is not t.he developed concept that Hegel expresses in the 
f L · 82 · b i h Ph 1 Science o ogic, or even in su sequent moments n t e enomeno ogy 
83 itself. But it is nonetheless an initial understanding of life, and one 
~hich Hegel uses to develop the notions of desire and agency as features 
of the experience of self consciousness. In this connection, it is 
important for my argument. Self consciousness initially views its object 
as its '!life" in the following senses: the object (now described by Hegel 
as "the whole expanse of the world of sense") is the condition of the 
possibility of self consciousness' ·enjoying experience; 84 the object is tha 
81 
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 220, Phanomenologie, p. 134. 
82 
Cf. Hegel's Science of Logic, trans. Miller, pp. 761-774; Wissenscha t 
der Logik, vol. 2, pp. 413-429. 
83 
Hegel, (Baillie), pp. 221-227, Phanomenologie, pp. 135-140. 
84 
Cf. Hegel, (Baillie),p. 219, Phanomenologie, p. 134. Cf. also Hege], 
(Baillie), p. 218, Ph~nomenologie, p. 133. In the latter text, Hegel notes 
that in the idalectic of self consciousness, "The abstract conception of 
the object gives way before the actual concrete object, or the first 
immediate idea is cancelled in the course of experience." This assertion 
means for Hegel that the present phase of the dialectic recognizes the 
'truth' of the object, to wit, that it is of the nature of the object to 
- occur in itself for consciousness. But given this, the understanding of --=::::::=tt=============================~=======~=============~====U=====~ 
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whose own reality involves its being a feature of the experience of self 
consciousness; 85 and the otrject is consequently that which makes it 
possible for consciousness to relate to itself, to be self consciousness, 
Or, the object is the life of consciousness, and thus its own. But at the 
. . . b. d' . f . 86 same time it is qua o Ject istinct rom consciousness. Thus self 
consciousness here experiences its life as both occurring in a unity with 
itself and as distinct from itself. 
Hegel expresses this idea in two statements, both of which warrant 
analysis. He first says that, given the experience of self consciousness, 
" ••• the sensible world is regarded by self consciousness as having a 
subsistence which is, however, only appearance, or forms of distinction 
from self-consciousness ,,that per ~ has no being. 1187 This statement is not 
to be taken to mean that the reality of the object in itself is nothing 
more than false appearance within the experience of consciousness, to be 
overcome simply through being negated. Its meaning is rather that the 
object taken simply as distinct and as such isolated from any relation to 
self consciousness is now seen to be, " ••• only appearance ••• " and that this 
the object as necessary for the occurence of experience remains. 
85 
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 218, Phanomenologie, p. 133. 
86 
Cf. Hegel, (Baillie), p. 219, Phanomenologie, p. 134. "When for 
self-consciousness the distinction does not also have the shape of being, 
it is not self-consciousness." 
87 
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 220. Phanomenologie, p. 135. 
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fact is now recognized by consciousness itself, from within its own 
experience, its life, and therefore its own. Thus, second, "This oppositio 
of its appearance and its truth finds its real essence, however, only in 
the truth - in the unity of self-consciousness with itself. 1188 Self 
consciousness, again, realizes its object as essentially related to itself. 
But this relation is not one of simple unity. 89 The object delivers itself 
to consciousness as other than and simultaneously as the experience of the 
latter. And "life" itself, in its initial moment, involves the recognition 
by self consciousness both of a unity .with itself through its own exper-
ience, and of a fundamental differentiation from itself within its own 
experience. "The act of moving to and fro between ••• subject and object 
constitutes the very differentia of self consciousness. 1190 Self conscious-
ness recognizes its own object, now its own "life", as both essentially 
related to itself and distinct from itself, and indeed self consciousness 
is fundamentally this recognition. 
All this means that, in Hegel's description, self consciousness 
experiences its "life" as both its own and as other than itself. But this 
experience yields the consequent experience of feeling that this disparity 
must be over~ome. And 'feeling' is meant in its literal sense here. Since 
self consciousness recognizes within its own experience a distinction 
88 
Ibid. 
89 
Cf. Loewenberg, op. cit., p. 77. 
90 
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 220, Phanomenologie, p. 135. 
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!between itself and its 'life', it desires to overcome this distinction, 
aiming at the goal of self unification. "This unity," the unity of self 
consciousness with its own life, "must become essential to self-conscious-
~ess, i.e., self-consciousness is the state of Desire (Begierde) in 
1 1191 genera • 
It is desire, then, which forms for Hegel the basic category through 
!which the experience of the life of self consciousness is to be explici-
ltated. Self consciousness finds in its experience a " ••• twofold 
b . • 1192 10 Ject .... on the one hand the " ••• whole expanse of the world of sense 
••• 
1193 
as other than it,1:1elf, and on the other, this object as being the 
~xperience that is its own. Self consciousness thus desires to overcome 
the apparently simple otherness of its object in a way that is recognizablE 
!It experiences itself as desire, as, "~ •• the process in which this 
~4 ~pposition is removed, and oneness or identity with itself is established." 
91 
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 220, Phanomenologie, p. 135. 
92 
Ibid. 
93 
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 220, Phanomenologie, p. 134. 
94 
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 220; Phanomenologie, p. 134. Cf. Hyppolite, 
~rans. O'Neill, p. 3. Hyppolite, in conunenting on the relation of this 
section of Hegel's Phenomenology to the "Jeneser System" notes that, "In 
~ts immediate form self-consciousness is desire and the object which it 
~onfronts is nothing else than the object of its desire. Consciousness 
~n this case is identical with life, and the creature moved by desire does 
not consider the object of its desire as something essentially alien. 
~s a living creature he experiences the character of 'being other' only as 
a moment within an encounter that is virtually resolved in satisfaction." 
But Hyppolite fails to note clearly that, according to Hegel, des,ire 
r 
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The experiencing of itself as desire has two results for self 
consciousness. First, it yields a further individuation of self conscious-
ness. "Desire is always revealed as ~ desire, and to reveal desire, one 
,nust use the word 'I'. 1195 In that self consciousness experiences it~elf 
not only as desire in general, but also as the locus of the specific desirE 
to overcome the apparently simple otherness of specific portions of the 
range of its experience, self consciousness experiences itself as an 
individual. As a result, Hegel is able to offer an ~ccount of individual-
ity more significant and profound than he could have before. Second, the 
desire of self consciousness when apprehended in relation to the content at 
originates as the fundamental feature of immediate self consciousness, in 
self consciousness' own recognition that its object or its life is 
simultaneously its own and other than itself. Cf. however Hyppolite, 
Genese et Structure, p. 153. Here he comments that, for the imm~diate self 
consciousness which Hegel describes in the relevant section of the 
PhenomenoloS?v, "The worlsf no longer subsists in itself; it only subsists ir 
relation to self consciousness which is its truth. The truth of Being is 
the Self which possesses it, and possesses it for itself ••• Desire is this 
movement of consciousness which respects not being but negation, i.e., 
which possesses being concretely and makes it its own. This desire supposE ~ 
the phenomenal character of the world, which is only a means for the self.' 
In this comment he recognizes, although I think still too obliquely, that 
for Hegel it is self consciousness' recognition that its object is both 
its life and not its own which is at the basis of the desire of self 
consciousness. Hyppolite's account here is notably superior to that offerE ~ 
by Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), p. 14. 
Marcuse: simply notes that, "Man has learned that his own self consciousnesf 
lies behind the appearances of things. He now sets out to realize this 
experience, to prove himself master of his world. Self consciousness thus 
finds itself in a 'state of desire' (Begierde): man, awakened to self 
consciousness, desires the objects around him, appropriates them and uses 
them. 
95 
Kojeve, op. cit., p. 37 •. 
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~hich it is directed, reveals to self consciousness the process whereby it 
might be dealt with and overcome. This process is agency. 
It is of the utmost importance to see why, for Hegel, agency is an 
essential feature of the experience of self consciousness given the nature 
of desire. And this can be done through noting that, even in the section c ~ 
the Phenomenology now under consideration, agency takes on for Hegel three 
definitely interrelated but yet distinguishable senses. First, agency has 
here the sense of labor or work. The desire which self consciousness 
experiences is directed at '" ••• the whole expanse of the world of sense ••• "c P 
as its object. Self consciousness desires to overcome the appearance of 
this object as being in no essential relation to consciousness itself. Anc 
the foundation of this appearance is located precisely on the object's 
being sensible. Insofar as an item is a sense item, it seems simply to 
contain within itself its own identity, and to offer this identity to 
sensation, to consciousness as passive and receptive. The only way in 
which self consciousness can overcome this apparent nature of its object 
is to transform it as a sense object, to transform it materially. And it 
is agency as work which enables the self conscious individual to effect 
th . f . 97 is trans ormation. The nature, then, of that desire which self 
consciousness experiences as its self, together with the character of the 
object at which that desire is directed, results in self consciousness' 
96 
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 220, Phanomenologie, p. 135. 
97 
Cf. Kojeve, pp. 37-38. 
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further experiencing itself as an agent, or experiencing agency as work as 
a necessary manifestation of the•desire which it is, for, as Hegel 
concisely puts it, " ••• labor shapes and transforms the thing. 1198 
Several commentators have noted the function of action as work or 
labor in Hegel's philosophical analysis of desire. Kojeve identifies desii ~ 
as, " ••• the desire to transform the contemplated thing by an action, to 
overcome it in its being that is unrelated to mine and independent of me, 
to negate it in its independence ••• For Self Consciousness ••• to exist, then, 
there must be in 1iian not only positive, passive contemplation, which mere!) 
reveals being, but also negating Desire, and hence Action that transforms 
the given being. 1199 Analogous comments are made by MarcuselOO and Hyppo-
lite.101 One might also remark that Hegel's initial understanding of the 
object of self consciousness as desire, " ••• the whole expanse of the world 
of sense," is in two particulars analogous to that concept of nature which 
Marx utilizes to illuminate some initial structural features of praxis. 
Nature, as I show in chapter one, is for Marx that external and maleable 
environment which is the necessary "material" of praxis, and which is 
itself essentially determined as the object of praxis. The object of self 
98 
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 238, Phanomenologie, p. 149. 
99 
Cf. Kojeve, op. cit., loc. cit. 
100 
Cf. Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, pp. 114-115. 
101 
Cf. Hyppolite, trans. O'Neill, p. 165. 
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consciousness as desire, described by Hegel,.is analogous to this, first, 
in that it is both other than and essentially related to self consciousness 
as the "life" of self consciousness, and second in that it is as such 
determined by the labor of the self conscious individua1. 102 
102 
Cf. Hegel's Philosophy of Nature, trans. A.V. Miller, (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1970), pp. 4-5; Enzykolpadie, p. 199. It should not be 
surprising to find Hegel speaking of the object of the desire of self 
consciousness in a way analogous to Marx' explicitation of the concept of 
nature. For in the second volume of the Encyclopedi~ of the Philosophical 
Sciences, Hegel himself develops the concept of nature in a way analogous 
to Marx. Hegel insists therein, first, that an adequate philosophy of 
nature must be one which comprehends nature practically as well as 
theoretically, physics being an example of an exclusively theoretical 
comprehension of nature. He then goes on, in introducing the second volume 
pf the Encyclopedia, to indicate what the comprehension of nature as a 
l>ractical object might involve. "In man's practical approach to Nature, 
the latter is, for him, something immediate and external; he himself is an 
external and therefore sensuous individual, although in relation to 
natural objects, he correctly regards himself as an end. A consiµeration 
of nature according to this relationship yields the standpoint of a finite 
teleology (#205). In this, we find the correct presupposition that nature 
does not itself contain the absolute final end (//207-11)." And in an 
addendum to this statement, taken from the 1857 Michelet text, Hegel goes 
on to indicate how it is that, as a practical object, nature relates 
teleologically not to itself but to the human subject confronting it. "The 
Practical approach to Nature is, in general, determined by appetite, which 
is self-seeking; need impels us to use Nature for our advantage, to wear 
ner out, to wear her down, in short, to annihilate her. And here, two 
characteristics stand out. (a) The practical approach is concerned only 
with individual products of Nature, or with individual aspects of those 
products. The necessities and wit of man have found an endless variety of 
ways of using and mastering nature ••• (b) The other characteristic of the 
Practical approach is that, since it is our end which is paramount, not 
natural things themselves, we convert the latter into a means, the destiny 
of which is determined by us, not by the things themselves; an· example of 
~his is the conversion of food into blood. (c) What is achieved is our 
aatisfaction, our self-feeling, which had been disturbed by a lack of some 
kind or another." Hegel then offers an example of these points, highly 
!reminiscent of the texts of Marx, especially the Manuscripts of 1844. "The 
negation of myself which I suffer within me in hunger, is at the same time 
present as an other than myself, as something to be consumed; my act is to 
~nnul this contradiction by making this other identical with myself, or by 
!restoring my self-unity through sacrificing the thing." 
r 
r 
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In elaborating upon agency, Hegel goes on to show how it is that agenc r 
as work relates to the desire of self consciousness. The result of work 
is that self consciousness recognizes its object as its product, and this 
in three senses. First, the object as product is a "transformed" item, 
and as transformed it embodies within itself the details of that agency 
~hich effected its transformation. 103 Both Marx and Hegel might express 
this idea by saying that the product of work "objectifies" the activity of 
which it is the result. Second, specific pieces of individual agency are 
This description of the practical significance of nature is highly 
analogous to the concept of nature as offered by Marx. Hegel takes nature 
here to be that sensuous environment which is both external to and 
essentially the correlate of the human subject. He notes that the details 
of the relations of the subject to his natural environment are determined 
~y needs resident in the experience of the subject. And he notes that the 
details of nature itself are determined by that activity which the subject 
undertakes on nature, towards the satisfaction of his needs. One might 
also note in passing that Marx and Hegel use the same example to illustrate 
the subject of needs in his relation to sensuous nature: hunger. 
At the same time, Hegel's description of practical nature clearly 
relates itself to his description of the object of the desire of self 
consciousness. Both the object of desire and nature are described by Hege] 
as correlates of the subject, relative to the desire or need of the subject , 
and that upon which agency, consequent upon desire or need, might be 
undertaken. Given these points, it is not surprising that Hegel's 
description of the object of the desire of self consciousness, pointing as 
it does to his description of practical nature, reminds us of Marx' concep1 
of nature as well. 
103 
This is a direct implication of Hegel's statement in the : 
Phenomenology cited above in footnote 98, that " ••• labor shapes and 
transforms the thing." 
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temporally finite and evanescent. But the result of agency, which embodies 
t~eir details, involves in its own reality a relative degree of permanence. 
~herefore the product lends also a degree of permanence to the activity 
d ·1 . b d" 104 ~hose etai s it em o ies. And finally, the object as related to and 
depending upon itself in a way more profound than was previously conceived. 
~d self consciousness apprehends its own self in its object as product. 
"That consciousness that toils and serves accordingly attains by this means 
h f h · d d b · as its self. 11105 the direct appre ension o t at in epen ent eing 
Consequently, agency as work satisfies the desire of self consciousness, 
albeit in a limited fashion, and results in the overcoming·of the apparent-
106 
ly simple otherness of the object. 
104 
Cf. Hegel, (Baillie), p. 238, Phanomenologie, p. 149. 
105 
Ibid. 
106 
Cf. Soll, op. cit., p. 12. It can be seen from the above that Sol] 's 
comment on the relation of action to the desire of self consciousness is 
inadequate because over simplified. Soll writes: "The action initiated 
by desire changes, uses, and possesses the~external world but not merely fc 
the benefits ordinarily associated with these activities. The immediate 
goals of desire and the behavior implementing it are rather viewed as 
manifestations of the basic drive of self-consciousness to negate the 
external world and to have only itself for an object ••• All the stages of 
self consciousness are to be viewed as different attempts to negate or den) 
the reality of the external world." But Hegel explicitly denies that the 
reality of the external world can be simply denied or negated, or that 
self consciousness desires this. Nor does he hold that self consciousness 
desires to have " ••• only itself for an object," in the simple sense of 
these terms employed by Soll. Rather, self consciousness desires to 
overcome the apparently exclusive otherness and externality of its object, 
and aims at the partial achievement of this through work, in the way 
outlined above. 
So far, we have discussed agency as work in connection with showing 
bow, according to Hegel, the self conscious subject of desire must be taker 
as an agent. But two other senses of agency are involved in Hegel's 
description of self consciousness at this stage of the Phenomenology, and 
these are also worth mentioning. They involve the notions of intersubjec-
tivity and "self transformation." 
The phenomenon of intersubjectivity arises for Hegel in his examinatic~ 
of the dialectic whereby self consciousness initially realizes for itself 
the truth of its own desire. The introduction to the dialectic of self 
consciousness is entitled by Hegel "The Truth of Self Certainty" (Die 
Warheit der Gewissheit seiner selbst), and initially, that self certainty 
which self consciousness realizes is that its object is its own in the 
f b i f f i . 107 . 1. sense o e ng a eature o ts own experience: consciousness rea izes 
now what was stated in the "Introduction" to the Phenomenology itself, 
that the distinction of the object as in itself and for consciousness is 
one drawn by consciousness from within its own experience. 108 In terms of 
the language of desire, this is to assert that self consciousness recognize; 
its object as both its "life" in the senses described above, and as 
107 
Cf. Hegel, (Baillie), p. 218, Phanomenologie, p. 133. Here, Hegel 
states this point through discussion of the object of consciousness in 
relation to consciousness' knowledge of that object. But a recalling of 
the distinction of the relation between consciousness, its object, and its 
knowledge of that object offered in the "Introduction" to the Phenomenolosn 
makes it clear that self-certainty means that consciousness realizes its 
object as a feature of its own experience. 
108 
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 139, Phanomenologie, p. 70. 
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distinct from itself. We have already seen that this recognition is itself 
the source of self consciousness' desire. But further, inasmuch as self 
consciousness experiences this desire, it is capable of recognizing itself 
as the locus of such desire, i.e. capable of recognizing itself as a 
personal individual. 
Hegel argues that the realization of this capacity for self-recognitic ~ 
requires that the self conscious individual occur in an intersubjective 
context, or, that the occurenc~ of intersubjectivity for self consciousnesf 
is necessary for the latter to be itself in a full sense. He offers an 
argument to this effect in. what I take to be the following terms. Self 
consciousness relates to its desire to overcome the apparently simple 
otherness of its object through agency as work. As that which transforms 
the object, work succeeds in overcoming its mere otherness. But in the 
very success of its work, self consciousness rediscovers the yet remaining 
otherness of its object in the latter's perduring externality. "In this 
state of satisfaction, however, it has experience of the independence of 
its object. 11109 For it is only as external to self consciousness that the 
object can be the object of the former's work, and can be transformed 
thereby. 110 Two consequences follow from this. The first is stated by 
109 
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 225, Ph&lomenologie, p. 139. 
110 
Here again is a further parallel between Hegel's concept of the 
object of self consciousness and Marx' concept of nature as the object of 
praxis. For Marx, as shown in Chapter One, the object of praxis must be 
conceived as both external to the subject of praxis, the productive agent, 
and maleable or transformable by praxis. 
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Hegel through the assertion that,, "Self cOJ;1sciousness is thus unable by its 
negative relation to the object to abolish it; because of that relation it 
rather produces it again, as well as the desire. 11111 Self consciousness 
succeeds in overcoming the apparently simple otherness of its object throug 
that work which transforms the latter. But the goal of the desire of self 
~onsciousness is the overcoming of the distinction between self conscious-
ness and its object as its "life." Since the occurence of work on the 
object itself elicits self consciousness' recognit~on of the object's 
enduring externality, then the success of work is only partial. 
A second consequence is that, "The object desires is, in fact, somethi g 
112 other than self consciousness, :the essence of desire ••• " And this 
~ssertion indicates the nature of self consciousness' comprehension of its 
own desire in relation to its self. Self consciousness necessa!ily 
comprehends its desire by comprehending it in its relation to the object at 
~hich it is directed: the object is "the essence of desire ••• " As long as 
hat object is one which retains as its fundamental quality externality, 
;elf consciousness recognizes the essential content of its desire as that 
~hich is external to itself. Thus, self consciousness does not recognize 
ts own desire as located within itself, as being its own character and 
ndividuality, or its own or its self in proper senses of those terms. As 
111 
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 225; Ph~nomenologie, p. 139. 
112 
Ibid. 
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ffyppolite comments, "In relating to this world, desire must rediscover 
itself, but it is unable to recognize itself without passing through the 
mediation of this worid. Thus the self appears to itself as an immediate 
~atum of the external world, even at the bare level of life. 11113 In order 
~or the desire of self consciousness to be more adequately satisfied, then 
~he externality of its object must be overcome in some further sense. In 
order for self consciousness to recognize itself as a personal individual, 
~o comprehend its desire as its self or its own, some adequate basis of 
~omprehension must be provided by the object. And indeed it is necessary 
~or self consciousness to recognize itself as a personal individual in the 
6ense noted above, for this is a fundamental feature of the experience of 
lf i f h b . h f 114 se consc ousness, or o t e eing t ereo • 
Hegel argues that self consciousness may achieve both a more adequate 
satisfaction of its own desire, and the recognition of itself as a personal 
~ndividual, another self consciousness. A more adequate satisfaction of 
the desire of self consciousness, first, would involve the overcoming of 
~he externality of self consciousness' object in a more adequate sense that 
~an be overcome in the object of work, "the whole expanse of the world of 
~ense ••• " For the object of work, externality could be further overcome 
Pnly through a radical abolition of the object, which is for Hegel on all 
erms impossible. But the event of self consciousness' being recognized by 
113 
Hyppolite (O'Neill), p. 162. 
114 
Cf. Hegel, (Baillie), p. 225; Phi:inomenologie, p. 139. 
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externality of its object. Here the object is the other self consciousness 
This other is, for the original self consciousness, its recognition of that 
latter. But this is to say that, in the case of intersubjectivity under 
discussion, the object of self consciousness is able to be its self, as 
that which is the recognition of itsel~, in a way which the object of work 
can not be, and in this way more adequate to the satisfaction of the desire 
of self consciousness. 115 
Further, given recognition by the other, or the experience of 
intersubjectivity, self consciousness is able to comprehend itself as a 
personal individual. As noted above, self consciousness, as related to its 
pbject of work, is not able to so comprehend itself, both because of the 
nature and the externality which this object retains, and because its 
!object is "the essence of desire", the content of that desire which is 
nonetheless self consciousness' own. But in the case of being recognized 
by another, self consciousness is able to see itself in its object, because 
dts object here is the recognition of itself. And moreover, the other as 
that object of self consciousness which recognizes it points self 
~onsciousness' comprehension of its own desire away from the mere external-
115 
Cf. Hegel, (Baillie), pp. 225-26; Phanomenologie, p. 139. Hegel 
states this idea in a way which interestingly displays his use of the notio 
of negativity. "On account of the independence of the object, therefore, 
it can only attain satisfaction when this object effectually brings about 
negation within itself. The object must per se effect this negation of 
11.tself, for it is inherently (an sich) something negative, and must be for 
the other what it is." - --
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mere externality of its object and back to itself. Thus in the case of 
intersubjectivity, "A self consciousness has before it a self consciousness 
Only so and only then is it self consciousness in actual fact; for here 
first of all it comes to have the unity of itself in its otherness. 11116 
For Hegel, then, intersubjectivity is necessary in order that self 
consciousness be itself and this in two related senses: in order that it 
adequately relate to its own desire, and in order that it comprehend its 
desire as its self, itself as a personal individual. In order to be 
itself, in the sense of realizing features implicit in its own experience, 
self consciousness must occur in a context of intersubjectivity. These 
are comments, which, as is clear from the text, do more than merely point 
117 
to the dialectic of Lordship and Bondage. They form for Hegel an 
initial argument in support of the general conclusion that the context of 
experience of the self conscious individual must be an intersubjective one. 
116 
Hegel, (Baillie), pp. 226-27; Ph~nomenologie, p. 140. Cf. Also 
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 229; Phanomenologie, p. 141. "Self-consciousness 
exists in itself and for itself in that, and by the fact that it exists fo1 
another self-consciusness; that is to say, it is only by being acknowledgec 
or recognized." 
117 
Cf. Hegel, (Baillie), p. 227; Phanomenologie, p. 140. It is clear· 
that Hegel means to do more with his comments on intersubjective recogni-
tion than point to the dialectic of Lordship and Bondage, in that his 
immediate reference, in the text subsequent to the argument exposed above, 
is to the concept of Spirit. "With this we have already before us the 
notion of Mind or Spirit. What consciousness has further to become aware 
of, is the experience of what mind is - this absolute substance, which is 
the unity of different self-related and self-existent self-consciousnesses, 
in the perfect freedom and independence of their opposition as component 
elements of that substance: Ego that is 'we', a plurality of Egos, and 
'we' that is a single Ego." 
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Hyppolite seems to see this when, in a single comment of self consciousness 
relation to its own satisfaction and self comprehension, he notes that, 
" ••• it can only achieve this if it appears in the form of an other Self, 
another living self consciousness ••• the existence of the Other is an 
ontological condition of my own existence ••• Thus the desire of life 
becomes the desire of another desire, or rather, in view of the necessary 
reciprocity of the phenomenon, human desire is always desire of the desire 
118 
of another." Hegel, then, can hold even at this stage of the 
Phenomenologv that self consciousness must necessarily occur in an 
intersubjective context, or that the self conscious individual is 
necessarily a social individua1. 119 
118 
Hyppolite, (O'Neill), p. 162. 
119 
Cf. Findlay, op. cit., p. 94, Soll, op. cit., p. 16-17. Both 
Findlay and Soll offer, in my opinion, inadequate connnents on the text of 
the Phenomenology under discussion here, in failing to consider the full 
detail of the argument offered by Hegel. Findlay comments: "Another self 
is, in short, the only adequate mirror of .!!!l. self conscious self; the 
subject can only adequately see itself when what it sees is another self 
consciousness." But the other is not for self consciousness simply a 
'mirror' in which it finds itself reflected. It is rather that object 
which 'acts' on self consciousness by recognizing it, and thus makes it 
possible for self consciousness to comprehend itself. Soll thinks himself 
to offer a corrective to Findlay's comment, but he is misled by an overly 
vague appreciation of Hegel's use of 'negation'. He writes: "Desire is 
only satisfied by the negation of its object, and, since desire can not 
~ring this about through its own action on this object (as Hegel argued 
earlier), desire can be satisfied only if this object negates itself ••• If 
one were to describe the attainment of life and self-consciousness by the 
object of self-consciousness in terms of the mirror metaphor, it would be 
~ell to remember that self-consciousness here is expressing itself as the 
~esire to destory through action." But to suggest that, for Hegel, self 
consciousness seeks 1the abolition of its object is to fly in the face of 
the text. Rather, Hegel argues that self consciousness desires the over-
coming of the externality of its object in a way recognizable to itself. 
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A final comment needs now to be made ~n Hegel's arguments concerning 
self consciousness and its relation to its object, viz., that self 
consciousness in acting on or relating to its object, realizes its own 
nature, realizes explicitly possibilities which are located within its own 
experience, or actualizes itself. This comment may be brief, for its 
evidence is contained in what has already been claimed. It will be 
remembered, that, in the "Introduction" to the Phenomenology, Hegel referre l 
to experience as a "dialectical process which consciousness executes on 
itself--on its knowledge as well as on its object--in the sense that out of 
h d b . . 120 c . . b. it t e new an true o Ject arises... onsciousness acts on its o Ject, 
and this action constitutively affects not only the nature of the object, 
but consciousness as well. This idea is expanded and concretized in Hegel'; 
description of self consciousness, in three senses. First, the occurrence 
of self consciousness' experiencing its object as an object of desire 
introduces into its experience a further moment of individuation. As 
Kojeve comments, "Desire is always revealed as .!!!l. desire, and to reveal 
desire, one must use the word 'I'. 11121 Second, in relating to its other 
~s that which recognizes itself, self consciousness is able to comprehend 
explicitly (Hegel would say is capable of being "for itself11 ) 122 its own 
~is is achieved by the object which, while it retains its independence, is 
~or self consciousness the recognition thereof. 
120 
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 142; Phanomenologie, p. 73. 
121 
Kojeve, op. cit., p. 37. 
122 
Cf. Hegel, (Baillie), p. 229; Phanomenologie, p. 141. 
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personal individuality. And finally, in relating to its object as the 
result of its agency as work, self consciousness is capable of comprehend-
ing both itself as a concrete, practical agent, and its object as the 
. f . 1 i d' 'd l' 123 concrete expression o its own persona n ivi ua ity. In these three 
senses, self consciousness' relation to and activity on its object results 
in its own self realization or self actualization. 
So far, we have analyzed texts of the Phenomenology in which Hegel 
treats the notions of consciousness and self consciousness, for the sake of 
getting clear how Hegel develops concepts relevant. to the content of Marx' 
theory of human nature. We have seen how, in introducing the topics of 
experience and knowledge, Hegel argues that consciousness must be described 
as maintaining an active role in relation to its object. We have seen how 
these introductory remarks point beyond themselves to the examination of 
the dialectic of self consciousness. And in that latter dialectic, we 
have seen the how notions of agency, intersubjectivity, and self actualiza-
tion introduced and developed. I want next to examine a further section 
~f the Phenomenology, one which Hegel entitles "Das geistige Tierreich und 
der Betrug, order die Sache Selbst." 
This section of Hegel's text although referred to by one coillill.entator 
~s-"an obscurely sketched dialectical phase11124 of the Phenomenology, is 
~f the highest significance both for the development of the Phenomenology 
123 
Cf. Hegel, (Baillie), p. 238; Phanomenologie, p. 149. 
124 
Findlay, op. cit., p. 110. 
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subjectivity. 1128 Soul's emergence is the implicit goal or 'truth' of the 
~rocess of nature, but that goal is realized only through the actual 
emergence of individual, natural organisms capable of primative forms of 
~wareness of experience. For Hegel to describe conscious events as so 
emergent from nature is to describe such events as properties of the 
:individual. 29 
This emphasis is further drawn out by Hegel in the Encyclopedia, as he 
describes the capacities of awareness of 'soul' under three headings: 
sentience, feeling, and habit. By sentience or sensation, 30 
'Empfindung 1 , 31 Hegel means to indicate the barest form of organic aware-
28 
Hegel, Enzyklopadie, p. 320, my translation. Cf. Hegel, Philosophy 
pf Mind, (Wallace, Miller), pp. 35-36, for a translation which is, in my 
ppinion, deceptive. Cf. also Harris, op. cit., p. 80, for commentary on 
the idea offered by Hegel here. 
29 
Cf. Hegel, Enzykolpadie, pp. 325-326; Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, 
(Wallace, Miller), p. 73, for confirmation that Hegel retains this argument 
for consciousness as a property of the individual in the context of a 
discussion of more developed forms of consciousness as well. 
30 
The former translation of 'Empfindung' is selected by Harris, the 
latter by Wallace. Harris' translation has the advantage of distinguishinE 
in translation 'Empfindung' f~om 'Sinnlicheit', a distinction which Hegel 
obviously draws. 
31 
Cf. Hegel, Enzyklopadie, p. 325. 
r 
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In this present section of the Phenomenology, Hegel discusses the experienc e 
of the self conscious individual which takes itself to be both an agent 
and an individual. He includes an analysis of the most primitive form 
which this experience can take, and the dialectical ramifications thereof. 
Initially, the individual's experience of itself is that of, in 
Hegel's language, a "result, 11126 and individuality itself is comprehended 
II • • 1 d • 1112 7 as an origina eterminate nature ••• By "result" here, Hegel means 
that the individual takes itself to be simply a giyen, or simply as one 
Whose experience is immediately given, rather than as being the consequence 
pf several interacting, intermediating features. The term "original" has 
~he same meaning in this context. This meaning is further refined by the 
~erm "determinate". The individual's experience of itself is that of 
~nvolving definite capacities and possibilities for action. In. that these 
capacities are definite, the individual experiences itself as concrete: 
the individual is concretely determined through those capacities for action 
which are both definite and its own. The concrete individual, at this 
Drimitive phase of its experience, does not recognize these determinate 
capacities as involving negation, i.e. as limiting as well as defining the 
~ange of possibilities of its own activities. 128 Rather, the individual 
126 
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 419; Phanomenologie, p. 285. 
127 
Ibid. 
128 
Cf. Ibid. 
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here takes itself simply to be the unity of disparate capacities for actior, 
and takes its life to be the process of activities which follows therefrom. 
This process of activities in turn enables the individual to realize 
the unity between himself and his environment. The environment is compre-
hended simply as that context wherein life activity itself is comprehended 
simply as the life process of the individual. Hegel offers a lengthy 
metaphor to illustrate this point: 
We have here something similar to what we find in the 
case of indeterminate animal life: this breathes the 
breath of life let us say, into water as its element, 
or air or earth, and within these again into still 
more determinate conditions; every aspect of its life 
is affected by the specific element, and yet animal life 
still/keeps these aspects within its power and itself 
a unity in spite of the limitations of the element, and 
remains qua the given particular organization animal 129 life throughout, the same general fact of animal life. 
Analogous to animal life, the concrete individual initially comprehends its 
own activity as its life process, and its environment as simply that con-
text within which its life process is undertaken. Thus it comprehends its 
environment as occurring in a unity with itself. 
This brief examination of the experience of the concrete individual, 
although inadequate in its first presentation, has offered a subject matte1 
for analysis: the activity itself of the individual. "This concept of 
129 
Hegel, (Baillie), pp. 419-420; Phanomenologie pp. 285-286. 
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activity has become essential, and it is this which becomes our object."lJC 
The concept of activity is essential here because it is activity which the 
concrete individual, from within its own experience, comprehends as funda-
~ental to its own life process, and thus to its relation between itself 
and its environment. Because of this, it must now become the object of 
philosophical examination. And this examination involves, for Hegel, first 
~ more detailed analysis of activity as an occurence within the experience 
\ [of the individual, and second, some connnents on the viability of the 
individual's experience of itself as experience of an "original determinate 
[of nature ••• " 
The analysis of activity begins with an attempt to note within the 
experience of action certain unified and yet distinguishable features. 
Wirst, concrete activity is experienced by the individual as that which it 
~esires in virtue of definite capacities for action which are the 
~ndividual's own. Because of this, activity is experienced by one individ-
µal as an intention or purpose. "To begin with, action is here an object, 
an object, too, still belonging to consciousness; it is present as a 
ourpose (Zweck), and thus opposed to a given reality. 11131 "Zweck" might 
t>e better translated here as "design" rather than "purpose," the term 
~aillie choses; the concrete individual experiences its own capacity for 
action as a design to be realized in the context of given environmental 
130 
Hyppolite, Genese et Structure, p. 286. 
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Hegel, (Baillie), p. 420; Phanomenologie, p. 286. 
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circumstances. But while design (or purpose) is a moment of activity, it 
must be accompanied by a second moment, involving the concrete details of 
that action whereby design is realized. This feature of activity Hegel 
entitles "means11 • 132 And finally, activity is experienced by the individuc 
as involving the unification of these two prior features in a third, the 
result of activity in which design is realized through the details of the 
process of action. "The third moment is, finally, the object, no longer ae 
immediately and subjectively presented purpose, bµt as brought to light and 
13': 
established as something other than and external to the acting subject." ~ 
But the unification of design and means in result bears a consequence 
for the experience of the acting individual. The consequence is this: it 
is in virtue of being able to comprehend the result of its own activity 
that the individual is capable of comprehending in an objecti~e and con-
crete fashion the details of its own action (the "means"), as well as the 
details of that design resident at the base of the process of activity. 
Design and "means" are available to consciousness in an objective sense 
only as embodied in the result of activity as that result appears within 
the experience of the indvidual. But design and "means" are respectively 
the original nature of and the life process of the individual: its self. 
Thus the individual can only concretely comprehend itself in virtue of the 
132 
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 421; Phanomenologie,_p. 286. 
133 
Ibid. 
r 
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experience of the results of its own activity. Hegel gives clear expressic ~ 
to this idea in the text. "Consciousness must act solely that what it 
inherently and explicitly is, may be for it explicitly; or, acting is just 
the process of mind coming to be qua consciousness. What it is implicitly, 
therefore, it knows from its actual reality. Hence it is that an individu< ~ 
cannot know what he is till he has made himself real by action. 11134 
In concluaing his initial examination of the occurence of activity 
within the experience of the concrete individual Hegel draws two further 
134 
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 422; Phanomenologie, p. 287. Parentheticallyi 
Hegel notes that there seems to be a paradox concerning the possibility of 
the concrete individual's being an agent. Cf. Hegel, (Baillie), pp. 422-
23; Phanomenologie, pp. 287-89. The apparent paradox may be simply 
formulated. If the individual must act in order to comprehend himself 
concretely, and if action includes design or purpose, a feature of the 
"original nature" of the individual, then how can design or purpose be 
known by the individual in such a way as to allow him to initiate action? 
It would seem that he can not, and that activity is impossible on the 
above terms. But Hegel argues that this paradox may be resolved, if it 
is realized that by "design" (Zweck) here is not meant purpose in the sensE 
of a consciously constructed intention as the result of deliberation or 
planning, but simply the individual's experience of himself as responding 
to the environment in virtue of specific capacities for action which are 
his own, and his experience of this response as involving "interest" in or 
a spontaneous tendency towards the active realization of such specific 
capacities. It is for this reason that I have prefered to translate "Zwecl ' 
as 'design' rather than as 'purpose'. 'Purpose' bears the connotation of 
planning and deliberation which Hegel is anxious to avoid here. In this 
fashion the self comprehension consequent upon 'design' may be seen as 
possible for the individual. And indeed, Hegel seems to argue that it 
is only given such self comprehension as the result of activity that pur-
poseful activity then becomes possible for the individual. 
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consequences from his analysis. First, as noted above, the individual is 
capable of concretely knowing himself, his own "original nature," through 
recognizing the results of his own activity. And this is the case because 
the result of activity both unifies the design and the process of activity 
itself, and is an objective result, public and capable of being discerned. 
If this is so, then it follows that the individual is capable of knowing 
not only his own concrete nature through the results of his own activity, 
but also of knowing the concrete natures of other individuals through 
the results of their own activities. He is thus capable of comparing 
individuals in terms of the range and variety of activities available to 
135 them. This involves, of course, not an ethical comparison; no standardi 
for such a comparison have yet been provided from within the experience of 
the concrete individual itself. 136 It involves a comparison which is 
simply quantitative, one in which consciousness " ••• can, e.g., regard an 
individual who is of wider compass in his work as possessing stronger 
energy of will or a richer nature, i.e. a nature whose original constituticn 
. 1'7 (Bestimmtheit) is less limited; another as a weaker and a poorer nature." 
Second, inasmuch as the result of activity unifies in itself design and 
"means," and since the "original nature" and life process of the individua 
are precisely these, then the individual can apprehend the result of 
135 
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 424; Ph~nomenologie, p. 289. 
136 
Cf. Ibid. 
137 
Ibid. 
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bis activity as proceeding from and crystalizing his own nature, his self, 
138 
and take satisfaction from it. 
But from this point Hegel moves to a critical exposition of the 
supposition of the "original nature," asking, " ••• whether its reality 
. h h' . .,139 agrees wit t is notion. This leads him to further develop the theme 
of intersubjectivity. The individual agent, conscious of himself as 
possessing an "original nature" in the sense defined above, takes itself, 
1 1 II b 11 l' 11140 Th' 1 in Hege s language as such to ea rea ity... is concrete y 
means that this individual, from within its experience, takes the 
environment which it confronts to be simply that milieu in which it may 
realize its given capacities through action: the environment is both 
external to the individual and that which wholly offers itself as the 
context in which the activity or 'life process' of the individual can be 
carried on; it is wholly at the service of the individual, and therefore 
'f' d . h h' i h' . 141 uni ie wit im n is experience. The making of this point was 
the purpose of Hegel's description of the life process of the individual 
agent through the metaphor of animal lfie. It has been noted that in 
virtue of the results of activity the individual is capable of comprehend-
ing the details of his own individual nature, of taking satisfaction in 
138 
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 425; Phanomenologie, p. 290. 
139 
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 426; Ph~nomenologie, p. 290. 
140 
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 419; Phltnomenologie, p. 285. 
141 
Cf. Hyppolite. Genese et Structure, pp. 286-287. 
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its objective embodyment, and of comparing various discretely individual 
'original natures.' 
But these three possibilities are real possibilities for the individua 
agent because the results of his activity are embodyed in his environment 
as products external to himself. 142 And this 'objective' character of the 
results of the individual's activity renders it possible that others can 
relate to his own product. The individual is capable of experiencing 
others through to the results of his own action, but this experience 
~egates in a specific fashion his experience of the 'reality' of his 
environment as being essentially in unity with himself. Others do not 
relate to the product of the individual's activity as if it were the 
expression within the external environment of their 'natures'. They relate 
to this product rather as a feature of the external environment itself, 
within which they must assert their own active capabilities in order to 
realize a unity therewith. As Hegel puts it, "The work is, i.e., it is fot 
other individuals, and for them it is an external, alien reality, in whose 
place they have to put their own, in order to get by their action conscious 
ness of their unity with reality. In other words, the interest which they 
take in that work owing to their original constitution is other than the 
~eculiar interest of this work, which is thereby turned into something 
142 
Cf. Hegel, (Baillie), p. 421; Phanomenologie, p. 286. "The third 
moment is, finally, the object no longer as immediately and subjectively 
presented purpose, but as brought to light and established as something 
other than and external to the acting subject." 
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different. 11143 This is to argue that, given the apprehension of his produc 
by others, the individual is no longer capable of experiencing the reality 
of his environment as simply occuring in unity with, or as a correlate of, 
his own activity. 
The apprehension of the product of the individual's activity by others 
bears a further implication for the experience of the individual. The 
individual agent as described above experiences himself as constituted 
through an 'original nature', given and definite capacities for action, 
which yield for him the 'interest' of acting out given purposes or designs. 
And the interest that this individual has in acting out designs is precise! 
this, that the results of such activity will express in an objective 
144 fashion his own 'original nature.' The 'interest' which others take in 
the product of the individual's activity is not the same as that taken by 
the individual himself. For others apprehend his product, not simply as 
~expression of the individul's 'nature,' but rather as the realization 
~f some purpose which in itself is worthy of being realized through action. 
(For example: the individual comprehends his activity of poetizing and its 
result as expressing some definite capacity or talent of his own; others 
~pprehend his result as the result of an activity whose underlying purpose 
143 
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 427; Ph~nomenologie, pp. 291-292. 
144 
We have seen Hegel assert that it is in virtue of this 'interest' 
that the individual takes satisfaction in the product of his activity. 
--
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is worthy on its own terms.) The individual experiences the product of his 
activity as related to by others in this fashion. The result of this for 
the experience of the individual agent may be described under the followinE 
h d . 145 five ea ings. 
First, the individual now experiences his own activity as both 
expressive of his self and as realizing an intrinsically worthy purpose, 
but with the latt.er characteristic as the essential one through which 
activity is to be comprehended. Hegel asserts that " ••• what disappears 
in the work, is the objective reality ••• 11146 The "objective reality of 
work has been taken by the agent to be simply this, that activity yields a 
result which gives objective expression to its producer's 'original nature'~ 
But now the individual experiences the result of his activity as realizing 
a purpose generally worthy of being acted upon, and as expressing the 
individuality of its producer insofar as this generally worthy purpose is 
also his own. 
Second, the individual experiences the details of his own activity or 
k (w k) 147 II i 11148 wor er as ••• trans tory ••• This point has two interrelated 
145 
That five headings are required to explicitate Hegel's argument at 
this point illustrates, I think, the typical and torturously slow pace witl 
which Hegel's dialectic progresses. 
146 
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 429; Phanomenologie, p. 293. 
147 
Cf. Ph~nomenologie, p. 294. 
148 
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 430; Ph~omenologie, p. 294. 
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meanings for Hegel. On the one hand, the general purpose underlying the 
activity of the individual is now seen as realizable through any number of 
disparate activities, of which his activity, in its concrete details, is 
only one instance. (E.g., doing poetry can, as a general purpose, be 
realized through a number of disparate sorts of poetizing acts.) On the 
other hand, the individual's self (or 'nature') might be objectified or 
externally expressed thro~gh any of these disparate and possible acts. 
Thus the activity of the individual in its concrete details is 'transitory' 
in the sense of its not being the necessary and only action through which 
b li d d . d' 'd l' b' if' d 149 purpose may e rea ze an in ivi ua ity o Ject ie • 
But thirdly, the individual further experiences the transitory 
character of his work or activity overcome precisely to the extent to whic 
it is concrete action towards the accomplishment of some generally worthy 
purpose. Hegel entitles the unity of particular activity with the 
II 11150 d k realization of a general purpose ••• die Sache selbst ••• , an ma es o 
it the following statement. "This unity, this identity is the true work, 
it is the real intent, the fact of the matter (die Sache seblst), which 
asserts itself at all costs, and is felt to be the lasting element, 
independent of 'fact' which is the accident of an individual action as sue 
149 
Cf. Ibid. Hegel sums up the points made here in the following 
statement. "On the contrary, the opposition and negativity manifested in • 
the case of work then affects not only the content of the work E.!. the 
content of consciousness as well, but the reality as such, and hence affec 
the opposition present merely in virtue of that reality and in it, and the 
disappearance of the work." 
150 
Phanomenologie, p. 294. 
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the accident of circumstances, means, and activity. 11151 In virtue of its 
being the realization of a generally worthy purpose, 152 particular activity 
achieves a worth and permanence that it does not simply in itself bear. 153 
And this permanence involves precisely concrete activity's being the 
realization of a general purpose, and thus holding that general purpose 
within its own particular details. 154 
An implication of this is that the 'reality' of the environment may no 
longer be taken to be simply that of a milieu within which the individual 
agent gives expression to his own 'original nature;' it must be taken as 
151 
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 430; Phanomenologie, p. 294. 
152 
It is interesting to note here that'. Hegel offers no criteria where-
by 'generally worthy purpose' might be a priori determined. I suspect he 
would hold that the 'worthiness' of general purpose must be determined 
socially and historically. Evidence in support of this suggestion will 
be offered subsequently. 
153 
Cf. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, trans. T.M. Knox, (Oxford: The 
University Press, 1967), p. 238, addendum to paragraph #270. "Actuality 
is always the unity of universal and particular, the universal dismembered 
into the particulars which seem to be self-subsistent, although they really 
are upheld and contained only in the whole. Where this unity is not 
present, a thing is not actual even though it may have acquired existence." 
l'his definition of actuality is clearly relevant to Hegel's description of 
~ctivity at this point. 
154 
Cf. Loewenberg, op. cit., p. 171. Loewenberg errs in seeing the 
IUility of concrete activity and general purpose as an operative principle 
in the beginning of this dialectic. Contrary to this, Hegel holds that 
~his principle can be an operative one only when the experience of the 
~ndividual agent is articulated to the point at which he can comprehend 
~he relation which the product of his activity has to himself, and notice 
~he effects of the apprehension of his product by others on his own 
experience 
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as that context within which activity which unites within itself particular 
details and the interest in the realization of a general purpose may be 
undertaken. It is in taking the environment as a correlate of activity 
of this sort that the individual agent realizes the fundamental possibility 
which that environment offers to him as an agent, its 'truth' in Hegel's 
sense of that term. I will take up this point subsequently. 
Fourth, the adequacy of describing the individual agent as endowed 
With an 'original nature' is now called into question. Hegel notes that, 
'Objective reality, however, is a moment which itself has no longer 
~ndependent truth in this mode of consciousness; it (i.e. the truth) 
consists solely in the unity of this consciousness with action (tun), and 
~he true work (das wahre Werk) is only that unity of action and existence, 
of willing and performance. 11155 'Objective reality' in this statement 
~efers to that 'original nature' in terms of which the agent took himself 
~o be constituted as an individual, and in relation to which his e;.~viron­
~ent was experienced simply as a correlate. Activity was taken by the 
Lndividual to be simply an expression of this 'original nature'. 
But the experience of others relating to the results of his activity 
las forces the agent to revise his attitude towards that activity itself. 
\nd in virtue of this, his attitude towards his own individuality must 
ilso be revised. The individual continues to comprehend himself as an 
ndividual who acts. But now he comprehends his own activity as containing 
155 
Hegel, (Baillie), pp. 429-430; Phanomenologie, pp. 293-294. 
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twithin its details the aim of realizing a generally worthy purpose. This 
purpose is both a general one and the individual's own. But more, it is 
one which the individual makes his own through acting upon it. 
This is the case in two senses. First, it is through acting on a 
general purpose that that purpose is incorporated into the experience of 
the individual as a 'design' of his own. The individual becomes one who, 
as an individual, has specific 'designs' precisely through incorporating 
general purposes into his own behavior. (E.g., it is not the case that one 
is first a poet, and then proceeds to do poetry. Rather, one does poetry, 
and through this action becomes an individual poet.) Second, the result 
of action 'objectifies,' i.e. embodies in a definite product which is 
external to the individual activity itself, and thus enables the individual 
to know concretely both his activity and himself. I have already noted 
this. But activity itself is now comprehended by the individual as concret ~ 
action holding within its particularity the aim of realizing a general 
purpose. The product of action, then, embodies both the concrete details 
of this activity and the above mentioned aim as the agent has incorporated 
it into his own individuality. Thus the individual is capable of knowing 
the details of his adoption of a generally worthy purpose through his 
relation to the result of his activity, which embodies in itself those 
details. On this basis, of course, the individual is now capable of 
revising the details of his own design, and of engaging in further and more 
sophisticated activities in virtue of that revision. 
With these observations in mind, let us return to a consideration of 
~egel's text. The individual agent may no longer be described, and no 
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longer comprehends himself from within his own experience, as being con-
stituted as both an agent and as an individual through possessing a 
definite, 'original nature.' The 'original nature,' as Hegel puts it, 
" ••• has no longer independent truth in this mode of consciousness ••• 11156 
Rather, those capacities for action and designs which are the individual's 
own, and through which the agent as an individual is to be described, in 
their definite forms are consequences of the individual's actions, through 
which designs are adopted by the individual and specified as his own in 
their details: " ••• it (i.e. the truth) consists solely in the unity of this 
i . h . 1115 7 consc ousness wit action ••• This is to say that the 'nature' or 
concrete individuality of the agent, that unity of capacities and designs 
which is his own and thus his self, is the result of, or is constituted 
by, that action of his own which unifies particular details of activity 
and general purpose. One might say for Hegel that the individual nature of 
the agent is 'acut~lized' by his own activity. It is a proposition with 
which Marx would heartily agree. 
A final implication of the product of the individual's activity being 
related to others may now be noted. It is essential to the nature of 
activity, as pointed out above, .that it involve the unification of parti-
cular details with a general purpose. Hegel points out that in virtue of 
156 
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 429; Phanomenologie, p. 293. 
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Hegel, (Baillie), p. 429-430; Phanomenologie, p. 294. 
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this, activity is experienced as involving.permancence, or 'actuality,•158 
rather than mere transitoriness. But when his product is apprehended by 
others, the individual notices, first, that the general purpose which is 
15 I incorporated into his activity is not his alone, but is shared by others. 
Indeed a defining feature of 'general purpose' is its ability to be 
incorporated by several individual agents into the details of the particu-
lar actions of each. And further, the individual must now experience and 
comprehend the 'reality' of his environment as tha~ context within which 
the activities towards the realization of general purposes, and thus 
communal activities, may be undertaken. 
It is with this comprehension that the "geistige Tierreich" is 
tovercome. Society is a "community of animals" when individual agents 
~xperience and comprehend themselves as simply giving active expression to 
~heir own, immediate, 'original' natures, and experience the environment 
pnly as a correlate of activity towards this expression. But given the 
possibilities implicit within the experience of the individual agent 
nimself, this form of self comprehension, and thus this description of the 
nature of the agent, will not do. Hegel now argues that agency is that 
through which the individual achieves self actualization, and that means 
through which he "objectifies himself in his environment. The environment, 
in turn, is and is experienced by the individual as that milieu within 
158 
Cf. the definition of 'actuality' noted in foot note #153. 
159 
Cf. Hegel, (Baillie), p. 437; Ph&nomenologie,, p. 300.-
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Mhich social as well as individual action occurs, and a milieu whose detail 
are produced through social activity. And, finally, agency brings the 
individual into the context of a society of agents, which context 
profoundly affects both the nature of individual action and the individual' 
experience of his own action. The individual is now seen as essentially a 
member of a society of agents. 
When the individual attains this comprehension of himself, when he 
understands himself to be a participant in a society of agents in virtue of 
the very structure of his experience as an agent, consciousness achieves 
its realization as Spirit. This notion was heralded earlier in the 
Phenornenologv, in the dialectic of self consciousness, where Spirit was 
uescribed as, " ••• the unity of the different self related and self existent 
self consciousnesses in the perfect freedom and independence of their 
ppposition as component elements of that substance: Ego that is 'we', a 
plurality of Egos, and 'we' that is a single Ego·. nlGO The description of 
~he dialectic of the experience of the individual agent has both described 
~he nature of individual agent itself, and reached consciousness of itself 
as Spirit. Precisely in realizing himself as an individual through his own 
~ctivity, the agent notes that his experience both affirms his individualit , 
~nd points beyond it towards the experience of being a participant in a 
?ociety of individuals. As Hyppolite admirably notes, through an examinati1 n 
~f the structure of the experience of the agent as an individual, Hegel 
160 
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 227; Phanomenologie, p. 140. 
-284-
concludes that "Self consciousness is not only for itself, it is also for 
others; it is not only subjective, it is also a datum (une chose), an 
objective manifestation ••• This is the world of spirit, this world which 
is spirit, which will finally be the thing itself (i.e. die Sache selbst), 
and this world demands the consideration not of individuality alone but of 
. . f h . 1 b . d. . d l' . 11161 interaction, o t e interp ay etween in ivi ua ities. It is to Hegel' 
examination of those features of the experience of the individual that are 
~oth soical and are fundamental to the experience of the individual qua 
individual that we must next analyze. 
III. Agency and society in the Philosophy of Right. 
In taking up this issue I shift my analysis from the text of the 
~henomenologv of Spirit to that of the Philosophy of Right. For it is in 
~he Philosophy of Right that Hegel offers concise analysis of the question 
of, in Hyppolite's language, "the interplay of individualities," the ques-
tion which, as shown above, arises for Hegel out of his examination of the 
structures of the experience of the concrete individual agent. I turn to 
the Philosophy of Right rather than to the Phenomenology for Hegel's 
analysis of the social nature of individual experience because, while 
162 Hegel treats this question in the text of the Phenomenology, his primary 
161 
Hyppolite, Genese et Structure, pp. 299 and 300. 
162 
Cf. Ibid., pp. 311-313. 
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concern there is the explicitating of the development of the notion of 
163 Spirit, whereas the Philosophy of Right directs attention specifically 
to the questions of the nature of society, especially political society, 
and of the relation between society and the individual. Also the latter 
. i 11 k hi h Ma d. d . d . 1 4 text is, as s we nown, one to w c rx irecte sustaine attention. 
In Hegel's philosophical description of the experience of self 
consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit, the individual as person is 
one whose activity externalizes himself, bringing him into relations with 
pthers. In introducing the Philosophy of Right, an analogous description 
pf the nature of the individual subject is offered, through an explicitatio 
pf the concept of "will." It is this concept which must first be 
~onsidered. 
Will is described by Hegel under three interrelated headings, which 
are further unified into a concrete description of will itself, and of the 
. 165 ~ndividual as its subJect. The first heading is that of will as abstrac • 
163 
Cf. Hegel, (Baillie), pp. 457-461; Phanomenologie, pp. 313-316. 
164 
It will not be my purpose to develop a thoroughgoing interpretation 
pf Hegel's Philosophy of Right here. This would divert attention from the 
overall question which I am attempting to handle. Nor will my emphasis be 
on the content and development of Hegel's political theory, and Marx' 
Critique of it. Rather, I see as my task here the isolating of those 
~rguments in the Philosophy of Right relevant to Marx' theory of man, most 
t>articularly those arguments in which Hegel considers the social features 
of individual experience, as well as the nature of social relationships 
""hemselves. 
165 
One might note here that Hegel does not first attempt to demonstrat 
hat will is 'free will', and then proceed to a descriptive analysis of the 
atter. Rather, he attempts to describe the nature of 'will' systematical! , 
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"The will contains (a) the element of pure _indeterminacy or that pure 
indeterminacy or that pure reflection of the ego into itself which involves 
the dissipation of every restriction and every content either immediately 
presented by nature, by needs, desires, and impulses, or given by any 
means whatever. 11166 Aid in understanding this difficult statement is 
offered in the text. Following the statement cited, Hegel refers to will 
167 in this sense as "the pure thought of oneself." He goes on to comment 
that "will" in this sense involves a "unrestricted possibility of abstrac-
tion from any determinate state of mind which I may find in myself or which 
[ may have, set up in myself, my flight from every content as a restric-
~ion.11168 And finally he notes that the exercise of will in this sense, 
'imagines that it is willing some positive state of affairs, such as 
!Universal equality or universal religious life ••• 11169 
~d to demonstrate freedom of will, i.e. the ability of the individual to 
~etermine himself through choice, within the context of this systematic 
~escription. This is in keeping with Hegel's understanding of philosophica 
method. See the "Preface" to the Phenomenology of Spirit in Kaufman, Hegel 
~exts and Commentary, (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1966), p. 28; Phanomen-
ologie, p. 19, Hegel asserts that a philosophical position is such that it, 
' ••• must justify itself by the presentation of the system ••• " He reiterate 
~his idea with explicit reference to the question of the nature of will in 
rhe Philosophy of Right, trans. Knox, p. 21; Grundlinien der Philosophie 
des Rechts, (Hamburg: Felix Meinie, 1955), p. 29. "The proof that the will 
is free and the proof of the nature of the will and of freedom can be 
established only as a link in the whole chain (of philosophy)." 
166 
Hegel (Knox), p. 21; Grundlinien, p. 30. 
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Hegel, (Knox), p. 21; Grundlinien, p. 30. 
168 
Hegel, (Knox), p. 22; Grundlinien, p. 30. 
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Given these supplementary comments, it seems that by will Hegel here 
means the ability of the self conscious individual to determine himself 
through comprehending himself as one who chooses allegiance to some univer-
sal principle, such as political equality, religiosity, etc. It is, first, 
a "pure thought of oneself," an act of self comprehension, and thus of 
self determination. 170 Will in this sense involves "pure indeterminacy" 
in that the self comprehension here described is one which abstracts from 
particular or determinate content, e.g. determinate forms of religious 
ritual, political action, etc. It invovles individual self comprehension 
through a principle which is exclusively universal. 
Insofar as this exercise of will is abstract, it is also one sided, 
and is so precisely because it is an exercise which abstracts from "any 
determinate state of mind which I may find in myself or which I may have 
. lf 11171 f d d f set up in myse ••• , rom eterminate situations an experiences o 
will which occur for the individual either circumstantially or through 
choice. A description of will which is abstract in this sense is inadequat e 
to the experience of the individual and.must be supplemented. Thus Hegel 
notes that, "At the same time, the ego is also the transition from 
undifferentiated indeterminacy to the differentiation, determination, and 
positing of a determinacy as a content and object. Now further, this 
170 
It is for this reason that I describe will here as a capacity of 
the self conscious individual. 
171 
Hegel, (Knox), p. 22; Grundlinien, p. 30. 
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content may either be given by nature or engendered by the concept of mind. 
Through this positing of itself as something determinate, the ego in 
. . 1 . d . . .. 112 princip e steps into eterminate existence. 
Hegel's discussion of determinate content as "given by nature" within 
the experience of the individual subject of will is particularly revealing: 
and may be dwelt upon briefly. In connnenting on the Kantian moral positiot 
in the Phenomenology, Hegel asserts that: 
••• nature is not merely this completely free external 
mode in which, as a bare and pure object, consciousness 
has to realize its purpose. Consciousness is per se 
essentially something for which this other detached 
reality exists, i.e. it is itself something contingent 
and natural. This nature, which is properly its own, 
is sensibility (Sinnlichkeit], which, taking the form 
of volition, in the shape of Impulses and Inclinations, 
has by itself a determinate essential being of its 
own, i.e. has specific single purposes (einzelne 
Zwecke), and thus is opposed to pure will with its pure 
purpose.173 
The individual, Hegel here insists must be described as a concrete 
individual, and as such one whose experience necessarily brings him in 
relation to the concrete details of an external environment. This 
environment or "nature" in turn, is not to be understood as merely externaJ , 
but in a way with which we are already familiar from the dialectic of "selJ 
consciousness," is to be understood as externality which occurs as 
172 
Hegel, (Knox), p. 22; Grundlinien, p. 31. 
173 
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 618; Phanomenologie, p. 427. For conunentary 
on this text see W.H. Walsh, Hegelian Ethics, (London: Macmillian Co. Ltd.i 
1969), pp. 29-31. 
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essentially within the experience of the in.dividual, as "for" the individua 
''impulses" and "inclinations", impulses or drives felt by the individual 
in relation to his environment, and thus manners in which will manifest 
~tself in determinate fashions, in relation to determinate objects. 
Three implications follow. First, it is in virtue of the experience 
of "specific, single purposes (einzelne Zwecke) 11174 of specific impulses 
and drives through which will is manifested in a determinate fas~ion, that 
the individual experiences himself as an individual. In virtue of that 
relationship to concrete nature which Hegel calls "sensibility" 
(Sinnlichkeit), the individual experiences himself as a concrete, particu-
~ar individual. As Hegel notes in the Philosophy of Right, it is this 
experience of will which represents "the finitude or particularization of 
the egot. 11175 
Second, a consequence of this is that a further and more adequate 
description of will itself is required. Thus Hegel goes on in the 
Philosoohy of Right to hold that, "The will is the unity of both these 
moments. It is particularity reflected into itself, and so brought back to 
174 
Hegel, (Baillie), p. 618; PhHnomenologie, p. 427. 
175 
Hegel, (Knox), p. 22; Grundlinien, p. 31. 
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universality, i.e. it is individuality. 11176 The act of will of the fully 
concrete individual is an act which wills a particular object (e.g. assents 
to some determinate impulse or drive), and wills a universal purpose throug 
this relationship to a particular (e.g. will political equality through 
relating itself itself to specific established democratic processes). The 
act of will fully described, then, is one in which the particular and 
the universal are held together in a single act. This is of course 
analogous to the description of the individual agent offered in the 
Phenomenolo~v of Spirit, where the individual is pictured as one whose 
action involved the realization of a concrete "design", and hence also 
action towards the realization of a general purpose. For Hegel here, this 
tunity of particular impulse and universal purpose in the single act of 
~11 is necessary in order that the essential possibilities of particular 
impulses themselves be realized for the individual. As Reyburn notes, "For 
~egel ••• the fixity and incoherence of natural impulses is only a first 
appearance and not the final truth. The practical attitude, of which they 
are the crude manifestation, is capable of higher things; and in 
rationalizing its content and building it into a consistent aim of life as 
a whole it is developing the intrinsic nature of impulse itself. 11177 When 
determinate impulses are unified with universal purpose in a single act of 
~ill, these impulses achieve a degree of integration, consistency, and 
176 
Hegel, (Knox), p. 23; Grundlinien, p. 32. 
177 
Hugh A. Reyburn, The Ethical Theory of Hegel, (Oxford: Clarendon 
0 ress, 1921), p. 133. 
--291-
direction that they do not have of themselves. 178 
Another and more significant implication follows from this. The 
activity of will in the fuller sense described above involves self 
determination. After initially describing will in the more adequate sense, 
Hegel goes on to note that, "It is the self-determination of the ego, whicI-
means that at one and the same time the ego posits itself as its own 
negative, i.e. as restricted and determinate, and yet remains by itself, 
i.e. in its self-identity and universality. It determines itself and yet 
h . b' d . lf h wi h i lf 11179 Th d ·1 f at t e same time in s itse toget er t tse • e etai s o 
this statement concerning self determination are critical. 
Hegel refers to the "restricted and determinate" as the "negative" of 
the "ego", the individual conscious subject. By "restricted and determinat ~" 
is meant the particular. impulses and drives which the individual experience , 
in relation to his natural environment, as well as their particular object. 
Such particular impulses and drives are the "negative" of, or other than tl e 
ego in that the individual conscious subject is capable of comprehending 
himself through universal principles or purposes, i.e. is capable of 
"willing" in the first sense described by Hegel. But as noted above, the 
experience of the individual also necessarily includes particular impulses 
in relation to particular objects, "the impulses, desires, inclinations, 
180 
whereby the will finds itself determined in the course of nature." 
178 
Cf. also Hegel, (Knox), pp. 24-25; Grundlinien, p. 34. 
179 
Hegel, (Knox), p. 23; Grundlinien, p. 32. 
l80H~~~1 (Knn~). n. 25~ Grundlinien. n. 35. 
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Because such impulses are necessary features of the experience of the 
individual, they are his own. But in themselves they occur disparately anc 
in an ununified fashion, " ••• as a medly and multiplicity of impulses, each 
of which is merely 'my desire,' but exists alongside other desires which 
are likewise all 'mine' ••• aimed at all kinds of objects and satiable in 
all kinds of ways. 11181 Such impulses then must be integrated and given 
direction within the experience of the individual, and this is effected 
through an act of will in which they are unified with some universal purpo~ • 
At the 1 same time, that act of will through which the self conscious 
subject comprehends himself in relation to some universal purpose is also 
by itself inadequate, because universal purpose needs to be embodied in 
some specific content, to be related to a determinate object, in order to 
~e actualized within individual experience. The description of.will in 
general which Hegel finally accepts is a description of one in which the 
~niversal and the determinate are unified and held together in a single act 
But his means that the act of will is that through which the subject unifie 
elements which are at once initially disparate and implicitly unifiable 
within his own experience. This is one sense in which Hegel asserts that 
will involves self determination. The act of will effects this unification 
of elements within the experience of the individual, which unification in 
turn is necessary for the realization of individuality itself. 182 
180 
Hegel, (Knox), p. 25; Grundlinien, p. 35. 
181 
Hegel, (Knox), p. 26; Grundlinien, pp. 35-36. 
182
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Furthermore, the integration of impulses in themselves disparate 
through the act of will requires that the objects of those impulses also 
be transformed so that they conform to the will of the individual. This 
is necessary because, given integration and direction, such impulses are 
~till directed at particular external objects, and because it is only by 
being brought i.n relation to particular and determinate objects that 
universal purpose can itself be actualized for the subject of will. Thus 
for the subject of will, the external environment is not simply external, 
but is that which occurs "for" the subject, that in which will can be 
~mbodied. 
Bernard Bourgeois comments on this point • 
••• that which is willed and in which the Self discovers 
itself is opposed to that which this same self 
represents as the external world, and this is why the 
liberty realized in the identity of the willing Self 
is not a real liberty. This (i.e., real liberty) 
requires the overcoming of the otherness of the 
objective world through relation to that which is 
willed. Spirit then is the effort to pose in objective 
being that which is willed, that is, the identity of 
the willed and willing, freedom, and through this 
enterprise of the objectification of freedom, it becomes 
objective spirit ••. 183 
Hegel's description of will leads to the view that the subject of will 
experiences 'nature' or the external environment as that which may be 
brought into conformity with his will, that which may be transformed in 
183 
Bernard Bourgeois, La Pensee Politigue de Hegel, (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1969), p. 114. The author goes on in this 
text to note that Hegel's arguments concerning 'objective spirit' essential y 
include descriptions of the necessarily social character of the experience 
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such a fashion that his will is embodied in it. Indeed, this understandinE 
of 'nature' as the correlate of will, as that objective context in which 
will may be embodied, is essential to the notion of will itself, as this 
is described above. For the specific impulses as integrated, and thus the 
will itself, are directed towards particular external objects which are 
themselves not merely external, but are those contexts in which will may 
be concretely realized. I shall show presently that Hegel's additional 
descriptions of the individual subject of will are based on this view and 
employ particularly the idea that 'will' itself requires embodyment in the 
external environment, this leads him to the conclusion that the experience 
of the individual is necessarily social. 
In the beginning of the Philosophy of Right proper, Hegel, under the 
heading of "Abstract Right," describes will in terms of its most basic 
184 
manifestations as " ••• the inherently single will of a subject," as well 
as its most basic forms of embodiment in externality. Will is described as 
involving, " ••• a content consisting of determinate aims and, as exclusive 
individuality, it has this content as an external world directly confrontir g 
it."185 Will involves initially those particular impulses and needs186 
which the individual experiences as his own, as well as the external items 
to which the individual stands in relation in virtue of the former. But 
184 
Hegel, (Knox), p. 37; Grundlinien, p. 51. 
185 
~· 
186 
Cf. Ibid., article 35. 
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will even at this stage cannot be described simply as the particular impul~ >s 
and needs of the individual, because it is at the same time that in virtue 
of which the individual embodies or objectifies himself in the external 
environment. Hegel's general purpose here is to describe systematically 
" ••• the constitutive principles through which mind, as will or practical 
reason, embodies itself in an outer element, and is recognized by others 
as a free and objective self. 11187 
The most basic form of such embodiment is property, and Hegel's 
discussion of this includes comments relevant to the question of the 
relation of his position to Marx. He first notes that the 'right' of the 
individual to property arises from the fact that non-personal items occur 
within the experience of the individual as essentially in relation to 
hi lf i h d d i 1 . 1 d . h. ·11 188 mse , .e. to t e nee s an mpu ses invo ve in is own wi • Thus, 
"A person has as his substantive end the right of putting his will into any 
and every thing, and thereby making it his, because it has no such end in 
itself and derives its destinI and soul from his will. This is the absolut ~ 
right of appropriation which man has over all 'things•. 11189 
Three senses in which an item may be possessed as property are 
187 
Reyburn, op. cit., p. 115. 
188 
Cf. Hegel, (Knox), p. 40; Grundlinien, p. 55. "What is innnediately 
different from free mind is that which, both for mind and in itself, is the 
external pure and simple, a thing, something not free, not personal, withou 
rights." 
189 
Hegel, (Knox), p. 41; Grundlinien, p. 57. 
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distinguishable: " ••• (a) by directly grasping it physically, (b) by forming 
. . 190 it, and (c) by merely marking it as ours." Interestingly, Hegel notes 
bf the second of these senses that, "When I impose a form on something, the 
thing's determinate character as mine acquires an independent externality 
,,191 I take him to mean that the taking possession of an item through ... 
forming it involves the transformation of some item in the external world 
such that the item becomes appropriate to the satisfying of a determinate 
peed involved in the 'will' of the individual, through embodying within 
itself the details of the individual's activity on it. Hegel here makes th 
same point as does Marx in ?is analysis of needs in relation to praxis. 
~his can be vividly seen from the examples which Hegel utilizes here: 
~, ••• the tilling of the soil, the cultivation of plants, the taming and 
~eeding of animals, the preservation of game, as well as contrivances for 
Utilizing raw materials or forces of nature and processes for making one 
192 
Jna.terial produce effects on another, and so forth." 
The idea of the relation between the property item and the determinate 
need of the individual is developed by Hegel in his discussion of the 'use' 
pf property. He says that, " ••• my need, as the particular aspect of a 
190 
Hegel, (Knox), p. 46; Grundlinien, p. 64. 
191 
Hegel, (Knox), p. 47; Grundlinien, p. 65. 
192 
Ibid. 
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ingle will, is the positive element which finds satisfaction, and the 
hing, as something negative in itself, exists only for my need and is at 
ts service. The use of a thing is my need being externally realized 
hrough the change, consumption, and destruction of the thing. 11193 In the 
se of property, the item utilized becomes for the individual an external 
orrelate of his particular need, and this need is in turn externalized 
nd embodied in the item being used. 
But Hegel wishes to develop the concept of property, and the 
elation between property and will, beyond the points already noted, and 
e does so through apparently de-emphasizing the notion of need. In an 
ddendum to article Forty-one, the first article under which the Philosophy 
f Right discusses property in general, Hegel notes that, "The rationale 
f property is to be found not in the satisfaction of needs but.in in the 
upersession of the pure subjectivity of personality. In his property a 
erson exists for the first time as reason. 11194 And in the context of 
he same discussion, he notes further that, "The particular aspect of the 
atter, the fact that I make something my own as a result of my natural 
eed, impulse, and caprice, is the particular impulse satisfied by 
ossession. But I as free will am an object to myself in what I possess 
nd thereby also for the first time am an actual will, and this is the 
spect which constitutes the category of property, the true and right factor 
193 
Hegel, (Knox), p. 49; Grundlinien, p. 67. 
194 
Hegel, (Knox), pp. 235-36. 
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. 195 in possession." While the relation between the item of property and 
p~rticular need cited above is a feature of the relation between property 
and will, it is not the exclusive feature of this relation. Thus a 
statement of this feature is not an adequate or sufficient description of 
this relation itself. It must be unified with the further statement that 
property is the externalization and objectification of individual will. 
This further description of the relation of property and will is 
indicated in the texts above. In fact its argumentative basis is containec 
in the previous description of the relation of property item to need. In 
the property item, need is embodied as need for a particular, external 
item. But this is to imply that, insofar as need is for a particular 
external item, then the individual person is capable of recognizing the 
item as his own, his object, and thus is further capable of comprehending, 
through the details of the object, the details of that need to which the 
object stands in relation. . Thus he is capable, through the property item, 
of comprehending in a "objective" fashion, i.e. through the details of an 
external object, the details of his own will, and therefore of his own self 
Hegel concisely states that, through my relations to items of property I 
am "an object to myself in what I possess ••• 11196 
One might recall here the discussion of will, in general, according to 
195 
Hegel, (Knox), p. 42; Grundlinien, p. 58. 
196 
Ibid. 
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hich the exercise of will involves necessarily the embodiment of will in 
external objects and the unification of universal purpose with particular 
impulses and needs through this embodiment. Here Hegel is describing the 
relation to the individual to external items as his property as the most 
asic and primitive form of this embodiment. Through his relation to 
roperty, the individual is at least capable of comprehending the particul 
etails of his own will. 197 
One final but essential feature of the relation of individual will 
to property must now be noted. This involves Hegel's assertion that the 
appropriation198 of property necessarily brings the individual into 
relationships with others. This point is made by Hegel first in his 
iscussion of property in general. "Since property is the embodiment 
personality, my inward idea and will that something is to be 
ne is not enough to make it my property; to secure this end occupancy is 
requisite. The embodiment my willing thereby attains involves its 
199 
recognizability by others." The claim made here is that the full 
197 
Cf. Reyburn, p. 125. "Property is the realization of a self-
conscious will in an external thing. Since mind is essentially a self-
revealing system, it must give itself an outward existence and maintain its 
freedom in a world of things." 
198 
Cf. Hegel, (Knox), p. 236, addendum /126 to paragraph /144. " ••• 'to 
appropriate' means at bottom to manifest the pre-eminence of my will over 
the thing, and to prove that it is not absolute, is not an end in itself. 
his is made manifest when I endow the thing with some purpose not direct! 
its own." 
199 
Hegel, (Knox), p. 45; Grundlinien, p. 62. 
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actualization of the property relation, of the individual's appropriation 
of rights over an external item of property, requires that this relation 
be recognized as such by others. Abstracting from the specific question 
of occupancy, an argument for this general claim is indicated by Hegel 
in an addendum to the above text: "The inner act of will which consists in 
saying that something is mine must also become recognizable by others. If 
I make a thing mine, I give to it a predicate, 'mine,' which must appear 
in it in external form, and must not simply remain _in my inner will. 11200 
I take the argument which Hegel suggests here to be as follows. The 
individual is capable of comprehending concretely the details of his own 
will insofar as those details are made manifest in an object, i.e. in 
something external to himself. For the individual comprehends the details 
of his own needs through the details of objects relevant to tho~e needs. 
But the property item is not simply an item relevant to some need of the 
individual. It is also an item in which the will of the individual has 
been embodied through his appropriation of it, i.e. through his taking 
possession of it in some way such that it is an item which has its role 
or purpose, in the experience of the individual, not in virtue simply of 
its own characters and properties, but in virtue of its relation to the 
201 individual himself, to his need. Now this feature of the property item 3 
200 
Hegel, (Knox), p. 237. 
201 
Cf. footnote number 19~ for this sense of 'appropriation'. 
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that its essential function or purpose is derived from its relation to the 
individual and his appropriation of it, must be recognized by the individuc 
so that he can fully recognize himself as the item's "owner," or the item 
itself as one within which his will is embodied, so that he can say of the 
item, it is "mine." 
But this recognition in turn requires a fotmdation in that environment 
which is both the context of the individual and external to him, because, 
again, it is through the details of his will being externalized that the 
individual is capable of comprehending those details concretely and 
adequately. And the external basis for the individual's recognition of 
himself as "owner," as one whose will is embodied in an item, is precisely 
the recognition of this relation between himself and the item in question 
by others. Thus the individual's relation to property necessarily brings 
him into relations with others. 
It must be noted here that Hegel is not involved in deducing the 
presence of others from the details of the property relationship. 202 Such 
202 
Hegel has been accused of such a method. Cf. V.R. Mehta, Hegel anc 
the Modern State, (New Delhi: Associated Publishing House, 1968), p. 41. 
"What is wrong with Hegel is that he connects this perfectly legitimate 
way of raising problems and resolving them with a deductive method based 
on self-evident principles. If we have to base our conclusions on the 
analysis of experience, then certainly, at the same time we cannot start 
with self-evident principles, for every principle according to the first 
criterion is contingent and must correspond to some objective physical 
reality." But it is clear that 'deduction' in the sense used here is not 
a part of Hegel's analysis at this point. 
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an enterprise would fly in the face of Hegel's understanding of 
philosophical method. Rather, he is inquiring into those conditions 
requisite for the full realization of the property relation. One such 
condition is that the relation of the individual to his items of property 
be recognized by others. 
The formalization of this recognition is contract. The general 
understanding of contract is asserted in the Philosophy of Right. Property 
is, " ••• an existent as an embodiment of the will (Dasein des Willens), and 
from this point of view the 'other' for which it exists can only be the 
will of another person. This relation of will to will is the true and 
proper ground in which freedom is existent. The sphere of contract is 
made up of this mediation whereby I hold property not merely by means of a 
thing and my subjective will, but by means of another person's will as 
203 
well, and so hold it in virtue of my participation in a common will." 
It is unnecessary here to consider the full and detailed development of 
Hegel's discussion of contract, as it is offered in the Philosophy of Right 
However, it is worth mentioning three features of the notion of contract as 
summarized in the text just cited. First, the partners to contract compre-
204 hend themselves as "independent property owners," as private individuals 
205 ~ith the discrete relations of owners to their own property. Second, tr~ 
203 
Hegel, (Knox), p. 57; Grundlinien, p. 78. 
204 
Hegel (Knox), p. 58; Grundlinein, p. 79. 
205 
Cf. also Reyburn, p. 139. 
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formalization of contract involves not simply the agreement of two or more 
!Private individuals as to the right of each, but also the "relation of will 
to will," in the sense of the establishment of common agreement that the 
rights of each be maintained. In this sense the establishment of contract 
involves the establishment of "a common will" of which the individual is 
i . 206 a part cipant. Finally, that contract which yields the establishment oj 
a common will is· itself the formalization of that recognition by others of 
the individual's relation to his prop~rty which is a necessary feature of 
the property relationship itself. This it is a formalization of that 
feature of the individual's experience in virtue of which he is, as a 
property owner in the full sense, necessarily a social individual, a 
participant in society. As Hegel notes in an addendum to his general 
description of contract, " ••• in contract my will still has the character 
'this,' though it has it in community with another will. 11207 
It is the task of explicitating the character of this "connnon will," 
and its relationship to the individual, which at this point becomes the 
major focus of the Philosophy of Right. Hegel's approach to this task 
involves his deriving a premise from the previous discussion, and con-
structing two arguments on the basis of this premise. The premise which 
Hegel derives from the above discussion is that the individual who 
exercises his will, has this will itself as the objective of this exercise 
206 
Cf. Above, footnote number 203; Reyburn, pp. 138-139, and p. 141. 
207 
Hegel, (Knox), p. 242, addendum to paragraph #71. 
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or that, given the individual which exercises will, "Its personality ••• it 
208 
now has for its object ••• " 
There are two necessarily related senses in which this statement can 
be seen as derived from the above offered discussion. The first harkens 
back to Hegel's comments on needs and appropriation. And will, as already 
noted, includes the particular impulses and needs experienced by the 
individual. The individual in turn relates to such needs through the 
"appropriation" of property, i.e., through the taking possession of an 
external item in a way such that the item comes to have, as its essential 
purpose within the experience of the individual, its relation to his will, 
to his need. 209 But to hold this is to hold that the act of appropriation 
has as its objective or goal the handling of that need which is resident 
within the will of hte individual. And appropriation itself is a feature 
of the exercise of individual will. Thus the individual will have itself 
as its objective or goal of its own exercise. 
Second, the exercise of individual will results in its externalizatio1 , 
its embodiment in an external object. But it is in virtue of this 
externalization that the individual is capable of comprehending the detail 
of his will, and thus himself as a concrete individual. Thus the exercise 
of will is at the service of the individual subject of will, or has this 
individual subject himself as its objective. 
These two senses in which the exercise of will has itself as its 
208 
Hegel, (Knox), p. 74; Grundlinien, p. 100. 
209 
Cf. a2ain He2el's definition of 'aovropriation' at footnote #203. 
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object are unified by Hegel. The exercise.of will has itself for its 
own object in that it at once brings the individual into relation objects 
relevant to his needs, and enables him to comprehend himself concretely 
through through the details of these objects. Indeed, it is in virtue of 
the exercise of will in this fashion that the individual is not simply 
h b . h 210 b . d f h a person, one w o can ear rig ts, ut in an a equate sense o t e term 
a "subject", one who can comprehend the details of his own experience, 
and himself in relation thereto: " ••• this reflection of the will into 
itself and its explicit awareness of its identity makes the person into 
211 the subject." But at the same time this individual subject of will 
bears a relation to others and to a common will as a seemingly essential 
feature of its individuality. The question which now arises for Hegel 
is, can the individual who is the subject of will, whose exercise of will 
has will itself as the object of that exercise, be validly described as 
simply an individual, or must such a subject be described as one whose 
experience is essentially social? The proceedure of the Philosophy of 
Right involves, I think, the construction of two sustained arguments, one 
in support of the conclusion that it is paradoxical to describe the subjec 
of will simply as an individual, and a second in support of the conclusion 
210 
Cf. Hegel, (Knox), p. 37; Grundlinien, p. 52. "Personality 
essentially involves the capacity for rights and constitutes the concept 
and the basis (itself abstract) of the system of abstract and therefore 
formal right." 
211 
Hegel, (Knox), p. 75; Grundlinien, p. 101. 
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that it is necessary to conceive the subject of will as an individual 
whose experience is essentailly social. I take this latter point to be 
adequately summarized by Reyburn in the comment that, for Hegel, "Men 
212 
reach individuality in social groups." 
Both of these arguments are highly complex, and are presented in 
lengthy fashions in the Philosophy of Right. The first can be understood 
as comprising the entire section of the text which Hegel entitles 
"Morality." And elements of the second are dispersed throughout the 
final division of this work, "Ethical Society." However, for purposes of 
efficiency, both these arguments may be presented in a briefer and more 
integrated manner. And, as I hope the following will bear out, textual 
analysis itself warrants this briefer presentation. 
Hegel begins the first argument with the question: what criterion migl 
there be whereby this individual can determine those actions which he ough1 
to do, as opposed to those which he ought to avoid. It would seem that 
there are two possible responses to this question: individual interest or 
i di .d 1 h . lf 213 B i d.l b h h n vi ua appiness or we are. ut t may rea i y e seen t at t e 
first of itself collapses into the second, for that which interests the 
individual subject is precisely that which will contribute to his welfare.~ ~4 
Thus individual welfare or happiness might initially seem to be the criter· 
ion on the basis of which the subject of will might select his actions. 
212 
Reyburn, p. 201. 
213 
Cf. Hegel, (Knox), p. 83; Grundlinien, p. 111. 
214Ibid. 
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But this criterion of itself will not do, because it is not necessary 
that all action result in individual welfare. Indeed, some activity 
may have a definitely pejorative effect on the experience of the individuaJ 
Hegel notes that, "What the subject is, is the series of his actions. If 
these are a series of worthless productions, then the subjectivity of 
his willing is just as worthless. But if the series of his deeds is of 
a substantive nature, then the same is true of the individual's inner 
will."215 Since activity may or may not effect the welfare of the individt =i.l, 
some further criterion is required, on the basis of which the individual 
subject of will may decide through which activities his welfare will be 
achieved, and thus on the basis of which he may select activities themselv1 >. 
And for the simply individual subject of will this criterion can only be 
the good as such or in itself. If he selects his actions according to thiE 
criterion, the individual will necessarily achieve his own welfare, and 
thus for the iwll of this individual, " ••• the end to which it devotes 
itself must have absolute worth and be desirable in and for itself. 11216 
Hegel insists, then, that the subject of will taken simply as an 
individual must have as the object of its will the good: "The good is the 
Idea as the unity of the concept of the will with the particular will."217 
Since the good as such is the object of the will of the individual subject 
it must be the basis upon which he selects activities: " ••• since the good 
215 
Hegel, (Knox), p. 83; Grundlinien, p. 112. 
216 
Reyburn, p. 172. 
217 
Hegel. (Knox). p. 86: Grundlinien. o. 116. 
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must of necessity be actualized through the particular will, it is at 
the same time its substance, it has absolute right in contrast with the 
abstract right of property and the particular aims of welfare. If either 
of these moments becomes distinguished from the good, it has validity 
1 "218 on y in so far as it accords with the good and is subordinated to it. 
Since the good as such functions as a criterion for the selection of 
actions, then the individual subject has both the right to will that which 
219 he conceives of as being in accord with the good, . and is obliged to do 
220 
so. And finally, reminiscent of Kant as has been this whole discussion 
the good as such must be taken as that which will promote boht one's own 
welfare and welfare as such, and is then determinable as that which will 
promote the welfare of all. Thus, " ••• what is my duty? As an answer 
nothing is so far available except: (a) to do the right, and (~) to 
strive after welfare, one's own welfare, and welfare in universal terms, 
the welfare of others."221 
At this point in the Philosophy of Right,. as I understand the text, 
Hegel proceeds in the development of the present argument through the 
construction of three subsidiary arguments, each of which leads to the 
218 
Hegel, (Knox), p. 87; Grundlinien, p./ 116. 
219 
ef. Hegel, (Knox), p. 87; Grundlinien, p. 117. 
220 
Cf. Hegel, (Knox), p. 89; Grundlinien, p. 119. 
221 
Cf. Hegel, (Knox), p. 89; Grundlinien, p. 120. 
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conclusion that it is paradoxical to describe the subject of will having a1 
his object the Good in the sense taken above. 
First, the concept of the good, as utilized above, abstracts from any 
determinate content, and is determinable only as that which might promote 
lf . all 222 we are un1vers y. But if this is so, then one is faced with a two 
horned dilemma. For on the one hand, if the good abstracts from all 
determinate content, then no specific action may be considered good in 
223 itself. And on the other hand, in abstraction from determinate 
reference to situation, any act may be comprehended as following from a 
maxim which is universalizable. 224 For these reasons, Hegel argues that, 
" ••• if duty is to be willed simply for duty's sake and not for the sake 
of some content, it is only a formal identity whose nature it is to exclud1 
c .. 225 
all content and specification. 
Second, the good in relation to the individual subject is meant to 
function as an objective standard whereby actions which ought to be done 
may be selected, and those which ought to be avoided may be recognized as 
such. That through which the individual might recognize the good, and 
might utilize it is as such a standard, is a particular faculty of his 
222 / 
Cf. Hegel, (Knox), pp. 89-90; Grundlinien, pp. 120-121. Hegel, 
tinsurprisingly, makes specific reference to Kant at this point. 
223 
Cf. Hegel, (Knox), p. 90; Grundlinien, p. 120. Also see Reyburn, 
pp. 59-60. 
224 
Cf. W.H. Walsh, op. cit., pp. 22-23. 
225 He2el. (Knox), p. 90; Grundlinien. n. 121. 
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226 
own, his conscience (Gewissen). Consci~nce is inherently individual, as 
the certainty of the individual as to what does and what does not accord 
!With the good, " ••• the self certainty of this subject. 11227 But if this is 
the case, then the good is available to the individual only in terms of 
his own insights and awareness, which are inherently subjective. The 
good itself, then, is inherently subjective for the individual, and thus 
cannot function for him as theobjective standard which he takes· it to be. 
Hegel argues here that, "Conscience is therefore s~bject to the judgment 
of its truth or falsity, and when it appeals only to itself for a decision, 
it is directly at variance with what it wishes to be, namely the rule for 
a mode of conduct which is rational, absolutely valid, and universal. 11228 
Finally, the good as such abstracts from all determinate content, and 
is determinable only as that which might promote welfare universally. The 
duty of the individual subject of will is to conform to the good in this 
sense. But if duty consists simply in this, it is consistent for the 
individual subject to will each act in such a way as to promote his own 
!Welfare privately, or, as Hegel puts it, the individual is capable, " ••• of 
elevating above the universal the self ~11 of private particularity ••• 1122S 
226 
Ibid. 
227 
Hegel, (Knox), p. 91; Grundlinien, p. 122. 
228 
I'Hid. 
229 
Hegel, (Knox), p. 92; Grundlinien, p. 124. 
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But this is in direct contradiction to the idea of the good as an objectivE 
standard whereby specific actions might be determined as necessarily 
yielding universal welfare. And it directly opens the possibility of 
"evil," i.e., the dominance of a will" ••• which can draw its content only 
from the determinate content of natural will, from desire, impulse, 
i 1 . t . t 11230 nc ina ion, e c. And it further opens the possibility of hypocracy, 
i.e., the conviction of acting at once according to a universal norm, and 
from individual impulse and desire. 231 
For these reasons then, it is paradoxical to conceive of the subject 
of will as having as its object the good as such. But as noted above, 
Hegel argues that the good as such must be conceived of as the object of 
the will of the subject taken simply an an individual, for it is only in 
taking this as the object of his will that this subject can conceive of 
a standard whereby actions towards the promotion of his own welfare might 
be determined. Thus it is further paradoxical to conceive of the subject 
of will as an individual taken simply. 
This represents, as I see it, the argument underlying the second 
division of the Philosophy of Right. It is the first of the two arguments 
referred to previously concerning the subject of will. It is integral to 
Hegel's text, but must now be complemented with a second argument, towards 
the conclusion that the subject of will is an individual whose experience 
is essentially social. 
230
cf. Hegel, (Knox), p. 93; Grundlinien, pp. 124-215. 
231
cf. Hegel, (Knox), p. 94; Grundlinien,- p. 126. 
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An initial formulation of this argument can be offered through 
recalling the discussion of "conscience." Conscious involves the 
particular awareness and insights of the individual as to the "good." 
As such, conscience is inadequate for the individual because conscience 
seeks some objective standard whereby the individual may evaluate his 
own activities, thus integrating and unifying them into a single life, 
but necessarily relies on the subjective insights of the individual. 
"Conscience turns away from the objective unity of its elements, and 
presents only a sub.]ective one. 11232 Conscience is thus inadequate, but 
the individual still requires some objective standard for the evaluation 
of his actions, and this standard must arise out of and be intrinsic to 
will itself, because the individual is here the subject of will, i.e., 
one who has will itself as his object, one who has as the purpose of his 
exercise of will this exercise itself, and the self determination it 
233 
effects. The individual subject of will requires some standard which 
arises intrinsically out of will itself, but which is not <fependent on 
the caprice of his merely individual inclinations and insights. But 
society, as the living construct of customs, norms, mores, and laws, is 
232 Reyburn, p. 178. 
233
cf. Ibid., p. 172. "The freedom of the will and the absolute worth 
of its own end can be reconciled only if in the last resort the two are 
identical, or at least are aspects of a single whole. The end at which 
will aims is that which it seeks to overcome, it is the declared essence 
of the wi17. And hence the end of free will is realized freedom." This 
is Reyburn s commentary on articles 127 and 128 of the Ph.l h f Right H 1 ( r · i osop y o 
, ege , 1'.nox, pp. 85-86; Grundlinien, pp. 114-115. 
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precisely that which can provide such a standard to the individual. Social 
customs, mores, and laws, as belonging to the group, are beyond individual 
caprice, and they simultaneously arise out of will itself, in that they 
are the embodiments of personal action in the objective world. Thus 
society can provide the individual with the standard he requires, and 
thus the individual subject of will must relate as such to society, or is 
necessarily social. 
I wish to make three observations concerning this argument. First, 
Hegel is not here asking the question: does the individual occur in 
society. He assumes that the individual does so occur, and takes this 
~ssumption to be based on ordinary experience, as well as on the analysis 
bf certain experiences, e.g., property. Hegel's question rather is,given 
the fact that the individual occurs in a social context, what is the 
~elation between his experience of himself as a particular individual and 
""s an i· d · · d 1 h . · · i 1? 2 34 ~ n l.Vl. ua w ose experience is soc a . 
Second, the essential features of Hegel's description of society are 
~hat society involves public customs, laws, and norms, that these are 
hemselves the expression of will, in that they arise out of the activity 
>f personal subjects, and that, as public, they are the embodiments of 
234
cf. Reyburn, p. 200. Reyburn seems to err slightly on this point. 
He writes: "It is needless to insist here on the dependence of the in-
dividual on society; so much may be taken for granted. Not only the 
developed life, but even bare existence would fail for man apart from 
society; and there is nothing in the whole round of his being which is 
not mediated by social powers. The most private and secret functions of 
the mind are shot through with the influences of the common life." But it 
does not seem that Hegel wishes to take this point for granted. Rather, 
such a description of the relation of the experience of the individual to 
l,i., sor;,,1 nri;urence js one which Hegel would wish rn ""'O'''"' fnr 
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will in the objective world. In introducing the third main division of 
the Philosophy of Right, Hegel asserts that "The ethical substance and 
its laws and powers are on the one hand an object over against the 
subject, and from his point of view they are--'are' in the highest sense 
of self-subsistent being. 11235 By the "ethical substance" is meant 
society in the sense indicated here. And abstracting momentarily from 
the question of the relation of society to the individual, one point here 
is simply that society is existence of will as objectified in the world 
through customs and laws. 
Third, Hegel explicitly argues that society provides the individual 
subject of will with the standard which he, as such a subject, requires. 
In making the transition from "Morality" to "Ethical life," Hegel notes 
that, "For the good as the substantial universal of freedom, but as 
something still abstract, there are therefore required determinate 
characters of some sort and the principle for determining them through 
a principle identical with the good itself. 11236 The individual subject 
of will requires some standard which is ·capable of providing determinate 
content, and which involves also an adequate "principle," i.e., which 
arises itself out of the nature of will. The customs and laws of society 
are such a standard and thus are precisely what the individual requires. 
To be fully a subject of will, then, the individual must derive the 
content of his will from society. If so, some comments on the relation 
235ttegel, (Knox), pp. 105-106; Grundlinien, p. 134. 
236Hegel, (Knox), p. 103; Grundlinien, pp. 139-140. 
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of the individual to society may now be made. Hegel's most concise 
statement of this relation occurs in the Phenomenology, in his assertion 
that society " ••• is spirit which is £or itself, since it maintains 
itself by being reflected in the minds of the component individuals; and 
which is in itself or substance, since it preserves them within 
i lf 11237 tse • Society is distinct and separate from the individual, 
because it is that which provides the objective expression of will whereb~ 
individual will may be realized. At the same time, the individual is 
necessary for society, in that the social expression of will can only 
exist through embodiment in individual consciousness. Thus the individuaJ 
both depends on society and is required for the occurence of the latter. 
Statements analogous to these are made in the Philosophy of Right. 
Two such may be noted. Hegel asserts that, " ••• the ethical order is 
freedom or the absolute will as what is objective, a circle of necessity 
whose moments are the ethical powers which regulate the life of 
individuals. To these powers individuals are related as accidents to 
substance, and it is in individuals that these powers are represented, 
have the shape of appearance, and become actualized. 11238 The individual 
is dependent on society, in order to fully realize himself as a subject 
of will. At the same time, society as the objective realization of will 
237 Hegel, 
23R.._ 
-Hegel, 
(Baillie), p. 467; Phanomenologie, p. 319. 
(Knox), p. 105; Grundlinien, pp. 142-143. 
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239 is only actual when embodied in individual self conscious subjects. 
Thus social customs and laws "are not something alien to the subject. On 
the contrary, his spirit bears witness to them as to its own essence, the 
essence in which he has a feeling of his selfhood ••• 11240 The individual 
) derives the content of his will, and thus the content of his own 
-
experience of himself from society. He is thus identified with society, 
not in the sense that, as a member of society, his individuality is 
cancelled, but rather in the sense that it is in virtue of his social 
1 b . f ·11 241 experience that he.can realize his individua ity as a su Ject o wi • 
Hegel's developments of the argument concerning the essentially 
social nature of the individual subject of will are lengthy and detailed 
in the Philosophy of Right. Indeed, these developments can be seen as 
the purpose of the whole remainder of this text, culminating in Eegel's 
doctrine of the State. I shall illustrate these developments by analyzing 
selected arguments from Hegel's discussion of the family, and of civil 
239 
Cf. Hegel (Knox), p. 259, addendum 94 to paragraph# 145. Hegel's 
way of presenting this point is ackward. "Whether the individual exists 
or not is all one to the objective ethical order. It alone is permanent, 
and is the power regulating the life of individuals." The point here 
seems to be that society as the objectification of will occurs irregardles: 
of the existence of this or that individual, but this is not to deny that 
the existence of individuals is necessary to the occurence of society. 
240 
Hegel, (Knox), p. 106; Grundlinien, p. 143. 
241 " 
Cf. Hegel, (Knox), p. 106; Grundlinien, p. 144, where Hegel summar-
izes these points. "As substantive in character, these laws and 
institutions are binding on the will of the individual because as 
subjective, as inherently undetermined, or determined ~s particular 
he distinguishes himself from them and hence stands related to them' as 
to the substance of his own being." 
r 
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society as a system of needs, the former because of its interest as 
illustrative of Hegel's point, the latter because of this and because of 
certain striking analogies between it and the texts of Marx. 
The family, Hegel argues, is at once the most fundamental and basic 
mode of the occur~ence of society as an "ethical order," for within the 
family, members experience themselves as members of the unit rather than 
primarily as discrete individuals, and at the same time this unit is 
capable of informing or providing content for the will of the individual. 
He states that, " ••• in a family, one's frame of mind is to have self 
consciousness of one's own individuality within this unity as the absolute 
essence of oneself, with the result that one is in it not as an independen 
person but as a member. 11242 The family provides an initial and immediate 
context in which the individual may experience himself as a member of a 
group, and of a group having specific customs and rules which provide 
content for his will. 243 This is the case for the family considered as 
partners in a marriage, and especially in monogamous marriage each 
individual may experience his (her) individuality concretely insofar as 
he (she) is recognized as an individual by the other244 while 
242 
Hegel, (Knox), p. 110; Grundlinien, p. 149. 
243
cf. Hegel, (Knox), pp. 112-113; Grundlinien, p. 152. "The identifi-
cation of personality, whereby the family becomes one person and its 
members become its accidents (though substance is in essence the relation 
of accidents to itself), is the ethical mind." Also see Reyburn, p. 207. 
"A family has habits, capabilities, an atmosphere, as specially marked as 
those of individuals. No two homes are quite alike, and the difference is 
not a mere series of particulars but resides in an attitude of things as 
a whole." 
244 Cf. Hegel, (Knox), p. 115; Grundlinien, p. 155. 
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simultaneously participating in an emotionally founded245 common interest 
246 
and will. This is even more the case for children, who depend on the 
family not only for initial and necessary emotional support, ·but also for 
concrete subsistence247 and education. 248 
The family, then provides the individual with an immediate and 
emotionally founded context wherein he or she may experience himself 
(herself) as an individual the content of whose experience is derived 
from participation in a common life, and the content of whose will is 
derived from the rules and customs regulating that common life. But in 
its function as educator, the role of the family is a double edged one. 
It is first to instill in the individual a sense of the unity between his 
will and the common life in which he participates. 249 But it is secondly, 
to develop within the individual the capacity of being a subject of will, 
and of experiencing his own will individually: " ••• this education has 
the negative aim of raising children out of the instinctive, physical 
~evel on which they are originally, to self-subsistence and freedom of 
personality and so to the level on which they have the power to leave the 
~atural unity of the family. 11250 One function of familial education is to 
245c£. Hegel, (Knox), p. 110; Grundlinien, p. 149. 
246Cf. Hegel, (Knox), p. 115; Grundlinien, p. 155. 
247Cf. Hegel, (Knox), p. 117; Grundlinien, p. 158. 
248Cf. Hegel, (Knox), pp. 117-118; Grundlinien, p. 158. 
249cf. Hegel, (Knox), p. 117; Grundlinien, p. 158. 
250Cf. Hegel, (Knox), pp. 117-118; Grundlinien, p. 158. 
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allow the child to relate to a common life so as to develop a will that 
is individually his own. Thus the individual becomes capable of 
experiencing his will as involving desires and needs which transcend the 
boundaries of the familial common life and are his own. 
This development is necessary in order that the individual become in 
an adequate sense a subject of will, one who comprehends the exercise of 
will as involving its own object. The development of this comprehension 
must occur in the context of a common life, so that will is objectified 
sufficiently for the individual to develop his own will. But the details 
of this immediate common life must also be transcended by the individual, 
so that he may come to comprehend his will as his own. 
The individual who has realized this self comprehension is, Hegel 
tells us, a member of "Civil Society." And "Civil Society" itself, he 
tells us, must be analyzed from two points of view. "The concrete 
person, who is himself the object of his particular aims, is, as a 
totality of wants and a mixture of caprice and physical necessity, one 
principle of civil society. But the particular person is essentially so 
related to other particular persons that each establishes himself and 
finds satisfaction by means of the others, and at the same time purely and 
Si 1 b f th f f . lit h d . . 1 h 251 mp y y means o e orm o universa y, t e secon princip e ere. 
Civil society involves the individual, who is an individual because of 
private aims and needs, who is at the same time, and precisely as such 
an individual, a participant in social life. I make no attempt here to 
offer a full account of Hegel's understanding of "CiiYil Society." 
-
251
cf. Hegel, (Knox), pp. 122-123; Grundlinien. o. 165 
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Rather, I shall attend to those ideas on the social experience of the 
individual which Hegel develops in his discussion of civil society as "A 
System of Needs." This section is important both in exhibiting the basis 
of the relation between the developed individual subject and society, 
and, for my purposes, in containing a number of assertions which Marx 
might well have lauded. 
Given Hegel's discription of the individual, his " ••• aim here is 
i 1 . 252 f th d d the satisfaction of subjective part cu arity ••• , o ose nee s an 
desires which are his own. The means available to the individual for 
the satisfaction of such needs is work. "The means of acquiring and 
preparing the particularized means appropriate to our similarly 
particularized needs is work (Arbeit). Through work the raw material 
directly supplied by nature is specifically adapted to these numerous 
253 ends by all sorts of different processes." Nature offers the context 
in which needs can be satisfied, but it is essentially the products of 
254 work upon nature which can become items relevant to needs. And just 
as items have value in terms of their ability to satisfy needs, it is 
work which endows them with such value: " ••• this formative change 
252 
Hegel, (Knox), p. 120; Grundlinien, p. 170. 
253 
Hegel, (Knox), pp. 128-129; Grundlinien, p. 173. 
254 
Cf. Hegel, (Knox) ,p. 269, addendum 125 to paragraph II 196. "There 
is hardly any raw material which does not need to be worked on before 
use. Even air has to be worked for because we have to warm it. Water 
is perhaps the only exception, because we can drink it as we find it. 
It i~ by the sweat of his brow and the toil of his hands that man 
obtains the means to satisfy his needs." 
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confers value of means and gives them utility, and hence man in what he 
· · 1 d ith th d t of 11255 consumes is main y concerne w e pro uc s men. 
But an additional and essential character of the individual, personal 
subject is that needs develop and complexify within his experience, as wel 
as simply occur within his experience. This is the case in at least two 
senses. First, work, as the means towards satisfying needs, is capable 
of becoming increasingly subtle and more complex. But then the 
experience of the agent becomes also more subtle and more complex, and 
thus toq his needs. 256 And second, as the means towards the satisfaction 
of needs become more complex, the means themselves may divide and 
qualitatively change, 257 as the need for food results in needs for 
agricultural implements, land, livestock, etc. Indeed some needs appear 
to be ~on-developmental, those relevant to the subsistence of the 
individual, but even these are experienced by the individual as qualified 
by the natural environment he confronts, and the specific work which he 
d t k d h i . f . 258 un er a es as means towar s t e r satis action. Thus needs are 
concretely experienced and develop in terms of the specific work 
undertaken towards their satisfaction. 
But just as needs and work specify the experience of the individual, 
these features of his experience also bring him essentially into social 
relations. As I read the text, Hegel offers three reasons why he takes 
255Hegel, (Knox), p. 129; Grundlinien, p. 175. 
256iiegel, (Knox), p. 127; Grundlinien, p. 171 
257
cf. Ibid. 
258Hegel, (Knox), p. 268, addendum 119 to paragraph# 187. 
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this to be .the case. First, Hegel states that it is in virtue of the 
multiplication of needs that the individual becomes an individual person 
in the full sense; of the term: " ••• this is the first time, and indeed 
259 properly the only time, to speak of~ in this sense." Hegel's 
reasons for this statement, offered in an addendum to the cited text, are 
that the multiplication of needs requires the individual to actively and 
intelligently plan his work, to exercise conscious self restraint so 
that his more significant rather than simply his most immediate needs will 
be handled, and that this exercise of intelligence on his own experience 
further qualifies the individual's experience both of his needs and of 
himself. 260 But then just as the individual is capable of experiencing 
himself in full concreteness here, he is also capable of being experienced 
and recognized by others with a measure of concre'teness also depending 
upon the development of needs. 261 Thus the individual is now capable of 
being a member of society with a degree of concreteness heretofore 
unrealized. 
But further, just as needs are in their details experienced according 
to the work undertaken for their satisfaction, work itself, i.e., the work 
of the individual, is undertaken in a context in which other working 
agents occur, and thus is conditioned and modified by the work of 
262 
Pthers. The fact of common work affects the conditions under which the 
259Hegel, (Knox), p. 127; Grundlinien, p. 171 
260 6 Cf. Hegel, (Knox), p. 2 9. 
26lcf. Hegel, (Knox), p. 127; Grundlinien, p. 171. Cf. also Hegel, 
(Kn~~~' p. 355, translator's note 50 to paragraph # 192. 
Cf. G.A. Kelly, Idealism. Politics, and History, Sources of Hegelian 
rhnt•~l,f- {f'~~i..,-;..i~~· 'J'J,~ TT-~ .. ~-~;~ "" •£... ' - 'HOI: 
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individual does labor, and, " ••• the conditions of labor create new 
tendencies, and each phase of the vast social machinery, constituted 
originally as a means, invades the realm of private ends, instituting 
customs and opinions 'Which in time demand fresh satisfaction. 11263 Out 
of the details of common work, needs arise, which the individual then 
experiences as his own. 264 
Finally, Hegel argues, common labor in society yields divisions of 
labor, or as he puts it divisions of classes (Untershiede der Stande). 265 
As needs and the means to their fulfillment multiply within society, 
these means, various forms of work, are severally undertaken by disparate 
groups and persons within society, according to their interests and 
skills. 266 As a consequence, the individual agent and subject of needs 
is more closely drawn into social relations, and this for three reasons. 
First, because he is now aware that his work may yield the satisfaction 
of his own needs and of those of others as well. 267 Second, because the 
individual is now also aware of his dependence on the work of others for 
needs of his own. 268 And third, because division of labor or classes 
introduces further modifications into that work productive of social 
263Reyburn, p. 217. 
264
cf. Hegel, (Knox), pp. 127-128; Grundlinien, pp. 171-172. 
265cr. Grundlinien, # 201, p. 175. 
266cf. Hegel, (Knox), p. 129; Grundlinien, pp. 173-174. 
267cf. Hegel, (Knox), pp. 129-130; Grundlinien, p. 174. 
268cf. Ibid. 
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269 
needs which the individual may then experience privately. Hegel also 
notes that social labor produces conventions and fashions which influence 
I d d . 270 the individual s private nee s an experience. 
Of the three above arguments, the latter two are more significant 
here for they lead to the conclusion that the individual member of civil 
society is necessarily a social individual. He is one whose experience 
is fundamentally social rather than simply individual and private. The 
concrete individual subject of needs is one who experiences needs as 
particular and his own, and whose basic purpose is activity or work which 
aims at the satisfaction of those needs. But the needs which the 
individual experiences as his own are themselves also socially produced. 
If the individual's experience of himself is most basically his 
experience of his needs, and if these needs are derived from society, 
then the individual's experience of himself includes a fundamental social 
dimension. It is the experience of himself as a member of society. Put 
more simply, the concrete individual subject is as such essentially social 
These comments on Hegel's descriptions of the family and civil 
society as a system of needs develop and concretize Hegel's claim that 
the individual subject of will is necessarily a social individual. 
Much more is done by Hegel in the sections of the Philosophy of Right 
which my analysis has touched upon than was revealed here. In his section 
on the family, for example, Hegel discusses such specific questions as 
269
cf. Reyburn, p. 217. 
270Cf. 1 ( ) Hege , Knox , p. 269, addendum 123 to paragraph # 192. 
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271 d h . 272 familial ownership of property an in eritance. In his section on 
civil society, Hegel describes how such society organizes and facilitates 
273 274 . 
social experience through law, the courts, public police 
h . 275 d h mi t' 276 aut ority, an t e econo c corpora ion. But although I have 
omitted a great deal, I take myself to have analyzed the claim which is 
both fundamental to this section of the Philosophy of Right, and which 
most clearly sets Hegel into relation with Marx, namely, that the concrete 
individual is necessarily a social individual, a member of society, one 
whose experience is necessarily social experience. 
I do not take as necessary to my task the explanation of that 
doctrine of the state with which the Philosophy of Right concludes. To 
do so would not yield material relevant to the relation of Marx to Hegel 
on the question of the theory of man. I shall only point out that, for 
Hegel, the state is the necessary objective expression of the fundamental 
social dimension of individual experience. 277 In introducing the notion, 
Hegel asserts that, "The state is the actuality of the ethical Idea. It 
is ethical mind qua substantial will manifest and revealed to itself, 
271 ( Cf. Hegel, Knox), pp. 116-117; Grundlinien, pp. 156-157. 
272
Hegel, (Knox), p. 219; Grundlinien, p. 260. 
273
cf. Ib d 
____!_.,pp. 134-141; Grundlinien, pp. 180-189. 
274
cf. H 1 ( ) ege , Knox , pp. 140-145; Grundlinien, pp. 189-195. 
275Cf. Hegel, (Knox), pp. 146-152; Grundlinien, pp. 197-203. 
276cf. Hegel, (Knox), pp. 152-155; Grundlinien, pp. 203-207. 
277Cf • G. A. Kelly, pp. 324-326. 
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knowing and thinking itself, accomplishin~ what it knows insofar as it 
knows it. 11278 The state is the objective expression of that social unity 
which is implicit in civil society. Because of this, the state 
objectively manifests to its individuals as its citizens the essential 
social dimension of that experience which is their own. Moreover, the 
state is not only the expression of the implicit social unity of civil 
society, but it is also necessary to divil society, in that it is 
ultimately the objectification of social will, 279 _which will, as has been 
shown above, comprise the identity of society and is necessary for the 
full self realization of its individual members. And because of this, 
280 Hegel argues, the state exists with absolute right. 
But in abstraction from the question of the state, the major 
components of the doctrine of the Philosophy of Right relevant.to the 
content of Marx' theory of man have been, I think, considered in this 
chapter. And with this, I have completed what I set out to do in this 
chapter, namely, to offer an analysis of those elements of Hegel's 
philosophical doctrine, as expressed in the Phenomenology of Spirit and 
the Philosophy of Right which are relevant to Marx' theory of man. These 
themes of Hegel may be summarized as follows: 
In the Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel argues that the self conscious 
individual is one who experiences his own object as his "life." This 
278 Hegel, (Knox), p. 155; Grundlinien, pp. 207-208. 
279 Cf. Hegel, (Knox), pp. 155-156; Grundlinien, p. 208, Cf. also 
Bourgeois, pp. 123-125, Reyburn, p. 233. 
280 Cf. Hegel, (Knox), p. 155; Grundlinien, p. 208. 
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experience engenders the desire to overcome the apparent externality of 
the object, and this desire in turn constitutes the individual as an 
agent. Agency here is initially understood as work, which transforms the 
material environment of the agent. The product of such work objectifies 
its details, and makes possible individual self actualization. 
The activity of the individual makes possible his objective self 
comprehension, and in turn brings the individual to participate in a 
society of agents. Such social experience is necessary in order that the 
individual be constituted as a self conscious individual through 
recognition, and in order that the individual be an agent in the full or 
actual sense of that term. And given this social experience, the 
environment is, and is comprehended as, the context of the activity of a 
society of agents. 
Themes such as these are repeated and developed in the Philosophy of 
RiQht, in which Hegel examines the experience of the individual subject 
~f will. This subject necessarily acts to embody its will in external 
objects, in the external environment. The most primitive form of such 
embodiment is property. The property item occurs for the individual as 
essentially relevant to some need of his, and the appropriation of 
property necessarily brings the individual into relationships with others. 
The individual subject of will cannot be taken as an isolated 
individual, but must be described as an individual whose experience is 
essentially social. It is the family which provides the immediate social 
context in which the subject of will can develop as an individual, and 
r 
as one who can enter civil society. The individual as a member of civil 
society experiences private needs whose satisfaction he attempts to 
achieve through work. Such needs of the individual are both experienced 
in terms of and develop or multiply in terms of his work. 
But although needs here are viewed as private, the experience of 
this individual is itself essentially social. His work necessarily brings 
him into relations with others. The details of his work are conditioned 
by connnon social labor. He recognizes himself as depending for the 
satisfaction of his needs on the work of others, and they on his work. 
And the needs which he experiences as his own, and thus as his self, are 
at once his own and products of society. 
This summarizes the portions of Hegel's philosophical doctrine which 
have been examined in this chapter. What next needs to be considered 
is the relation of these themes in Hegel to the content of Marx' theory 
of man. 
r 
Chapter Four 
Marx' Appropriation of Hegel 
The attempt to clarify Marx' theory of man leads naturally to the 
question of Marx' relations to his predecessors, particularly Feuerbach 
and Hegel. Marx' theory of man itself, as well as the arguments exp! icit 
or imp! icit which support and specify it, occur in texts which are 
largely polemical in character, and which are largely devoted to Marx' 
critical evaluations of others. Consequently, a discussion of Marx• 
relation to Feuerbach and Hegel seems an appropriate way of comprehending 
Marx• anthropology. 
Althusser 1 s interpretation of Marx is instructive in this respect. 
For he believes that those texts of Marx in which a theory of man is 
developed are dominated by Feuerbach 1 s influence. Marx• theory of man, 
consequently, is thought to be thoroughly Feuerbachian in content. This 
interpretation is at the basis of his claim that the mature Marx is a 
theorist of economic society for whom 11 humanism11 of a Feuerbachian sort 
and of any sort, has been overcome and classified as ideology, 
inadmissable within any theory of society or history which is val idly 
11 scientific. 11 I have attempted to show, in my second chapter, that the 
basis of Althusser's claim is erroneous, that the content of Marx' theory 
of man is clearly and consciously at variance with the Feuerbachian 
anthropology with which Marx was familiar. But the question of Marx' 
relation to Hegel remains to be handled. 
I shall now argue that, on the basis of the analyses of the 
preceeding chapter, Marx' theory of man can be understood as essentially 
related in its content not to the E?hilosophicaJ doctrine of Feuerbach, 
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but to that of Hegel. To do this, I shall defend two major claims. 
First, the notions of praxis and society contained in Marx' theory of 
man essentially reflect the analyses of those notions already made by 
Hegel in the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Philosophy of Right. And 
second, in the Paris Manuscripts, Marx develops his argument in support 
of the conclusion that praxis is a more fundamental category than 
consciousness in an adequate theory of man, through a critical dialogue 
with Hegel. Thus it will be shown both that Marx is indebted to Hegel 
for a major portion of his anthropology, and that Marx constructs an 
argument in support of the distinctiveness of his own position through 
a critique of Hegel. In short, it is in terms of its relation to Hegel, 
rather than to Feuerbach, that Marx' theory of man is both positively 
and negatively defined. 
I. Marx' Indebetedness to Hegel. 
The first of the points I wish to make has to do with Marx' 
statements on praxis and society, and their relation to Hegel's 
doctrine. I shall proceed by recalling the formulation of those state-
ments in chapter one, and by comparing them to the analyses of chapter 
three. I shall not attempt to show that the development of Marx' theory 
on these points is systematically parallel to Hegel's. I doubt that 
they are. But I will show that the content of Marx' theory is identical 
with or relevantly similar to statements for which Hegel argues at 
various places in the texts. 
As seen in chapter one, Marx begins his discussion of praxis or 
productive activity by describing nature as the necessary correlate 
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of praxis, and this in two senses. 1 First, Marx insists that the 
occurence of productive activity requires the presence of an external, 
maleable environment. 2 And second, nature itself, Marx argues, is to 
be understood not merely as the external environment, but as that whose 
own reality is such as to occur essentially for the productive agent, 
and as that which receives its essential determinations from the activity 
of this agent. 3 These statements clearly reflect the position argued 
by Hegel. 4 Hegel argues, first, in the transition from "Consciousness" 
. . 
to "Self Consciousness" in the Phenomenology of Spirit, that it is in 
virtue of the self conscious subject's experience of its object, its 
"life, 115 as both essentially in relation to itself and as other than 
itself, 6 that this subject experiences itself in turn as the desire7 to 
1cf. Chapter One, pp. 2 and the following. 
2cf. Marx, "Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and 
Guddat, MEGA; 1, 3, 384. 
3cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 325; MEGA, 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 160 •. - This idea is, as seen in chapter one, an 
implication of Marx' notion that nature occurs for the productive agent 
as his "object" in that it can be determined by his own activity in 
such a way as to become appropriate for the satisfaction of his needs. 
4cf. footnote number 104, chapter three, for a more detailed 
discussion of the content of Hegel's theory of nature in relation to 
Marx. 
5cf. Hegel, The Phenomenology of 
Geo. Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1931, p. 
Geistes, ed. Hoffmeister, (Hamburg: 
p. 135. 
6 Cf. Ibid. 
7 Cf. Ibid. 
Mind, trans. J.B. Baillie, (London: 
220. Hegel, Phenomenologie des 
Felix Meiner Verlag, 1952), 
--332-
overcome this distinction between its life and itself, and consequently 
upon this desire is an agent. Moreover, since the object which the self 
conscious subject experiences as both its own and other than itself is 
" ••• the whole expanse of the world of sense ••• , 118 that agency which is 
appropriate to the desire of this subject is productive agency, 
literally, owrk. 9 Hegel here argues, in brief, that it is in virtue of 
nature as sensuous externality that the subject experiences productive 
agency as appropriate to the desire which is its own. 
Furthermore, in that section of the Phenomenology which he 
entitles "Das Geistige Tierreich und der Betrug, oder die Sache Selbet," 
Hegel notes that the concrete agent experiences his external environment 
fundamentally as that context within which his activities may be carried 
10 
out. This means that, for the concrete agent, nature is both 
experienced as the essential correlate of his activities, and, as the 
scene of those activities, receives its basic determination from them. 
This idea is both repeated and developed in the Philosophy of Right, in 
his discussion of the productive agent as the subject of needs. There 
he notes both that the satisfaction of needs requires that the productive 
agent relate himself to nature, 11 and that to be appropriable as an 
8 Cf. Ibid. 
9cf. Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, ed. Allan Bloom, 
trans. J. H. Nichols, (New York: Basic Books, 1969), pp. 37-38, for 
commentary on this point. 
lOHegel, (Baillie), p. 419; Ph~nomenologie, p. 285. 
1~egel, 1be Philosophy of Right, trans. T. M. Knox, (Oxford: The 
University Press, 1967), p. 269, addendum 125 to paragraph #196. 
r 
object of need, must nature, receive its basic determinations from 
d t . . . 12 pro uc ive activity. Thus with respect to the basic description of 
the relation of praxis to nature, Marx' doctrine can be seen as 
essentially Hegelian. 
The import of this relation becomes more pronounced when one turns 
to a consideration of Marx' concept of objectification. As I have 
shown in chapter one (see pp.4f~ the concept of objectification is 
essential to Marx' theory of praxis in several related ways. In 
the Manuscripts of 1844 Marx first describes the product or result of 
praxis as " ••• only the resume of activity, of production. 1113 Since a 
product is by definition the result of productive activity, than it 
embodies within itself, or is in itself determined by, the details of 
that activity of which it is the result. This implies that the product 
is the realization of labor, 1114 of productive activity. For the 
5 product renders the details of praxis public and observable, "objective," 
and enduring in a way which transcends the transient character of 
activity itself. Marx sums these ideas up in the simple statement 
12cf. Hegel, (Knox), op. cit., loc. cit. 
13Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 291; MEGA, 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, P• 85. 
14 Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 289; MEGA 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 83. 
15cf. Nicholas Lobkowicz, Theory and Practice, (Notre Dame: The 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1967), pp. 341-342. 
l 
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that, "The product of labor is labor embodied and made objective in a 
h . 1116 t ing. 
The notion of objectification as included in Marx' theory of 
praxis, further implies the concepts of "self actualization," in one 
17 
of the two uses of this term which may be attributed to Marx, and 
self satisfaction. 18 It is through engaging in productive activity 
that the agent at once makes a product, and realizes himself as an 
agent of a specific sort. (It is through writing, for example, that 
he realizes both definite results, and himself as a writer). This 
realization in turn involves a further sort of self actualization, one 
involving self satisfaction. Since the product is the embodiment or 
"resume" of the det"ails of that activity of which it is the result, the 
agent, in recognizing his product, is capable of comprehending his own 
activity in a definite and objective form, and thus himself as well. 
And the agent can further take satisfaction in his product as the 
17Marx' •tuee of 'self actualization' in the context of his developed 
theory of needs will be discussed subsequently in this chapter in terms 
of its relation to Hegel. 
18c£. Lobkowicz, op. cit., loc. cit. Regarding the first point 
Lobkowlicz correctly conunents that for Marx the productive agent, 
" ••• confers his life on objects. However, this externalization must 
not be taken to be a translation of pre-existing ideas into reality. 
Rather, the inner life conferred to outer objects must be viewed as 
a potentiality which becomes actual in and for man by becoming the 
form of a reality outside man. Accordingly, obj,ectification also 
connotes self-actualization ••• " 
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detailed and externalized result of his own activity, and thus of his 
own self. 19 
Each of these points is also discernable in Hegel. In the 
dialectic of Self-Consciousness in the Phenomenology, Hegel argues that, 
as a result of labor or work, the object is transformed in that it is 
determined by the details of that activity of which it is a result. 
Work overcomes the apparently simple externality of the object. And the 
reason this externality is overcome is identical to the first component 
of Marx' concept of objectification, namely, that the object as product 
contains within itself or is a "resume" of the details of productive 
activity. It receives its essential determinations from productive 
activity, rather than simply containing them within itself. 2° Further, 
Hegel notes, as Marx does, that the 'objectification' of productive 
activity in its results overcomes the transient character of that 
activity itself, lending it a degree of permanence. Productive activity, 
" ••• passes into the form of the object, into something that is permanent 
and remains ••• 1121 
19cf. Marx, "Excerpt-Notes of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 281; 
MEGA, 1, 3, p. 546. As Marx puts this, "In my production I would have 
objectified my individuality and its particularity ••• in viewing the 
object I would have experienced the individual joy of knowing my 
personality as an objective, sensuously perceptible, indubitable power." 
20cf. Hegel, (baillie), p. 238; Ph~nomenologie, p. 149. 
21Ibid. 
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The way in which Marx sees self actualization as involved in 
objectification is also discoverable in Hegel. Hegel's dialectic of 
"Lordship and Bondage" in the Phenomenology is the place in which he 
22 first elaborates his notion of agency as work. There he argues that, 
through specific productive activities, the specific determinations of, 
or the " ••• proper being ••• " of the agent is actualized. 23 The product 
is the concrete realization of productive activity, and thus of the 
productive agent himself. It is his own productive activity crystalized 
and brought to term. 24 
These notions are again repeated and developed by Hegel in his 
later description of the agent as a concrete individual in the 
Phenomenology. There, as seen in chapter three (see pp.267), Hegel 
initially posits and then argues against the position that the concrete 
individual agent is possessed of an "original nature," a set of 
possibilities and capacities which are, for Hegel, determinate and given. 
He argues first, that a possibility of 'design' for action becomes the 
individual's own precisely through his acting upon it; the individual 
incorporates such a possibility into his own experience through his own 
t . . 25 ac 1v1ty. Second, it is through acting out his specific possibility 
-------
22The complete explicitation of the argument at this point would require 
an exposition of Hegel's description of the relation between bondsman 
and master. However, I feel that the text justifies an abstraction 
from this description, in that Hegel's essential assertions concern 
the effects of the productive activity of the bondsman upon himself. 
23Cf. Hegel, (Baillie), p. 239; Phanomenolo8ie, P• 149. 
24Cf. Hegel, 02. cit., loc. cit. 
25cf. Hegel, (Baillie), pp. 429-430; Phanomenologie, PP• 293-294. 
or 'design' that the individual realizes it in detail for himself, and 
thus realizes himself as one whose experience involves a given possibilit 
or 'design' in concrete detai1. 26 And finally, it is on this basis that 
the individual is capable of revising the details of his own possibilitie 
for action, and of engaging in further and more sophisticated forms of 
action. Thus the concrete individual agent cannot be comprehended as one 
possessed of an 'original nature,' but rather is who 'actualizes' himself 
as a result of his own activity. 27 
The major components of Marx' concept of objectification, then, 
are discoverable in the texts of Hege1. 28 This, I shall now argue, is 
also the case fo~ Marx' discussion of needs, as that discussion is 
\ 
located in his doctrine of praxis. The discussion of needs, as was shown 
in chapter one, (see pp.19ff)is equally important for Marx' doctrine of 
praxis as 'is his concept of objectification. That analysis may be 
26 Cf. Hegel, (Baillie), p. 438; Pha'.nomenologie, p. 300. "The real in-
t~nt thereby ceases to stand in the relation of a predicate, loses its 
characteristic of lifeless abstracted universality; it is substance 
peremated by individuality ••• " 
27Again, Hegel brings in the notion of society at this point. I have 
postponed an analysis of this aspect of Hegel's discussion. 
28cf. Hegel, (Baillie), pp. 238 and 425; Ph~nomenologie, pp. 149 and 
290. I note briefly here that, in each of the phases of Hegel's argument 
cited above, 'self actualization' is related to self satisfaction as a 
result of productive activity. In the dialectic of self consciousness, 
Hegel observes that agency as work is. appropriate to the desire of the 
self conscious individual, and notes further that the individual agent 
takes satisfaction in recognizing its own activity, and thus a feature 
of its own self, as objectified in its product. "The consciousness that 
toils and serves accordingly attains by this means the direct apprehensio 
of that independent being as its self." This point is reiterated in the 
analysis of "Das geistige Tierreich und der Betrug;" the concrete agent 
apprehends his result as proceeding from and crystalizing his own activit , 
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summarized as follows: for Marx, a) all praxis or productive activity 
is rooted in the agents experience of needs; 29 b) needs require pro-
ductive activity on nature for their satisfaction; 30 c) the human 
productive agent acts both out of 'subsistence' needs, needs which arise 
from the physiological structure of and whose satisfaction is required 
for the life maintenance of the organism, and 'human' needs, that is 
needs developed beyond the literal subsistence of the individual;3l d) 
human activity which aims at the satisfaction of a need may result both 
in the satisfaction of that need and the 'production' of some new need, 
thus involving the 'self actualization' of the agent in a further sense 
32 
of that term. Just as my discussion of these claims in chapter one 
showed that Marx' concept of needs is essential to his theory of praxis, 
I want now to show that the basic components of that concept are found 
in Hegel. 
29Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 325; ~' 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, pp. 160-161. 
30cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 325, MEGA 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, pp. 160~161. Cf. Also Marx, Capital, trans. Moore an-d~­
Aveling, (New York: International Publishers, 1967), vol. 1, p. 42, 
Marx, in Marx-Engels, Works, (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, ), vol. 23, p. 
57. This edition of the works of Marx will henceforth be referred to as 
MEW. 
31Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 294; MEGA 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 88. 
32Marx, The German Ideology, trans. R. Pascal, (New York: Inter-
national Publishers, 1947), pp. 16-17; MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 5, p. 18. 
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In the Phenomenology, Hegel claims that the individual is an agent 
in virtue of an ontologically founded desire, 33 which in turn requires 
activity (and activity as, among other forms, literal work) on the 
external environment. In the Philosophy of Right, in his description of 
the individual as a member of civil society, Hegel goes even further. 
There, he describes the individual as one whose, " ••• aim here is the 
satisfaction of subjective particularity ••• 1134 and he goes on to assert 
that, "The means of acquiring and preparing the particularized means 
appropriate to our similarly particularized needs (partikularisierten 
Bedurfnissen) is work. 1135 This reveals to two sides of the concept of 
needs already noted in Marx. Needs are those features of the experience 
of the individual which render him a productive agent. And further, 
productive activity as 'work' is required for the satisfaction of needs. 
Hegel implies this through stating that, "It is the products of human 
effort which man consumes, 1136 'consumption' here meaning the final stage 
33cf. J. O'Malley, "History and Nature in Marx," The Review of 
Politics, 1966, 28, (4), pp. 521-527, in which it is persuavely argued 
that for Marx needs may be considered ontological features of the 
experience of the productive agent. 
34 Hegel, (Knox), p. 26; G. W. F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie 
des Rechts, ed. Hoffmeister, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1955), 
P• 170. 
35Hegel, (Knox), p. 128; Grundlinien, p. 173. 
36 Hegel, (Knox), p. 129; Grundlinien, p. 173. 
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of that activity through which needs are satisfied. 37 
Furthermore as noted in chapter three, (see p.320) Hegel makes a 
distinction between two classes of needs analogous to that made by Marx, 
and considers this distinction to be critical. This is revealed in a 
single text. 
An animal's needs and its ways of satisfying them are 
both alike restricted in scope. Though man is subject 
to this restriction too, yet at the same time he 
evinces his transcendence of it and his universality, 
first by the multiplication of needs and means of 
satisfying them, and secondly by the differentiation 
and division of concrete need into single parts and 
aspects which in turn become different needs, 
particularized and so more abstract.38 
Needs, here, are first classified as those proper to the "animal," i.e., 
as restricted to thos~ arising from the physicological structure of the 
39 
organism. and needs which are not so limited, and thus capable of 
developing or "multiplying." The numan productive agent is described as 
capable of acting from needs of both sorts, and the language of that 
37cf. Hegel, (Knox), p. 269, addendum 125 to paragraph 193. Hegel 
supplements these statements with an addendum, illustrating even more 
concretely the relation between his doctrine and that of Marx. He states 
that, "There is hardly any raw material which does not need to be worked 
on before use ••• It is by the sweat of his brow and the toil of his hands 
that man obtains the means to satisfy his needs." This indicates first 
that the activity to which Hegel refers as initiated by needs is external 
activity, activity on nature. Second, it clearly reveals that the 
activity under consideration here is productive activity. And third, 
productive activity is required for the satisfaction of needs; nature 
must be 'transformed' or 'worked up into shape' in order to yield items 
appropriate to the needs of ind!viduals. 
38Hegel, (Knox), p. 217; Grundlinien, pp. 170-171. 
39For confirmation of this point cf. Hegel, (Knox), p. 268-269, 
addendum 121 to paragraph #190. 
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distinction recalls Marx' statement that, " ••• the animal produces only 
what is immediately necessary for itself or its young. It produces in 
a one-sided fashion, while man produces universally."40 
Further, the explanation offered by Marx and Hegel respectively 
of the development or "multiplication" of needs are related in content. 
This is the case, I suggest, on two counts. Marx hold the position 
that needs develop in virtue of productive activity undertaken towards 
the satisfaction of previously experienced needs. Productive activity 
transforms the environment such that it may both elicit new needs in 
the agent, and support activity which aims at the satisfaction of such 
needs. Through productive activity, the agent realizes himself as a 
specific agent, rendering himself capable of experiencing new needs, and 
of undertaking new and more subtle forms of activity aiming at their 
satisfaction. 41 Now Hegel seems to suggest an analogous argument in 
speaking of " ••• the differentiation and division of concrete need into 
single parts and aspects which in turn become different needs, 
particularized and so_more abstract."42 Needs for Hegel require 'work' 
40Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 294; MEGA 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 88. 
41cf. Rotenstreich, Basic Problems of Marx' Philosophy, (Indianapolis 
The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 19657 pp. 34-35; Lefebvre, Dialectical 
Materialism, trans. John Sturreck, (London: Johnathan Cape Ltd., 1968), 
p. 118. 
42Hegel, (Knox), p. 127; Grundlinien, p. 171. 
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as their mode of attaining satisfaction. 'Work' in turn transforms 
the environment which is its object. But this means that the 
environment now becomes more complex, and thus capable of offering 
possibilities for supporting more complex and differentiated forms of 
work. In turn the individual who has 'worked on' this environment is 
thereby capable of different and more complex activities. As a result 
the needs of the individual are rendered more complex relative to the 
new forms of work which he may now undertake. 
This brings us to still another similarity. In chapter one (see 
pp.82ff) I argued that, for Marx, consciousness is an essential feature 
of the structure of praxis because, only given this can we explain the 
phenomenon of a developed need as the basis for productive activity. 
Three reasons were offered for this. First, the agent must apprehend 
his environment consciously in order for that environment to elicit a 
developed need within his experience. An environment to which the 
individual enjoys no conscious relation can only elicit 'subsistence', 
species specific needs for that individual. Second, the individual 
must enjoy conscious awareness of his own experience in order to 
recognize developed needs as occuring in it. Only the experience of 
'subsistence' or species specific needs, based on the physiological 
structure of the individual, do not require such awareness. And third, 
the individual must enjoy conscious awareness of his environment so 
that he may comprehend possibilities it promises for productive 
activity. Only if he is con~cious of his environment is he capable of 
acting towards the satisfaction of the need in question. 
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t take these reasons to underly Marx' position that consciousness 
is an essential feature of human praxis. But an analogy may be seen 
between these reasons and a position which Hegel takes on a similar 
question. Hegel notes that, "The need of shelter and clothing, the 
necessity of cooking his food to make it fit to eat and to overcome its 
natural rawness, both mean that man has less natural comfort than the 
animal, and indeed, as mind, he ought to have less. Intelligence, with 
its grasp of distinctions, multiplies human needs, and since taste and 
utility become criteria of judgment, even the needs themselves are 
affected thereby. 1143 Hegel is making at least two assertions here. 
First, that human action towards the satisfaction of needs such as those 
for shelter and food yields the development or 'multiplication' of needs. 
And second, this is possible in virtue of "intelligence" or "mind": 
mind as capable of a) distinguishing among various features of an 
environment, and b) distinguishing the component features of needs 
themsleves. Thus needs can develop only in terms of their being 
consciously noticed, and indeed this noticing alters the character of 
needs themselves. Marx will offer later a critical argument against 
what he takes to be Hegel's position on the location of consciousness 
within the experience of the individual, but there is here at least 
an analogy between the positions of Marx and Hegel on the question of 
the relationships between productive activity, consciousness, and the 
development of needs. 
Finally, it was noted above (see chapter one, p •• 29 ) that for 
43Hegel, (Knox), p. 269, addendum 121 to paragraph # 190. 
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Marx the notion of needs as developmental introduces a further sense of 
'self actulaization' into his doctrine of praxis. As needs develop, the 
individual agent is capable of enjoying ever more subtle and complex 
productive relations with his environment, as well as more diversified 
forms of experience, in terms of the needs which are his own. It seems 
that Hegel has the conceptual foundation to make this same assertion, 
although he does not do so specifically. Hegel too argues that 
developing needs yields consistently complexifying forms of "work" and 
thus the actualization of both the environment and 'the individual agent. 
A final point of relation between Marx' doctrine of praxis and 
Hegel has to dd with the concept of appropriation. This concept arises 
in Marx' analysis as follows. (See chapter one, pp.6ff). First, since 
productive activity is 'objectified' in its natural result, nature is, 
as product, transformed according to the details of praxis. 44 The 
productive agent thus brings nature into definite relations to himself, 
or appropriates45 nature, through his activity. Second, productive 
46 
activity is determined concretely by the needs of the agent. Since 
the product of activity embodies the details of productive activity, and 
since that activity i~ undertaken for the sake of satisfying definite 
44cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 291; MEGA 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 85. 
45cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 290; MEGA 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 84: " ••• der Arbeiter sich die Assenwelt, die sinnliche 
Natur, durch seine Arbeit aneignet." 
46cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 325; MEGA 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3,pp. 160-161. Marx-Engels, The German Ideology, trans. 
Pascal, pp. 16-17; MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 5, pp. 17-18. Marx, Capital trans. 
-~!9._or~ a1!._c!_Ayeling, p. 42; MEW vol. 23, • 57. 
-345-
needs, the product is capable of being appropriated or taken up by the 
agent for the purpose of such satisfaction.47 
A strong parallel between Marx' concept of appropriation and Hegel 
is found in the Philosophy of Right, 48 again in Hegel's description of 
47cf. The Grundrisse, trans. David Mclellan, (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1971), pp. 24-25; Marx, Grundrisse der Kritik der Politischen 
Okonomie, (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1953), pp. 12-13. Marx most clearly 
demonstrates this idea in this text of the Grundrisse, by showing that 
consumption is an integral feature of, and indeed the culmination of, 
the activity of production. 
48cf. Hegel, (Baillie), p. 238; Phanomenologie, p. 149. An argument 
in Hegel's treatment of the dialectic of Self Consciousness in the 
Phenomenology also points up how Marx is related to Hegel on the concept 
of appropriation. For Hegel, the self conscious subject is an agent in 
virtue of 'desire'; this agency involves work in that, as directed at 
the object, " ••• labor shapes and transforms the thing." This is to say 
that work or productive agency oversomes the apparently simple 
externality of nature through causing its object to involve within itself 
labor's own determinations. Productive activity then involves 
'objectification' in Marx' sense of that term. And then, through this 
activity, the agent brings his object into some definite relation with 
himself, or 'appropriates' that object. In turn, productive activity is 
undertaken towards the fulfillment of a need, in this case the desire 
of the subject to overcome the apparently simple externality of that 
object which he recognizes as both other than himself and as essentially 
related to himself as his own 'life.' The 'appropriated' object is 
capable of satisfying, albeit partially, this desire. 
There is an analogy between this argument in Hegel and 'appropriatio ' 
in Marx. But the analogy limps on two points. First, Marx seems to 
discuss appropriation in terms of definite needs (Bedurfnisse), whereas 
the desire (Begierde) which Hegel describes here is a generalized desire. 
Second, Hegel argues that both this desire and the activity consequent 
upon it have their source in the conscious experience of the subject, 
whereas Marx wishes to argue in general that conscious experience derives 
from the practical relations of agent to environment, praxis, while 
simultaneously being an essential structural feature of praxis. 
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the individual as a member of civil society. Individuals act out of 
determinate aims or needs, 49 and the experience of these determinate 
needs results in the individual's undertaking productive agency or 
50 work. The effect of this activity is the transformation of the 
natural environment, 51 yielding products which may be 'consumed' , 52 
that is, which may be taken up or 'appropriated' by the individual 
towards the satisfaction of needs. 53 Hegel here discusses the relation-
ships between needs, productive activity, and 'consumption' or 
appropriation in a way more clearly resembling Marx' use of 
'appropriation'. For Hegel means to argue here that the individual 
undertakes productive activity in virtue of the experience of definite 
needs, that literal productive activity must be undertaken towards the 
satisfaction of these, and that the final feature of this activity is 
the using or appropriating of products. 
This brief analysis shows, I think, the positive relationships 
between the key concepts of Marx' theory of praxis and parts of Hegel's 
thought. Both describe nature in relation to productive activity in a 
49Hegel, (Knox), p. 122-126; Grundlinien, pp. 165 and 169-170. 
socf. Hegel, (Knox), PP• 128-129; Grundlinien, p. 173. 
51 Cf. Hegel, (Knox), p. 129; Grundlinien, p. 173. See also Hegel, 
(Knox), p. 269, addendum 125 to paragraph fl 196. 
s2cf. Hegel, (Knox), P• 129; Grundlinien, P· 173. 
53cf. Hegel, (Knox), P• 269, addendum 125 to paragraph fl 196. 
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way that is generally similar. Those concepts which comprise Marx• notion 
of 'objectification• are discoverable in Hegel. There is a strong 
similarity between Marx and Hegel in terms of the function of needs in 
experience of the productive agent, and an analogy between Marx• concept 
of •appropriation' and Hegel's comments on the relation between product 
and need. 
I consider next the relation of Marx to Hegel on the question of 
society and the relation of the individual to society. It will be more 
difficult to bring out this. connection, since the· relationships on this 
point are not as clear cut as those obtaining on the question of praxis. 
But I shall try to show that, in spite of critical differences, some 
strong similarity obtains between Marx and Hegel on the question of the 
productive agent as social. 
We saw in chapter one (pp. 40-44) that, for Marx, praxis renders 
social relationships possible. Marx' argument for this statement was 
twofold. First, insofar as the appropriable product resulting from 
productive activity is external to the producer, then it can be taken up 
54 for use both by that producer and by others. Thus the product intoduces 
into the environment of the individual the possibility of his activity's 
55 being related to by others. And second, since the product is the 
54 Cf. Marx, 11Manuscripts of 1844, 11 in Easton and Guddat, p. 290; MEGA, 
Abt. 1, Bd.3, p. 84. 
55 
Cf. Marx-Engels, The German Ideology, Pascal, pp. 17-18; MEGA, 
Abt.1, Bd.5, pp. 18-1'9," 
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objectification of the agent himself, of his own activity as determined 
I 
by those definite needs which he experiences as his own, and since another 
who appropriates this product does so in virtue of his experience of 
relevantly similar needs, it follows that productive activity makes 
possible interaction between concrete individuals. "In your satisfaction 
and your use of my product I would have had the direct and conscious 
satisfaction that my work satisfied a human need; ••• that it created an 
object appropriate to the need of another human being. 1156 
Concepts analogous to those employed by Marx in arguing that the 
structure of praxis renders social relationships possible are found in 
Hegel's analysis of the concrete individual agent, in "Das Geistige 
Tierreich und der Betrug." In his initial description of agency here, 
Hegel asserts that concrete agency involves as its result some external 
object or product. And this product embodies within itself some feature 
of the concrete nature of the agent, the " ••• subjectively presented 
purpose ••• " (Zweck) 57 ±n virtue of which the details of his activity are 
determined.58 
Hegel goes on to argue that it is in virtue of the externality of 
the product or object of the concrete agent that this agent comes into 
56Marx, "Excerpt-Notes of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 291; MEGA, 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 546. 
57cf. Hegel, Phanomenologie, p. 286. 
58cf. also Hegel, {Baillie), p. 426; Phanomenologie, p. 290. "The 
work produced is the reality which consciousness gives itself." 
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relationships with others. 59 The object of activity externalizes the 
details of that activity of which it is a result. But insofar as the 
object is external, persons other than its producer are capable of 
relating to it. In this sense, to say that, "the work is ••• " is to say 
that " ••• it is for other individuals ••• 1160 And since the product is in 
itself determined by the details of the activity of which it is a result, 
and thus some features of its producers own self, those others who relate 
themselves to the agent's own product also relate themselves to the 
agent's self. Thus concrete activity yields interaction between concrete 
individuals. 
There ~re both points of similarity and differences between Hegel's 
and Marx' a~guments. But both would claim that the event of concrete 
agency implies social relationships, and Marx would agree with Hegel's 
subsequent argument that the concrete agent is necessarily a social 
59cf. Hegel, (Baillie), p. 426; Ph~nomenologie, p. 291. This point is 
shown in a single text, one couched in the language of Hegel's analysis 
of this phase of the Phenomenology. "The work is thus thrown out into a 
subsisting fmrm where the specific character of the original nature does 
in fact come out as against other determinate natures, encroaches on them, 
just as these in their turn encroach on it, and is lost as a vanishing 
moment in this general process." 
60uegel, (Baillie), p. 426; Phanomenologie, p. 291. 
61 individual. 
-350-
61rn passing, let me note some points of difference. Hegel begins his 
analysis of the experience of the concrete agent with an analysis of the 
individual's experience of himself as possessed of ap "original nature." 
Marx does not analyze this concept in arguing that social relationships 
are engendered through praxis, although the analysis of Marx' position 
vis a vis Prudhon in chapter two shown that he would agree with Hegel's 
position that this concept is not viable. Cf. Marx, The Poverty of 
Philosophy, (New York: International Publishers, 1963, p. 32; Marx, 
Misere de la Philosophie, (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1946), pp. 31-32. 
Marx here argues t~at the concept of 'homo economicus' which comprehends 
the individual in society as one who undertakes productive activity in 
virtue of certain innate and definite needs will not do. One might hold 
here that Marx argues against the concept of the agent as possessed of 
an "original nature" in Hegel's sense of that term. 
Further, Marx does not distinguish or analyze the distinction 
between specific "design" and general purpose, the analysis of which, 
as pointed out in chapter three, is crucial to Hegel's description of the 
experience of the concrete agent. 
And finally, it seems that Hegel would consider the argument 
concerning the necessary sociality of the individual found in his 
introduction to the dialectic of Self Consciousness to be more fundamental 
than the argument exhibited here, because in that latter dialectic it is 
argued that interpersonality is necessary in order that the self conscious 
subject be itself fully, i.e., in order that the desire which constitutes 
the experience of that subject be adequately handled from within its own 
experience. Marx makes no analysis of general desire, and thus no such 
argument is available to him. Cf. O'Malley, Review of Politics, 1966, 
p. 524. O'Malley notes that even the need for a 'human' society, i.e., 
one in which those economic factors responsible for alienation are 
overcome, is the result of definite developments in the interacting 
forces and relations of production. Nonetheless, Marx and Hegel do agree 
concerning the limited question of the relation between productive activit) 
and social experience. 
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Mar~ of. course further argues that society conditions the details 
of praxis, the concrete productive activities of individuals, occuring 
within it. In the context of Marx' arguments, the meaning of this 
statement was seen to be twofold. First, as the systematization of 
productive activities, society offers such activities in definite forms 
as options to its members. 62 And second, individual activity itself both 
utilizes materials which are socially provided, and provides an 
" 
externalized result which is capable of being further determined by the 
social milieu into which it is introduced. 63 Here the details of 
productive activity are influenced by the fact that, " ••• what I make 
from myself I make for society, conscious of my nature as social. 1164 
Hegel in the Philosophy of Right def ends this same point in his 
analysis of needs. He first describes the multiplication of needs as 
arising from " ••• the differentiation and division of concrete need into 
single parts and aspects which in turn become different needs, particu-
larized and so more abstract. 1165 As the means for the satisfaction of 
concrete needs become more complex, those needs themselves differentiate 
and become particularized. In Hegel's language, such needs become 
62cf. Marx-Engels, The German Ideology, trans. Pascal, p. 18; MEGA, 
Abt. 1, Bd. 5, p. 19, where Marx describes society as such a system, 
and then notes that society " ••• is itself a 'productive force'." 
63cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 306; MEGA 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 116, where Marx introduces this point through the 
example of scientific activity. 
64Ibid. 
65Hegel, (Knox), p. 127; Grundlinien, p. 171. 
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"abstract, 1166 i.e., become the differentiated and particular elements of 
a need which is yet single, and in which they are included. 
These differentiated needs, or elements of needs, however, now 
enable their subject to relate concretely to the productive activity 
of others. For the activity or work of others may relate itself to those 
differentiated needs which the individual experiences as his own. As 
Hegel puts it, "Needs and means, as things existent realiter, become 
something which has being for others, by whose needs and work satisfactio 
for all alike is conditions. 1167 If, to take a basic example, the 
individual's need for food differentiates itself into the needs for land, 
seed, livestock, and agricultural implements, then he may be dependent 
on the productive activity of others for the last two, or perhaps three, 
materials required for his own productive activity. 
Three implications follow from this analysis, each of which 
approaches the conclusion that the productive activity of the individual 
is conditioned by the socially systematized milieu of productive 
activities within which he is located. First the differentiated needs 
which the individual as an individual experiences are in their content 
influenced by the details of the activity of others as that activity 
relates to these needs. 68 For example, the individual's need for 
66 rbid., (# 191). 
67rhid., (# 192). 
68Cf. Ibid. "The abstract characteristic, universality, is the 
characteristic of being recognized and in the moment which makes concrete 
i.e., social, the isolated and abstract needs and their ways and means 
of satisfaction." 
r 
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agricultural implements is determined as the need for implements of a 
specific sort, in virtue of the activity of others which renders these 
concretely available to'him. Second, the concrete activity of the 
individual is in turn conditioned by the activity of others, as is the 
activity of others conditioned by the individual's own work. 69 This is 
the case because, on the one hand, the details of individual's work 
derives from those differentiated needs which are influenced in their 
content, and, on the other hand, the activity of others is here 
undertaken in response to the needs of the individual whose content his 
own work manifests. 70 
These two implications alone support the conclusion that the 
productive activity of the individual is conditioned by the social milieu, 
that the activity of the productive individual is conditioned by his 
specific relations to the actions of others. This conclusion is further 
strengthened by the fact that, for the human productive agent, needs are 
experienced as arising out of his social context. Hegel notes that in 
virtue of the two points just discussed it can be said that, "This 
social moment thus becomes a particular end--determinant (Zweckbestimmug) 
for means in themselves and their acquisition, as well as for the manner 
in which needs are satisfied. 1171 Since the content of the differentiated 
particular needs of the individual are contentually influenced by his 
~ 
·'Cf. Hegel, (Knox), p. 298, addendum 120 to paragraph # 189, Hegel 
recognizes this point in this text. 
70cf. Reyburn, The Ethical Theory of Hefel, (Oxford: The Clarendon 
gress 1 1921), 2· 217. ReyRurn recogn1zeshat social production yields 
••• division or labour ••• , but does not analyze the argument for this 
which I take to be implicit in Hegel's text. 
71 
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actual relations to the productive activity of others, the content of 
these more generic needs of which the noted differentiations are 
particular elements is also influenced by these relations, as are the 
active means available to the individual for the satisfaction of these 
more generic needs. 
The general conclusion that follows is that, for Hegel, the options 
for productive activity available to the individual are essentially 
conditioned and constituted by the individual's relations to the 
productive activity of others, i.e., by his social relations. This 
conclusion is thoroughly amenable to Marx' doctrine of the relation of 
individual and society, although Marx does not offer a single and unified 
argWll2Ilt for it, such as can be found in the texts of Hegel. Both 
authors share an insistence that society comprises a systematization of 
productive activities, and that this systematization essentially 
influences the productive acts of society's individual members; both are 
capable in this sense of asserting that " ••• society itself produces ~ 
as man ••• 1172 
From this we can see further points of similarity between the 
positions of Marx and Hegel regarding the essentially social nature of 
the experience of the productive individual. The first involves a 
reference to Marx' concept of "totalization." It was seen in chapter one 
(see pp. 60ff) that, for Marx the subject of praxis, as social, is in 
principle capable of "totalization," i.e., of self actualization in a 
72 Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 305; MEGA, 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 116. 
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consistently developing fashion. For society, as the systematization of 
various forms of productive activities offers these various forms of 
activities to the individual as real options, thus expanding the horizons 
of his options for praxis. In addition, society itself is the source of 
needs which the individual as social may experience as his own, and thus 
may operationalize in his productive activity. Hegel seems to recognize 
at least the second of these two influences of society on the individual 
clearly. In the point we were just considering, Hegel claims that the 
differentiated, particular needs of the individual are influenced in thei 
content by the individual's relations to the activities of others. One 
implication of this is that the needs of the individual differentiate and 
specifically particularize themselves precisely in terms of these 
relations. It is in virtue of this differentiation that the individual 
is capable of engaging in ever more complex forms of productive activity. 
So if these differentiations are to be comprehended in terms of the in-
dividual's relations to others, then it is in virtue of these relations 
that his actuality as an agent consistently develops, and that he becomes 
a more 'total' subject of praxis. 73 
73 Cf. Reyburn, op. cit., p. 217. Also cf. Hegel, (Knox) pp. 129 and 
128; Grundlinien, pp. 173 and 172. Hegel's language in the Philosophy 
of Right is ambiguous concerning this point. Reyburn notes that, "The 
very division of labour which springs up in the economic world in order 
to satisfy needs begets new ones ••• " This would seem consistent with the 
statements discussed above. But unhappily, Hegel's own language 
concerning "division of labor" (Teilung der Arbeiten) is equivocal. At 
one point he asserts that, "By this division, the work of the individual 
becomes less complex, and consequently his skill at the section of the 
job increases, like his output." This comment would for Marx describe 
the 'fragmentation' rather than the 'totalization' of the individual. 
But, as I hope my argument above shows, Hegel's texts .La down the 
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One fihal analogy between Marx' doctrine of the essentially social 
nature of the productive individual and Hegel involves the position 
expressed in Marx' assertion that, "To be objective, natural, sentient 
and at the same time to have an object, nature, or sense outside oneself 
or be oneself object, nature, and sense for a third person is one and 
h . 1174 the same t ing. It was seen in chapter one (see pp.67ff) that this 
statement means that insofar as the individual agent enjoys real 
relations of praxis with his environment, he is describable both as a 
subject, in this case a subject of needs, and as an object, one whose 
experience is capable of being determined by the actions of others. 75 
The full determination of the experience of the individual involves the 
individual's being the object of the acts of others, as well as being the 
subject of his own needs and activities. It is the social environment 
which allows the individual to be such an object, and thus society which 
determines his experience with necessary concreteness. 
premisses upon which he might discuss "division of labor" in a more 
general fashion, thus arriving at a sense of Reyburn's comment, then, is 
not fundamentally in error. And Hegel does at least assert, with regard 
to the experience of needs, that, " ••• this social moment has in it the 
aspect of liberation, i.e., the strict natural necessity of need is 
obscured, and man is concerned with his own opinion, indeed with an 
opinion that is universal, and with a necessity of his own making 
alone ••• " This means that the social individual is capable, in virtue of 
his social nature, of experiencing and acting upon a broader range of 
needs than the hypothesized a-social agent might be capable of enjoying. 
7~arx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, op. cit., p. 325; 
!'!_EGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 161. 
75c£. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 326; MEGA, 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 161. A being which is not itself an object for a third 
being has no being for its object, that is, is not related objectively, 
its being is not objective." 
r 
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Hegel, as I see it, offers an argument which has a similar 
conclusion. For Hegel, the individual human agent must be described as 
76 
one for whom needs "multiply" or develop. One necessary form of this 
"multiplication" of needs is the differentiation of more generic needs 
77 into their particular components or elements. This differentiation 
in its details occurs in terms of the individual subject's relations to 
the activity of others. 78 But this means that the concrete individual is 
the object of the activities of others, as well as the subject of his 
own needs and activities. In fact he must be such an object in order to 
be a concrete individual agent in an adequate sense. Thus for Hegel as 
for Marx, the concrete agent is one who must be described as the object 
of the activities of others, as well as the subject of his own activities 
and needs. 
II Marx' Critique of Hegel 
To this point I have considered analogies between the positions of 
Marx and Hegel with regard to the questions of the nature of productive 
activity, and the essentially social nature of the productive agent. 
Regarding the latter question we have seen that both Marx and Hegel 
claim that, a) productive activity renders possible social relations 
between concrete individuals; b) society conditions the details of such 
activity available to its individual members; c) society renders possible 
76cf. Hegel, (Knox), p. 127; Grundlinien, p. 171. 
77cf. Ibid. 
78cf. Ibid. , ( 192). 
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the 'totalization' of the agent; d) society allows the individual to be 
determined as the object of the activities of others, as well as the sub-
ject of his own activities and needs. 
But at this point there is a divergence between the positions of 
Marx and Hegel, one whose ramifications will be critical for the 
remainder of my argument. Both Marx and Hegel argue that the individual 
is essentially social, but the contents of their respective arguments 
for this assertion point up significant differences between them. Marx 
attempts to show that society and praxis imply one another. All 
genuinely productive ·activity results in "objectification." This 
objectification involves the externalization of the agent. As so 
externalized, the individual is in principle capable of entering into 
social relationships. Conversely~ the experience of the individual 
includes determinations introduced therein by others, and these are 
determinations df the individual as an agent. In his active relationships 
with the external world, the individual utilizes materials and productive 
options which are constituted by society, and his needs themselves are 
socially as well as individually constituted. The argumentative details 
of these assertions were exposed in chapter one, and need not be repeated 
here. But the conclusion to be drawn is that, for Marx, to say that the 
individual is necessarily social is to say that society and praxis imply 
each other. 
Hegel also argues that the individual must be described as neces-
sarily and essentially social. At certain junctures in his thought he 
also maintains that concrete social relations arise out of productive 
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activity, as well as that society essentially conditions productive 
activity. But it does not seem to be the case that Hegel's basic 
argument concerning the essentially social nature of the individual leads 
to the same specific conclusion as Marx' arguments. The two arguments 
most basic to Hegel's conc·lusion that the individual is necessarily a 
social individual are those involving his analyses of the subject of will 
in the Philosophy of Right, and the subject of self consciousness in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit. I shall mention the first briefly, and analyze 
the second in more detail. 
In the Philosophy of Right it is the individual subject of will who 
must occur as a social individual. The subject of will is one who require1 
consciousness of the~ " ••• desirable in and for itself ••• " as a standard 
for his activities. 79 But if this subject is taken simply as an 
individual, an examination of its experience reveals a number of 
anamolies. First, since the good as object of the individual's will 
abstracts from all determinate content, it offers no adequate standard 
for the evaluation of a specific action as good. 80 Second, as an 
individual, the subject of will is thrown back upon a dependence on the 
caprice of his own conscience.for awareness of "the good" and thus cannot 
81 be said to possess the objective ethical standard which he requires. 
And third, the individual is forced to constitute his own experience as 
a standard for his acts, and again is denied an ethical standard which 
is objective. 82 
~Reyburn, p. 172, Cf. also.Hegel, (K.~ox), p. 87, Grundlinien, p. 116. 
80cf. Hegel, (Knox), p. 90; Grundlinien, p. 121. 
81cf. Hegel, (Knox), p. 91; Grundlinien, p. 122. 
82cf. Hegel, (Knox), p. 92; Grundlinien, p. 124. 
r 
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Hegel goes on to argue that just as the subject of will cannot be 
adequately comprehended as a mere individual, he may be adequately 
comprehended as an individual whose experience is essentially social, as 
an individual participating the life of society. For society is the 
product of will, as the embodiment of personal activities in the concrete 
83 
world. It is at the same time a system of customs and norms which is 
both objective, as transcending the caprice of individual experience 
k . 1 d d . . 84 ta en simp y, an eterminate in content. If the individual subject 
of will is described as participating the life of society, then society 
can be described as providing that determinate and objective ethical 
standard which the individual requires. Thus the individual subject as 
will, in order to be an adequate subject, must be, and must be 
comprehended as, one who participates the life of society, or one whose 
experience is essentially social. 
The above merely restates briefly an argument developed in greater 
detail in chapter three. But this restatement calls attention to a 
notable contrast between the positions of Marx and Hegel. Both Marx 
and Hegel argue that the individual is essentially social, but differ in 
respect of the arguments which each offers in its support. For Marx, to 
say that the individual is essentially social means that society and 
praxis are mutually implicative. For Hegel, this claim means that the 
I 
conscious subject must be social in order that he be an adequate subject 
of will, who requires social life. And for Hegel, the social life in 
which this subject participates is the life of ethical mind embodied in 
83cf. Bernard Bourgeoisl La Pensee Politique de Hegel, (Paris: Presse 
Universitaires de France, 969), p. 114. 
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the world or in being, of mind as "objective." 
The contrast between the positions of Marx and Hegel is heightened 
when one turns to an analysis of Hegel's argument for this position in 
his introduction to the dialectic of Self Consciousness in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit. There, we may recall, Hegel argues that the 
self conscious subject must experience relationships with others, must 
be recognized by others, in order that the desire which initially 
constitutes self con~ciousness may be adequately explained, and in order 
that the self conscious subject may comprehend himself as a personal 
individual. This point may be briefly resumed. 
The self conscious subject is constituted through a desire to 
overcome that contradiction in its object through which that object appear 
as both its own, its 'life,' and as other than itself.as In virtue of 
this desire, the self conscious subject is an agent who works to transfor 
its object.aG But agency as work is not a fully adequate manner in 
which the self conscious subject may relate to its own desire, and this 
for two reasons. First, although work transforms the object, the 
externality and independence of this object from its subject still remains 
and the object continues to be experienced by the subject as external and 
a7 independent. And second, the subject comprehends its own desire in 
terms of the details of the object at which this desire is directed.as 
85Hegel, (Baillie), p. 220; Phanomenologie, p. 135. 
86cf. Hegel, (Baillie), p. 23a; Phanomenologie, p. 149. 
87cf. Hegel, (Baillie), p. 225; Phanomenologie, p. 139. 
Sacf. Ibid. 
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If this object is experienced as fundamentally external to the subject, 
the subject experiences the content of his desire as other than and 
external to himself. This means that the self conscious subject here does 
not and can not comprehend itself as a personal individua1. 89 
But this subject may more adequately relate to its desire, and may 
comprehend itself as a personal individual, if it is recognized as such b 
another self consciousness, if its experience is intersubjective. For 
here, first, the other is the object of the original self consciousness, 
and is at the same time its self, as the recognition of itself. Thus 
here the externality of the object is more thoroughly overcome than is 
possible when the object is the object of work. 90 And second, in that 
the object of the self conscious subject is, for that subject, the 
recognition of itself, then this object provides the subject with an 
adequate basis on which to comprehend itself as a personal indi~idua1.9l 
Moreover, the self conscious subject must comprehend itself as a personal 
' 
individual. For this subject to be adequately a self conscious subject, 
it must not only exist as the source and locus of its own desire, but mus 
also comprehend itself as such. Thus the full constitution of the self 
conscious subject requires that this subject be recognized by another 
self consciousness, that it occur in a context which is intersubjective 
or, broadly speaking, social. 
89cf. Hypolite, Studies on Marx and Hegel, trans. John O'Neill, 
(New York: Basic Books, 1969), p. 162. 
90cf. Hegel, (Baillie), pp.· 225-226; Ph~nomenologie, p. 139. 
9lcf. Hegel, (Baillie), pp. 226-227, and 229; PhMnamoneologie, pp. 
140 and • 141. 
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It was important to recall this argument, in order to see its bearin 
on Hegel's conclusion that the individual is necessarily social. As was 
the case in the previous argument, it is here the conscious subject whose 
experience includes, and must include, a social dimension. Further, this 
subject requires some social dimension in order that its experience be 
adequately realized as a conscious subject. In this case, the subject is 
the self conscious subject of experience, and a social dimension to its 
experience, recognition by another, is requisite in order that the subject 
comprehend itself as a personal individual. And finally, the 'society' 
or 'intersubjective' milieu which Hegel describes here is essentially a 
series of relationships between individuals who are to be described 
primarily as conscious subjects. 
I consider this argument from the Phenomenology of Spirit more 
fundamental than the argument found in the Philosophy of Right. The latte 
is devoted to arguing that certain conditions are necessary in order that 
the personal individual be an adequate subject of will, whereas the former 
argues that certain conditions are necessary in order that the subject be 
a personal individual at all, i.e., comprehend itself as such. But in 
both arguments the general issue is the same, for in both social relations 
are described as necessary for the.adequate co~stitution of the conscious 
subject, and in both 'society' is described as a system of relations 
between conscious subjects. 
Marx' description of society, and of the individual in relation to 
society, differs from this description of Hegel's. Several texts, among 
them the Paris Manuscripts and the German Ideology illustrate this. 
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First, society for Marx, is to be understood as a system of productive 
relations, or as a series of relations between productive individuals. 
When in the Paris Manuscripts Marx asserts that, " ••• what I make from 
myself I make for society, conscious of my nature as social, 1192 the 
import of this statement is that the individual's " ••• nature as social" 
derives from the fact that productive activity is that which brings the 
individual into social relations: " ••• I.make for society ••• " Social 
relations then are to be described most fundamentally as productive 
93 
relations. 
Second, Marx insists on describing the individual who is 
essentially social as the productive individual or subject of praxis, the 
agent. The texts cited above from the Manuscripts of 1844 indicates that 
for Marx it is productive activity or praxis which brings the individual 
concretely into social relations. And in the German Ideology as well, 
men, that is, social beings, distinguish themselves essentially through 
which " ••• they begin to produce their means of subsistence ••• " 94 
92Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844, in Easton and Guddat, p. 306; MEGA, 
Abt. 1, Bd. 1, p. 116. 
93 Cf. Marx-Engels, The German Ideology, trans. Pascal, p. 18; MEGA, 
1, 5, p. 19. This is also implied in the German Ideology_, in Marx' 
statement that, "By social we understand the cooperation of several 
individuals, no matter under what conditions, in what manner and to wha~ 
end. It follows from this that a certain mode of production or industrial 
stage, is always combined with a certain mode of cooperation, and that 
this mode of cooperation is itself a 'productive force'." 
/ 
94Marx-Engcls, The German Ideology, trans. Pascal, p. 7; MEGA, 
Abt. 1, Bd. 5, p. 10. 
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Marx' descriptions of society and of the social individual, then, 
differ from Hegel's description of those notions. Two further points 
must be added as well. Marx not only differs in his description of 
society and the social individual from Hegel, he objects to the Hegelian 
description. Marx insists on describing society, the subject of the 
process of history, 95 as essentially constituted through productive rela-
tions. Hegel and the Young Hegelians were unable to comprehend history 
adequately in Marx' opinion because they did not comprehend the subject 
of the historical process, society, in this fashion. 96 Further, Marx' 
basis for holding that society is fundamentally a system of productive 
relations is his position that man is fundamentally a productive agent, 
a subject of praxis. For Marx, it is the structure of praxis which 
renders social relations possible. Also, society is described as a 
system of productive relations because it is taken by Marx to be a system 
97 
of relationships between productive agents. It would seem then that 
Marx' quarrel with Hegel's description of social relationships rests on 
a basic objection to certain aspects of Hegel's description of the social 
individual. 
95cf. Marx-Engels, The German Ideology, trans. Pascal, p. 18; MEGA, 
Abt. 1, Bd. 5,p. 19. "Further that multitude of productive forms 
accessible to men determines the nature of society, and hence that the 
'history of humanity' must always be studied and treated in relation to 
the history of industry and exchange." 
~6Marx-Engels, The German Ideology, trans. Pascal, p. 4; ~' Abt. 1, 
Bd. 5, p. 8. 
97Marx-Engels, The German Ideology, trans. Pascal, p. 17; ~' Abt. 1, 
Bd. 5, P• 19. 
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It is a.t this point that the question of Marx' att:J..tude to Hegel's 
description of the individual and of productive activity comes to the 
fore. I have shown that Marx' doctrines of society and praxis bear 
strong analogy to certain concepts found in Hegel's texts. Lobkowicz 
goes so far as to assert that, " ••• almost everything which Marx says 
98 
about labor can be traced back to Hegel." And Marx himself seems to 
be generally aware of this. Marx gives Hegel credit for grasping " ••• 
the nature of work, ••• " and comprehending " ••• objective Itlan, authentic 
. 99 because actual, as the result of his own work." This :indicates, I 
suggest, Marx' recognit:i_on that those categories required to describe 
"work" or praxis adequately are to be found in Hegel. But Lobkowicz is 
also correct in noting that on this point, Marx," ••• dissociates himself 
. "100 f h from Hegel easily ••• , for much of the portion o t e Paris 
Manuscripts devoted to Hegel is comprised of a number of sustained 
arguments against Hegel's view of the individual in relation to his own 
praxis (or 'work'). 
I shall devote the remainder of this chapter to showing that, 
while Marx recognizes his debt to Hegel for those concepts which he 
utilizes to describe the nature of praxis, he nonetheless levels a 
critical argument against what he takes to be Hegel's description of 
human nature. The kernel of this argument is that, for Marx, Hegel's 
description of the human individual as a conscious subject renders it 
98Lobkowicz, Theory and Practice p. 321. 
99Marx, "Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, P• 321; 
~, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 156. 
lOOLobkowicz, op. cit~, loc. cit. 
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impossible for him to theoretically describe the individual as an agent, 
a subject of praxis. This means that Marx' main quarrel with Hegel 
pertains to the relationship of the categories of consciousness and praxis 
in an adequate theory of human nature. Several commentators have pointed 
this out generally. Lobkowicz, for example, notes that, " ••• the 
difference consists in Hegel viewing the transformation effected by 
bodily labor as a premisse and a subordinate form of the ultimate, 
reconciling transfiguration achieved by speculative thought, while Marx 
is and increasingly will be induced to see all theoretical activities 
101 
as only an epiphenomenon of labor and practice in general." But then 
Lobkowicz goes on to say that the basis of Marx' objection to Hegel on 
this point is that Marx, " ••• accuses Hegel 
1 . . .. 102 a ienation ••• Marx does indeed assert 
of camauflaging man's 
this, 103 but his objection 
to Hegel is something more fundamental. Calvez points out that Marx 
objects to Hegel's doctrine of consciousness on two specific points: 
that Hegel can only account for specific phases of conscious experience 
104 in terms of their pointing beyond themselves to some succeeding phase, 
lOllbid., p. 340. 
l02Ibid., p. 341. 
l03cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 321; MEGA, 
Abt. 1, Bel. 3, p. 257. "provisionally, let us say this much in advance: 
Hegel's standpoint is that of modern political economy. He views labor 
as the essence, the self confirming essence of man he sees only the 
positive side of labor, not its negative side~" 
104cf. Calvez, La Pens~e de Karl Marx, (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 
1956), p. 355. 
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and that Hegel can only account for the development of conscious 
experience as a whole in terms of this development's pointing beyond 
itself to the achievement of absolute knowledge. 105 
I shall consider these of Marx' objections to Hegel subsequently, 
but in the context of showing that they depend on the more fundamental 
objection that Hegel, in describing the individual as essentially a 
conscious subject, is unable to proceed from this to a description of 
the individual as a productive agent. This argument is critical for 
Marx, because it leads him to conclude that the individual must be 
described as fundamentally a productive agent, because such a description 
of the individual can proceed to a further description of him as a 
conscious subject. It is in the sense brought out in this argument 
which Marx constructs against Hegel that Marx holds praxis to be the 
fundamental category of an adequate theory of human nature, and the 
category in terms of which''co~scio¥sness' is to be understood. 
Marx' argument against Hegel's description of the individual as 
essentially a conscious subject focuses initially on Hegel's correlative 
description of the nature of the object in relation to the conscious 
subject. And the point to which Marx calls attention in his criticism 
of Hegel involves an interpretation of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit 
from the standpoint of its last chapter. Given Hegel's doctrine of 
absolute knowledge, what are the implications of that doctrine for a 
concept of the "object" in general? Marx' response to this question is 
105 Cf. Ibid., p. 355. 
r 
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that, "The main point is that the object of consciousness is nothing more 
than self-consciousness, or that the object is only objectified self 
106 
consciousness, self consciousness as object. There are of course 
implications in this statement concerning the meaning of self 
consciousness as well as concerning the meaning of the object as such. 
But it is with the latter that Marx finds his primary interest. And that 
meaning, for Marx, amounts to this: that an object is an object in virtue 
of some determination which it receives from the subject to which it is 
related, and that, for Hegel, the determination which an object receives 
from its subject is that of the object's "being for" the subject as 
conscious subject. Or, for Hegel, as Marx reads the texts, the subject 
which determines the object as object, which 'constitutes' the object as 
such, is only a conscious subject. Therefore that determination which 
is constitutive of the object is exclusively a mental, Marx would say 
'spiritual' (geistige) determination. And this doctrine has, for Marx, 
two unfortunate implications. First, it implies that the human subject 
can only be validly understood to be a conscious, or better, a self-
conscious, subject.~ For Hegel, human nature, man, is equivalent to self 
consciousness. 11107 And second, the object as conceived by Hegel can be 
106 Cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 322; ~' 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 157. 
l07Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, P•' 323; MEGA, 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 158. 
---:::::.: 
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exhaustively described through a description of those conceptual or 
'spiritual' determinations through which it is constituted by the 
108 
subject. 
Marx justifies this critical interpretation of Hegel's doctrine 
of the object by a series of statements, which he draws from the last 
chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit, and which he takes to accurately 
describe Hegel's understanding of the relationship between the object of 
consciousness and consciousness itself. First, " ••• the object as such 
i lf . hi . h. ,.109 presents tse to consciousness as somet ng vanis ing. Insofar as 
an item is conside~ed to be simply an isolated datum with no definite 
relation to a subject, then such an item cannot be referred to as an 
'object' in the proper sense of the term. Or, insofar as an item is 
described simply in terns of those characteristics which are proper to 
it as an isolated entity, simply as it occurs "in itself," then there is 
no way in which one can, from that description alone, determine the 
nature of that item in terms of its being located in the range of 
experience of a subject. And thus such an item cannot be ref erred to as 
an object, because to be an object means to be located in the range of 
experience of a subject, in some determinable fashion. This point calls 
to mind Hegel's description of the supposed object of "sense certainty" 
l08cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, op. cit., 
p. 324; MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 159. "Totality of its aspects gives the 
object implicitly a spiritual nature, and it truly becomes this nature fo 
consciousness through the apprehension of every one of these aspects as 
belonging to the self or through what was earlier called the spiritual 
relation to them.-.. ~-
lO~rx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 323; MEGA, 
Abt. l, Bd. 3, p. 158; Hegel, (Baillie), p. 789; PhMnomenologie, p:-549. 
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towards its "object," namely that its object is an isolated datum 
containing all its determinations in itself, then it cannot be validly 
described as an object; the only thing which can be said of the item is 
that, " ••• the thing is; and it is merely because it is. It is - this is 
the essential point for sense knowledge, and that bare fact of being, 
h . 1 . d. . . h .. 110 t at simp e imme iacy, constitutes its trut • This description of 
the object is the ultimate implication of that attitude of consciousness 
towards its object and towards itself which Hegel in the "Introduction" 
to the Phenomenology entitles the "natural standpoint. 11111 And the virtu 
.of this attitude is found in its being overcome through the describable 
development of consciousness itself. 
The description of an item as isolated and simply intrinsically 
determined, then, will not do as a description of the object qua object 
of consciousness. And it will not do because, as noted above, from such 
a description alone no determination can be made of the location of the 
object in the range of experience of the subject. In order to surmount 
this difficulty, some description must be offered which shows the object 
to receive an essential determination from the subject, from 
consciousness. And this is the case because only from such a description 
of the object can it be shown that the object counts necessarily in the 
range of experience of the subject. It is for this reason that Hegel, 
according to Marx' restatement of his position, now asserts that, 
llOHegel, (Baillie), p. 150; Phanomenologie, p. 80. 
111cf. Hegel, (Baillie), p. 135; PhHnomenologie, p. 67. 
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" ••• it is the externalization of self consciousness which establishes 
112 thinghood." 
Great care must be taken in the interpretation of this text. Marx 
is not, I think, accusing Hegel of maintaining that the distinction of 
consciousness and its object is the result of some original bifurcating 
act of the ego, a position which Hegel himself in the Phenomenology 
refers to as " ••• a onesided, unsound idealism ••• 11113 Rather, I take Marx 
at this phase of 1 ~he Manuscripts to be attributing to Hegel a more subtle 
doctrine of the relation of consciousness and object, involving several 
claims. "Thinghood" or objectivity involves an item's being "for another 
as well as involving simply intrinsic determinations, and that its being 
for another, for consciousness, is a real and essential determination of 
the thing, not merely a further determination added on to those which 
it might already involve. Three features of this statement must be noted 
A formal definition of the object is, on the one hand, being offered 
here. An item is an object in virtue of its being for another. The 
successful elucidation of this definition would surmount the difficulties 
consequent upon describing the object as an isolated datum. Further, 
the object's being for another is an integral aspect of the constitution 
of the object, not simply in general but in its specificity. That means 
that, insofar as an object is determined as being for another, this 
determination interacts with other determinations of the thing to 
ll2Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 323; MEGA, 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 158. Hegel, (Baillie), p. 789; Phlinomenologie, p. 549. 
ll3Hegel, (Baillie), p. 276; Ph~nomenologie, p. 278. 
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constitute the specific character of the object, or as Hegel would say to 
"work it up into shape." 
Marx does not interpret Hegel as asserting that an item might, as 
it were, enter the range of the experience of a subject as determined 
in an essentially complete fashion, and then receive the additional 
determination of being for another, from consciousness, as if this were 
merely a further determination superimposed upon the already constituted 
datum. Determinations are not added to the object the way items are 
added to a list. Rather, as the dialectic of thing and property in the 
c 
Phenomenolo1gy showi;, any determination of a given object interacts with 
its other determinations to constitute the total character of the 
114 
object. 
Finally, just as being f~r another is a determination of the object, 
it is a determination of the object. That item which is determined as 
for another possesses this feature as integrated with other features 
pertaining to it, such that this is an essential moment of the specific 
object as such or in itself; a determination of the object itself; a 
determination of the object itself, albeit one received. It is necessary 
to stipulate this in order to avoid the implication that, given Hegel's 
doctrine, the distinction between subject and object ultimately collapses 
in favor of a view which would naively understand the object as a mere 
"externalization" of consciousness, a determination by consciousness of 
itself as other, to be ultimately and dialectically overcome. This would 
be a version of that Idealism which Hegel takes to be "onesided" and 
"unsound." Rather, Hegel attempts to maintain the integrity of the obj ec 
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through arguing that its being for another is an essential moment of its 
own character, and Marx, I would suggest, recognizes this. What Marx 
does recognize as collapsing, and this will be a crucial point in a later 
stage of his argument, is the distinction of an object's being for another 
and its being for itself. He recognizes Hegel to assert that, insofar as 
being for another is a feature which the object itself possesses, it woul 
make no concrete sense to speak of the object as it might be, or to ask 
what it might be, without this feature. Being for another is simply an 
integral aspect of the object as such. And the texts of Hegel seem to 
1 h Ma . . h. . . 115 revea t at rx is correct in t is recognition. 
I offer these comments as an explanation of Marx' claim that, for 
Hegel, " ••• it is the externalization of self consciousness that establish·· 
116 
thinghood." Two other points immediately follow. First, that in 
virtue of which an object is an object, its being for another," is a 
determination which the object receives from a source other than itself 
taken simply. It is received from the subject to which it is present. 
And this is to say that it is received from consciousness, for it is 
115cf. Hegel, (Baillie), p. 175; Phanomenologie, pp. 99-100. As early 
as the end of the dialectic of perception in the Phenomenology, Hegel 
asserts the dialectic to have shown that any suggestion, " ••• which separ-
ated self existence and existence for another, drops away all together. 
The object is really in one and the same respect the opposite (Gegenteil) 
of itself - for itself 'so far as' it is for another, and for another 
'so far as' it is for itself. It is for self, reflected into self, one; 
but all this is asserted along with its opposite with its being for 
another. 
ll6cf. footnote number 12~. 
--= 
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consciousness that can realize an object as both other than itself and 
present to itself. If this is so, then it is also the case that for a 
thing to be an object is equivalent to its being for consciousness, 
capable of being realized or known by that consciousness to which it is 
present. There is, then, a fundamental equation between objectivity and 
intelligibility. And second, the determination of the object is somethin 
that consciousness does. It involves the act of consciousness' 
"externalizing" itself, relating itself to that which is other than itsel 
Thus consciousness is itself active in its relation to the object, rather 
than being simply a passive recipient of the content of the object. 
Consciousness know~ the object, and thus knows that which it has actively 
determined. 
These observations concerning the nature of the object and its 
relation to consciousness are observations made in the abstract. The 
questions which immediately pose themselves are: What are the details of 
that determination through which an object is for another as well as is 
itself? How is it that this determination is integrated with other 
features so as to preserve the autonomy of the object? And what are the 
details of that activity through which consciousness effects a 
determination in the object? Unfortunately, answers to these questions 
cannot be given here, but the reason for this is that, ultimately, the 
satisfactory answer to these questions for Hegel is the Phenomenology of 
Spirit. Hegel would argue that it is only through the dialectical 
exposition of the experience of consciousness in its several interrelated 
moments that the full detail of the nature of the object as concretely 
II 
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experienced, as well as the nature of the experiencing subject, are 
revealed. And Marx hopes to offer an account of the relation of the 
object consciousness, realizing that in Hegel's own eyes only the detailed 
development of the Phenomenology itself offers the ultimate description 
and justification of that structure. However, Marx feels that if the 
structural features of Hegel's understanding of objectivity can be 
isolated and revealed, fruitful critical reflection may ensue. 
Moving ahead in his analysis of this structure, Marx asserts that 
the understanding of consciousness as active in determining the object 
has implications for both a doctrine of consciousness and a further 
description of the object as well, " ••• that this externalization has not 
only a negative significance but a positive significance as well. 11117 
The positive signficance, that which relates to a doctrine of the object, 
is stated by Marx in a fortuously complex assertion taken from the 
Phenomenology: 
••• for self consciousness, the negative of the object or 
its self transcendence has a positive significance--self 
consciousness thus knows this negative of the object--
since self consciousness externalizes itself and in this 
externalization establishes itself as object, or establishes 
the object as itself on behalf of the indivisible unity of 
being for itself.118 
This text holds crucial importance for Marx' understanding of Hegel' 
doctrine of the object. It refers, first of all, to the object as "the 
117Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 323; MEGA, 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 158. Hegel, (Baillie), p. 789; Phanomenologie,--P:--549. 
llSibid., fmGA, pp. 158-159). 
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through "self transcendence." This is again to assert the real otherness 
of the object in relation to consciousness itself. But still, to say 
that an item is an object in virtue of consciousness' "self significance" 
concerning the nature of the object. For the object is as such 
constituted through some activity involving the "externalization" of 
consciousness relates itself to the object as its own other. And this 
activity is one through which, Marx states, consciousness " ••• establishes 
itself as object or establishes the object as itself ••• 11119 
How can this be? If it is the case that there is a real distinctio 
between consciousness and its object, how can there nonetheless be an 
identity between them? The response to this question contains, I think, 
the key to Marx' critique of Hegel's doctrine of the object. The object 
is, as has already been said, constituted through some activity whereby 
consciousness "externalizes" itself. Now this means that while it is 
distinct from consciousness, the object is determined in such a fashion 
as to be available to consciousness. It is for another. And what must 
an object be, in order for it to be in a valid sense of the term "for 
consciousness"? Marx' response in a word would be, Intelligible. 
Consciousness is that which apprehends the intelligible. An item must 
be inte;ligible in order for it to be an object for consciousness. And 
an item is determined as intelligible through some activity whereby 
consciousness "externalizes" itself, relates itself to that which is 
other, and brings that other into relation to itself. 
ll9cf. Ibid. 
r 
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For Marx, this understanding of the nature of the determination of 
the object implies the assertion that there is an identity between 
consciousness and its object, an identity that is not numerical but, as 
it were, specific. Consciousness is rational, and determines its object 
as intelligible. The object, in turn, is intelligible, that is, is for 
consciousness. It is in this sense that consciousness "externalizes 
itself" with regard to its object and establishes the object "as such." 
Consciousness establishes " ••• the object as itself ••• 11120 by bringing 
the object in relation to itself, determines it as intelligible, 
constitutes it as something which consciousness can relate to and 
apprehend in virtue of its intelligibility. It is in this sense that the 
object is the "self transcendence11121 of consciousness; it is that which 
is constituted by consciousness as intelligible. 
To complete an examination of the text at hand, we need to consider 
two other statements made in it. One is that " ••• self consciousness thus 
k h . f h b. 11122 h h h h bj i nows t e negativity o t e o Ject ••• ; t e ot er tat t e o ect s 
established "on behalf of the indivisible unity of being-for-self ••• 11123 
For in these statements the development of the discussion up to this 
point culminates. That through which an item is determined as an object 
120cf. Ibid. 
12lcf. Ibid., (MEGA, p. 158). 
122cf. Ibid. 
123cf. Ibid., (MEGA, p. 159). 
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is both a received determination, and one which is an integral and 
essential feature to the identity of the specific object. Now we have 
seen that, in Marx' critical exposition of Hegel's doctrine, for an item 
to be an object is for it to stand in relation to consciousness in virtue 
of its being intelligible. And it is the integral nature of this 
determination that Marx wishes to stress at this point. 
Intellibility is not a feature that is added to an item in virtue 
of its standing in relation to consciousness. An object is not 
intelligible and other things as well, for example sweet, white, a cube, 
etc. Rather, an item is an object in virtue of its contents being 
intelligible contents, capable of being apprehended by consciousness. 
But this is to say that the object is and only is its intelligible 
contents, that its identity is exhausted by its intelligible contents, 
that the complete description of the intelligible contents of a given 
object would be a complete and exhaustive description of that object 
itself. Nothing eise could or would be said of it. 
This is the significance of Marx' observing that the object is 
established in terms of "the indivisible unity of being-for-self." The 
term "being-for-self" is used in a way typical of the early chapters of 
the Phenomenology: a thing is for itself if it is a unity of differences 
For an item to be sweet, white, a cube, is for it to contain differences 
within itself. But qua <Object, an item is "for itself" in that it 
contains these differences within itself as a unity, and these contents 
are intelligible contents. And again, the point of cardinal importance 
in Marx' eyes is that this unity of different, intelligible contents is 
L:::::4f:=========================================ff==== 
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the object; the object is nothing more than this specific, "indivisible 
unity of being-for-self. 11124 Thus the access that consciousness has to 
its object is expressed in the statement that " ••• self-consciousness thus 
hi i f h b . ..125 knows t s negat vity o t e o Ject.... Consciousness recognizes its 
object as distinct from itself. But simultaneously consciousness has 
access to the object in that it "knows11 its object. The object is that 
which, given its character, is capable of being known by consciousness. 
Consciousness relates to the object through knowing the object, and this 
relation is the only access~which consciousness has to the object because, 
Marx holds, Hegel's position leads him to the conclusion that the object 
is only a unity of disparate intelligible contents, and thus is only 
accessible in terms of the knowing activity of consciousness itself. 
This analysis I take to reflect the "positive significance" of 
Hegel's doctrine of objectivity as understood by Marx, the implications 
of that doctrine as they bear on a fuller description of the nature of 
the object itself. But Marx also tells us that this doctrine contains 
a "negative significance," implications that lead to a fuller description 
of the nature of the conscious subject. And these implications are statec 
in a text that once again refers to the "externalizing" activity of 
consciousness: " ••• there is also present this other moment in the 
process, that self consciousness has transcended and reabsorbed into 
itself this externalization, this objectivity, and is thus at one with 
124cf. Ibid. 
125cf. Ibid., (MEGA, p. 158). 
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itself in its other being as such. 11126 
Of prime importance in this statement is the implication that, 
given the role of consciousness in relation to its object, then 
consciousness is capable of grasping itself as self consciousness. Since 
the object is determined as such through an initial activity of 
consciousness, then consciousness, in knowing its object, knows both that 
which is other than itself and that for which it is responsible. This 
is the sense in which consciousness "reabsorbes" into itself its own 
activity of "externalization": consciousness knows that which is both 
its other and that which is constituted through its own activity. Put 
otherwise, in knowing its object consciousness enjoys a relation both to 
the object and to itself. Consciousness relates to itself in virtue of 
that which it knows as other being the result of its own determining 
activity. Consciousness relates to its own activity in knowing this 
result. 
. 127 
Thus it is, " ••• one with itself in its other being as such." 
Or, given the terms of the above relation, consciousness can validly be 
described as self consciousness, as well as consciousness taken simply. 
The dialectic of the general structure of consciousness in relation to 
its object reveals that consciousness relates to its object and to itself 
within this structure. 
A point of methodological importance underlies this phase of Marx' 
analysis, and it is one which he takes to have accurately borrowed from 
Hegel. It is that, on the one hand, a description of subjectivity can 
126Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, PP• 323-324; MEG. 
.. .:...;.;;.;..;; 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 159. Cf. Hegel, (Baillie); pp. 789-790; Phanomenologie 
p. 549. 
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be obtained from an analysis of the structure of the relation of subject 
to object, and that, on the other hand, only those statements which can be 
obtained from this analysis are ones which can validly be taken to 
describe the nature of the subject. To speak of the subject at all is to 
speak of that which occurs in definite relations, in relations to objects. 
The subjects occurence is its occurence as one term in this relation. 
Thus it is an analysis of this relation which, in the first place, must 
be undertaken in order to understand what the subject is as one term in 
this relation. 
Furthermore the occurence of the subject is not simply found in, 
but also exhausted in, being a term in this relation. Thus to describe 
what the subject is in this relation is to describe it exhaustively. Or, 
a full analysis of the structure of the relation of subject to object 
provides the only theoretical context from which statements descriptive 
of the nature of subjectivity itself can be validly drawn. Hegel is able, 
for example, to analyze this structure in such a fashion as to describe 
subjectivity as involving self consciousness, and this because self 
consciousnes~ is a. feature of the subject contained within, and therefore 
revealed by an analysis of, the relationship of consciousness to its 
object. An analysis of the nature of the object, then, allows him to 
make certain assertions concerning the nature of the object as well. But 
only such assertions as are grounded in an analysis of this sort will be 
valid and acceptable. 
This point is stressed by Marx through two subsequent statements 
which all but conclude his interpretive exposition of Hegel's doctrine of 
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the object. First, the structure of the relation of consciousness as 
subject to its object is such that this structure, " ••• is the movement 
of consciousness, and consciousness is therefore the totality of its 
phases. 11128 The nature of consciousness is wholly contained in the 
structure of its relation to the object as described above, and is wholly 
described in the doctrine which is a description of that structure. 
Consciousness is that which "externalizes" itself, actively relates to 
that which is other than itself, determines that other as an object, 
knows this object, and in knowing the object relates to itself as well, 
is self consciousness. Nothing more need or may be said of consciousness 
or of the subject, for nothing more is derivable from the above analysis. 
Correspondingly, the above analysis must be taken as offering an 
exhaustive description of the nature of the object as well: II 
consciousness must similarly have related itself to the object in all of 
its aspects and have grasp~d the object in terms of each of them. 11129 
Just as the subject is that which occurs only in its relation to the 
object, the object is that which occurs only in its relation to the 
subject. Thus all "aspects" of the object, so Marx reads Hegel, are 
discoverable in terms of the above analysis. The object is in general 
that which is other than consciousness and is determined as being for its 
l2~L 
-Marx, 
Abt. 1, Bd. 
549-550. 
"Manuscripts of 1844, in Easton and Guddat, p. 324; MEGA, 
3, p. 159. Hegel, (Baillie), p. 790, Phanomenologie, pp. 
129cf. Marx, Ibid. Hegel, (Baillie), p. 790, Phgnomenologie, p. 550. 
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other, for consciousness, as well as that which holds this determination 
within itself as an integral element of its own unity. 
In fine, Marx holds that this description of the nature of the 
object reveals a description of the subject as well as a description that 
is for Hegel both adequate and complete. It is adequate in that it 
contains all that is necessary for a fundamental understanding of the 
nature of the object, and of the subject in relation to it. It is 
complete insofar as it is an analysis of the source and the only source 
of information from which a doctrine of the object and a description of 
the subject in relation to the object can be derived. Thus this relation, 
Marx asserts both in reference to Hegel and through Hegel's terminology, 
is significant both " ••• for self consciousness itself ••• " and " ••• for 
us ••• nl30 For self consciousness, the structure of the relation 
described above is the structure of its experience of its object and 
itself. For us, for the philosophical analyst, this structure is that 
and that alone which must be described in order that an adequate under-
standing of the object, and consequently of the subject also, might be 
developed. 
Adequate, that is to say, for Hegel. But is this theory actually 
complete and adequate description of the nature of the object? Marx' 
response to this is negative, but it is a response based not on insights 
concerning the consistency of the position which he outlines and 
attributes to Hegel. Marx' objection is rather that, given the internal 
consistency of the above position, it becomes impossible for Hegel to 
l3~rx, "Hanascripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 323; MEGA, 
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speak of the object as object of agency, or of the subject as agent. In 
Marx' eyes, Hegel's position is incapable of including a crucial and 
experienced phenomenon, that of agency. On this ground it is an 
inadequate view of man. 
The details of Marx' objection must be outlined here, and this can 
be done briefly given the exposition already seen. First, Marx takes the 
above description of the object in general to be one which Hegel views 
as essentially complete in all its phases. And in particular he 
emphasizes that for an item to be an object is for it to be for another, 
for consciousness. An item is determined as an object by consciousness, 
consciousness brings items as objects into some relation with itself, 
and that relation at its basis involves the thing's being intelligible. 
An item is an object if it stands in some relation to consciousness 
whereby it can be known. 
But this means that it would be superfluous for Hegel to go on to 
assert that the object is also something which receives determinations 
from the subject as an agent. And more than superfluous; to assert this 
would be for Hegel to violate the consistency of his own position. To 
be sure, Hegel does speak of consciousness as "acting" on its object in 
an extended sense of that term. But this is activity only on a cognitive 
level, and distinct from "real" activity, for which Marx' model is 
physical action which would yield some actual and productive 
transformation of an einvironment. Hegel is unable to speak of agency 
in this latter sense in relation to the object, because he has already 
argued that for a thing to be an object is for it to be an intelligible 
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item for consciousness. No ingredient of "real" agency is necessary in 
order for a thing to be so determined. And if the details of Hegel's 
description of the object as an intelligible item for consciousness form 
an essential and complete description of the object, then he would be 
inconsistent to go on to assert that the object is this and also that 
which the subject can further determine through actual and transformative 
agency: There is thus no way in which Hegel can speak of the object as 
object of agency at all. 
This phase of Marx' objection alone seems to him damning enough. 
But he goes on in the Manuscripts to develop a further implication of 
Hegel's position which he takes to be even more critical. Because Hegel 
is on his own terms unable to speak of the object as object of agency, 
he is also unable to describe the subject or self as agent. 
This implication is drawn by Marx from considerations already seen. 
The subject is nothing more (or less) than that for which objects occur. 
A description of what the subject is as it stands in relation to objects 
that are "for it" will be an exhaustive description of the subject. Now 
for the Hegel of Marx' exposition, three descriptive assertions can be 
made concerning the nature of the subject. First, since to be an object 
is to be an intelligible item for a subject, the subject by 
consciousness itself, the subject must be capable of activity on the leve 
of cognition. And third, consciousness is self consciousness; it knows 
its object as the result of its own activity. But these statements, Marx 
holds, exhaust the assertions which Hegel can validly make towards a 
description of the nature of the subject. And they in no way either 
---·--·-J!-
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mention or necessarily imply that the subject is an agent in what Marx 
would take to be an actual sense of the term: an individual who acts on 
a real and external environment in such a way as to transform it and 
produce within it. Hegel is unable to describe the subject as agent, 
and is thus unable to include in his theory of subjectivity a crucial 
and experienced feature of selfhood. 
Marx' critique of Hegel's doctrine of objectivity, then, is twofold. 
First, Hegel is capable of describing the object only as the intelligible 
bj f . 131 o ect or consciousness. Second, and in view of this,- it becomes 
further impossible for Hegel to describe the subject as anything other 
than active self consciousness: " ••• the self is only man conceived 
abstractly ••• For Hegel, human nature, man, is equivalent to self 
. 11132 
consciousness. 
Hegel, then, whom Marx priases as the only one of his predecessors 
to have grasped " ••• the nature of work ••• 11133 and to have comprehended 
" ••• objective man, authentic because of his own work, 11134 is ultimately 
condemned by Marx as unable to account for agency in a concrete sense, 
as being able only to describe action as the "labor of the concept." In 
1'31 Cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 324; 
MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 159. 
132
cf M "Ma ' of 1844," i Ea d G dd 322 d • arx, nuscripts n ston an u at, pp. , an 
323; MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 158. 
l33Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 321; MEGA 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 156. 
l34Ibid. 
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Marx' terms; "The only labor Hegel recognizes is abstract, mental labor." 
And that because his underpinning doctrine of the object in relation to 
consciousness allows him only to describe the subject as active self 
consciousness. 
In view of these difficulties, a new doctrine must be developed, a 
" ••• consistent naturalism or humanism ••• ," one " ••• distinct from Idealism 
and materialism as well, and at the same time unifying the truth of 
both. 11136 Such a doctrine would describe objects as objects of the 
subject's " ••• drives ••• " which " ••• exist outside of him as independent ••• 
as " ••• objects of his need, essential and indispensable to the exercise 
and confirmation of his essential capacities. 11137 It would at the same 
time describe the subject as concrete agent, asserting that, "Self 
consciousness is rather a quality of human nature ••• ," and not that, 
" ••• human nature is a quality of self consciousness. 11138 
Three general comments may now be made concerning the above critical 
argument which Marx levels against Hegel. First, Marx' argument is 
directed specifically at Hegel's description of the conscious, or better 
the self conscious subject, and one conclusion he derives from this 
135Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 322; MEGA, 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 257. "Die Arbeit weoche Hegel allein kennt und 
anerkennt, ist die abstrakt geistige." 
136 Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 325; MEGA, 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 160. 
137 Ibid. 
13~arx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 323; MEGA, 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 158. 
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argument is that given this description, Hegel is unable to validly 
proceed to a description of the individual subject as a real agent. Thus 
Lobkowicz is correct in his claim that, at issue between Marx and Hegel 
is, in Marx' eyes, the question of the relationship of consciousness and 
praxis as categories within a theory of human nature. 139 
Second, the criticism which Marx levels against Hegel here may not 
be taken as "Feuerbachian" in content. Marx in the Paris Manuscripts does 
credit Feuerbach with leveling three accurate criticisms against Hegel. 
Feuerbach had corrected Hegel in holding that the individual must be 
described through the totality of his determinations rather than simply 
those which pertain to him as a self conscious subject. 140 He had 
defended this statement by refuting Hegel's employment of the dialectical 
h d . 1 . . 141 met o in re ation to sense consciousness. And Feuerbach had insisted 
that, of those concrete determinations of the individual which must be 
descriptively and argumentatively located in a theory of human nature, 
h 1 f h . d" id 1 142 one essential such determination is t e socia ity o t e in iv ua • 
Now the first of these seems identical with that criticism of Hegel made 
in the argument we have just considered. But this is not in fact the 
case. For Feuerbach's criticism is that Hegel is unable to comprehend 
l39cf. Lobkowicz, Theory and Practice, p. 340. 
140cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 316; 
MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 152. 
14~arx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 317; ~' 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 152. 
142Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 316; MEGA 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 152. 
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the individual as the subject of sense consciousness, in relation to the 
object of perception as completely determined. 143 And Marx himself, as 
shown in chapter two, goes on to criticize Feuerbach as capable of 
describing " ••• the object, actuality, sensuousness ••• conceived only in 
the form of the object or perception (Anschauung), but not as sensuous 
human activity, practice (Praxis), not subjectively. 11144 
Marx, it seems, might go on to construct an argument against 
Feuerbach's position strongly analogous to the argument outlined above 
against Hegel, concluding that F~uerbach is capable of describing the 
object only as object of perception and imagination, and thus is also 
incapable of validly describing the individual as an agent or subject of 
praxis. Mclellan is incorrect in holding that, in the Paris Manuscripts, 
Feuerbach's concept of the relation of the individual subject to its 
object is " ••• taken over and elaborated by Marx, being at the root of his 
conception of the relationship of man and nature. 11145 Marx does credit 
Feuerbach for an improvement on Hegel's concept of the object in his 
realization that the object needs to be described as sunsuous. But 
ultimately Feuerbach is unable, given his theoretical foundation, to 
adequately describe this object as the object of praxis, or the individual 
as a concrete agent. This is of course precisely the question at issue 
143Feuerbach, Principles of the Philosophy of the Future, trans. Vogel, 
(Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1966), p. 51; Fauerbach, Samtliche 
Werke, ed. Bolin and Jodl, (Stuttgart: Fr. Fronnnans Verlag, 1904), vol. 
2, p. 296. 
144Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," in Easton and Guddat, p. 400; MEGA, 
Abt. 1, Bd. 5, p. 533. 
145McLcllan, The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx, (New York: Frederick 
A. Praeger, 1969), p. 108. 
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in Marx' criticism of Hegel, and thus this criticism cannot be taken as 
identical with Feuerbach's, or as Feuerbachian in content. 
The third general comment to be made is that, it is in virtue of 
this argument that Marx finds justification for holding that praxis must 
be taken as the fundamental category in a theory of human nature, or that 
man must be described as fundamentally a productive agent. Evidence for 
this is offered in the text. Immediately after his formulation of the 
argument outlined above, and after having noted that Hegel is capable of 
comprehending the object only as intelligible object and the subject as 
self conscious subject, 146 Marx goes on to assert that, "An objective 
being acts objectively, and would not act objectively if objectivity did 
not lie in its essential nature. It creates and establishes only 
11147 Th" i objects, because it is fundamentally part of nature. is s to say 
that the individual must be conceived both as one who enjoys concrete 
relations to "nature" if it is to be taken as actual, or as an "objective 
being," and that these relations must be taken as ones in which the 
individual is understood to "act objectively," i.e., in which his action 
is taken as both directed at his external environment and governed by 
148 his needs. 
146cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844, "1 in Easton and Guddat, p. 324; MEGA, 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 159. 
147Ma rx, 
Abt. 1, Bd. 
14~arx, 
Abt. 2, Bd. 
"Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 325; MEGA 
3, p. 160. 
"Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 325; MEGA, 
3, p. 161. 
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Following Marx' argument against Hegel's position immediately as it 
does, this assertion shows that., in Marx' eyes, his argument against Hege 
is also his justification for the position that productive action or 
praxis is the fundamental category through which human nature is to be 
comprehended. In Marxian terms this justification may be stated as 
follows. 
A position which defines the individual as essentially a conscious 
subject, as one whose essential relations to his own experience are 
conscious relations, is unable also to account for the individual as a 
productive agent. However a position which describes the individual as 
fundamentally a subject of praxis or a productive agent can, and indeed 
must, proceed to a description of the individual as a conscious subject. 
It can be shown, as seen in chapter one, that consciousness is itself a 
feature of the structure of praxis149 in fact a necessary feature of 
it. Now inasmuch as a theory of man which takes the individual as 
fundamentally an agent can also and indeed must also describe the 
individual as a conscious subject, and since a theory of man which takes 
the individual as essentially a conscious subject cannot also describe 
the individual as a productive agent, then the former theory is more 
adequate than and preferable to the latter. Furthermore, the latter 
theory is able to adequately describe. the individual's social relations, 
and the effects of society of the individual, phenomena which an 
adequate theory of man must describe and explain. Thus Marx' 
justification for a theory of man which asserts the fundamentality of 
149cf. Harx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, pp. 294-295; 
• 
MEGA Abt. 1 Bd_._3, p. 88.====================tl===== 
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praxis. 
It may be noted here that this criticism which Marx levels against 
Hegel is a theoretical, philosophical criticism. Marcuse, at one point 
in Reason and Revolution, suggests that Marx' critique of Hegel is 
basically a social critique, based on the notion that Hegel's doctrine 
of the relation of the individual to society is unable to account for 
the alienation and suffering of the prolitariate. 150 This, I suggest, 
is an error. Marx may indeed be able to make this criticism, 151 but 
the argument outlined above is one which criticizes Hegel not on the 
bases of the relevance of his position to social experience, but on the 
theoretical ad~quacy of that position. 
I have argued that it is in virtue of the argument discussed above 
that Marx feels justified in holding that the category of praxis is the 
most fundamental concept in an adequate theory of man. I have also 
claimed that this argument represents Marx' most basic criticism of 
Hegel. I shall now support this claim by considering three further 
criticisms of Hegel offered by Marx in the Manuscripts of 1844, and by 
showing that. each of these criticisms depends on the above argument. 
Two of these criticisms are noted by Calvez. Calvez observes first 
that Marx criticizes Hegel for the latter's method of analyzing the 
experience of consciousness, and his use of "sublation," "Aufheben," 
150Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), p. 2 
l5lrf, e.g., he were to respond to Hegel's formulation of the notion 
of "division of labor." 
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within that method. Hegel can analyze any given phase of conscious 
experience only in terms of that phase's pointing beyond itself to some 
succeeding phase. This is to say, however, that the function of 
consciousness is to point beyond itself to some more sophisticated form 
of consciousness, and that consciousness does not exercise a significant 
function of itself within the material experience of the individua1. 152 
Marx does make such a criticism of Hegel. In the Paris Manuscripts, he 
asserts that, for Hegel, "Since abstract consciousness,--the form in 
which the object is conceived--is in itself only a moment of distinction 
in self consciousness, the result of the movement is the identity of 
self consciousness with consciousness (abstract knowledge) or the 
movement of· abstract thought no longer directed outward but proceeding 
only within itself. That is to say, the dialectic of pure thought is 
153 the result." This means that for Hegel, specific phases of conscious 
experience make sense only in terms of their succeeding phases, or that 
his position results in a "dialectic of pure thought ••• " But why might 
this result be objectionable? 
It is objectionable for Marx because, first, it fails to account for 
specif~c phases of conscious experience as enjoying a function within the 
; 
experience of the individual of themselves, and second, because that 
position which results in describing conscious experience as a "dialectic 
of pure thought" is one which describes the individual as essentially a 
152 Cf. Calvez, p. 344. 
153Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 321; MEGA, 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 156. 
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self conscious subject, and thus is unable adequately to proceed to a 
description of the individual as a productive agent. But then both forms 
of this criticism are based on the argument outlined above. For, first 
it is because of that argument that Marx is able to insist that the 
individual both needs to be described as a subject and praxis, and needs 
to be described fundamentally as such. And second, as shown in chapter 
one, it is in virtue of Marx' doctrine of the fundamentality of praxis 
that he is able to assert that conscious experience plays an essential 
role in relation to specific "material" experiences of ~.he individual, 
i.e., specific experiences of the individual as an agent, rather than 
simply a role in relation to succeeding phases of conscious life itself. 
Calvez also notes that Marx criticizes Hegel for being able to 
analyze specific phases of conscious experience only in terms of their 
154 
relation to abstract knowledge. The texts of Marx again illustrate 
that this is a criticism which he levels against Hegel. "Since Hegel's 
Encyclopedia begins with logic, with pure speculative thought, and ends 
with abstract knowledge--with self-consciousness, self-comprehending or 
abstract act, that is, superhuman, abstract mind [Geist]--it is 
altogether nothing but the expanded essence of philosophical mind, its 
lf 
1
b · · f · · 11155 Ma i . . H 1 f b i bl t k se -o Ject1 1cat1on. rx er ticizes ege or e ng a e o ma e 
sense of specific phases of conscious experience only through showing 
their necessary relation to "abstract knowledge," to a phase of conscious 
154 Calvez, p. 345. 
155Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, P• 318-319; 
MEGA, pp. 153-154. 
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experience which comprehends all previous phases of consciousness, and 
integrates them within itself. 
But again, why might this be objecfionable? It is objectionable 
only if one can show that the primary function of conscious experience is 
not to yield some all-comprehending form of consciousness, but to 
comprehend, or to render possible, some other dimension of the experience 
of the individual subject of consciousness. For Marx, the demoµstration 
of this depends on the position that praxis is more fundamental than 
consciousness in the experience of the individual, because it is only 
given this that he is able to go on to argue that the function of 
consciousness is to enable the individual to comprehend his own 
productive activity and to render him a possible subject of praxis. Marx 
j 
does argue that consciousness plays this role, as shown in chapter one. 
But the position on which this argument depends, that man is fundamental! 
a subject of praxis, emerges clearly in the argument against Hegel 
sketched above. 
Finally, Marx in the Paris Manuscripts criticizes Hegel for being 
unable to adequately comprehend the genesis of human history. He asserts 
that Hegel, " ••• found only the abstract, logical, speculative expression 
of the movement of history, not the actual history of man as a given 
subject ••• 11156 Now to understand this criticism, we must remember that 
for Marx, human history 'is ·essentially the history of man as a productive 
157 
agent. Why is Hegel unable to comprehend history in this fashion? 
l.56Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat," p. 317; MEGA 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 152-153. 
157cf. Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, trans. Pascal, p. 7; MEGA 
Ab~ 1 2 Bd. 5, p_._l_O~. =============================================Ii======:::::-
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In Marx's eyes, he is unable to do so essentially because he is unable 
adequately to comprehend man as a productive individual. Hegel is only 
capable of comprehending man as a conscious subject, and for this reason 
he is only capable of comprehending the historical process in its 
" ••• ~bstract, logical speculative expression ••• " Here again Marx' 
criticism is derived from his justification of the fundamental role of 
praxis. 
Since the other criticisms Marx makes against Hegel's description 
of the individual as essentially a conscious subject are justified by the 
assumption that praxis is the fundamental category in an adequate theory 
of man, it follows that Marx' argument in support of this claim 
constitutes his most basic complaint against Hegel. 
But what are the implications of this for Marx' theory of man? 
These implications are twofold. First, in virtue of this argument Marx 
feels driven by theoretical necessity to describe the individual as 
fundamentally a productive agent. But second, this for Marx involves 
the taking of those concepts which Hegel himself employs to describe 
human agency, and locating them at the basis of his own theory of human 
nature. At the end of chapter one I raised two questions: How does Marx 
justify a theory of human nature which involves praxis as its fundamental 
category? And: What are the relations of Marx' theory of man to the 
doctrines of Hegel and Feuerbach? Both of these questions have now been 
answered. Marx justifies praxis as the fundamental category in his 
theory of human nature through his argument against Hegel's description 
of the conscious subject in relation to its object. While Marx endorses 
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in a general fashion certain Feuerbachian criticisms of Hegel, his own 
theory of man leads to a rejection of Feuerbachian anthropology. Marx' 
own anthropology involves concepts which are, on the questions of praxis 
and society, in the main imported from Hegel's texts. Thus Marx' theory 
of man, as revealed in the Paris Manuscripts and allied texts, is in no 
sense a "Feuerbachian humanism." Rather, Marx' theory of man is defined, 
positively and negatively, in relation to Hegel. 
r 
Chapter Five 
The Role of Marx' Anthropology 
In the Introduction, as wel 1 as in the second chapter, I have 
mentioned an hypothesis concerning the function of Marx' theory of man 
within his larger theoretical framework. In the Introduction, I described 
Marx' theory of man as 'normative', that is, as one which provides Marx 
with principles or norms enabling him to comment on other topics such as 
alienation an.d the economic details of productive activity. In the 
second chapter, I noted that from Marx' theory of man principles follow 
through which the possibility of the genesis of history itself can be 
1 
comprehended. In this final chapter shall elaborate these statements 
and give some indications of how Marx' theory of man functions as a 
'normative' theory, one from which principles or norms follow which 
enable him to comprehend the possibility of human history, as well as to 
describe and evaluate specific human historical situations, such as the 
alienation of the worker in capitalist society, and the economic 
2 
condition of the wage laborer. 
lcf. Shlomo Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx, 
(Cambridge: The University Press, 1968), p. 85. 
2My use of 'normative' here is an extended, but I do not think 
illegitimate use of that term. I understand a norm to be a principle 
through which phenomena not directly refered to by th~ principle 
itself may nonetheless be adequately comprehended, as well as a principle 
through which such phenomena may be evaluated. Marx' theory of man 
functions for him as 'normative' in both of these senses, that is, it is 
for his broader theory a principle in both of these senses. 
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_I_. The Comprehension of History 
Marx' understanding of history seems to include at least .three 
assertions, whose formulations occur in various texts. The first is the 
assertion that history originates from human productive activity: 
11 
••• life involves before everything else eating and drinking, a habitation 
clothing, and many other things. The first historical act is thus the 
prod~ction of the means to satisfy these needs, the production of material 
life itself ... The second fundamental point is that as soon as a need is 
satisfied, (which implies the action of satisfying; and the acquisition of 
an instrument), new needs are made, and thts production of new needs is 
3 
the first historical act. 11 Second, history is to be taken as the history 
of human self actualization: 11 ••• the entire so called world history is 
only the creation of man through human labor, and the development of 
4 
nature for man ..• 11 And finally, history is to be understood as· a process 
5 
whbse subject is society, society itself providing the context in which 
the historical process can occur, and in terms of which the historical 
process can be explained. Marx' most concise formulation of the content 
3 Marx-Engels, The German Ideology, Pascal, pp. 16-17; MEGA, Abt. 1, 
Bd. 5, pp. 17-18. The seeming contrsdiction in these statements wil I be 
subsequently discussed and resolved. 
4 Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844, 11 Easton and Guddat, p. 314; MEGA, Abt.1, 
Bd. 3, p . 125. 
5 Marx-Engels, The German Ideology, Pascal, p. 18; MEGA, Abt. 1, 
Bd. 5, p. 19. That society is the subject of the historical process is, 
as I see it, an imp I ication of the text at this point. 
'\ 
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of this assertion is found in his statement of the doctrine of 'historical 
materialism' in the famous "Preface" to the 1859 Critique of Political 
Economy. 
In the social production of their existence, men 
inevitably enter into definite social relations, which 
are independent of their will, namely relations of 
production appropriate to a given stage in the develop-
ment of their material forces of production. The 
totality of these relations of production constitutes 
the economic structure of society, the real foundation, 
on which arises a legal and political superstructure, 
and to which correspond definite forms of social 
consciousness ••• At a certain stage of development, the 
material productive forces of society come into 
conflict with the existing relations of production ••• 
From forms of development of the productive forces 
these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins 
an era of social revolution. The changes in the 
economic foundation lead sooner or later to the 
transformation of the whole immense superstructure.6 
Here Marx notes that society is the subject of the historical process, and 
describes those interacting features within society in terms of which 
history occurs. 
How are these three statements related? I suggest that the first 
statement is, in part, a response to the question, how is human history 
as a process possible? This is .a_necessary question for a theory of 
history. The data ~hich it tries to explain is the data of a process, 
and therefore we must ask the question, how is one to make sense of there 
being such a process at all? Moreover Marx' statements seem to insist 
6~1arx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, trans. 
S. W. Ryazanskaya, ed. Maurice Dobb, (New York: International Pub-
lishers, 1970), pp. 20-21; Marx Engels, Werke, (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 
1961-1971), vol. 13, pp. 8-9. This edition of the works of Marx will 
hereafter be noted as MEW. 
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~hat this question be specified so as to ask, how can one make sense out 
7 
of human history as a process, and as a specifically human process? If 
~istory is to be explained, it must be explained as a process which is 
specifically human, in order that history be distinguished from and 
iescribed in distinction from other processes of development, for 
example processes implicit in nature. 8 
l The first of the assertions listed above is a response to this 
ruestion. Marx' doctrine of praxis supplies him with an account of the 
oossibility of man's being involved in a process which is at once 
~pecifically hum.an and distinctly historical. There are three reasons 
~or this. First, praxis itself is a constant process in which man 
7cf. R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of-History, (New York: Oxford Uni-
~ersity Press, 1956), pp. 210-217. Marx is not alone in this assumption. 
Collingwood, in the text cited, explicitly argues that a theory of history, 
~unctioning as the basis of an historiography, must be one which 
~dequately distinguishes human historical affairs from the mere process 
of natural events. For a gloss on Collingwood's arguments see also 
~ackenheim, Metaphysics and Historicity, (Milwaukee: Marquette University 
Press, 1969), pp. 17-19. 
8But cf. Engels, "Introduction" to The Dialectics of Nature, in Marx 
and Engels, Selected Works, (New York: International Publishers, 1968), 
op. 342-357; MEW, vol. 20, pp. 311-327, in which Engels seems to collapse 
this distinction. Marx, as I hope subsequent comments will show, would 
argue that this dist.inction must be maintained if human history is to 
oe adequately described. 
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9 engages. It involves his productive activity on nature, and his necessar) 
transformation of nature towards the satisfaction of needs. 
But second, and more significantly, praxis is also that process in 
virute of which man is specifically distinguished. On the one hand, it is 
in virtue of the structure of human praxis that man overcomes the 'species 
"f" . ,l-0 h" h h . h 1 . f h f f l"f speci icity w ic c aracterizes t e re ation o non- uman orms o 1 e 
to their environment, and is able, in Marx' language, to produce 
"universally.-"11 Human productive activity transforms the environment so 
that the environment can elecit new needs within the experience of the 
agent. Such activity also 'actualizes' the agent so that he can be the 
subject of new needs. Consequently he can also be an agent who may act in 
more complex and diverse fashions on the environment, rather than in a 
9cf. Engels, The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State, 
"Preface to the First Edition, 1844," in Marx-Engels, Selected Works 
(New York: International Publishers, 1968), p. 455; MEW, vol. 21, pp. 
27-28. "According to the materialist conception, the determining factor 
in history is, in the last resort, the production and reproduction of 
immediate life. But this itself is of a twofold character. On the one 
hand, the prodhction of the means of subsistence, of 'food, clothing and 
shelter, and the tools requisite therefore; on the other hand, the 
production of human beings themselves, the propagation of the species." 
Petrovic's gloss on this text, in Petrovic, Marx in the Mid-Twentieth 
Century, (New York: Anchor Books, 1967), pp. 97-99, and pp. 112-113, 
is that, for Marx and Engels, praxis is that process in which man both 
universally engages, and which distinguishes man specifically. 
lOcf. Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, (New 
York: Anchor Books, 1967), p. 47. 
llcf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 294; MEGA 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 88. 
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way fixed by given biological limitations. 12 Marx insists that praxis, 
as characterized by 'universality' is this fashion, specifically 
distinguishes the human agent. 13 On the other hand, praxis also 
structurally requires the occurence of consciousness as a feature or 
'moment' of itself. Marx himself asserts this in the Paris Manuscripts, 14 
and in chapter one I suggest an argument towards this assertion, concludinE 
that only if consciousness is an essential feature of praxis can the 
development of needs in relation to productive activity be accounted for. 
In order for developed needs to be experienced.by the agent as functional 
bases for his activity, he must be capable of relating both to this 
environment and ,to himself in a way which transcends the instinctua115 or 
species specific relation of self to invironment enjoyed by the animal. 
And this relation can only be a conscious relation. But the development 
of needs itself is essential to the structure of human praxis. Therefore, 
the occurence of consciousness is an essential feature of human praxis. 
Praxis, then, is a process in which man necessary engages, and one 
through which he is specifically differentiated. But, it is also a 
12 Cf. Berger and Luckmann, op. cit., pp. 47-48, for further explicita-
tion of this concept. 
13
cf. Marx, op. cit., loc. cit. 
l4cf. Marx, Ibid. "Conscious life activity (bewusste Lebenstatigkeit) 
distinguishes man immediately from the life activity of the animal." 
15cf. :t1acmurray, Persons in Relation, (London: Farber and Farber Ltd., 
1961), p. 48, in which "instinct" is defined in a way consistent with 
this argument, as " ••• a specific adaptation to environment which does 
not require to be learned." 
r 
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a process which is itself distinctly historical. By this I mean that 
praxis is a process which is not merely repetative or cyclic. No process 
of change which is merely repetative or cyclyc deserves to be entitled 
historicai. 16 Rather, an historical process must be one of the 
development of some subject through differentiated and internally 
distinguishable phases. And human praxis itself is such a process, in 
virtue 9f its involving the development and proliferation of needs. This 
is the point to Marx' assertion, cited above, that the " ••• production of 
new needs is the first historical act. 1117 Productive activity is rooted 
in needs, 18 and needs are those experienced occurences in virtue of which 
productive activity is undertaken. The details of specific instances of 
praxis are selected in relation to the content of those needs at whose 
satisfaction they aim. But Marx also argues that human praxis 
structurally involves both activity towards the satisfaction of needs, and 
the development out of that activity of new needs which may function as 
bases for new forms of activity. This means that human praxis itself is 
not a mere cyclic or repetative process, not simply consistent repetition 
16
cf. Engels, 
1
"Introduction" to The Dialectics of Nature, loc. cit., 
pp. 345-346; MEW, vol. 20, pp. 311-312. Even Engels, in spite of the 
ambiguities of this text, argues that history cannot be comprehended as 
a mere cyclic process of change, and must be comprehended as a process 
involving the development of some subject, through distinguishable 
phases. 
17 Cf. Marx-Engels, The German Ideology, Pascal, p. 17; MEGA, Abt. 1, 
Bd. 5, p. 18. 
18cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844" in Easton and Guddat, p. 325, ~' 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 160. 
·-
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of instances of behavior identical in detail. Rather, praxis involves a 
development through successive and inter-distinguishable phases, as those 
needs which function as the bases of productive activity themselves develoI 
and undergo differentiation. And these comments show too why Marx, in 
the texts from The German Ideology cited above, refers to both " ••• the 
production of material life ••• " and the "production of new needs ••• " as 
".,.the first historical act ••• 1119 It is the same productive act, through. 
which subsistence needs are handled by the human agent, and from which 
new needs develop for that ag·ent, and thus it is this single act which is 
initially historical. 
These comments suffice to show that it is in virtue of his doctrine 
of praxis that Marx can assert, in broad terms, that man is historical. 
For it is in virtue of his doctrine of praxis, that Marx can assert that 
~an engages in a process which is both specifically human and distinctly 
historical. Parenthetically, we should note that the doctrine of praxis 
also provides Marx with a broad orientation for the doing of history, to 
~it that orientation which comprehends human history as the history of 
human productive activity, upon which Marx insists in The German Ideology. 
One may note also that it is through his doctrine of praxis as 
located in his theory of man that Marx is able to assert, as he does in 
the Paris Manuscripts, 20 that history is the history of human self 
actualization. For self actualization is also an intrinsic feature of 
the exercise of human productive activity. The productive agent 
19cf. Marx-Engels, The Germ~n Ideology, Pascal, pp. 16-17; MEGA, Abt. 1, 
Bd. 5, pp. 17-18. 
20cf. footnote four. 
-407-
'actualizes' himself, as shown in chapter one, both through realizing 
himself as an agent who has engaged in and brought to term some specific 
instance of activity, through the objectification of his labor in a 
product, and through the development of those needs which arise out of 
his activity itself, and which enable him to be an agent in a fuller and 
more diversified sense. That process in virtue of which Marx can say that 
man is historical is the same process which allows him to assert a 
doctrine of human self actualization. 
It is also the doctrine of praxis, one may argue, which allows Marx 
to h~ld that history is necessarily social history, or that the subject 
of the historical process is society. Marx asserts this in a passage in 
the "Preface" to the 1859 Critique of Political Economy cited above. The 
\ 
basis of that assertion is, I think, contained in the analysis I made in 
chapter one concerning the relation of praxis and society, in Marx' theory 
of man. (See pp.37ff). That theory involved, first, the claim that social 
relationships are to be understood as possible in virtue of praxis. 
Productive activity results in a product which is both appropriable 
towards the satisfaction of a need, and, because objectification is a 
feature of praxis, em.bodies the details of the agent's activity in externaJ 
form. 21 But insofar as relevantly similar needs are shared by individuals, 
then some individual other than the producer is capable of appropriating 
the product towards the satisfaction of some need of his own. Since the 
product objectifies the details of the activity of its producer, then 
2lcf. Marx, "Excerpt-Notes of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, op. cit., 
p. 281; MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 546. 
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that other, in appropriating the product, relates himself not only to the 
22 product but also to its producer. Finally, it is the individual's 
product which introduces into his experience (or environment) the 
possibility of his being a subject of interaction. For interaction 
requires that some feature of the individual be externalized, in order 
that it be acted upon, and it is the product which renders such 
externalization actual. Thus social relationships are to be understood as 
most .basically productive relationships, and praxis in turn is to be 
understood as that which renders social relationships possible. 
The first point to be notices here is that, for Marx, it is the 
same process through which man can be described as historical, and through 
which man can be described as in principle social, a possible subject of 
social relationships or member of society. This offers an initial 
indication that, for Marx, the historical process is also a social 
process. In addition, one finds a second assertion concerning the 
relationship of praxis and society in Marx' theory of man, in the statemen 
that the actual details of the productive activity of the individual are 
conditioned by the individual's actual social relationships. The general 
argument already seen for this statement begins from the notion that 
society is to be understood most basically as a system of productive 
activities in relation. As such a system, society is itself a "productive 
22Marx, "Excerpt-Notes of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 281; MEGA 
Abt., 1, Bd. 3, pp. 546-547. 
I. 
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force" (Produktiv-Kraft) 23 in two senses. ~ociety as the system of 
interrelated productive activities, offers those activities as options to 
its members. Society also offers is members 24 "material" for productive 
activity. By "materials" Marx means things such as the scientif or 
technical ca~egories, language, and technical instruments through which 
d . . . . . d 25 pro uctive activity is carrie out. It is as a "productive force" 
which offers options for productive activity to its members as well as 
the "materia'ls" which specify the details of that activity, that society 
conditions and systematizes the details of praxis occuring within it. 
Praxis, then, is that which proceeds in virtue of which man is 
historical, in virtue of which he is social, and one whose concrete 
realization is conditioned by actual society. It is this last point, the 
expression given it by Marx is the Grundrisse, which is critical for my 
present argument. 
In the "General Introduction" to the Grundrisse, Marx notes that 
society conditions and controls the productive options available to its 
members, in that society involves, " ••• first, a distribution of the means 
of production, and secondly, which is another determination of the same 
relationship, it is a distribution of the members of society among various 
kinds of production (the subjection of individuals to certain relationship: 
23Marx-Engels, The German Ideology, Pascal, p. 18, MEGA, Abt. 1, Bd. 5, 
p. 19. 
24Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 306; MEGA, 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, P• 116. 
25cf. Ibid. 
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. 26 
of production)." Four points concerning this assertion are worth noting. 
First this assertion reiterates the idea that society offers productive 
options to its members, in stating that society "distributes" "means of 
production ••• " Second, as an obvious corollary of the first, this 
"distribution" conditions the productive options available to the in-
dividual members of society. But third, the content of these options 
!must lna.terially depend on the concrete "means of production" actually 
available within a given social context. And fourth, the realized 
productive options available to individuals as members of society are 
also their most fundamental social relationships, as "relationships of 
production." This means that society, which is made possible through 
praxis, is, at the same time, made up of definite relations of its members 
to those productive possibilities presented to them as available options 
by society itself. 
I suggest that Marx' assertion that society conditions the details 
of productive activity, may in part be rewritten to read, society is 
comprised at its basis of relations of production. I say in part, 
because in this rewriting the question of society as providing "materials" 
for productive activity is, for the moment, set aside. But given this 
qualification, it can be seen that the statement "society is comprised 
at its basis of relations of production" is a partial development of the 
second proposition noted in that portion of my outline of Marx' theory of 
26Marx, The Grundrisse, trans. D. McLellan, (New York: Harper and Row, 
1971), p. 30; Marx, Grundrisse der Kritik der Politischen-Okonomie, 
(Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1953), p. 17. 
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man in which the relationship of praxis and society is described. To 
state that society at its basis involves, or. that social relationships 
are to be comprehended most basically as relations of production, is to 
state, as Marx does in the Grundrisse, that society involves a distribu-
tion of the members of society among the various kinds of production. 27 
But this in turn is to state that society conditions and controls the 
productive possibilities available to its members. 
From this point, I shall argue that Marx' assertion in the "Pref ace" 
to the 1859 Critique of Political Economy to the effect that society is 
the history is both based on and finds its justification in Marx' theory 
of man. I take this to be the case for two reasons. First, Marx' 
description of the "economic structure of society"28 involves a re-
state~ent and partial development of the two propositions concerning the 
relation of society and praxis found in his theory of man which I have 
considered here. Marx describes this economic structure as composed of 
"the material productive forces of society" in interaction with "the 
existing relations of production" operative within the social system. 29 
By "material forces of production" I take Marx to mean the actual 
productive activities undertaken in society, along with the techniques 
and technical instruments through which those activities are undertaken. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Marx, Critique of Political Economy, ed. Dobb, p. 20; MEW, vol. 13, 
p. 8. 
29Marx, Critique of Polotical Economy, ed. Dobb, p. 21; MEW, vol. 13 
PP• 8-9. 
r 
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Marx understands the basic "structure"- of society as composed of 
these because he has previously argued that social relationships are in 
~eneral rendered possible through praxis. Thus he must also comprehend 
~ctual soceity as fundamentally involving those concrete productive 
activities through which society itself is realized. And of course 
~oncrete productive activity cannot be considered in abstraction from the 
techniques and instruments through which production is undertaken; these 
latter are integral features of the act of production. Marx' comment 
concerning society as involving productive relations is also a restatement, 
and here a development, of a proposition contained within his theory of 
inan. Society must involve at its basis both forces of and relations of 
production, because society is both rendered possible by and also condition 
the concrete productive activities undertaken by its members. Marx' 
comment on "relations of production" is a comment on a manner in which 
society exercises this latter role. 
Second, in the Preface of the Critique of Political Economy Marx 
goes on to describe how it is the case that society is the subject of the 
listorical process.) Society undergoes history in virtue of forces of 
lroduction outstripping existing productive relations. "At a certain 
;tage of development, the material productive forces of society come into 
~onflict with the existing relations of production ••• From forms of 
~evelopment of the productive forces these relations turn into their 
~etters. Then begins an era of social revolution. 1130 Developments of 
30Marx, Critique of Political Economy, ed. Dobb, p. 21; MEW, vol. 13, 
D. 9. 
r 
' 
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actual productive activity in a society, along with developments in 
instruments and techniques, render the social distribution of labor among 
members of society outmoded. These productive relations must then 
themselves change and develop, in order to become adequate to developed 
productive forces. Thus the "economic structure of society" undergoes 
transition, and thus society undergoes history. 
Now the question here is, how is it possible for forces of 
production to undergo the development which Marx indicates? If society 
"distributes" productive activity among its members, and systematizes it 
thereby, might one not assume that society thus renders productive 
activity static, capable of cyclic, i.e., nonhistorical, repetition, but 
not of real developmental change? The response to this question drawn 
from the content of Marx' theory of man, is that praxis structurally 
involves the possibility of its own development, through yielding both 
transformations of the environment upon which it is exercised, and the 
development of those needs on which it is based. 
The environment as transformed by praxis is thereby capable of being 
the scene of new and more diversified forms of productive activity. The 
agent, as the subject of new needs, is capable of engaging in new and more 
complex forms of praxis. The actual productive force residing at the 
basis of society is thus itself capable of undergoing real development. 
Because of this, it is capable of developing from phase to phase such 
that those social relations appropriate to the earlier phase become 
outmoded in the latter, and require revision. It is because of praxis as 
structurally involves the possibility of its own development that the 
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economic basis of society is capable of a transformation which can be 
validly entitled historical. And thus Marx' notion of society as the 
subject of the historical process is both explained and specified in terms 
of concepts initially laid down in his theory of man. 
These observations concerning the relationship of Marx' theory of 
man and his understanding of history may now be exhibited in a unified 
fashion. I have suggested that Marx' comprehension of history is based 
on his theory of man, and that this understanding includes the assertions 
that history is the history of human productive activity, that history 
involves human self actualization, and that society is the subject of the 
historical process. Regarding the first of these statements, I have 
pointed out that it is in virtue of his being a subject of praxis that 
man can be described as historical, because praxis itself is a process 
which is both distinctly historical and specifically human. But praxis 
is also that process from which social relationships result. The process 
!which renders man historical is the same as that which renders him social; 
this in general implies an identification of human with social history. 
Further, Marx' description of society as involving productive forces 
and relations is a restatement of and a partial development of the view 
of the relationship of society and praxis initially asserted in his theory 
of man. ·The justification for Marx' assertion that social productive 
forces develop in such a fashion as to outmode prior productive relations 
is also found a~ong those concepts through which praxis of defined in 
Marx' theory of man. Finally, "it is also through concepts found in his 
theory of man that Marx can describe history as the history of human self 
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actualization. Thus Marx' comprehension of history is both explained and 
justified by concepts initially laid down in his theory of man. It is 
through his theory of man that Marx can both comprehend the possibility 
of and describe the structural outlines of human history. 
This last statement is a statement of one function which the theory 
of man exercises within Marx' broader theoretical schema. It allows us 
to assert that Marx' theory of man is 'normative' in the sense that it 
provides principles through which other phenomena~ here history, may be 
comprehended. But Marx' theory of man is also •normative' in the sense 
that it provides principles or norms in terms of which specific historical 
phenomena may be comprehended and critically evaluated. It is to this 
theme that I now turn, and to an examination of Marx' descriptions and 
critical evaluations of alienation as a social phenomenon, and of the 
condition of the wage laborer in capitalist society. 
_l_I. The Problem of Alienation. 
Marx gives his most thorough elicidation of his renouned concept of 
alienation in the Paris Manuscripts, in the manuscript entitled 
"Alienated Labor. 11 He there identifies the alienated individual as the 
producer located in a society characterized by "the division between 
31 
capital and labor, 11 indicating, as Garaudy points out, that for Marx 
31 . Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844, 11 in Easton and Guddat, p. 288; MEGA, 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 81. 
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alienation, "has its objective base in the actual living conditions of 
32 the worker." Marx goins on to describe the condition of alienation 
~nder four interrelated headings, the first two of which, I suggest, are 
the more significant for my analysis. 33 And he expresses the first of 
these headings, "alienation from the product of labor," by the statement, 
" ••• the worker is related to the product of his labor (Produkt seiner 
IArbeit) as to an alien object (fremden Gegenstand). 1134 
The meaning of this statement must first be indicated. And the text 
itself offers two clues towards determining this meaning. Marx first 
asserts that, "The externalization35 of the worker in his product means 
not o~ly that his work becomes an object, an external existence, but also 
that it exists outside him independently, alien, an autonomous power, 
opposed to him. 1136 Marx also states that, "So much does the appropriation 
32Garaudy, Karl Marx, The Evolution of his Thought, trans. Nan 
IApotheker, (New York: International Publishers, 1967), p. 58. 
33But cf. Gajo Petrovic, Marx in the Mid-Twentieth Century, p. 84. 
~etrovic considers the second and third of the expressions which Marx 
gives to the concept of alienation to be the more fundamental, holding 
that the first and fourth are derived from these. While it is not my 
purpose to offer a total analysis of 'alienation' in Marx, I resist this 
$uggestion. I shall of fer reasons in the body of my text for holding that 
the first and the second of Marx' expressions of the concept of alienation 
~re the more fundamental, from which the third and the fourth are derived' 
through reference to the theory of man. 
34Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 289; MEGA, 
IAbt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 83. 
35 1 Externalization' must here not be taken in the more generic sense in 
~hich Marx uses the term, but in its narrower sense, as a feature of 
~roductive activity occuring under conditions of alienation. 
36Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 389; MEGA, 
~bt. 1, Bd. 3, pp. 83-84. 
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of the object appear as alienation that the more objects the worker 
produces, the fewer he can own, and the more he falls under the domination 
of his product, of capital. 1137 
These statements, taken in conjunction, indicate the meaning of 
"alienation from the product of labor" for Marx. Under conditions of the 
"division between capital and labor1138 the worker is a productive agent, 
_/ but is so in such a way that the results of his activity are produced in 
order to be handed over to, or appropriated by, another, the possessor 
of "capital." It is of the essence of capital that products immediately 
belong, not to their producers, but to those who control the means of 
production. One might assert here that, under the conditions to which 
Marx refers, the worker's product is essentially and directly appropriable 
not towards the satisfaction of his own needs, but towards the satisfac-
tion of the (economic) needs of another. 
As essentially appropriable by another rather than by its producer, 
the product bears no direct relationship to its producer himself, and to 
those needs in virtue of which he is a concrete agent. This is the 
meaning of Marx' statement that the product in relation to its producer 
"exists outside him, independently ••• " When Marx says that the worker 
"falls under the domination of his product ••• " he means that the product 
is produced, not for the purpose of some direct relation to its producer 
37Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 289; MEGA 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 83. 
38Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 288; MEGA, 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, P• 81. 
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hich it may eventually enjoy, but simply for its own sake. Production 
ere is controlled, in other words, not by the concrete needs of the worker 
or productive agent himself, but by the demands of the product, and the 
determination of those demands through the requirements of the possessors 
of capital. Marx sums up this point by noting that 'alienation from the 
oroduct of labor' involves the worker's " ••• loss of and subservience to 
the object ••• 1139 It is a loss in that,the product bears no relation to 
the concrete experience of its producer, and a subservience in that the 
producer, as a worker, is dominated not by concrete needs of his own but 
by standards and requirements which he apprehends as determined b~ the 
product in itself. 40 
The quest.ton which arises now however is, how Marx justifies the 
description of the above conditions as 'alienated'? A condition which 
~rx describes as 'alienated' must be one which he comprehends as 
problematic, 41 a state of affairs deleterious to the individual which must 
be overcome. But why might a state of affairs in which the product bears 
39Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 389; MEGA, 
A.bt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 83. 
40cf. Garaudy, op. cit., p. 59. "Hence the creator finds himself sep-
arated from the product of his labor, which no longer belongs to him but 
~o the ovmer of the means of production, i.e., slave master, or feudal 
lord, or capitalist boss. His labor is thus no longer the fulfillment 
)f his own goals, his personal projects; it fulfills the goals of someone 
else." 
4lcf. Rotenstreich, Basic Problems of Marx' Philosophy, (Indianapolis: 
rhe Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1965), pp. 144-161. Rotenstreich shows that, 
~istorically, 'alienation' does not consistently bear this broad 
:onnotation, but that it must connote some intrinsically problematic 
:ondition for Marx. 
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no direct relation to the concrete experien~e or needs of its producer, 
and in which production is controlled by the relation of the product 
itself to the other for whom it is appropriable, be considered problematic 
or deleterious, and thus one involving alienation? 
I suggest that Marx' justification for entitling the above condition 
'alienated' is discoverable in his theory of man. There, Marx develops 
concepts concerning man as a productive agent in relation to the object 
or product .of his activity. He claims that, a) productive activity yields 
( 
a transformation of 'nature' or the external environment upon which it is 
exercised; b) the result of such activity is an external product; c) the 
product is related to its producer in that it is appropriable by him for 
the satisfaction of some need of his own; d) the activity of the 
individual is rooted in some need concretely occuring within his 
experience. It seems that these assertions, developed in Marx theory 
of man, are now used by him as norms through which he might comprehend and 
critically evaluate the condition of the productive individual in a system 
involving " ••• the division between capital and labor ••• , " and through 
which he might be justified in entitling that condition 'alienated.' 
Within this system, first, the result of the individual's activity 
is an external product. But further, this product is, in its details, 
essentially non-appropriable by him. And third, to repeat the preceding 
statement in different terms, the product in its details relates not to 
the need of its producer, but to the needs of another. Given this, then 
the structural relation between agent and product which Marx describes 
in his theory of man is violated. The structure of praxis itself, as 
r 
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undertaken by the agent, is violated in virtue of the social context within 
which the productive individual is located. And it is because of this 
structural violation of praxis under given social conditions that Marx is 
able to entitle the relation of agent to product under those conditions 
'alienated'.~ 
Marx, then, utilizes the concepts concerning the relation of agent 
to product to evaluate a given historical relation of agent to product 
pejoratively. More specifically, he holds that the absense of a direct 
relationship of the product to its producer violates that principle which 
describes theproduce as appropriable by its producer. And he holds that 
the determination of the details of the product by the requirements of 
another violates the principle through which praxis is described as 
rootE!d in need, and concretely selected in terms of the needs of the 
individual agent. It is because the given relation obtaining between 
producer and product involves these violations that Marx comprehends it 
as problematic. And it is because of these violations that this relation 
of producer .to product is deleterious to the former. Since the agent 
by reason of the social division of labor and capital is unable to 
apprehend his product as in its details related to himself, and is unable 
to act according to standards derived from needs of his own, then he is 
unable to be an agent in the full and adeuqate sense of that term offered 
by Marx' theory of man. 42 ' Thus it is in terms of principles laid down in 
42cf. Garaudy, op. cit., loc. cit. "Man in his work ceases to be a 
man, i.e., a human being who determines his own ends, and becomes a means, 
a moment in the objective process of production, a means for producing 
commodities and surplus values." 
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that theory that Marx justifies comprehending and evaluating the specific 
ocelation of producer to product in the capitalist mode of production as 
~ne alienated. 
Parenthetically, one may note that the responsibility for that 
~elation of producer to product which Marx entitles "alienated" rests with 
the social division of labor and capital, i.e., with social conditions. 
It is consistent with Marx' theory of man for him to assert that social 
conditions yield this alienated relationship, because of the second 
proposition concerning the relationship of praxis and society in my 
outline cf that theory. In that praxis is conditioned by society through 
social "distribution" of the members of society among various forms of 
productive activity, this social distribution can occur so as to result 
in a relation of agent to product which Marx evaluates pejoratively. 
I have claimed that Marx' analysis of "alienation from the product 
of labor" is based on his theory of man. The same claim may be made for 
his analysis of "alienation from the process of labor." These two 
discussions of alienation are intimately related, and the concepts employee 
in the first will also be found in the second. 
Marx begins his discussion of this aspect of "alienated labor" by 
asserting that "alienation from the process of labor" is a necessary 
feature of alienation from the product. He supports this through a 
familiar statement concerning objectification. "How could the worker 
stand in an alien relationship to the product of his activity if he did 
not alienate himself from _himself in the very act of production? After 
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procre~ting, or at most in his shelter and finery, while in his human 
functions he feels only like an animal. 1147 To sum up these points, the 
production of an "alien" product is itself a process of activity whose 
details are controlled by some one other than the agent, a process which 
aims only indirectly at the satisfaction of his needs, and one in which 
the individual is unable to comprehend himself and his action out of the 
conjunctio~ of his own subsistence and human needs. 
But again the question arises, why does Marx conceive of a process 
of activity bearing these characteristics as "alienated," i.e., as a 
process which is problematic and deleterious to its subject? Why is it 
not proper for processes of activity to be controlled by someone other 
than the agent? Why is that activity which aims only indirectly at the 
satisfaction of need deleterious? And finally, why might at least some 
processes of activity be not undertaken towards the satisfaction of 
subsistence needs exclusively? 
Marx, as I read the texts, offers two responses to these questions, 
both based on the content of his theory of man. His first response is 
that activity as described above occurs in violation of certain features 
of the nature of praxis, and of man's nature as an agent. In the context 
of this response, the question of the relation of praxis and needs again 
comes to the fore. And the above description of activity aimed only 
indirectly at the satisfaction of needs must be stated more accurately 
here. By this, Marx does not mean action which is apprehended in its 
details as instrumental towards the satisfaction of a need (e.g., the act 
47 Ibid. 
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pf assembly\ line manufacture which, because of its resulting compensation, 
enables the worker to purchase food). It is this latter sort of 
productive process from which the agent is alienated, because, in principle 
productive activity is rooted in needs, and is performed because of the 
relevance of the details of a given instance of productive action to the 
needs which the agent concretely experiences. When the agent can apprehend 
no relationship between the actual details of his activity and the content 
of his own needs, then this activity may, Marx holds, be liegitmately 
described as a process from which the agent is "alienated." Again, it is 
the content of his theory of man which enables Marx to comprehend a given 
phenomenon as involving alienation; here, the process of action is 
alienated in that it violates a feature of praxis described in that theory. 
As a result, one may also ~ee why, for Marx, that activity whose 
details are controlled not by the agent, but by another, is activity from 
~hich the agent is alienated. In principle concrete action is selected 
by the agent in terms of its relevance to his needs. The individual thus 
"controls" his own activity. To say that the details of action are 
controlled by another, is to say that while this activity has relevance to 
48 the requirements or needs of another, the agent is not able to experience 
48cf. Garaudy, op. cit., pp. 59-60. "In all systems of private 
ownership of the means of production, the worker is not only estranged 
from the product of his labor, but from the very act of his labor. His 
boss not only dictates the aims but also the means-and methods of his 
work ••• They are predetermined, designed in a vacuum, in an entirely 
dehumanized form and to rhythms of tools and machines that of ten become 
hallucinating ••• Here alienation is depersonalization." 
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or apprehend his concrete activity as "his own," as having discernable 
relevance to his experience. 49 Again he is "alienated" from his activity: 
"It belongs to another. It is the loss cf his own self. (Verlust seiner 
selbst. 11 ) 50 
Finally, Marx seems to hold in this context that, while it is 
through human productive activity that the satisfaction of subsistence and 
numan needs is conjoined, in that the very production of means of 
~ubsistence, the "first historical act" as Marx puts it in the German 
Ideologv, results in the development of.new needs, the agent who is 
alienated from the process of his activity is, because of this alienation, 
unable to experience this conjunction as a feature of his action. And 
this, in turn, is itself a further source of alienation. 51 
It is clear that Marx' theory of man provides him with principles 
whose normative employment allows him to speak of "alienation from the 
process of labor." It is the theory of man which allows Marx to evaluate 
a given condition of activity as involving "alienation." But .there is also 
a second manner in which Marx describes activity not related to the needs 
of ·the agent and controlled in its details by another. This involves the 
49cf. Marx, op. cit., lac. cft. Thus Marx' statement, " ••• the external 
nature of work for the worker appears in the fact that it is not his own 
but another person's, that in work he does not belong to himself but to 
someone else." 
SO Ibid. 
Slcf. Ibid. 
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[Concept of "self-actualization. 11 52 
"Self actualization" is taken by Marx as a structural feature of 
praxis, in two senses. First the agent, in engaging in productive activity 
actualizes himself as a definite agent. Second, the agent, through his 
action, realizes for himself new needs, which may in turn function as the 
Dasis of new and more diversified forms of action. But if the individual 
tis not able to apprehend his action as "his own," in the sense described 
above, then he is not able to apprehend his activity as his own, since it 
is controlled by another, nor can his activity be a relevant source for 
the development of new needs for him, since the action is not relevant to 
~is needs initially, but to those of another. Thus, given productive actio 
under these conditions, self actualization is denied to the agent. Another 
treason from the theory of man for entitling such action "alienated" is 
provided by Marx. 
The above discussion presents an identification of Marx' meanings 
for, and the justifications for his descriptions of alienation from the 
product and the process of labor. In the text of the Paris Manuscripts, 
Marx moves from the unification of these two descriptions to a discussion 
of alienation under a third heading: man's alienation from his "species 
oeing." I i h d . . 53 turn my attent on now to t at 1scuss1on. 
< 
In chapter one, (see pp.12ft), I differed from Lobkowicz' 
general interpretation of Marx' doctrine of •species being'. 
52cf. Lobkowicz, Theory and Practice, (Notre Dame: The University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1967), pp. 344-345, 349-51. Lobkowicz hints at this 
idea, but does not thoroughly develop it from the text. 
53cf. Marx, op. cit., loc. cit. 
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~ut in terms of his comments on the alienation of man from his species 
lbeing, it is the question of the "universality" of human praxis which is 
uppermost in the texts of Marx. 
A single citation illustrates this point. Marx states in the Paris 
!Manuscripts that, "By degrading free spontaneous activity to the level of 
~ means, alienated labor makes the species life of man a means of his 
h . 1 . ..60 p ysica existence. In this statement, Marx first refers back to his 
~iscussion of alienation from the process of labor. Such activity is a 
"means" towards the satisfaction of needs, but an "indirect" one, i.e., 
one whose details bear no discernable relation to the actual needs of the 
agent. Using this notion as a basis for his present analysis, Marx' point 
here is twofold. First because the agent is unable to experience his 
activity and its results as relevant to his needs, he is unable to 
experience his own relation as an agent to nature as actual, i.e., as one 
through which nature is transformed through activity of his own, towards 
the satisfaction of needs of his own. And second, because of this, the 
agent is also unable to realize himself as one who produces universally. 
For "universal" production depends upon the agent's becoming the subject 
of new needs, whicb in turn depends upon his realizing himself as one who 
has acted towards the satisfaction of prior needs of his own. Since this 
latter possibility is unavailable to the agent alienated from the product 
and process of alienation, then the former is unavailable to him also. 
Thus this individual is unable to experience his productive relation to 
60cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 295; MEGA, 
Abt. 1, Bd. 3, p. 89. 
-427-
nature as "actual," in the sense noted above, and is unable to produce 
"universally." He is thus, Marx holds, alienated from his "species 
being. 1161 
Here again Marx' discussion of alienation is directly related to his 
theory of man. That theory shows the structure of human productive 
activity to involve the possibility of man's being a "species being." It 
~s the vitiating of that possibility that Marx here refers to as 
~lienation. 62 
Marx finally discusses alienation in the Manuscripts as alienation of 
~an from his fellows. 63 Marx' discussion of this is both brief and 
oblique, and is summed up in the following statement. "What holds true of 
nian's relationship to his work, to the product of his work, and to himself, 
also holds truP. of man's relationship to other men, to their labor, and 
_6lcf.. Petrovic, op. cit., p. 83. " ••• by alienating his own activity 
~rom himself, man in fact alienates his essence from himself and himself 
[rom his essence. Man is in essence a creative, practical being, and when 
~e alienates his creative activity from himself, he alienates his human 
~ssence from himself." In this comment 'creative' and 'universal' may be 
~kaen as synnonyms. 
620ne might note here that Marx' critique of alienation also essentially 
lnvolves those concepts describing praxis which are discoverable in Hegel. 
µf. L. Easton, "Alienation and History in the Early Marx," Philosophy and 
rhenomenological Research, 1961-62, vol. 22, no. 2, p. 194. Easton, 
commenting on the relation of Marx' notion of alienation to Hegel, notes 
~hat, the part of the Phenomenology of Spirit which seems to have attracted 
t-Iarx most is the section, " ••• which concentrates on 'wealth' and 'state 
power,' namely, 'Spirit in Self-Estrangement,' The Discipline of Culture 
~nd Civilization." He holds (p. 194) that the image of Rameau's Nephew 
(Diderot) in this section is the source of Marx' concept of alienation. 
~ut Marx' explicit critique of alienation involves more fundamentally those 
~oncepts involved in his doctrine of praxis which Marx derives from Hegel. 
63 \ Cf. Garaudy, op. cit., p. 59. Garaudy, curiously, omits reference to 
"his heading. 
r 
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and to the object of their labor. 1164 . The claim implicit in this statement 
seems to be as follows. The individual is an actual agent in virtue of 
his ability to produce products universally towards the satisfaction of 
his needs. Under conditions of alienation, this ability is vitiated. But 
the individual also experiences relations with others most fundamentally 
in virtue of his agency, of praxis. If then the individual is alienated 
from his own activity and its results, he will also be alienated from his 
relationships with others. He is unable to experience his activity as 
actually his own, and thus is further unable to experience those others 
IWho relate themselves to his activity as relating actually to himself. 
!This heading under which Marx describes alienation, then, is derived from 
the first two headings described above. 
It has been seen then, that Marx' descriptions of "alienation" in 
~he Paris Manuscripts are both based on and justified by his theory of man. 
trhis illustrates another function of Marx' theory of man, in addition to 
~ts enabling him to comprehend the possibility of and the general structure 
pf history. Marx' theory of man provides principles through which he is 
~ble to comprehend specific historical phenomena and evaluate them as 
li.nvolving alienation. It is a "normative" theory in this sense. 
Parenthetically, comment might be made on a statement of Lobkowicz 
~oncerning the relation of the theory of human nature to the notion of 
alienation in Marx. In Theory and Practice, Lobkowicz states that 
' ••• neither Hegel nor Marx measures man's 'alienated state' against either 
64cf. Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in Easton and Guddat, p. 295; MEGA, 
~bt. 1. Bd. ]_ n_ RQ_ 
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a trans-historical human nature or against a 'logically predetermined' fut 
ure. Rather, they measure it against a human potentiality revealed by 
the phenomenon of alienation--against a human potentiality which, though 
at first it emerges in an alienated state, allows one to envisage a 
previously unknown possibility of ultimate human self-actualization. 1165 
Some correction needs to be made of this statement. Certainly Marx does 
object to a "transhistorical theory of human nature" in one sense, as 
seen in chapter two (see pp.{Pff) in comments on Marx' relation to 
Feuerbach and Prudhon. Marx would not allow a concept of alienation which 
asserted that human nature universally and transhistorically involved 
some definite need (e.g., that man be agricultural) whose denial (e.g., 
by technology and urbanization) yields a deleterious effect to the denied 
subject. But Marx' notion of alienation is based on his theory of man, 
and there is one significant sense in which that theory is transhistorical 
It is a theory which describes the structural outlines in terms of which 
all human historical possibilities are realized. Man is, for Marx, 
capable of realizing historical possibilities because he is a universal 
productive agent, because his agency necessarily results in social 
relationships, and so forth. And it is specific historical frustrations 
of these structural human possibilities which Marx in the Paris Manuscript 
identifies as alienation. To be sure, specific human possibilities and 
needs are realized historically and must be comprehended empirically. 
But such realizations occur in virtue of the structure of man's nature 
as a conscious, social productive agent. This nature is intelligible 
65Lobkowic~, Theorv and Practice, p. 315. 
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and can be described in a theory. 
We have seen that Marx• theory of man has a 'normative• use when 
included in his analysis of alienation. We shall now see this also to be 
the case in Marx• analysis of wage labor in capital ism. 
ill· The Cr it igue of Wage Labor. 
A summary of Marx• critique of the condition of the wage laborer is 
66 
found in his Wage Labor and Capital, first presented in Marx in lecture 
form in Burssels in 1847, 67 and re-edited by Engels for publication in 
68 
1891. This essay is both remarkably consistent wlth portions of 
CaoitaJ, 69 and offers in a brief and unified form Marx• economic 
~escription and critique of the question at hand. 
Marx opens this essay by describing the apparent relationship of 
labor power and wages within the capitalist system of production. The 
Wage laborer is defined as one possessed of labor power, that is, the 
~apacity to actively produce for definable periods of time. It is his 
labor power, as so defined, which the wage laborer sells to the capitalist, 
Cf. Marx, "Wage Labor and Capital," 11 lntroduction11 by Engels, in 
~arx-Engels, Selected Works, pp. 64-94; MEW, vol.6, pp.397-423, 593-599. 
67 
Cf. Engels' "Introduction" to "Wage Labor and Capita_J, 11 Joe. cit., 
p. 64; MEW, voJ.6, p. 593. 
68 
Cf. Ibid., p. 71; MEW, vol. 6, p. 599. 
69 
Cf. especially Capital, vol. 1, pp. 167-176, "The Buying and Selling 
of Labor Power;" MEW, vol. 23, pp. 181-191. 
-431-
the owner(s) of the means of production, in the marketplace. 70 Through 
the selling of labor power, the wage laborer receives definite 
compensation. 
Thus the initial condition of the wage laborer is determined in 
that, " ••• what they sell to the capitalist is their labor power. The 
capitalist buys this labour power for a day, a week, a month, etc. And 
after he has bought it, he uses it by having the workers work for a 
stipulated period of time. 1171 Two features of this statement may be noted. 
~irst, inasmuch as the wage laborer sells or exchanges his labor power in 
the market place, he relates to his own labor as to a commodity, 72 that 
i •t h bl f h . f . 1 1 73 s, an 1 em exc angea e or some ot er item o equiva ent va ue. And 
wages are simply that compensation which the wage laborer realizes in the 
sale or exchange of his labor power. "The exchange value of a commodity, 
reckoned in money, is what is called price. Wages are only a special name 
70cf. Engels' "Introduction" to "Wage Labor and Capital," loc. cit., p. 
68; MEW, vol. 6, p. 597. Engels shows that it must be 'labor power' ratherj, 
than actual labor which the wage laborer exchanges for compensation. "Wha~j 
the economists had regarded as the cost of production of 'labour' was the j' 
cost of production not of labour but of the living worker himself. • •• At 
the most, he might sell his future labour, that is, undertake to perform 
a certain amount of work in a definite time. In so doing, however, he doe 
not sell labour (which would first have to be performed) but puts his labo1' 
power at the disposal of the capitalist for a definite time (in the case 
of time-work) or for the purpose of a definite output (in the case of piec 
work) in return for a definite payment; he hires out, or sells, his labour 
power." Cf. also Capital, vol. 1, (Moore and Aveling), p. 539; MEW, vol. 
23, p. 559. 
71cf. Marx, "Wage Labor and Capital," loc. cit., p. 73; MEW, vol. 6, 
P• 399. 
72cf. Ibid. 
73cf. Capital, Moore and Aveling, vol. 1, p. 55; MEW, vol. 23, p. 70 
r 
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for the price of labor power, commonly called the price of labour, for the 
price of this peculiar commodity which has no other repository than human 
flesh and blood. 1174 The wage laborer, then, is one who exchanges his labot 
power as a commodity, in return for wages, the price of this commodity. 
The question which Marx raises at this point is, how are wages, the 
price of labor power, determined in definite forms? But this question 
cannot be handled by itself; a more fundamental question must be raised. 
Since labor power functions as a commodity, its price and value must be 
determined in relation to th.e price and value of commodities in general. 
Therefore, in order to comprehend definite wages in relation to labor 
power one must treat the question, how is price and value in relation to 
commodities in general determined? 
The characteristic feature of a commodity is that, " ••• it is 
directly exchangeable with other commodities. 1175 This means that 
commodities, in spite of their disparate characteristics as utility items, 
involve severally a relationship to some common denominator in terms of 
76 
which their exchangeability may be measured. And that to which 
commodities commonly relate is the generalized labor of which they are 
products. Commodities are, " ••• the products of social activity, the resul 
of expended energy, materialized labour. As objectifications of social 
77 labour, all commodities are crystalizations of the same substance." 
74Marx, "Wage Labor and Capital~' loc. cit., P• 74; MEW, vol. 6' P• 399. 
75Marx, Capital, Moore and Aveling, vol. 1, P· 55; MEW, vol. 23, P• 70. 
Ip. 76cf. Marx, Capital, Moore and Aveling, vol. 1, p. 57; MEW, vol. 23, 11. 
77Marx, Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, ed. Dobb, 
~ p. 29; NEW, voo. 13, p. 16-17. 
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One speaks of general or "abstract1178 labor here because, as commodities, 
products have in common not that they are the detailed results of concrete 
instances of relevantly similar productive activities, but that they are 
generally the results of definite amounts of expended labor time; " ••• as 
exchange values they represent the same homogeneous labour, i.e., labour 
in which the individual characteristics of the workers are obliterated. 
Labour which creates exchange value is thus abstract general labour. 1179 
The value of a commodity, then, is constituted and determined in virtue of 
its embodying expended labor power. In Capital, Marx notes that the 
definite values of commodities are constituted in virtue of the commodities 
80 
embodying definite amounts of labor power, and that the values of 
commodities vis a vis others are determined by the respective amounts of 
"socially necessary" labor time they respectively embody, that is, the 
time, " ••• required to produce an item under normal conditions of 
production, and with the average degree of skill and intensity prevalent 
at the time. 1181 
In Wage Labor and Capital, Marx relates the above comments to the 
question of the price of the commodity, through noting that the basic pricE 
78cf. Marx, Political Econo~, ed. Dobb, p. 29; MEW, vol. 13, p. 17. 
79Marx, Political Economy, ed. Dobb, p. 29, MEW, vol. 13, p. 17. Cf. 
also Capital, Moore and Aveling, vol. 1, p. 45; MEW, vol. 23, p. 60. 
80cf. Capital, Moore and Aveling, vol. 1, pp. 38-39; MEW, vol. 23, P• 5' • 
8lrbid. Also, "Commodities, therefore, in which equal quantities of 
labour-are embodied, or which can be produced in the same time, have the 
same value." 
r 
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of a commodity is equivalent to the cost ef its production. 82 Cost of 
oroduction is the sum of the costs of materials and instruments, plus 
~xpended labor power, 83 which the capitalist must realize through price in 
the:-exchange of his commodity, in order to realize the value of that 
commodity. 84 The basic price of a commodity, then, abstracting from the 
~luctuations of profit and loss attributable to variations or competition85 
and supply and demand86 in the economic market, is equivalent to that 
amount of labor power expended in the production of the item both directly, 
in terms of direct expenditure of labor time, and indirectly, in terms of 
the labor time expended in the creation of those materials and instruments 
necessary for productive activity. This price is also equivalent to the 
t f h d . f h i d b h . l" 87 cos o t e pro uction o t e tern accrue y t e capita ist. 
On the terms of the above, labor power, that which is exchanged by 
the wage laborer for compensation, must have a price and a value. However 
an anomoly is apparent here, in that labor power must both have a value, 
if it can be exchanged by the wage laborer as a commodity, and also be the 
82cf. Marx, "Wage Labor and Capital," loc. cit., PP• 77-79; MEW, vol. 
6, pp. 403-405. 
83cf. "Wage Labor and Capital," loc. cit., P• 79; MEW, vol. 6, p. 405. 
84cf. "Wage Labor and Capital," loc. cit., P• 77-78; MEW, vol. 6, pp. 
403-404. 
ascf. "Wage Labor and Capital," loc. cit., p. 76; MEW, vol. 6, P• 402. 
86cf. "Wage Labor and Capital," loc. cit., p. 77; MEW, vol.. 6, p. 403. 
87cf. "Wage Labor and Capital," loc. cit., P• 79; MEW, vol. 6, P• 405. 
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source of the values of all other commodities, 88 as that which all products 
as commodities share in common. How then can the definite value and 
price of labor power be determined? Marx' way of answering this question 
is to re-phrase it, to ask, "What, then, is the cost of production of 
labor power11 ?89 Since there is a relation of equivalence between the 
value, price, and cost of a commodity, then the price and value of labor 
power as a commodity may be determinable if the cost of its production is 
determinable. And this latter feature of labor power is, Marx argues, 
determinable as, " ••• the cost required for maintaining the worker as a 
worker, and develooing him into a worker ••• The price of his labor will, 
therefore, be determined by the price of the necessary means of 
subsistence. 1190 The value, and therefore the basic price of any 
commodity, is equivalent to its cost of production. But the cost of the 
production of labor power is that necessary for the worker's subsistence. 
Thus the price of labor power is that compensation which the worker must 
receive in order to maintain his subsistence. And in that the cost in 
question here is socially determinable in a definite form, then the value 
and basic price of labor power is also definitely determinable in society. 
These assertions are subject to two qualifications. In referring to 
the cost of_ the production of labor power as that cost necessary for the 
subsistence of the worker, Marx does not mean here to refer to the minimal 
88cf. Capital, Moore and Aveling, vol. 1, P• 537; MEW, vol. 23, p. 557 
Marx notes the anamoly referred to at this point. 
8911Wage Labor and Capital'! loc. cit., p. 79; MEW, vol. 6, p. 406 
90"Wage Labor and Capital~' loc. cit., p. 80; MEW, vol. 6, p. 406. 
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subsistence of the individual worker. For one thing, that which is 
necessary for the maintenance of the capitalist mode of production is not 
simply the individual worker, but rather the consistent supply of labor 
power. Thus the cost of the production of labor power is not equivalent 
to that necessary for the subsistence of the individual worker, but 
rather that necess&ry for the maintenance of that class of persons who 
exchange their labor power for wages. The " ••• wage minimum, like the 
determination of the price of connnodities by the cost of production in 
general, does not hold good for the single individual, but for the 
species. 1191 Thus the individual worker must, for example, receive in 
compensation wages adequate for his own subsistence and that of his 
family. And second, Marx means to refer here not to bare subsistence, but 
to socially tolerable subsistence, that is to a level of subsistence 
minimally adequate to the aspirations and needs acquired by the working 
class from the concrete social environment in which that class is located.< 2 
It is not, then, necessary for Marx to argue that a characteristic of that 
class which exchanges its labor power for wages is impoverishment. 
But given these qualifications, Marx feels it legitimate to hold 
that the situation of the wage laborer in capitalist society is 
characterized by his exchanging his labor power for wages equivalent to 
the cost of his 'production, that is equivalent to the socially tolerable 
9lnwage Labor and Capital," loc. cit., p. 80; MEW, vol. 6, pp. 406-407. 
92c£. "Wage Labor and Capital," loc. cit., pp. 84-85; MEW, vol. 6, p. 
412. 
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or adequate subsistence of the class of wage laborers in society, and for 
Marx this is to further explain and defend the assertion that the wage 
laborer relates to his own labor power as a commodity, that is as an item 
bearing a definite exchange value in the social economic market. 
It is of this situation of the wage laborer that Marx wishes to offe1 
a critique. And this critique is expressed by Marx in two ways, the first 
of which depends upon the second, and the second of which, I shall propose 1 
is dependent upon the .content of Marx' theory of man. 
Marx first asserts that, "within the relation of capital and wage 
labor, the interests of capital and the interests of wage labor are 
diametrically opposed. 1193 For this statement itself Marx offers two 
justifications: a) the relation of rise in wages to rise in profits is 
necessarily an inverse relation, because profit is measured by that price 
received for a commodity in excess of the cost paid out by the capitalist 
94 for the labor power expended in the commodity's production; b) it is the 
necessary interest of the capitalist to maintain a class of wage laborers, 
for it is only in virtue of a class of persons who exchange their labor 
. 95 
power for wages that the production of commodities may be maintained. 
But the first of these reasons is not sufficient to support Marx' 
assertion that the interests of the capitalist and working classes are 
necessarily antagonistic or "diametrically opposed." Given that wages 
9311Wage Labor and Capital" loc. cit., P• 88; MEW, vol. 6, P• 415. 
94cf. "Wage Labor and Capit;al" loc. cit., PP• 86-87; MEW, vol. 6, pp. 
413-414. 
95cf. "Wage Labor and Capital,." loc. cit., P• 83; ~' vol. 6, p. 410. 
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ay maintain.the working class at a socially tolerable, or perhaps even 
acceptable, level of subsistence, then the 'interest' of this class need 
ot necessarily be antagonistic to that of the capitalist class; it may 
simply differ from the interests of this latter class. Thus in order to 
suppo~t his assertion that the interests of the capitalist and working 
classes are necessarily antagonistic, Marx if forced to fall back on the 
second of the two reasons noted above. But how would the interest of the 
capitalist class in maintaining the existence of the 'working class' 
indicate a necessary conflict of interests or antagonism between these 
two classes? This could be the case only if it were necessarily in the 
interest of the 'working class' not to be maintained as such, that is not 
to maintain itself as a class of persons which exchanges its labor power 
for wages. 
It is this last expression which leads to the second of Marx' 
expressions of his critique of the condition of the wage laborer in 
capitalist society. The interests of wage labor and capital can, in Marx' 
view, be considered necessarily antagonistic only if it is necessarily 
against the interest of wage labor to relate to its own labor power as a 
commodity, i.e., to exchange this labor power for wages. But this is to 
say that there must be some inherent and demonstrable problematic feature 
or features to the situation of relating to one's own labor power as a 
commodity. How might Marx show this to be the case? 
Early in the text of Wage Labor and Capital, Marx asserts that, 
" ••• the exercise of labour power, labour, is the worker's own life 
activity, the manifestation of his own life. .And this life activity he 
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$ells to another person in order to secure the necessary means of 
$ubsistence. Thus his life activity is for him only a means to enable him 
to exist. He works in order to live. He does not even reckon labour as 
~ part of his life, it is rather a sacrifice of his life. It is a 
couunodity whdch he has made over to another. Hence also, the product of 
nis activity is not the object of his activity. 1196 This statement contains 
I suggest, two arguments whose conclusion is that the situation of the 
~age laborer in relating to his own labor power as a couunodity is 
inherently problematic. Both of these arguments depend on the content of 
Marx' theory of man, and both, perhaps unsurprisingly, bear similarities 
to Marx1 analysis of alienation. 
First, insofar as the wage laborer exchanges his labor pwoer for 
wages, he then expends that labor power in a fashion indifferent as to 
what the results of his activity might be. To paraphrase an example 
offered by Marx,97 the individual's activity might produce one quarter of 
corn or two ounces of gold, and yet receive the same item in exchange for 
his expended labor power, wages in a definite amount. But this means that 
the direct relation of the individual to his activity is not a relation to 
the determinate result of his activity, but to the compensation received 
in the exchange. And on the basis of Marx' theory of man, this situation 
is problematic on two counts. 
The individual first is here unable to experience the result of his 
96cf. "Wage Labor and Capit.al," loc. cit., p. 75; MEW, vol. 6, p. 400. 
97cf. Capital, Moore and Aveli~g, vol. 1, pp. 62-63; MEW, vol. 23, pp. 
rn-1s. 
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acti vi ty as the genuine embodiment of the details of his activity, because 
the purpose of his action is not the production of some definite product, 
out the realization of wages. It is wages, not the product, which, as it 
were, crystalize the activity of the individual. This is the meaning of 
!Marx' assertion that, for the wage laborer, " ••• the product of his activit~ 
is not the object of his activity. 1198 For the wage laborer the product 
does not objectify his activity because, for him, his activity directly 
realizes not the product itself but wages. 99 
Second, the activity of the wage laborer is not a direct but rather 
a problematically indirect means towards the satisfaction of needs. The 
details of the laborer's activity do not correspond to a definite need of 
~is own: His labor power is expended for the purpose of realizing wages, 
~hich then may be utilized for the handling and satisfying of needs. Thus 
~rx asserts that the wage laborer's " ••• life activity is for him only a 
means to enable him to exist."lOO 
The wage laborer, then, does not experience his product as the 
objectification of his own activity, and does not experience his activity 
and its result as relevant to his own needs, that is, as 'his own'. This 
situation, given Marx' theory of man, is problematic and deleterious to 
the individual. And the reason for this is the same as that cited above 
in the discussion of Marx' concept of alienation. Given this situation, 
the structure of praxis is violated, and the individual is unable to be an 
98cf. "Wage Labor and. Ca_pital," loc. cit., p. 75; MEW, vol. 6, p. 400. 
99cf. Capital, Moore and Aveling, vol. 3, pp. 821-823; MEW, vol. 25, 
pp. 828-829. 
lOO"Wage Labor and Capital," loc. cit., p. 75; MEW, vol. 6, p. 400. 
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agent in an adequate sense of that term, one who experiences his product 
as the concrete objectification of his own activity, and as appropriable 
in some sense relevant to needs of his own. Marx here utilizes concepts 
~ound in his theory of man concerning the product as involving 
pbjectification and appropriability to evaluate the condition of the wage 
laborer in capitalist society. 
Furthermore, that activity from which commodity value results is 
' ••• abstract, general labor ••• , 101 that is, a measurable quantity of labor 
related to a labor in general. The wage laborer, in exchanging his labor 
oower for wages, then, exchanges his capacity to expend labor power in 
general, in whatever way in which_the corresponding member of the exchange 
111ay see fit. That is, the wage laborer exchanges here his capacity to 
produce commodities, and thus his labor power is for him " ••• abstract, 
:?eneral labour ••• " He exchanges, within the limits of his talents, 
abilities, and skills, his capacity simply to produce whatever commodities 
might be at the moment required. Marx expresses this by saying that, "He 
~oes not even reckon labor as part of his life ••• 11102 
The meaning of this can. now be shown. In that the wage laborer 
exchanges essentially his capacity simply to produce the commodities 
~equired at the moment, whose character is their value based on labor which 
ls 'abstract', the individual's relation to his own activity is an 'abstrac ' 
relation. He relates to his own activity here as the general means whereby 
lOl~farx, Political Economy, ed. Dobb, p. 29; ~' vol. 13, p. 17. 
l02"Wage Labor and Capital," loc. cit., p. 75; MEW, vol. 6, p. 400. 
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possibility of self actualization in virtue of his own activity is 
vitiated for the wage laborer. 
The text cited above from Marx in part may now be cited fully. "He 
does not even reckon labor as a part of his li.fe, it is rather a sacrifice 
of his life. 11103 Since the wage laborer does not relate directly but only 
abstractly to the details of his own activity, he fails to achieve self 
actualization through that activity. This is a " ••• sacrifice of his life,' 
because, as seen in Marx' theory of man, the possibility of self 
actualization is one integral to the human subject of praxis. The situatic :i 
which vitiates this possibility, then, violates the nature of man as an 
agent. Thus again Marx evaluates negatively the situation of the wage 
laborer, and again this evaluation is based on and justified by the 
content of Marx' theory of man. 
We have seen then, that Marx' theory of man is given a noarmative 
employment within his larger theoretical framework. It enables Marx to 
comprehend and evaluate the phenomenon of alienation, the condition of 
the wage laborer in capitalist society, and furnishes him with principles 
through which he comprehends the possibility of as well as the structure 
in general of human history. I take this to indicate not simply that ther1 
occurs a theory of man within the texts of Marx, but also that that theory 
plays an integral role in his overall thought. If the brief analysis of 
Marx' normative employment of his theory of man is correct, then it must 
be held that that theory enjoys an integral and basic location within the 
larger theoretical doctrine wqich Marx' texts ex.hibit. 
l03Ibid. 
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A sumniation of the argument of my theses may now be presented. I 
offer this under the following five brief headings. 
First, I have argued that a theory of man is validly discoverable 
in the early texts of Marx. The contra! text in which this theory is 
found is the "Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844." My method of 
determining the content of this theory has been textual analysis. From 
the Paris Manuscripts and allied texts, I isolated the main assertions 
comprising Marx' theory of man. The arguments which Harx takes to 
justify and elucidate those propositions were exposed. When an argument 
for a proposition contained in Marx' theory of man was implicit in the 
text rather than explicit, my test for its utilization was a twofold one. 
I have, in my exposition of Marx' theory of man, utilized only those 
implicit arguments germane to that theory which are consistent with other 
propositions in that theory and consistent with explicit arguments 
offered by Marx in support of those other propositions. 
The content of Marx' theory of man involves sets of propositions 
concerning productive activity or praxis, social relationships, and 
consciousness. Marx argues that man's fundamental relationships to nature 
and to himself must be understood as productive relationships or 
relationships of praxis. The individual himself must be understood 
fundamentally as a subject of praxis, a productive agent. Praxis itself 
involves the transforniation of nature, objectification, and appropriation. 
The human agent is, for Marx, ·one who acts in virtue of both subsistence 
and human needs, and whose activity is 'universal' rather than 'species 
specific'. On this basis, Marx argues that the human agent is one who 
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experiences self actualization through praxis. 
Moreover, praxis both renders possible and is conditioned concretely 
by the individual's social relationships. Productive activity is in 
principle social, and as such enables the individual to experience 
'totalization' and to be determined as an object through the activities 
of others as well as through his own activity as a subject of praxis. 
Marx argues that consciousness is a feature of and an essential feature 
of praxis. Consciousness is a feature of praxis in that it is a relation 
of the individual to his environment and to himself founded on the more 
fundamental productive relationship. But it is also an essential feature 
thereof, because only given this can another essential feature of the 
structure of praxis be legitimately explained, namely, the development of 
human -needs. The individual subject of praxis must then be described as 
a conscious agent. 
Second, Marx' theory of man can not be validly described as 
'Feuerbachian' in its content. Marx in the Paris Manuscripts does credit 
Feuerbach with making certain legitimate objections against Hegel. But 
Marx, within the context of his theory of man, objects to the content of 
Feuerbach's anthropology with respect to the relation of praxis to nature 
as its object, the nature of consciousness, including sense consciousness, 
in relation to its object, and man as one who enjoys concrete social 
relationships. For Marx, Feuerbach's view of nature does not allow him to 
give an adequate account of nature as the object of praxis. Correlative 
to this, Feuerbach is unable to describe the object of consciousness as 
one which receives its fundamental determinations from praxis. Thus he 
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is unable to describe consciousness as an essential feature of praxis. 
Consequently, he is only able to describe the individual as a conscious 
subject, not as a conscious agent. Marx also argues that Feuerbach is able 
to describe social relationships only abstractly. Feuerbach asserts that 
man is essentially communal, but he is unable to describe social relations 
as actual or concrete relationships between agents, and he is also unable 
to account for the social character of human needs. 
The content of Marx' theory of man cannot therefore be described as 
'Feuerbachian'. Althusser's position with regard to the interpretation of 
Marx' theory of man will not stand. Althusser suggests, a) that the theory 
of man discoverable in the early texts of Marx is contentually a repetitioTI 
of Feuerbachian 'humanism', and b) that this theory must be judged as 
irrelevant to those mature texts in which Marx develops communism as a 
science, for in those texts Marx rejects Feuerbach's anthropology and 
classifies it as ideology. I have attempted to refute the first of these 
two suggestions, showing that Marx' theory of man as revealed in his early 
texts is no repetition of, but rather involves at its basis critical 
objections to, the anthropology with which Marx was familiar from the texte 
of Feuerbach. Although I have not dealt directly with the second of 
Althusser's suggestions; I feel that my manner of dealing with the first 
calls the second strongly into question. 
Third, I have argued that, on the question of the relation of Marx' 
theory of man to Marx' predecessors, that relation which is critical for 
the formation of, and for contemporary comprehension of the theory of man, 
is Marx' relationship to Hegel. This is the case for two reasons. First, j 
i 
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there are strong analogies between Marx' concept of praxis and arguments 
concerning agency in Hegel's texts, and analogies as well between Marx 
and Hegel on the question of the individual as necessarily social, or as 
one whose experience essentially involves social relationships. Thus 
Marx' doctrine of praxis can be at its main points comprehended as a 
restatement of those arguments employed in Hegel's texts concerning the 
individual as an agent. 
But second, Marx finds the chief justification of his claim that 
praxis as the fundamental category through which human experience is to be 
described, and upon which a valid theory of man must be based, in an 
argument which he constructs against his understanding of Hegel's position 
on the relationship of consciousness to its object. This is significant 
for two reasons. First, this argument does not involve Marx' rejecting 
the Hegelian concepts through which agency is described. Rather, it 
involves his insistence that those concepts be maintained as descriptive 
of agency or praxis, but also that praxis itself be located differently 
in a theory of man than Hegel's position allows. Second, it is this-
argument which provides Marx with justification for holding that man is 
essentially an agent, a subject of praxis, and that, within a theory of 
llllan, praxis must be taken as the fundamental category. And this is 
critical to Marx' overall position. Marx must be able to hold this in 
order to hold that man's fundamental relationships to himself and to nature 
are productive, that it is in virtue of his being an agent that he 
achieves self actualization, that it is in virtue of his being an agent 
that man both enjoys social relationships and is essentially social, and 
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that consciousness, while an essential and necessary feature of the 
structure of productive activity, is yet a feature thereof. These features 
of Marx' theory of man are essential to it, and Marx can only hold them if 
he can also hold the position that man is fundamentally a productive agent. 
But Marx finds justification for holding that position through the 
argument, exhibited in chapter four, which he directs against Hegel. 
Thus the content and structure of Marx' theory of man, both 
positively and negatively, can best be understood in terms of his 
relationship to Hegel. On the one hand, those concepts employed by Marx 
to describe productive agency are discoverable in Hegel. Indeed, for the 
most part, the concepts utilized by Marx to describe social relationships 
are also exhibited in Hegel's texts. On the other hand, Marx develops a 
central and crucial argument in his theory of man, through the 
construction of an argument directed against Hegel. 
Fourth, I have tried to show in this chapter how Marx' theory of man 
is integrally located within his larger theoretical framework. It is 
this theory of man which allows Marx to comprehend the human historical 
process because it is, on the one hand, through his doctrine of praxis 
that Marx is able to describe man as historical, and on the other hand, 
through his doctrine of the relation of praxis and society that Marx can 
go on to describe society as the subject of the historical process, and 
justify that description. Furthermore, Marx employs principles taken from 
his theory of man to comprehend and evaluate historical phenomena such as 
alienation, and the condition of the wage laborer in capitalist society. 
':rhe theory of man, then, is not simply found in Marx' texts; it plays an 
===tt::::====================================================;ft====-= 
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integral and essential role in Marx' total theoretical schema. 
Finally, it might be suggested here that Marx' theory of man is not 
for him 'ideological', as Althusser claims it to be. The theory of man 
as outlined above is not, for Marx, the expression of the experience of a 
given society, or a given class within society. It is rather for Marx a 
theory which exposes the possibility and the structure of human historical 
development, and which allows us to com~rehend given historical experiencei 
accurately. As such, Marx' theory of man does not fall prey to his own 
condemnations of humanisms as ideologies, seen for instance in his 
condemnations of the Young Hegelians as ideologists in the German 
Ideology, but is rather able to play a role both integral to and 
consistent with Marx' mature aims. 
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